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A Note on Transcription 
In transcribing Arabic and Kurdish proper names of people, institutions, and of 
geographical features, commonly accepted forms of English are used, especially for 
place names. For personal names, I have tried to strike a balance between forms 
familiar to the Western reader and accuracy. Commonly used Western renderings of 
names of certain well-known individuals have been retained throughout the thesis. 
Chalabi and Barzani are therefore preferred to the literal transcription of these Iraqi 
names, which never appear in Arabic unless preceded by the ubiquitous definite 
article 'AP. Names of individuals appearing only in third-party sources have either 
been transliterated (if from an Arabic source) or kept as they appear in the source 
material (if from a Western source). 
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Introduction 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 represents a watershed in the history of 
modem Iraq, and certainly a turning point in the relationship between President 
Saddam's regime and its internal and external enemies. The instant rejection of 
Saddam's move on Kuwait, expressed by the international community and most of 
the Arab world provided a strong incentive to different groups and individuals 
opposed to the regime, inside and outside Iraq. Dozens of opposition groups, which 
had not been heard of before the invasion, increased in number as if by proliferation. 
The intensely anti-Saddam environment prompted them to be active and seize what 
was perceived as a "golden opportunity" to exploit Saddam's miscalculation and end 
his rule. For most opposition groups, if not all, were under the impression that this 
could be achieved through stepping up pressure by way of reactivating old opposition 
groups and forming new ones. 
The task of removing Saddam Hussein from power, however, proved quite difficult. 
For the regime of Saddam Hussein, which is totally obsessed with security, proved 
more aggressive, more disciplined and structured than the opposition had thought. 
Besides the regime's stubborn resilience, there were other reasons for the failure of 
the opposition to effect political change in Iraq. The inherited mistrust and conflict 
between various political parties and currents, the ethnic and sectarian divide as well 
as the involvement of regional and international powers in the affairs of the 
opposition movement, were among the major factors which led to the failure of the 
opposition to topple the regime of Saddam Hussein. This thesis will focus primarily 
on the "new" opposition groups which mushroomed after the second Gulf War and 
whose declared common aim is to topple the regime of President Saddam Hussein. 
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The present investigation attempts to examine the activities of Iraqi opposition in the 
period following the invasion of Kuwait. It also seeks to analyse the reasons for the 
opposition's failure to achieve its main objective: toppling the regime of Saddam 
Hussein. The basic question to which the thesis attempts to find an answer is why did 
the Iraqi opposition groups fail in its mission despite regional and international 
support? 
Explanatory Frameworks 
In order to assess the performance of the post-Gulf War Iraqi opposition, a brief look 
at the nature of Iraqi society will be provided. Some emphasis will be placed on the 
historical context and the condition of the society in which Iraqi political opposition 
developed. Among the major points to be investigated is the religious, ethnic and 
sectarian diversity of the Iraqi society, especially the Sunni-Shi'a rivalry, which had a 
noticeable impact on the performance of the opposition movement. The Sunni-Shia 
fault-line, on the one hand and the Arab-Kurdish conflict on the other, which 
consistently plagued the Iraqi state since its creation, have never faded or indeed 
diminished despite the immense resources which successive regimes spent on 
education and the overall improvement in the standard of living of ordinary Iraqis, 
Although Iraq was one of the first Arab states to be admitted to the League of 
Nations, following its full independence in 1932, no democratic tradition ever 
evolved to match the many advances achieved in the economic, cultural and scientific 
fields. The absence of democratic traditions has had an immense impact on the 
opposition which was always considered suspect and severely punished. Besides the 
traditional police and other security apparatus, Saddam Hussein's Mukhabarat 
(Intelligence) Department thought nothing of physically eliminating its real and 
imagined enemies.. Alongside the brutality of these oppressive tools, Saddam 
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Hussein's regime occasionally enticed opposition figures and dissidents to abandon 
their hostile stance and endorse its legitimacy, through declarations of general 
amnesty or bribes. In so doing, Saddam Hussein's regime succeeded in thwarting 
numerous attempts by the opposition to establish political, military or even terrorist 
bases inside Iraq. 
There other important factors which influenced the opposition's strife to achieve its 
declared objective of toppling the regime of Saddam Hussein. These include the 
absence of a charismatic figure, capable of rallying the opposition groups behind him. 
Intervention on the part of regional and international powers in the affairs of the 
opposition movement exacted a heavy political toll, exposing many groups to . 
accusations of submission and betrayal of the cause. It will also be seen that what 
further confounded the state of affairs of the Iraqi opposition was its inherited 
suspicion with which each group viewed the other. 
Background to the Opposition 
Contrary to what many believe, opposition to the Ba'thist rule in Iraq is not a new 
phenomenon, which suddenly emerged following Saddam Hussein's invasion of the 
neighbouring state of Kuwait on 2"d August 1990. The undeniable fact is that over a 
period lasting some three decades (1968-1990), a number of factors, related mainly to 
the policies adopted by the regime, had an immense impact on the nature and *shape of 
post-Gulf War political opposition. Soon after their alleged "White Revolution" of 
July 1968 succeeded in toppling the Aref regime, the Ba'thists, for opportunistic 
purposes, projected themselves not as monopolisers of power but as political partners, 
leading the struggle against Zionism and world imperialism. In so doing, they were 
not only playing a cautious game against their political rivals, whom they did not 
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want to alienate, but were also trying to buy time, widen their popular base and 
whitewash their image which had been widely tarnished by the excesses which 
inaugurated and followed their February 1963 coup. Within a few years, Al-Hizb Al- 
Qa'id (the leading party) succeeded in entrenching itself as the sole party. The 
transition from "one-party rule" to one of the "sole leader" was soon to follow. 
In order to neutralize its rivals and establish full and absolute hegemony, the regime 
employed the most violent means to eradicate any opposition to its policies and 
programmes. Physical elimination was often resorted to in order to silence critics and 
potential dissidents. Besides the traditional police and other security apparatus, the 
newly created Mukhabarat (Intelligence) Department carried out the task of rooting 
out real and imagined enemies. The word Mukhabarat, which had never been part of 
Iraqi political lexicon, soon came to be a household name in Iraqi society. Alongside 
the gruesome activities of these oppressive tools, the regime occasionally enticed 
opposition figures and dissidents to abandon their hostile stance and endorse its 
legitimacy. While these violent methods succeeded in uprooting practically all forms 
of active opposition, they nevertheless instilled in the Iraqi- conscience deep 
resentment against the central government and bred widespread tacit opposition. The 
failed economic policies of the regime and the immense suffering caused by the 
widely unpopular eight-year war against Iran, which sent hundreds of thousands of 
Iraqi youth to what came to be known as Saddam's killing fields, turned most Iraqis 
into potential opponents, not only among the Shi'as and Kurds, but also among large 
segments of the Sunnis, the supposed backers of, and sympathisers with the regime, 
whose loyalty was by tradition taken for granted. 
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Generally speaking, Iraqi opposition attracted little interest, both on the part of the 
wider public in the Arab world and in the West. The same can be said to be true 
among academics, Middle East scholars and students of Iraqi political fortunes. There 
are of course a number of serious works on the subject. Most of them however are 
devoted to the study of opposition before the invasion of Kuwait. 1 More recently, 
however, Efraim Karsh, Amatzia Baram, Peter Sluglett and Marion Farouk Sluglett, 
Charles Tripp and Thomas Koszinowski, among others, took up Iraqi issues and 
touched upon some aspects of Iraqi opposition. 2 The focus in most of these works 
was Iraqi opposition activities prior to the 1990 invasion of Kuwait. With the 
exception of the Kurdish question3, which has attracted some attention, no full-length 
study of post-Gulf War Iraqi, opposition has appeared. This might perhaps be 
attributable to the commonly held belief that except for Kurdish armed rebellion, all 
other opposition groups are so ineffective that they constitute no real threat to the 
regime and that their activities did not therefore warrant serious study. 
Before 1990, the long arm of Saddam Hussein's security service, and the brutality of 
his regime in dealing with its political opponents, had succeeded in eliminating 
1 These include Hana Batatu's The Old Social Classes and the RevolutionaryMovements oflraq which 
was first published in 1978 and The Republic of Fear: Saddam's Iraq by Samir Al-Khalil [Kanan 
Makiya] which appeared in 1989, Phebe Marr, History ofModern Iraq (1984) and Majid Khadouri's 
Iraq series. 
Z Among other works detailed in the Bibliography, these include: 
Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
Lawrence Freedman & Efraim Karsh The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New 
World Order (London: Faber and Faber, 1993). 
Barry Rubin and Amatzia Barara, Iraq's Road To War (London: Macmillan, 1993). 
Amatzia Barara, Building Towards Crisis: Saddam Hussein's Strategy for Survival (Washington: 
Washington Institute for Near east Policy, 1998). 
Derek Hopwood, Habib Ishow and Thomas Koszinowski (eds), Iraq: Power and Society (Reading: 
Ithaca Press, 1993). 
3 Michael Gunter's two books: The Kurdish Predicament in Iraq: A Political analysis (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1999) and The Kurds of Iraq: Tragedy and Hope (London: Macmillan Press, 1997) are 
examples of this interest in Kurdish affairs. 
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almost entirely any form of effective or active opposition inside the country and even 
outside it. 4 But the situation has changed since the second Gulf War, the aftermath of 
which generated widespread opposition not only among the Shi'as, who rose in arms 
immediately after the cease-fire of February 28th 1991, but also in such Ba'thist 
strongholds as the Western and northern Arab regions, among the military officers 
and indeed amidst many Tikritis from Saddam Hussein's home town, including 
prominent members of his own family. 
The Opposition Movement: A Definition 
Throughout this study, the term 'opposition' will refer to any political group or 
collection of groups that disagree with the policies or programmes of the regime of 
Saddam Hussein, oppose his leadership or the Bath Party's control of power. The 
prime objective of these groups are of course either to reform the policies of the 
government and the state political system, or to effect change of the political system - 
to take power and replace the government, whether by peaceful or violent means. 
With the exception of the Kurdish Front, which has always had its own agenda, these 
are the declared objectives of most Iraqi opposition groups, old and new. 
Like other totalitarian regimes in the Middle East and indeed throughout many parts 
of the world, Saddam Hussein's dictatorship and, to a large extent, that of Republican 
and even monarchist Iraq is based on the principle of rejecting democracy as a system 
of government. 5 In this respect, however, the difference between Saddam Hussein and 
4 Andrew Cockburn and Patrick Cockburn, Out of the ashes: The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein 
(New York: Harper Collins, 1999), point out that the Amman based opposition group Al-Wifaq was, 
according to several former CIA officers, "riddled with Iraqi double agents- at least half", p. 226. 
S Nazih N. Ayubi, Overstating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East (London: I. B. 
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his predecessors was one of degree rather than nature. Despite the existence of a 
ruling party, government machinery and a host of institutions with resounding names, 
the regime of Saddam Hussein is built on the fact that these institutions are powerless 
and devoid of any real meaning or life. Decision-making is concentrated solely and 
unquestionably in the hands of Al-Qa'id Al Adhim (The Great Leader). His regime 
may therefore be said to reflect many of the characteristics of Stalin's reign of terror 
(1924-1953). 
Over the last three decades, the Baghdad regime has gone through three distinctive 
stages: 
1.1968-1975: During this period , which may 
be referred to as the "Leading Party" 
stage, the Ba'thists gave a sham appearance of coexistence with some political 
parties and opposition groups. This seemingly cooperative approach was dictated 
by domestic as well as external factors relating to the regime's systematic and 
gradual consolidation of control over all governmental economic and social 
institutions. 
2.1975-1980: This period may be described as the "One-Party Rule" stage during 
which the dictatorship of the Bath Party was firmly established. All political, 
social and cultural activities came under the firm grasp of the Ba'thists. Trade 
unions, professional societies, academic institutions and social clubs were turned 
into Ba'thist fronts. This period also witnessed the total politicalization of the 
security and armed forces which, along with the teaching profession, had 
become closed to non-Ba'thists. 
Tauris, 1995), p. 447. 
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3. From 1980 onwards, Iraq entered into the "Sole Leader" stage, during which the 
Bath Party ceased to function as political instrument involved in the process of 
decision-making. All power bases, within the Bath Party and outside it, were 
liquidated. Collective leadership was ended and the phenomenon of inner power 
struggle was successfully terminated in favour of those who professed blind 
obedience to Saddam Hussein, who was now surrounded by a "docile flock of 
close associates. "6 
In his attempt to remain totally unchallenged, Saddam Hussein subordinated all 
foreign and domestic policies to his own political survival. It is ironic that, just as 
Kuwait's oil resources had indirectly brought about untold sufferings to the Kuwaitis 
during the Iraqi occupation, the vast mineral resources of Iraq can also be said to 
have failed the Iraqis in that they made it possible for Saddam Hussein to turn the 
country into a "rentier state", providing him with immense power to entrench his rule 
and subjugate the people: 
The availability in Iraq of immense revenues generated outside the 
domestic economy substantially lessened the reliance of governments 
on their own population... and released many of the regimes of the 
Middle East from the accountability ordinarily exacted by domestic 
appropriation of surplus.? 
Saddam Hussein's regime embodies practically all the characteristics of the 
authoritarian system of government, especially in his careful attempt to deal with a 
chronic crisis of legitimacy, either by invoking a "carefully crafted, selective and 
6 Efraim Karsh & Inari Rautsi, Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography (London: Brassey's, 1991), 
176. 
Lisa Anderson, "Policy-Making and Theory Building: American Political Science and the Islamic 
Middle East', in Hisham Sharabi, ed., Theory, Politics and the Arab World: Critical Responses (New 
York. Routledge, 1990), p. 70. 
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often inaccurate past", such as the glory that was Babylon, the greatness of, among 
others, Nebuchadnezzar, Hamurabi, Saladin and Sa'ad Bin Abi Waqqas, or by 
offering promises, perhaps wilfully false, of future material gain - an appeal to 
progress and developmentalism - in order to fragment the opposition. 8 Like other 
authoritarian rulers, Saddam Hussein resorts to dictatorship in a conservative way i. e. 
preserving traditional values and traditional social structures. This approach, 
according to Stephen Lee, contrasts with totalitarianism, which normally follow a 
more radical programme of change and deliberately mobilises the masses to serve a 
"revolutionary monopolist movement" permeated by a certain ideology. 9 
But Saddam Hussein's regime may also be said to contain many aspects of 
`totalitarianism' as practised in Stalinist Russia, Nazi Germany and possibly 
Mussolini's Italy in that everything in the state is subordinated to the so-called Ba'th 
ideology and that the Iraqi political system is under the full control of a single leader 
who has established a cult of personality. Another aspect of totalitarianism in Iraq is 
the complete subordination of the individual to the dictates of the state through a dual 
process of coercion and indoctrination. On this point, Lee remarks that while coercion 
could involve a system of terror, whether physical or psychic that is effected through 
party apparatus and secret police control, the indoctrination process seeks the 
destruction of cultural pluralism and the shaping of all human activities like 
education, literature, etc. to the objectives of political ideology. '0 
I Jill Crystal, "Authoritarianism and its Adversaries in the Arab World"' World Politics 46 (January 
1994), p. 264. 
9 Stephen J. Lee, The European Dictatorships 1918-1945 (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 299. 
10 Lee, Dictatorships, p. 300. 
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On the other hand, the regime of Saddam Hussein may also be said to mirror many 
aspects of the European medieval feudal system, where loyalty to the lord was of 
paramount significance. At the heart of Saddam Hussein's regime 
lay the small groups of men attached to the president by 
reason of common regional background, family or tribal 
affiliation or tried and tested dedication to his personal 
service. Beyond them spread the networks of patronage 
and association that gave them weight in Iraqi society 
and established their worth to Saddam Hussein himself, 
whilst reinforcing their dependence on his favour. " 
When building his power base Saddam Hussein, unlike Syrian counterpart, Hafiz 
Assad, "chose to recruit new members at a slow, controlled pace with maximum 
emphasis on loyalty". 12 Thus the "leader" can, like all absolute monarchs, control all 
the affairs of the state from a presidential office through direct patronage, or through 
the services of paramilitary and secret police forces. His regime, according to Paul 
Brooker, carries many of the outdated "absolute" monarchical features which became 
increasingly apparent, particularly in his rapacious megalomania, from the moment he 
officially assumed the presidency in July 1979. 
Saddam Hussein's personality cult seemed to differ from the standard international 
form only in degree or extravagance: 
It involved omnipresent portraits, constant public and television 
appearances, comparison with great historical figures, supposed 
personal piety (culminating in the pilgrimage to Mecca), and 
grandiloquent titles - `Sword of the Arabs', `Knight of the Nation', 
`Leader of the Victory' and the like. However, two unusually 
monarchical aspects were the attempt to identify Saddam with all 
sectors of Iraqi society, and the 1986 decree which made the crime of 
"Charles Tripp, A History oflraq (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 264. 
12 Roger Owen, State Power & Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East (London: Routledge, 
1992), p. 263. 
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insulting the President punishable by life imprisonment or the death 
penalty. The monarchical aspect was also very evident in the new 
heights to which the personality cult was taken in the ' late 1980s. 
There was `a flurry of speculations that Hussein was paving the way 
for the restoration of monarchical rule with himself as king and was 
grooming his eldest son, Udai, as his heir apparent'. A more 
favourable attitude to monarchy was apparent in the official 
rehabilitation of Iraq's Hashemite monarchy of the 1930s to 1958 
(along with continuing glorification of the ancient Mesopotamian 
monarchs), and Saddam was himself adopting a more monarchical 
image. The image of the ascetic and modest socialist had been 
replaced by monarchical pomp and grandeur that culminated in his 
leading a commemorative victory procession riding a white horse and 
dressed in the grab of a Hashemite monarch. In January 1990 he was 
made President for life. 13 
In establishing his rule of fear, Saddam Hussein, like other absolute leaders, 
predicated his personal rule on the Bath Party. His logic was, like that of other 
dictators, quite simple. Since the party possessed the organizational infrastructure and 
ideological basis for controlling people's actions and minds, "it would control the 
masses and the state machinery while he would control the Party". 14 Part of the 
tactics adopted by Saddam Hussein to tighten his total grip on power was his 
employment of economic control as an important tool to impose his political 
hegemony. Since its accession to power in July 1968, the Ba'thist regime embarked 
upon transforming Iraq's mixed economy, where private enterprise played a major 
role, into a socialist economic system, where the state practically monopolised all 
economic activities. In so doing, the state came to fully control all essential activities 
and services, which entrenched even further the hegemony of the Ba'thist state over 
the lives of all Iraqis. However, upon establishing a fine hold on most economic 
activities during the 1970's, the regime used development and industrial projects as 
13 Paul Brooker, Defiant Dictatorships: Communist and Middle Eastern Dictatorships in a Democratic 
Age (New York New York University Press, 1997), pp. 120-21. 
14 Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, p. 176. 
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well as export-import trade licences as a political tool to win over businessmen and 
insure their loyalty, through tying their own interests with that of the regime. 
It is therefore not easy to classify the regime of Saddam Hussein as it, in many 
respects, contains elements of totalitarianism and authoritarianism. But Saddam 
Hussein did have his own role model. Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi point out that 
early in his career, Saddam Hussein read about the dynamics of Nazi Germany which 
he saw as "an example of the successful organisation of an entire society by the 
state... ". 15 Like Germany on the eve of World War II, the political structure of the 
Iraqi state has, notably since 1968, been dominated by the ideologies of the Ba'th 
Party. Furthermore, the whole government machinery has, since July 1979 (when 
Saddam officially assumed the presidency) been subordinated to the exclusive control 
of the sole leader who established a strong base for his personality cult and developed 
it to an extreme extent in order to influence the life of every citizen. 
Despite the dictatorial nature of Saddam Hussein's regime, there are those who 
believe that before the Kuwait crisis, Saddam Hussein and his regime had a power 
base among certain social strata. The numerous development projects implemented 
by the government during the 1970s and the noticeable rise in the standard of living 
played an important role in casting the dictatorial regime in a favourable light. 
Furthermore, to entrench himself strongly in power, Saddam Hussein, perhaps more 
than any other Iraqi ruler before, resorted to the age-old tactic of buying off 
allegiance through "bribing" tribal leaders, military officers and party apparatchiks. 
This privileged access to the state resources came in variety of forms: contracts, 
'5Ibid., p. 89. 
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export-import licenses, industrial projects and distribution of state-owned land. In 
return, Saddam Hussein received active support, as those who enjoyed the regime's 
favour tied their future to that of the regime, as they felt that they would lose 
everything if the regime were to be overthrown. 16 
Post-1990 Opposition 
In discussing Iraqi opposition to Saddam Hussein's dictatorial regime, the study will 
focus on the period 1990-1996, which represents a distinct `phase' in the 
development of the Iraqi opposition movement and falls between two major events: 
the invasion of Kuwait (2°d August, 1990) and the advance of central government 
forces on the city of Arbil, the administrative centre of Iraqi Kurdistan (31" August 
1996) which led to ejection of the opposition groups based there. 
The term 'new opposition' refers to the numerous Arab opposition groups which 
sprang up in the aftermath of the second Gulf War. These groups have been fervently 
calling for, and working towards, the downfall of Saddam Hussein's regime, which 
considers them traitorous and illegal and with which he refuses to engage in any form 
of contact. As opposition to President Saddam Hussein's regime was in existence 
long before the invasion of Kuwait, the term `new' Iraqi opposition will also be used 
refer to the anti-regime activities of various groups which had been in existence 
before the invasion but which adopted new strategies and revived or reactivated their 
tactics and operations after the invasion. 
1b'Tripp, History oflraq, pp. 264-5. 
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Pre-1990 Iraq 
The historical development of the modern state of Iraq may be divided into four 
major and distinct phases. The first, which falls between 1921-1958, is the period 
when Iraq emerged as an independent state under the rule of the Hashimite family 
until the end of the monarchist regime at the hands of Free Officers Organisation in 
July 1958. The second phase, 1958-1963, is the period of the first republic under the 
leadership of General Abdul Karim Qassim. The third phase, 1963-1968, represents 
the period of coups and counter coups under the rule of the two Aref brothers. The 
fourth and last is the phase that has begun with the Ba'th party's return to power in 
1968 and continues to the present day. 
During these four phases of its development, the country lived under fundamentally 
different political and economic conditions. Thus different and changeable conditions 
naturally, produced different types of opposition movements and, in turn, different 
government strategies to counter opposition activities. But at the root of Iraq's 
political problems lie the two great divides: the first between the Shi'as and Sunnis, 
the second between Arabs and Kurds. During the royal regime, the idea of Arab 
nationalism qawmiya was often exploited to unite the Arab population (Sunnis and 
Shi'as) and the idea of wataniya (Iraqi nationalism - pertaining to the country or 
homeland) to unite the Arabs, Kurds and other minorities. These attempts, as later 
developments showed, were not particularly successful. The Shi'a -Sunni discord, on 
the one hand, and the Arab-Kurdish schism, on the other, has proved too deep to be 
plastered over by such terminology. 
Iraqi society contains, albeit with no clear or distinct demarcation lines, three 
identifiable' classes: the upper, the middle, and the lower. The upper classes wielded 
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considerable political and social influence during the monarchist period. From the 
1958 Revolution onwards, they have consistently been undermined until they were 
almost uprooted at the hands of the Ba'thists. But the middle-class, as Batatu points 
out, has always been the most powerful. '7 Political life in the country - the political 
leadership in power or in opposition - has been dominated by the middle-class, which 
represents the intellectuals, the professionals, and most importantly the army officers. 
In point of fact, all the regimes that 
issued from the 1958 Revolution and from the related 
subsequent coups, including the present regime, have 
been middle-class regimes, but not in the narrow 
sense that they have functioned explicitly on behalf of 
the middle classes or consciously furthered their 
interests. 18 
This composition however underwent drastic change during the last generation or so 
as Saddam Hussein, himself a product of depressed rural Tikrit, showed continual 
signs of distrust and suspicion towards the established urbanite middle class and tilted 
towards those of rural roots. Real power in Saddam's Iraq lies with those who, like 
their president, come from rural areas. 
The heterogeneity of the Iraqi nation had a great deal of impact on the political life of 
the state and on the nature of the opposition to the governments. Since the 
establishment of the modem state of Iraq, political power has been in the hands of a 
ruling elite representing the leading political element in Iraqi society: the Sunni 
Arabs. This made the other ethnic and religious communities, especially the Shi'as 
11 Batatu, Hanna, The Old Social classes and the revolutionary movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq's 
Old Landed and Commercial Classes and Its Communists, Ba'thists, and Free Officers (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 62,1115,1125. 
18Ibid. p. 1125. 
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and the Kurds, along with other smaller groups of various denominations, engage in a 
permanent form of opposition to the ruling elite. Thus opposition movements in Iraq 
have underlined an inter-communal struggle, which is largely based on ethnic and 
religious principles rather than on ideological bases or political doctrines. 
Structure 
The present investigation comprises two major parts. The first part consists of three 
chapters. Chapter I gives a brief account of the political history and development of 
Iraq, from the emergence of the modem state in 1921 through independence in 1932 
and the end of the monarchy up to the rise of President Saddam Hussein to power in 
1979. Chapter II provides a political-racial map of modem Iraq. It also discusses and 
analyses the implications and development of the term 'political opposition' in the 
Iraqi political lexicon and the evolution of this term throughout the political life of the 
country. The main emphasis in this chapter will centre on the ethnic, religious, 
sectarian, and regional divisions within Iraqi society. As many of the problems of the 
present state of Iraq are rooted in the state's early developments, and in its social and 
political make-up, the study will also attempt to trace Iraq's political, social, and 
economic developments. Chapter III focuses on the Iraqi opposition movement and 
its political activities until 1990. Special emphasis will be placed on the opposition to 
the Ba'thist regime between 1968 and 1990 including the intra-Ba'th struggle and the 
regime's attempt to establish a Soviet style one-party rule. 
The second and main part of the study will deal with the activities of the Iraqi 
opposition movement following the Iraqi invasion of the state of Kuwait. This part 
consists of three chapters. Chapter IV investigates the implications of the regime's 
decision to invade the state of Kuwait and its impact on the revival of opposition 
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activities, on the perceived weakness of the regime and on what seemed then as the 
imminent downfall of the regime of President Saddam. Chapter V focuses on the 
structure, policies and aims of the numerous new opposition groups and their anti- 
regime activities. Special attention will be given to the ideologies of the major 
groups, their relationships with regional and international powers as well as the 
methods of operation adopted. The circumstances under which the Iraqi National 
Congress (INC), the main umbrella organisation, was created, will be investigated, as 
well as the various attempts made at forming a united opposition front. Chapter VI 
discusses in some detail the role which the Iraqi National Congress (INC) played in 
the effort to topple the regime of Saddam Hussein from the period following the 
Salah Al-Din Conference of October 1992 to August 1996, when Saddam Hussein's 
troops stormed the regional capital of Kurdistan, Arbil. The thesis ends with a 
conclusion in which the results of the investigation are summed up. 
Sources 
Until the invasion of Kuwait scholarly interest in Mesopotamia far outweighed that of 
modem Iraq. The situation changed slightly after August 1990 and some important 
works, both in Arabic and English, have appeared since then. With regard to post- 
Gulf War Iraqi opposition, however, Western literature on authoritarianism neglects 
Iraq and suffers accordingly. 19 In general, the republican period attracted most of the 
attention inside the walls of Academe and outside. Standard works on republican Iraq 
since 1958 and general surveys of modern Iraqi history are now available and are 
19 Jill Crystal, "Authoritarianism and its Adversaries in the Arab World"' World Politics, vol. 46 
(January 1994), p. 287. 
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generally somewhat reliable. 20 In Arabic, Ali Al-Wardi's mammoth work, Lamahat 
min Tarikh Al Mujtama' Al-Iraqi (Glimpses of the History of Iraqi Society) (Baghdad, 
1965), as well as his other works on Iraqi society remain the most comprehensive 
reference on the development of Iraqi society from medieval times to the present; 
Kanan Makiya's Republic of Fear (1986) provides an insight into social and political 
development in Iraq from 1968 until the date of publication, while his second book, 
Cruelty and Silence: War, Tyranny, Uprising and the Arab World (London: Penguin 
Books, 1993) discusses the immediate impact of Saddam Hussein's defeat in the Gulf 
War and the rise of the Iraqi Intifada. Stephen Longrigg's Iraq 1900-1950: A 
Political, Social and Economic History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953) is 
still a very useful and valuable book as it combines eyewitness accounts and 
historical research. A good source of information may be found in the memoirs of 
veteran Iraqi politicians and military officers such as Ismaeel Al-Aref, Abdul Karim 
Farhan, Subhi Abdul Hamid and others who had played key parts in one stage or 
other in the history of modern Iraq. 21 
Arabic literature on Iraq under President Saddam has been growing albeit slowly. 
Most of these works however are one-sided, partisan and of doubtful academic value. 
As far as opposition to the regime is concerned, the picture is somewhat bleaker. No 
"Works such as Hanna Batatu's voluminous The Old Social Classes and the RevolutionaryMovements 
of Iraq: A Study of Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of its Communists, Bathists, and 
Free Officers serve as a major reference on the socio-political developments of the Iraqi state and 
society from the early 1920s to the downfall of General Qassim's regime in 1963. This scholarly work 
ends with the return of the Ba'thist regime to power in July 1968. It is a unique academic work in 
English in the sense that the author bases his research on personal interviews, Iraqi and Arabic sources 
and official and unofficial Iraqi documents and party pamphlets. Nlajid Khadduri's three books on the 
political history of the modern Iraqi state, Independent Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics, . 
1932- 1958, 
Republican Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics Since the Revolution of 1958 and Socialist Iraq: A Study in 
Iraqi Politics Since 1968 provide a useful reference to the state's political developments since 1932. 
Peter Sluglett and Marion Farouk-Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship 
(London: I. B. Tauris, 1990) provides an insight into the tyrannical regime of Saddam Hussein. 
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full-length study of this thorny and multi-faceted issue has yet been attempted. The 
few publications which purport to deal with this issue are lacking in credibility. On 
the other hand, Western interest has in the main focused on the personality of 
President Saddam Hussein. 22 
This study will draw on both written and oral sources. The written material will be 
mainly based on primary Arabic sources, especially the publications of the opposition 
groups and their press releases. along with their manifestos or constitutions. Indeed 
the main activities of the Iraqi opposition groups have so far not been in the political 
or military efforts to bring down President Saddam's regime but in the public relations 
fields, anti-regime propaganda and promotional publications intended as a defence 
and/or attack mechanism against rival groups. Besides the opposition groups' own 
publications, the study will also rely on media reports, analyses and comments. 
The oral sources consist of a number of personal interviews and discussions with 
opposition leaders and activists based in the Arab world and elsewhere. They are a 
major primary source of information. These interviews focus on the regional and 
international dimensions of the opposition groups and are concerned as well with the 
links between these groups and foreign governments, and the extent of foreign 
support - an issue which is normally left out of the opposition's publications. Most 
opposition figures interviewed attempted to present a favourable and bright picture of 
the goals and achievements of their political group. Some interviewees occasionally 
21 These are detailed in the Bibliography below. 
u The best examples of these are: Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, A Political 
Biography (London: Brassey's, 1991), Simon Henderson, Instant Empire: Saddam Hussein'sAmbltion 
for Iraq (San Francisco: Mercury House, 1991), Tim Trevan, Saddam's Secrets: The Hunt for Iraq's 
Hidden Weapons (London: Harper Collins, 1999) and Andrew Cockburn & Patrick Cockburn, Out of 
the Ashes: The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein (New York: Harper Collins, 1990). 
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made no account of, and even smeared, the work of fellow opposition leaders. The 
information obtained from oral sources was therefore carefully sifted, analysed and 
weighed against available evidence before it was incorporated into the present 
investigation. 
Among the difficulties confronted while conducting interviews was the fact that some 
of the interviewees were less than forthcoming in their responses to what must have 
seemed as stubborn and persistent queries from me. Having lived under close 
surveillance by Saddam Hussein's security apparatus, inside and outside Iraq, some of 
the activists were, understandably enough, even suspicious of the whole project and 
refused, at least at first, to cooperate. It took some time before I succeeded in 
establishing my credibility as an academic researcher. The fact that I was a Saudi 
diplomat did not help either. Although they did not show it, many of the opposition 
leaders were wondering as to whether I was using the interviews for purposes other 
than academic. Since these opposition leaders were involved in an unfinished 
business, and in ongoing and clandestine operations against the regime of Saddam 
Hussein, many were afraid that their responses might have a negative impact on the 
political group as a whole, their personal safety as well as on their friends and 
families still living in Iraq 
Summary 
Saddam Hussein's dictatorship did not collapse in the aftermath of his military defeat 
by the U. S. -led international coalition, despite the fact that the scope and extent of 
this defeat went beyond expectations. Furthermore, it survived an armed popular 
uprising in the south and the north and thwarted all attempts aimed at undermining 
the Baghdad regime or at physically eliminating Saddam Hussein. 
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The argument underlining this thesis is that, despite initial enthusiasm, the Iraqi 
opposition movement proved to be ineffective and was very limited in its ability to 
weaken or undermine the regime of President Saddam Hussein. It furthermore seems 
unable to exert any real influence on the Iraqi people or change their perception. 
Despite the favourable external environment, which materialised, at least in the first 
two years after the Gulf War, in the form of strong though not open Arab, regional 
and Western support, Iraqi opposition continued to be weak and ineffective. It will be 
seen that the ethnic, religious and ideological schisms, which were not known, before 
the Ba'thists seized power, to extend deep downward, turned into open conflicts and 
became a central issue in Iraqi opposition activities. Furthermore, lack of leadership, 
internal bickering and infighting over such issues as finances, proportional 
representation as well as the arbitrary and autocratic leadership of its umbrella 
organisation, the INC were among the most important factors which almost paralysed 
the opposition. On the other hand, the adversary against whom these motley groups 
were pitted against, the regime in Baghdad, was and remains ruthless, unscrupulous 
and in possession of a most secretive police force and intelligence apparatus, whose 
long arm operates practically everywhere Iraqis are known to exist. What has 
rendered the task of the opposition even harder is the fact that they were fighting 
against Saddam Hussein, whose ability to manoeuvre and survive great odds has 
become proverbial. A prime example is the way he inaugurated his political career 
with ambushing General Qassim with a machine-gun and then fleeing the scene by 
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crossing the Syrio-Iraqi Desert on foot disguised as a shepherd. 23 
An attempt will further be made to evaluate the role of personality in the movement 
and their bases of influence and legitimacy. This aspect of the study is necessitated by 
the fact that a number of individuals who represent no movement or organised 
ideological group came to play a major role in the opposition activities, relying solely 
on their social or religious status within the Iraqi community. Thus dignitaries from 
the eminent Shi'a religious families, as well as a few individuals belonging to the old 
landowner families appeared as leading figures in the movement. 
The unexpected conditions that obtained following President Saddam's surprise 
decision to invade and annex Kuwait on the one hand, and the international 
community's reaction and determination to reject and resist the occupation, on the 
other, provided unique and unprecedented favourable conditions for all anti-Saddam 
forces to utilise. The Western support and the noticeable degree of Arab and regional 
sympathy and backing for the "new" post-Kuwait Iraqi opposition movement was a 
privilege the "old" and the traditional opposition groups never enjoyed. 
The stated intention of this work - to focus on the "new" opposition movement whose 
specific and primary aim is to topple and replace President Saddam's regime - means 
that the sphere or range of this study has been narrowed down to exclude from its 
scope the anti-government's activities of the Kurdish national parties (namely the 
Kurdish Democratic Party- KDP, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan - PUK and the 
Islamic Movement in Kurdistan IMK). It is now universally accepted that the Kurdish 
parties' main objective is not toppling or replacing the government in Baghdad but, 
23 Muhammad Mualla, Al Ayyam Al-Taweela (The Long Days) (Baghdad: Dar Al-Shu'oun Al- 
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rather, to achieve political and national rights for the Kurdish minority. 24 
The role of the Iraqi Kurdish opposition however will be discussed in relation to their 
alliances with other non-Kurdish Iraqi opposition groups. Indeed, the Kurdish region 
of Iraq was for four years (1992-96) one of the main geographical areas where non- 
Kurdish anti-government's political and military activities were conducted. The 
Western protection of the Kurdistan region and its 'liberation' from the central 
government's forces and authority offered many opposition groups an excellent 
chance to operate in this part of the state with a large measure of freedom. 
Thagafiya Press, 1980), p. 86. 
24 Interview with Hoshiar Zibari, KDP London representative, in London on 15'x' January 2000. 
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Chapter 1: Iraq: From the End of the First World War to the Gulf War 
This chapter attempts to provide an overview of the major political developments 
which took place in Iraq, from the end of World War I to the Gulf War of 1991. 
Special emphasis will be placed on the role of the army in Iraqi politics and on the 
military coups which swept the land, from the early thirties through the mid- 
seventies. The complex relationship between King Faisal I and the Iraqis on the one 
hand and between Faisal and the British on the other, will be discussed with some 
attention given to the part played by the British-installed monarch in building the 
newly established state. This chapter will also discuss the factors which led to the 
extermination of the monarchy, the rise and fall of military dictatorships between 
1958 and 1968. Saddam Hussein's ascendancy to power, his conspiratorial mind, the 
ruthless elimination of his rivals and the imposition of a dictatorial regime aimed at 
monopolising power and silencing all voices of opposition, real or imagined, will be 
dealt with in some detail. 
Iraq Under British Occupation (1917-1921) 
The three Ottoman willayas (provinces) Basra first, then Baghdad and later Mosul 
came under direct British military rule at the end of World War I. With this conquest, 
Britain, whose interest in Iraq significantly increased after the Ottomans had granted 
concessions to Germany to build the Berlin-Baghdad Railway, ensured that the lines 
of communication to India would not be threatened. There are of course many factors 
which facilitated the invasion of Iraq. Chief among these was the rising nationalist 
feeling in Arabia which was decidedly anti-Ottoman. Resentment against the High 
Porte and subsequent Arab Revolt against the Ottomans played a considerable part in 
the success of the Indian Expeditionary Force which in 1914 was entrusted with the 
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task of advancing from Basra on the Shat Al-Arab waterway to Baghdad via Kut on 
the Tigris, where they were to suffer heavy casualties. 25 
To be sure, increased skirmishes in various parts of Arabia between the Arabs under 
the Sharefs' suzerainty on the one hand, and the Ottomans on the other, did much to 
distract the latter, both militarily and administratively. These clashes naturally offered 
a favourable opportunity for the British to attack the Ottoman soft belly, southern Iraq 
and the head of the Gulf 26 The protracted invasion of the Land Between the Two 
Rivers came after Britain had declared war on the Sick Man of Europe in November 
1914, stating at the same time that she "had no quarrel with the Arab inhabitants of 
the river banks as long as they showed themselves friendly". The following day the 
Fao fort at the southernmost tip of present day Iraq was silenced. 27 The invasion of 
Mesopotamia had begun. 
The British northward advance was not as easy as had been envisaged. Heavy losses 
were sustained between 1914 and 1917. In one battle alone the British lost 10,000 
men and 23,000 wounded. What eventually helped the British achieve their victory 
was the poor organisation of the anachronistic ottoman forces as well as their low 
morale. 28 The first British soldiers entered Baghdad on 11 March 1917. 
25 It was the gradual British occupation of what was loosely known as Mesopotamia that unified its 
three separate provinces. The present boundaries of the modern state of Iraq, though known in history 
as the `cradle of civilisation' were in fact drawn in the spring of 1920 in San Remo, on the Italian 
Riviera. See Khalid Al-Tamimi, Muhammad Jai arAbul Timman: Dirasa Fil Za'amaAl-SiyassiyaAl- 
Iraqiya (Muhamad Jaffar Abul Timman: A Study in Iraqi Political Leadership) (London: WM 
Typographics, 1996), pp. 45-7; Tim Niblock, Iraq: the Contemporary State (London: Croom Helm, 
1982), p. 3; Matthew Elliot, Independent Iraq: The Monarchy & British Influence, 1941-1958 
(London: Taucis Academic Studies, 1996), p. 1. 26 Phebe Marr, The Modern History oflraq (London: Longman, 1985), p. 31. 27 Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, Iraq 1900 to 1950: A Political, Social And Economic History (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 78. 28 Geoff Simons, From Sumer to Saddam (London: MacMillan, 1994), p. 190. 
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Most people at first saw in the British take-over a golden opportunity to shake off the 
yoke of Ottoman occupation and snatch independence for which they had yearned for 
a long time. In these three willayas, as in other parts of Ottoman occupied lands, 
hopes were raised even higher after the British had assured the rebelling Arabs, 
mainly through the Sharefs, that if they supported Britain the latter would then 
recognise and guarantee their independence. Although this promise was made to 
muster Arab support, it must be pointed out that Britain, through its Arab Bureau in 
Cairo and also through such adventurous officers as Lawrence of Arabia, did in fact 
offer some arms, money and military training to the rebelling Arabs in Syria, 
Palestine and elsewhere. 29 Much to their dismay and anger however this promise 
proved empty and the deeply cherished hope of independence remained unfulfilled. 
With the signing at the Conference of San Remo in April 1920 of the Peace Treaty 
and the Anglo-French oil agreement which divided the spoils, 30 British occupation of 
Iraq was legitimised under the newly coined euphemistic term `mandate' in which the 
individual countries were considered `independent' but subject to a mandatory power 
until they reached political maturity. However, Britain proved to be more interested in 
consolidating its hold over the newly conquered land than in fulfilling the wishes of 
the Iragis. 31 
21 Abdul-Majid H. Al-Qaisi, Al-Tarikh Yukyabu Ghadan: Hawamish ala Tarikh Al Iraq Al-Hadith 
(History Will Be Written Tomorrow: Notes on the History of Modern Iraq) (London: Dar Al-Hikma 
Publishing and Distribution, 1993), p. 107. 
30 Simons, From Sumer to Saddam, p. 186. 
31 Kadhim Ni'meh, Al Malik Faisal Al Awwal wal Ingilia wal Istiglal (King Faisal 1, the English and 
Independence) (Beirut: Al-Dar A1-Arabiya Lil Mawsou'at, 1988), p. 36. 
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The severity of the new centralised administration, the process of anglicising or rather 
`indianising' government machinery32 and the strict tax collection system only fuelled 
the frustration and bitterness of the people who had already been disappointed by the 
discovery that they had been duped by their so-called `liberators'. Resentment was 
especially pervasive in the rural areas and among the tribesmen to whom the British 
occupiers seemed even more repressive than their erstwhile co-religionist masters. 33 
In the cities and towns where many Ottoman-educated men and ex-officers from the 
Ottoman army had been calling for close co-operation with the British administration, 
attitudes were soon to turn anti-British. Jam'iyat AI Ahd Al-Iraqi (Iraqi Covenant 
Society), which brought together a number of Turkish-educated Iraqis, some of whom 
had served in the Ottoman army, and which had earlier sought co-operation with the 
British felt compelled to change its constitution to include an article expressing its 
commitment to independence, 34 In short, when the first three years of British 
occupation produced no emancipation, and the mounting complaints to the Arab 
Bureau in Cairo bore no fruit, popular opposition grew wider and took the form of an 
armed struggle. 35 Encouraged byfatwas which placed an obligation upon the people 
of the land to fight against the invading and outlandish kaffirs (infidels), many tribes, 
peasants as well as city dwellers throughout the three wilayas rose in arms against the 
new administration. 36 
32 `The administration imposed on Iraq was overwhelmingly the work of men seconded from the India 
Office and was modelled largely on Britain's imperial structure in India'. Marr, History oflraq, p. 31. 
33 Fadhil Al-Baryak, Dawr Al laish Al Iraqi fi Hukumat Al-Difa' Al-Watanl wa Al-Narb ma'a 
Baritania (The Role of the Iraqi Army in the National Defence Government and in the War Against 
Britain) (Beirut: Al-Dar Al-Arabiya Lil Mawsou'at, 1987), 1987, pp. 50-51. 
34 Ni'meh, Faisal 1, pp. 39-40. 
35 Ibid., p. 40. 361bid, 
pp. 37-38. 
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In Baghdad and other big cities the dignitaries, while not yet organised into political 
groupings or parties, used the neighbourhood coffee shops, schools, mosques and 
Hussainiyahs (Shi'a religious centres especially created for eulogising of Ah! AI-Belt 
i. e. the family of Prophet Muhammad and his descendants) as meeting places for the 
propagation of anti-British feeling. 37 
This however does not mean that no political parties existed during this period. In 
1919, Haras AI-Istiglal (Guardians of Independence) was specifically created to 
achieve independence. The Iraqi dignitary Ja'ffar Abul Timman, who was to play a 
major role in the political future of Iraq was one of its outstanding members. Other 
parties struggling for emancipation included Al-Hizb Al-Watani Al-Iraqi (Iraqi 
National Party) and Al-Nahdia Al-Iraqiya (Iraqi Awakening) headed by Amin Al- 
Charachafchi. In the mid-Euphrates a number of secret anti-British societies were 
formed. These included Jam'iyat Al-Nahdha Al-Islamiya (Islamic Awakening 
Society) and Al Jamiya AI-Wataniya Al-Islamiya (Muslim National Society). Driven 
by their zeal to expel the British from Iraqi soil, these societies sometimes resorted to 
violence in order to achieve that goal. Although open to all Iraqis Shi'as, Kurds or 
Sunnis, the vast majority of the followers of those parties and societies were Shi'as. 
Those parties which were basically class-based and lacked a comprehensive political 
vision or programme were however short-lived and were officially dissolved and 
banned from exercising any activities by the High Commissioner in August 1922.38 
37 Al-Tamimi, Ja f arAbul 7imman, p. 55. 
38 Nazar T. S. Al-Hassou, Al-Sira Ala Sulta Fi Iraq Al Malaki: Dirasa Tahliliya Fi Al Idara wa Al- 
Siyasa (Struggle for Power in Monarchist Iraq: An Analytical Study in Administration and politics) 
(Baghdad: Afaq Arabiya, 1984), pp. 68-9; Hoping that their act would incite others to rebel against the 
British, Jam'iyat Al-Nahdha Al-Islamiya (Islamic Awakening Society) assassinated a British officer in 
the holy city of Karbala. Al-Barrak, Role of the Military, pp. 77,83. 
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It is to be remembered that the political climate in Iraq in the years immediately 
following British occupation was not universally anti-British. Not all Iraqis were 
haters of British rule. Those Iraqis, particularly among city dwellers who had regular 
contact with the new administration, came to admire their new masters for their 
discipline, diligence and organisation and above all for their ceaseless efforts to 
impose law and order and build an efficient government machinery on the ruins of the 
old one which had collapsed almost totally towards the end of Ottoman rule. In 
addition, the Christian and Jewish minorities welcomed the arrival of the British as it 
afforded them what they saw at the time as an opportunity to free themselves from the 
constraints of living within a predominantly Muslim Community. 39 
The Revolt of 1920 
The imprisonment in Rumaitha4° on 2nd June 1920 of an influential and highly 
respected sheikh (Sha'lan Abu Al-Jawn), who had refused to pay a newly introduced 
agricultural tax, sparked an armed uprising which was to engulf most parts of the 
country for several months. From this predominantly Shi'a region on the mid- 
Euphrates the revolt spread to other parts of the country. Within weeks large areas in 
south-West Iraq passed totally out of British control. 
Although London and the British military administration in Baghdad saw the armed 
opposition as a mere insurgency caused largely by nationalist agitation from the Iraqi 
officers who were at the time in the retinue of Faisal in Syria, it was in many ways a 
widely supported revolution that sought to free Iraq from British domination. True, 
391bid., pp. 57,81,94. 
40 A small town on the mid-Euphrates. The name has become synonymous with the birthplace of the 
1920 Revolt. 
38 
the rebel tribesmen were illiterate, disorganised and lacking in political awareness, 
but their grievances, both economic and political, were intense enough to push them 
to Carry aMS. 41 
Describing the events that followed Sheikh Sha'lan Abu Jawn's mutiny, Geoff 
Simons writes: 
A full Arab revolt began in June 1920. Military posts were overrun 
by the Arabs, British soldiers were killed and lines of 
communications were severed. In the holy city of Karbala a jihad 
was proclaimed against the British. Leachman [the British colonel 
celebrated for his travels and military feats in the eastern deserts] 
was shot in the back by his Arab host, an event that encouraged 
further efforts to resist British rule. By mid-August 1920 the rebels 
felt strong enough to announce a provisional Arab government. 
Over a period of months Britain had lost 450 dead and some 1500 
further casualties. By late March the provisional Arab government 
was no more. The entire operation had cost the British government 
around £40 million, more than three times the total subsidies for the 
Arab Revolt against the Ottoman occupation. 42 
Dismissing London's official view that the Revolt was no more than a foreign 
inspired insurgency, Phebe Marr agrees with the Iraqi interpretation that the Revolt 
was "a genuine nationalist rebellion, the first in a series of abortive attempts to 
overthrow unwanted British rule". 43 
Iraq Under the British Mandate (1921-1932) 
Despite the numerous casualties, high material cost and some division among policy 
makers, Britain felt that it was still necessary to maintain control of Iraq. But instead 
of ruling it directly, and thus bear the full brunt of tribal attacks, London decided to 
adopt a new strategy aimed at minimising human and material loss. It therefore 
41 Marr, History of Iraq, p. 33; Ni'meh, Faisal 1, p. 46. 
42 Simons, From Sumer to Saddam, p. 212. 
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embarked upon the execution of a subtle plan in which it continued to rule the land 
through a puppet regime. 
To this end, Sir Percy Cox, the British High Commissioner in Baghdad contacted the 
local dignitaries and formed a State Council in order to draw up the shape of the 
future government of Iraq. The Council was headed by the ageing Abdul-Rahman Al- 
Naqib whose virtues, in the words of Phebe Marr were `his religious position, family 
background, and lack of experience in politics - which would leave ample scope for 
Cox to exercise real authority'. 44 Despite Al-Naqib's initial refusal to co-operate with 
the British he decided upon the insistence of Gertrude Bell and the High 
Commissioner to accept the British offer fearing that the presidency of the Council 
might be offered to a Shi'a leader, a prospect which the aged Sunni could not 
stomach. 45 Al-Naqib's colleagues in the Council were all drawn from distinguished 
families and tribal chieftains who were expected above all else not to oppose the 
British policies in Iraq. 
Al-Naqib's first (provisional) government was to last from 25 October 1920 to 3 
August 1921. It laid the general constitutional structure of Iraq's future government 
and took the decisive step of calling for the establishment of a monarchy, and upon 
Cox's insistence it issued a formal invitation to Sharef Hussein's third son Faisal to 
accept the Iraqi crown. 46 
43 Marr, History of Iraq, p. 33. 
44 History of Iraq, p. 34. 
45 Selim Al-Hasani, Ru'asa'Al Iraq 1920-1958 Dirasahfi IttijahatAl-Hukm (Iraq's Prime Ministers 
1920-1958: A Study in Government Orientations) (London: Dar A1-Hikma, 1992), p. 10. 
46 Marr, History oflraq, p. 34. 
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Faisal I 
Faisal's nomination for the Iraqi crown extricated him from the debacle in which he 
found himself after he fell out of favour with the French who had expelled him from 
the short-lived Kingdom of Syria. It also served as reward for the Hashemites who 
had led the Arab Revolt against the Ottomans and had stood behind Britain during the 
Great War. For these and other reasons the deposed Faisal who had taken refuge in 
London following his eviction from Damascus, was compensated by the Cairo 
Conference for his loss with the crown of Iraq. Faisal was, from the British point of 
view, the ideal candidate: he was a descendent of a distinguished family that traced its 
lineage back to the nobles of ancient Mecca. More importantly, he was perceived to 
be friendly, quite peaceful and of weak character. Such qualities would naturally give 
the British a free hand in the kingdom. The drama of installing Faisal as King of Iraq 
had to be acted out convincingly. After the High Commissioner Sir Percy Cox had 
`persuaded' the Council of State to declare Faisal king unanimously a plebiscite soon 
followed in which 96% of the people indicated their approval of the "king-elect". 
The reality however was something quite different: a sizeable proportion of the 
population expressed objection and rallied behind a local contender, Sheikh Talib Al- 
Naqib (no relation of Abdul-Rahman Al-Naqib) as they saw in Faisal a British ruler 
in Arab garb; others, particularly in the Kurdish areas and along the mid- and upper- 
Tigris simply stayed away from the plebiscite. On 23rd August 1921 however Faisal's 
pageant proceeded to the old Ottoman government Compound (the Serai) and 
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formally ascended the throne, commencing the Hashemite rule which was to last until 
1958.47 
Despite unlimited British support, Faisal encountered immense difficulties in his 
efforts to impose himself as a sovereign ruler. Apart from the fact that the long 
association of his family with the British made him suspect in the eyes of many 
Iraqis, there were those who saw in him nothing but an outsider `with no roots in the 
soil". 48 However, in the troubled years which followed the founding of the kingdom, 
Faisal relied heavily on the services of an old friend of his, Nouri Sa'id, who was to 
play a leading role in the politics of Iraq over the whole period of the monarchy. 
Opposition to Faisal's rule was further exacerbated by his dependency on the former 
Sherifian officers who came with him to Baghdad. This tilt towards his own clique to 
whom he entrusted the highest positions of authority hurt the feelings of most Iraqis 
and bred popular antagonism. 
There were of course other factors which alienated the people from his government, 
particularly among the Shi'as, who had inherited from Ottoman times a long- 
established tradition of distrusting the central (Sunni) government. For generations, 
Iraqi Shi'as were brought up to loath the Baghdad government and look to the Shi'a 
religious and intellectual centre, Najaf for guidance. 49 Furthermore, from the start the 
British, like their predecessors the Ottomans, showed an unmistakable tilt towards the 
Sunnis. This naturally heightened the Shi'a jealousies, increased their grievances and 
47 Ni'meh, Faisal 1, p. 77; Mart, History oflraq, p. 36. 
48 Liora Lukitz, Iraq: The Search for National Identity (London: Frank Cass, 1995), p. 74. 
49 Abdullah Fahad A1-Nafeesi, DawrAl- Shia Fi TattawourAl Iraq Al-Siyasi Al-Hadith (The Role of 
the Shi'as in the Political Development ofModern Iraq (Beirut: Dar Al-Nahar, 1973), pp. 12-13. 
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deepened the sectarian division which still plagues the Iraqi community and which, as 
will be discussed later, the post-Gulf War Iraqi opposition inherited. 50 
There are many reasons why the British preferred Sunni rather than Shi'a leaderships. 
In their desire to establish hegemony in the newly conquered land, the British 
looked for those who by birth or heredity were natural rulers. In 
Iraq they looked first to the Arab Sunni urban notables, ex- 
Ottoman officials, ex-Sharefan officers, to form an administration 
sl supported by local tribal leaders. 
Among the myriad challenges met by the British in Iraq none was as difficult as the 
task of building a unified state from a community, or rather a number of communities, 
divided basically along ethnic and denominational lines. Besides the Sunnis, there are 
the Shi'as who constituted, then as now, the majority of the Muslim Arabs; there are 
also the Kurds who form approximately one fifth of the population. 52 
National unity and social cohesion, the two foundation stones without which no state 
can survive, were markedly absent. 53 Faisal was fully aware of this challenge and in a 
memorandum sent to the Cabinet in 1931, he set forth the problems besetting his 
country and singled out sectarianism as being a serious menace threatening stability: 
Iraq is among the nations which lack the most essential element of 
social life: religious, sectarian and intellectual unity. It is plagued 
by internal divisions and in order to be able to govern the land 
politicians must possess wisdom, patience and experience. These 
divisions must be addressed for our people are divided into: the 
SO See Chapters V and VI below. 
s' Derek Hopwood, "Social Structures and the New State" in D. Hopwod, H. Ishow and T. 
Koszinowski (eds), Iraq: Power and Society (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1993), p. 12. 
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modernist younger generation including the government 
machinery, the fanatics, the Sunnis, the Shi'as, the Kurds, the non- 
Muslim minorities, the tribesmen, the Sheiks, and the vast majority 
of people who are ignorant and prepared to accept any idea 
uncritically and without any due consideration. 54 
From the beginning of Faisal's reign, British commitment to the preservation of 
Sunni hegemony over Iraq manifested itself quite clearly. Cabinets were dominated 
by those Sunnis willing to work with or rather under the British. For show purposes, 
however, token representatives from among the Shi'a majority, the Kurds, the 
Christians and the Jews were included. " 
Despite a policy of appeasement and reconciliation towards the Shi'as which Iraq was 
never to see again until perhaps General Qassim's rule, Faisal's government did not 
hesitate to use or threaten to use force when the Shi'as exceeded the limits set by the 
Sunni establishment. 56 When, for example, in 1931 the mid-Euphrates Shi'a tribesmen 
of Samawa rose in arms against the taxation policy of the government, Faisal's troops 
hastened to deal with the situation. As the troops were no match for the heavily armed 
rebels, Faisal's men threatened the rebel tribesmen with British aerial bombardment. 
It was only then that the government forces managed to restore a semblance of law 
and order in the area. 57 
54 Abdul-Karim Al-Uzri, Mushkilat AlHukm R Al Iraq (The Problem of Government in Iraq) (no 
place or date provided), pp. 2-3. 
5 Marr, History of Iraq, p. 39. 
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Most Shi'as in Iraq became disillusioned about the new Faisali regime when their 
doubts about the orientation of the new government were confirmed. Commenting on 
the sectarian rift that grew wider after the crowning of Faisal, Phebe Marr points out 
that the Shi'as were quite co-operative at first: 
From the start, Shi'a leaders had been identified with a staunch anti- 
British position, but in the early stages of opposition some had been 
willing to co-operate with the more moderate Sunnis. Even as late 
as April 1922 Ja'far Abul-Timman, a Shi'a businessman and 
politician of Baghdad known for his strong nationalist views, had 
been willing to participate in a predominantly Sunni cabinet. 58 
The 1922 Treaty and After 
Besides the mutual Sunni-Shi'a distrust, defining the relations with Britain was 
another crucial issue that faced Faisal and, indeed, all those who succeeded him 
whether in monarchist or republican Iraq. After the League of Nations had decided to 
place Iraq under British mandate until such time as it was ready for self-government, 
Britain preferred to seal their new relationship by a proper and internationally 
recognised treaty and the first Anglo-Iraqi treaty was signed in October 1922. 
Although on the face of it the treaty did not have any reference to direct British 
involvement in all vital matters concerning Iraq, it incorporated practically all the 
provisions of the mandate. This naturally incensed the nationalists and deepened even 
59 further the feelings of resentment towards Britain. 
Most Iraqis were in one way or other opposed to the Treaty which was scrutinised and 
bitterly debated at the Council of Ministers. Ethnic division in Iraq manifested itself in 
58 History oflraq, p. 44. 
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the popular attitude towards this treaty. Muslim Arabs resented continued British 
hegemony while, on the other hand, some Kurds and Christian Arabs felt that 
decreased links with Britain would expose them to persecution. To appease the 
opposition and lessen public criticism of the treaty, minor changes and a few 
modifications were made in a protocol to the treaty which reduced the period of the 
treaty from twenty to four years. Under heavy British pressure the Constituent 
Assembly finally ratified it on 11 June 1924 having been threatened that the whole 
business of the Treaty would be referred to the League of Nations. 60 
Since the Iraqis were practically forced into signing the 1922 Treaty, opposition to the 
terms of the Treaty and its protocol continued long after its ratification. Further 
cosmetic modifications were made in 1927 but these produced the same result : 
popular rejection and opposition. 61 The Hizb A1-Watani Al-Iraqi (National Iraqi Party) 
led by Ja'ffar Abul-Timman allied itself with Hizb Al-Ikha' AI-Walani (National 
Fraternity Party) headed by Yassin Al-Hashimi in order to co-ordinate opposition to 
the proposed treaty. 62 
Against this tide of popular resistance Britain announced in 1929 that it was seeking 
an end to the mandate and that it was ready to grant Iraq full independence and 
sponsor its admission to the League of Nations in 1932. A further Treaty expected to 
last twenty-five years was then envisaged to regulate the future relationship. In fact 
what made Britain agree to reconsider its position in Iraq was not its desire to see the 
Iraqis independent. Many in Britain, including Sir Winston Churchill, considered the 
59 Tim Niblock, Iraq: the Contemporary State (London: Croom Helm, 1982), p. 3. 
60 Hopwood, Social Structures, p. 10; Simons, From Sumer to Saddam, p. 217 
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62 Al"Barrak, Role of the Army, p. 80. 
46 
Iraqis incapable of self-government and looked upon them as "uncivilised tribes"6' 
The real motives, however, did not go beyond financial considerations. Mandate Iraq 
was increasingly viewed as a financial drain which alarmed Whitehall and made it 
consider other less costly ways of controlling it. A new treaty was therefore negotiated 
and in November 1930 ratified. 
With the conclusion of the Iraqi-British 1930 Treaty, which promised Iraq's 
independence and nomination for membership in the League of Nations, many of the 
financial burdens and responsibilities were now transferred to the Iraqis. Among other 
things, the treaty called for close consultation between the two countries in order to 
harmonise their foreign policies. It also granted Britain the right to retain military 
bases in Iraq and use local facilities in times of war. 64 The man who saw to it that the 
Treaty was ratified despite outcries against it, was General Nuri Sa'id. His pro-British 
policies and what seemed as total disregard for national demands came to make him a 
symbol of hate to many Iraqis and Arabs throughout his political career which 
spanned four decades. In point of fact during the forties and fifties, many warring 
opposition groupings felt united in their stand against what they perceived as Nuri's 
incessant attempts to fetter Iraq and chain its destiny to that of Britain. 
Iraq from Independence to Revolutionary Republicanism (1932-1958) 
With the independence of Iraq on 3 October 1932 and its admission to the League of 
Nations, the British had lulled the Iraqis into a fictitious sense of independence, and 
London found it necessary to exercise control more indirectly than before. 65 Despite 
63 Simons, From Sumer to Saddam, p. 213 
64 Marr, History oflraq, p. 50. 
65 Batatu, Social Classes, p. 325. 
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their new found independence, the Iraqi populace continued to oppose the 1930 Treaty 
as it did not put an end to the British power in Iraq. The "new opposition ... was far 
more broadly based and ably led than the opposition movements of the 1920s". 66 
Particularly active were the AI-Ikha' AI-Watani (National Brotherhood) Party led by 
Kamil Al-Chaderchi and Al-Hizb AI-Walani (National Party) led by Ja'far Abul 
Timman. The new Treaty triggered a wave of strikes and demonstrations in which 
people from practically all walks of life participated. 
Opposition to helpless Iraqi governments, which had earlier forced a prime minister, 
Abdul Muhsin Al-Sa'doun, to commit suicide, grew in intensity. Armed clashes with 
the security forces became quite common. Amidst these conditions of political 
upheaval and a caught in a complex web of ethnic and religious conflicts, the task of 
nation building Faisal had embarked upon with the help of the British was seriously 
impeded. A serious blow came unexpectedly when the founder of the monarchy 
himself, who had been suffering from heart disease, died before he could complete his 
mission. 
It is now not unusual in revolutionary Iraq to show reverence to the first Arab king 
since the fall in 1258 of Baghdad, the seat of Abbasid Caliphate, at the hands of the 
Mongols. `British-made" though he may have been dubbed, Faisal's reconciliatory 
bent of mind and generosity of spirit disarmed his enemies and won him admirers 
and followers in Iraq. This is a quite remarkable achievement by a man who was, to 
all intents, and purposes, an "outsider" surrounded by fellow outsiders who, at least 
during the first few years of his reign, did not have adequate understanding of the 
66 Marr, History oflraq, p. 52. 
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needs of the country. 67 Through a shrewd combination of patience and tolerance 
Faisal managed to absorb criticism and undermine much of the opposition. A 
measure of Faisal's leniency may be seen in the fact that he did nothing to those 
influential individuals who kept insulting him in public by not recognising him as 
the lawful ruler of the land. In their Friday sermons (khutbah) the religious leaders 
(Imams) continued, for three years after the coronation of Faisal, to insult him by 
calling for prayers by the people for the Ottoman Caliph "in both his spiritual and 
temporal capacity". 68 
There were of course during Faisal's reign many differences between the 
government and the people. There were also deep ethnic, religious and social 
divisions among the people themselves. But Faisal's royal tent, to use an Arabic 
metaphor, had room enough to embrace many, if not all those differences and 
divisions, and tactfully managed to silence many voices of dissent. It is for these 69 
reasons that Faisal's death in 1933 is often viewed as a turning point in the political 
history of Iraq. 
King Ghazi 
Faisal was succeeded by his only son, the twenty-one year old Ghazi. Unlike his father, 
the new king who reigned until the start of World War II was impulsive, inexperienced 
and lacked both political and social acumen. Despite his nationalist zeal and lofty 
notions of Arab unity, his lack of leadership and inability led to serious problems. 
Chaos and internal disturbances soon developed as faction leaders competed to fill the 
67 Batatu., Social Classes, p. 322 
68 Ibid., pp. 323-4 
69 Al-Tamimi, Ja ffarAbul l7mman, pp. 334-5. 
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political vacuum, which had opened following Faisal's death. To illustrate how chaotic 
the situation grew upon the departure of Faisal, we only have to remember that between 
1933 and 1939 no fewer than seven coup d'etats were staged. 70 Furthermore, many of 
the unruly tribes would also revolt for reasons of their own. During the premiership of 
Yassin Al-Hashimi (March 1935 - October 1936) seven uprisings against the 
government were suppressed. 7' 
Throughout the "roaring thirties", opposition to the government was not entirely based 
on patriotic grounds. Leaders bent on furthering their own cause often turned to their 
tribes and clans for support and action if need be. Tribal relationships were still much 
stronger than ideological bonds. 72 In fact even before Faisal's death in Switzerland and 
Ghazi's accession, chaos reigned supreme. Minorities and ethnic communities known 
for their peaceful coexistence with their Arab fellow countrymen rebelled when Faisal 
was in a Swiss hospital. The , 
Assyrians who were instrumental in helping the British 
during the mandate threatened to rise in arms against the central government unless 
they were granted some sort of autonomy. 73 It was not easy for the government to deal 
with the highly ambitious demands of this minority, whose loyalty to the state was 
questioned by most Muslim Iraqis at the time because of their willingness to serve the 
British army against their own compatriots. 74 Mutual distrust led to bloody 
confrontations and well trained in arms though they were, they were crushed ruthlessly 
70 Simons, From Sumer to Saddam p. 218. 
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72Ibid., p. 67. 
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by an army contingent under General Bakr Sidqi who too was later to figure 
prominently in the 1936 coup that still bears his name. 75 
Bakr Sidqi: the first coup leader in the Middle East 
Sidqi's coup brought to the fore a new breed of young Effendi (urbanite) politicians. 
Although the roots of politicising the army may be said to go back to King Faisal I, 
who had assigned ex-Ottoman army officers to the most important and vital political 
and administrative positions, Sidqi's coup was a turning point not only in the history 
of modern Iraq but also of the Middle East. It "inaugurated the officers' new style of 
intervention' in political life which rapidly became the norm throughout the Arab 
world". 76 Indeed from then until well into the seventies when Saddam Hussein placed 
his immediate family members and Tikriti clan in the most sensitive posts of the state, 
no government could come or go without the consent of the armed forces. 77 
The Ahali (People) group, formed in January 1932, which was made up of reformist 
intellectuals who challenged the old style politicians and entertained vague secular 
notions of equality and social justice reminiscent of the French Revolution, took the 
lion's share of posts in the cabinet. 78 The initial popular support for the coup's newly 
formed government under Hikmet Suleiman as Prime Minister soon faded, as the army 
officers were not well disposed to liberalism or democracy. 79 In 1936 General Bakr 
Sidqi was assassinated at the hands of a disgruntled group of nationalist officers, who 
75 Marr, History of Iraq, p. 71. 
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had always mistrusted the motives of this ambitious Kurd. 8° This became the 
customary end of all ambitious officers who forced their way into the political arena. 
The list of military men whose political careers ended violently is a long one. It 
includes the Golden Square (the four colonels) of the Government of National Defence, 
General Nuri Sa'id, General Abdul Karim Qassim and perhaps even General Ahmad 
Hasan Al-Bakr, Saddam Hussein's own mentor, who were all either butchered or, as in 
the case of Bakr, died under extremely suspicious circumstances. 
Faisal, who is always described as a `stooge', looks quite able and shrewd when 
contrasted with his whimsical and indecisive son Ghazi. 81 Under the latter however, and 
because of the growth and expansion of the urban middle class as well as the open- 
mindedness of the head of state, political parties experienced a degree of freedom that 
was seldom to be repeated in the future. 
Of the three Hashimite monarchs who succeeded to the throne in Baghdad between 
1921 and 1958 Ghazi was, despite his impulsiveness and tragic lack of experience the 
most popular. His youth, informality, sportsmanship, accessibility and even his 
eccentricity brought him close to the hearts of the Iraqis. Their love for him grew 
especially after his rather mysterious death in an automobile accident when he crashed 
into an electric pylon near his palace about midnight on 3 April 1939. Most Iraqis, then 
as now, believe that Ghazi's death was a conspiracy in which Nuri Al-Sai'd, Abdul- 
Ilah, (Ghazi's cousin) and Britain took part to make Ghazi pay with his life for his 
8o Salim Al-Hasani, Prime Ministers oflraq 1920-1958: A Study in Government Orientations (London: 
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8' Batatu, Social Classes, p. 324. 
52 
political stands which were in some ways hostile to the British. 82 Following Ghazi's 
death, Prince Abdul-Ilah (Ghazi's cousin) was declared crown regent since the son of 
the deceased King was only three years old. It was claimed at the time that the infant 
king's mother Queen Aliya testified that before his death, King Ghazi had asked that 
her brother, Prince Abdul-Ilah succeed him to the throne if he were to die before his son 
came of age. 
The Rise of Nuri Al-Sai'd 
Before the eruption of World War II Nuri Sa'id, the real architect of Monarchist Iraq, 
and his supporters in the army pressured Hikmet Suleiman to modify some of what 
they considered to be radical policies. 83 The pressure was so threatening that Hikmet 
had to resign. Tamil Al-Madfa'i succeeded him as prime minister. Al-Madfa'i's soft 
approach and conciliatory programme, though backed by the King, did not satisfy 
Nuri's influential group who sought the punishment of Hikmet Suleiman and his 
supporters. When Al-Madfa'i failed to respond to Nuri's demands, the army 
intervened and forced the cabinet to resign. 84 With the help of his officer friends, Nun 
Sa'id succeeded in seizing power and forming the third of his fourteen cabinets. 85 Nuri 
immediately expelled Hikmet Suleiman's collaborators and sympathisers from the 
armed forces and convicted Suleiman and many of his followers on a trumped up 
charge of treason. 
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World War II 
Nuri Sa'id used the outbreak of World War II as a stick with which to beat his 
opponents in order to crush all political dissent in his cabinet as well as throughout the 
country. He brought Iraq on to the side of the Allies and, against the wishes of many in 
his cabinet, severed diplomatic relations with Germany. The early success of the armies 
of Hitler, particularly the swift occupation of the countries adjacent to Nazi Germany, 
encouraged the anti-British camp. There was increasing support in the cabinet, in the 
political -parties and in the populace as well to detach Iraq from its commitments 
contained in the 1930 Treaty and to declare Iraq neutral. 
At the time Italy entered the war Nuri Sa'id was Foreign Minister but he could not 
persuade his fellow cabinet members to break off diplomatic relations with Rome. With 
the progress of the war, particularly after the spectacular victories scored by Hitler's 
advancing armies86, the Iraqi government under Rashid All Al-Gailani felt encouraged 
to show increasing hostility towards the British since Britain and the Allies appeared to 
be losing ground. Therefore, Al-Gailani's government embarked upon secret talks with 
the Axis. When Al-Gailani's government stopped the flow of oil to the West by cutting 
off the pipeline to Haifa, the Nazis welcomed this move to the extent that they ordered 
the dispatch of Vichy arms from Syria to Baghdad. Hitler's Germany also sent experts 
to offer Al-Gailani political advice. 87 Early in 1941 however Rashid All was forced to 
quit but his enthusiastic supporters in the army soon reinstated him. 
Developments of the war required reinforcement of the British troops stationed in Iraq 
in accordance with the 1930 treaty. Not willing to co-operate with its erstwhile 
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occupiers, armed conflict between Iraq and Britain broke out and after a feeble 
resistance to the superior and better equipped British troops Rashid Ali's forces lost and 
he had to flee the country and head for his German patrons. The crown prince who had 
fled Baghdad was duly reinstated and a new era in the history of modern Iraq began. 
The fall of Al-Gailani's government, known as the `National Defence government', was 
followed by a period of extensive purges and retribution. This was aimed not only as 
punishment against those who led the coup but also as lesson to other officers and 
politicians. The four colonels, also referred to as the Golden Square: Salah Al-Din Al- 
Sabbagh, Muhammad Fahmi Said, Mahmud Salman and Kamil Shabib, who had 
propped up Rashid Ali throughout his short career as prime minister, were court- 
martialled and executed. 88 
The political climate in Iraq underwent some change after World War II. Hoping to 
appease the growing opposition to the government, which was largely perceived as a 
puppet of the British authorities, Prince Abdul-Ilah attempted to liberalise and offer 
political parties an opportunity to work with relative freedom. Between 1945 and 1951 
several parties were licensed. These included Hizb Al-Sha'b -the People's Party which 
was licensed in 1946, Hizb Al-Ittihad AI-Watani - The Party of National Unity (1946), 
Hizb AI-Watani Al-Dimoqrati - the National Democratic Party (1946), Hizb Al-Istiglal - 
the Independence Party (1946), Hizb Al Ahrar - the Liberal Party (1946), Hizb Al- 
Ittihad Al-Dusturi -The Constitutional Union Party (1949), Hizb Al-Ittihad wal Islah Al- 
Ijtima'i - The Party of Unity and Social Reform (1949), Hizb Al-Ummah Al-Ishtiraki- 
the Popular Socialist Party (1951), Al-Jabha AI-Sha'biya Al Muttahida - the United 
86 Stephen J. Lee, The European Dictatorships 1918-1945 (London: Routledge, 1987), p. 293. 
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Popular Front (1951). Besides these there were also the parties that operated 
underground such as the Communist Party which was founded in 1934, and the Arab 
Ba'th Socialist Party which was founded in Syria in 1947 but did not operate in Iraq 
until four years later-89 It must be pointed out that while these parties were better 
organised than those of the twenties and thirties, they did not have large memberships 
and were active mainly during election times or when there was a national emergency 
or crisis - of which there were many. 
Salih Jabr: the first Shia Prime Minister 
It was during this period that the first Shi'a politician became a prime minister in Iraq. 
In his first cabinet, which he formed in 1948, Salih Jabr9° included a number of young 
reformists. 91 Jabr is remembered in Iraqi politics for his ill-fated attempt to modify the 
terms of the 1930 Treaty. Without authorization from his cabinet or party leaders he 
negotiated and signed the 20 year Portsmouth Treaty. Although the new Treaty was an 
improvement on the 1930 Treaty, it was met with immediate rejection in a popular 
uprising known to the Iraqis as the Wathba -the Leap- which was, in the words of 
Hanna Batatu, "the most formidable mass insurrection in the history of the monarchy" 
92 In the rioting that followed Jabr's signing of the Treaty, which never saw the light of 
day, several people, mainly young students and workers particularly of the Shalchiya 
Iron Factory West of Baghdad, were killed when the police opened fire with machine 
guns on the oldest of bridges in Baghdad which was renamed in 1958 as Jisr Al- 
Shuhada' (the Bridge of the Martyrs) in commemoration of the Wathbah. 
88 Marr, History oflraq, pp. 79-80. 
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Salih Jabr was forced to quit but his departure did nothing to mollify opposition to the 
government which continued even after the repudiation of the Treaty and the re-entry of 
the more experienced and devious of the old guard, Nuri Sa'id. The fierce competition 
between the new Effendi politicians represented by Salih Jabr and the older and more 
politically entrenched figures continued unabated, especially as the older generation did 
not countenance any measures aimed at liberalisation and reform. 3 Calls for the 
abolition of the old system of representation and the introduction of direct 
parliamentary elections went unheeded. 
During this period the setbacks suffered by Arab armies at the hands of the newly 
created state of Israel only added fuel to the fire. Opposition leaders now entwined the 
Palestinian cause with those internal issues which they struggled to achieve. In October 
1952, leaders of the anti-government forces which included the parties of Istiglal 
(Independence), Al-Hizb Al-Watani Al-Dimocrati (the National Democrats), Ansar Al- 
Salam (the Partisans of Peace, the front arm of the banned Communist Party) and the 
newly formed Al-Jabha Al-Sha'biya Al Muttahidah (United Popular Front) put forward 
a petition to the Regent demanding the granting of civil liberties, abolition of the 
outdated two stage method of voting and abrogation of the 1930 Treaty. They also 
reminded Prince Abdul-Ilah that he should not interfere in the business of running the 
country as he was supposed to reign and not rule. 
94 When these demands were rejected, 
agitation broadened and intensified, first in Baghdad then in other parts of the country 
especially in Najaf. When the situation got out of hand the Regent asked the chief of 
staff of the army, General Nur-ud-Din Mahmud to form a new government: 
91 Batatu, Social Classes, p. 546. 
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Within hours he proclaimed martial law, dissolved the opposition 
parties, locked up their leaders, and ordered arrests all over 
Baghdad. But the real power of the insurrectionary crowds, the 
invisible Communist party centre, remained intact. On the 
morning of 24 November, therefore, the demonstrations, now 
decrying the `dictatorship of the English spy Nur-ud-Din 
Mahmud, ' began again, and did not subside until the evening, 
when troops opened fire on the crowds in the plebeian quarter of 
Bab-ish-Shaikh and killed eighteen and wounded eighty-four.... 
By the end of November, in the entire country 958 persons had 
been thrown into 
3jail, 
2041 temporarily detained and 2 
condemned to death. 9 
Faisal II 
Upon the ascension of King Faisal II to the throne in 1953, his maternal uncle the 
Regent continued to pull the strings from behind the scenes, relying heavily on the 
services of Nuri Sa'id. Fearing a Nasserite type, or Communist inspired coup, Nuri 
strove to strengthen even further Iraq's ties with the Western powers on whose support 
the security of the regime depended. When, in 1955, the 1930 Treaty expired, having 
run its full course of twenty-five years, Nuri along with the Shah of Iran and other - 
Western oriented countries in the region (Turkey and Pakistan) entered into a close 
alliance with Britain through the Baghdad Pact Organisation. This and other unpopular 
measures, such as the hastily declared merger of the Hashemite kingdoms of Iraq and 
Jordan into the Arab Union which was basically intended to counter-balance the United 
Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria, only increased popular opposition and etched even 
deeper the feelings of resentment among wider segments of the society. 
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With the possible exception of General Nur Aldin Mahmud, who had relied heavily on 
the army to confront demonstrators and quell agitation, Iraqi governments before and 
after him, normally resorted to the police forces to deal with mass protests and 
demonstrations. 96 During the troubled fifties, when the army was called in it was 
usually to act as a peace keeper whose main task was to separate the conflicting parties 
rather than as an authoritarian instrument of suppression. When, for example, during the 
Suez crisis almost all students and workers in Baghdad and other cities demonstrated 
against Nun Sa'id in support of Nasser only tear gas, as opposed to live ammunition, 
was fired in the air and protesters were peacefully evicted from their entrenched 
positions in schools and colleges. 
Following the signing of the Baghdad Pact in 1955, popular opposition manifested 
itself in practically all aspects of Iraqi life: strikes, demonstrations, graffiti, walkouts 
and other forms of protest were resorted to. The price for corruption, nepotism and 
disregarding popular sentiments and aspirations was to be paid dearly. The social, 
economic and political tensions, which had been growing, finally exploded in 1958.97 
The Organisation of the so-called Free Officers took the initiative by plotting a military 
take-over. On 1e July 1958 the Hashemite regime was toppled and the key figure in 
the history of monarchist Iraq, Nuri Sa'id, was killed by an angry mob. 98 
Iraq Under Qassim (1958-1963) 
The military coup of 1958 was championed by Brigadier Abdul-Karim Qassim and 
Colonel Abdul-Salam Aref. These two allies took advantage of the orders given to them 
% Al-Hasson, Struggle for Power, p. 153. 
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by Nuri Said, who had been "alarmed by the growing crisis in Lebanon and the enmity 
of the UAR" to proceed to Jordan, in order to reinforce Iraq's partner in the hastily 
declared Arab Union. 99 Instead of continuing their journey from Baghdad which they 
had reached in the early hours of dawn, they attacked the Royal Residence and captured 
the Baghdad Broadcasting Station. Colonel Abdul-Salam Aref personally read 
Communique No. I in which the fate of the Hashemite Kingdom was sealed and a new 
republic was declared. 
Mindful of the complexities and legal wrangling following the Egyptian coup against 
King Farouq who was deposed and deported and also of the Bakr Sidqi coup during 
which the Regent left the country temporarily only to return victoriously and crush the 
Rashid Ali regime, the "Free Officers" decided to finish off the question of succession 
to the throne by shooting members of the royal family as they surrended to the rebels. 100 
Brigadier Qassim appointed himself prime minister, Commander in Chief of the Armed 
Forces as well as Minister of Defence. A three-man Council of Presidency made up of a 
Sunni (Nejib Al-Rubai'i), a Shi'a (Muhammad Mahdi Kubbah) and a Kurd (Khalid Al- 
Naqshabandi) was entrusted with the task of head of state. 
At first the 1958 coup was quite popular. People poured on to the streets of Baghdad to 
hail the rebels, offer assistance and respond to the officers' call to "attack imperialism 
and its agents", although many were driven by curiosity "to see the world turned upside 
down and, in some cases to exact a violent revenge on figures and symbols of the 
Hashemites and their British patrons"lol One result of the popular response to the 
" Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 146. 
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rebels' call was the massacre of the young King, his uncle Prince Abdul Ilah, Nuri Sa'id 
as well as Ibrahim Hashim, the Jordanian Prime Minister of the newly created Arab 
Union, who happened to be on an official Visit . 
102 The first republican cabinet included 
a wide variety of political orientations. Supporting the zealous officers was a loose 
grouping of Communists, Ba'thists, National Democrats, Arab Nationalists and 
independents. But the honeymoon period came to a bloody end and over the four and a 
half years which followed Qassim lost the support of each these parties and 
groupings. 103 
The failure of Qassim's internal policy was only matched by that of his foreign policy. 
While for different reasons the Ba'thists, Kurds, Communists, Arab nationalists and 
above all his fellow "free officers" deserted him and consistently conspired to 
overthrow him, regional and international opposition to his erratic handling of Iraqi 
relations, with the outside world, except perhaps the USSR, was steadily mounting. 
Nasser's mammoth propaganda machine was, on top of this, inciting the Iraqi and Arab 
masses to stand up to Qassim's policies. Nasser's anti-Qassim campaign was comprised 
of vitriolic radio propaganda and covert operations led by the UAR's intelligence 
agencies operating out of the Northern Province[Syria]. 
'°4 There were of course many 
reasons behind Nasser's antagonism towards the Qassim regime. As Andrew Rathmell 
points out, 
Nasser felt threatened by Qassim's regime, both because it stole some 
of his `anti-imperialist' limelight and because he feared that Qassim 
was an instrument of the Communists who hoped to detach Iraq from 
102 Alawi, Qassim, pp. 36-7. 
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the Arab world and use it as a base for further encroachment in the 
region. '°5 
Qassim's threat to invade Kuwait which, like King Ghazi before and Saddam Hussein 
later, he claimed to be part of Iraq, brought the country to the verge of military 
confrontation not only with the Arab armies which hastened to the defence of the newly 
independent, oil rich state but also with the United Kingdom which also sent troops to 
defend the ex-British protectorate. 
Qassim's main problem was that he had no clear strategy or vision except perhaps 
his rather quixotic quest to build an "immortal republic". His popularity plummeted so 
dramatically and so fast that anti-Qassim demonstrations began to take place just a few 
months after he had been hailed by the masses as a saviour: 
The first to abandon him was the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, then 
the Independence Party. He then differed with the Communist 
Party and parted ways with the National Democrats. The 
Independent Democrats then resigned their ministerial posts 
followed by Kurdish Democratic Party. The national leader was 
left with no National Front. ... 
Abul Karim Qassim considered his 
Revolution to be the proper substitute for all political parties and 
movements and that it was incumbent upon the political leaders to 
follow his leadership. 106 
Qassim's regime, it must be remembered, was born with a most serious defect: the 
extreme fragmentation of the officer corps who lacked `cohesion and organisation due, 
amongst other things, to the movement's relatively short gestation period'. 107 With the 
passage of time Qassim became totally isolated and many of his fellow officers tried 
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several times to oust him or even assassinate him. 108 Qassim's urban upbringing and 
his lack of `traditional familial or regional networks of allegiance' deprived him of the 
broad base of support indispensable for survival. '09 
An attempt on his life masterminded by the Ba'thists, in which the then 22 years old 
Saddam Hussein played a leading part, caused permanent damage to his left arm and 
almost killed him. Soon after he was left with practically no supporters except a handful 
of officers and some segments of Shi'as who felt that he was not as Sectarian as the old 
monarchist rulers had been. In February 1963 a group of nationalist and Ba'thist 
officers staged a successful coup and after a two hour trial executed him in the presence 
of his erstwhile soul mates and colleagues of the Free Officers Organisation. 
The 1963 coup and after 
The leaders of the coup then invited none other than Abdul Salam Aref, who had been 
Qassim's right hand man and deputy, to assume the office of President of the Republic. 
The 1963 coup was immediately followed by a period of severe repression particularly 
against the Communists. "" Although he was careful to appear more Nasserite than 
Nasser himself, Aref was in fact a conservative pragmatist. Despite the many 
differences between the personalities, leadership style and programmes, Qassim and 
Aref were similar in more than one vital point: like the regime it supplanted, Aref tried 
hard to concentrate power in his own hands: 
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Following the example of Qassim, Aref emerged as the 
strong man of a military regime. Like him he had no 
intention whatsoever of anchoring the legitimacy of his 
power in a parliamentary and democratic system. But in 
contrast to Qassim, he did not try to play off one party 
against another, but quite simply proceeded to effect the 
dissolution of all political parties, no longer relying on the 
hard core of Nasserist officers. "' 
The period from 8th February 1963 to July 30th 1968 is characterised by plots and 
counter-plots. Aref could not tolerate the excesses of the conspiratorial Ba'thists, who 
considered themselves above the law. When, in November 1963, the situation 
deteriorated into a stand-off between the armed forces and the `national guards', whose 
allegiance was to the party rather than the state, Aref stepped in. Rallying the armed 
forces behind him, Aref succeeded in expelling the Ba'thists and their sympathisers 
from power. 
Shortly after that a number of unsuccessful coup attempts were staged against Aref, 
particularly by the ousted Ba'thists. During this troubled period, Saddam Hussein, 
whose 1959 attempt on Qassim and subsequent escape across the desert into Syria had 
made him into something of a legend, quickly rose from amongst the rank and file of 
the Ba'th party to become in 1964 member of the Regional Command Council. From 
his underground hideouts Saddam continued to consolidate his position and reunite the 
party in order that it might be better prepared to seize power at the first available 
opportunity: 
Plans for coup attempts against Aref were scheduled for mid 
September 1964 at the latest; in one plan, Saddam would lead a group 
of armed Ba'thists to assassinate the entire Iraq leadership during a 
cabinet meeting; in another, Aref's plane would be shot down. Both 
IttM Chartouni-Dubarry, Internal Politics, p. 27. 
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schemes were uncovered by the Iraqi secret services, resulting in 
further repression of the Ba'th and its leadership. 112 
Aref however survived all of these attempts only to die suddenly on an April day 
1966 in a helicopter crash under suspicious circumstances. 113 Abdul-Salam's elder 
brother Abdul-Rahman Aref, an undistinguished military officer, was then hastily 
declared President. Under his rather weak and unenlightened leadership, divisions 
and factionalism became rife amongst the armed forces and morale eroded. 
Less repressive than the Qassim or the first Aref regimes, Abdul Rahman did not, or 
rather could not, muzzle the opposition. Communists, Nasserites and especially 
Ba'thists showed signs of reborn strength and aggressiveness. These actively and 
almost openly conspired to topple his fragile regime, particularly after the 
humiliating Arab defeat at the hands of the Israelis during the June (Six-Day) war in 
1967 which most political parties blamed on their regimes for their lack of 
preparation. 
Exploiting the sense of frustration and bitterness felt by the Iraqis and indeed the 
Arabs as a whole, the Ba'thists, who had never forgiven themselves for letting power 
slip from their hands in November 1963, redoubled their efforts to restore what 
Abdul Salam Aref and his cronies in the army had snatched from them. Their 
ceaseless efforts won over a handful of overly ambitious and disgruntled army 
officers including Abdul Razzaq Al-Nayef, chief of military intelligence and his 
friend Abdul-Rahman Al-Dawood. This man held the sensitive post: of commander 
112 Simons, From Sumer to Saddam, p. 276. 
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of the Republican Guards, who swiftly managed to overthrow the government on 
17th July 1968 in what the rebels called a `white revolution". "4 The task was made 
quite easy as the regime of Abdul-Rahman Aref was widely perceived to be both 
inefficient and corrupt. General Ahmed Hasan Al-Bakr, who was Prime Minister in 
the first Ba'thist government, became President. 
Ba'thist Iraq Under the Al-Bakr-Saddam Hussein Alliance (1968-1979) 
On 17 July 1968, the deposed president Aref was exiled and two weeks later on 30th 
July the non-Ba'thist leaders, Al-Nayif and Al-Dawoud"5 were removed from office 
in what was described as a correctionist revolutionary move. In so doing the 
Ba'thists ensured that they had a total monopoly of power. Although Ahmad Hasan 
Al-Bakr occupied the post of President of the Republic and Chairman of the 
Revolutionary Command Council, the daunting task of running the government and 
its security was entrusted to the Deputy Chairman, Saddam Hussein, whose secretive 
henchmen and loyal security apparatus formed a solid power base upon which he 
could rely 'in the years immediately after the coup and also later when he became 
better equipped to take over the Presidential Palace. 
' 16 
Barely a few weeks passed before Saddam embarked upon a systematic process of 
eliminating his opponents. These included any figure who might one day pose the 
slightest threat to his position. To avoid waging war on internal and external fronts at 
13 Faisal Hassoun, Masra'Al MushirAl Rukkun Abdul Salam Aref Hal Kana Mu'amara am min sun' 
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the same time, Saddam started by either taming or eliminating potential contenders 
within his party first. Those included military officers towards whom the young 
revolutionary felt a kind of inferiority complex, as his dream of joining the military 
academy had been frustrated when he was denied admission. There were also those 
civilian members of the party whose stature and popularity he feared might prove 
more than a thorn in his side. 
The two military generals who stood in his way were Hardan Al-Tikriti and Salih 
Mahdi Ammash both of whom had played decisive roles in the 1963 and 1968 
coups. The two generals felt that Saddam was taking more than his share of power 
but were unable to stop his steady rise as he enjoyed the full confidence and support 
of President Ahmad Hasan Al-Bakr. In time the two men were stripped of their 
military positions and ordered to leave the country and take up diplomatic posts: 
Hardan as ambassador to Morocco, Ammash to the Soviet Union. The first, who was 
reputed for his dashingness and strong-headedness decided against the express wish 
of Al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein, to leave his diplomatic post and return to Baghdad. 
Upon his arrival in Kuwait for a medical check up, it was widely rumoured in 
Baghdad that he was preparing to seize power. "? He was assassinated at the entrance 
to the Hospital by four unidentified gunmen whose identities remain `unknown". 
The latter, Salih Mahdi Ammash, continued to serve as ambassador until he died 
mysteriously in Finland in 1984 having just returned from Baghdad to which he had 
been recalled for urgent consultation. 
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On the civilian front there were many potential rivals. Of these two major opponents 
seemed to have threatened Saddam's position: Abdul-Karim Al-Sheikhli who served 
as Iraq's Foreign Minister and Ambassador to the United Nations during the late 
sixties and early seventies was murdered in full view of passers-by near his home in 
Al-Adhamiya in 1976.118 The other is Abdul-Khaliq Al-Samarra'i who had won 
young Saddam to the Ba'th Party in the mid fifties. Al-Samarra'I, who was highly 
respected for his integrity, humility and principled postures, was at first sentenced to 
life imprisonment with hard labour then executed in 1979 on charges of treason. 
Other party leaders who were dropped from membership of the Revolution 
Command Council, the highest governing body in the land include: Abdulla 
Salloum, who was first sent to India in 1971 as ambassador and then thrown in jail, 
and Izzat Mustafa the influential physician who provided money and refuge to the 
Ba'thists in the pre-1968 coup days. He was also stripped of all party and 
government posts-' 19 
Nadhim Gazzar's Coup 
In his unabated drive to impose his leadership on the party and through the party on 
the country, it cannot be said that Saddam Hussein's way was smooth and easy. 
Among the serious contenders for the leadership of the party who almost succeeded 
in snatching power from the Saddam Hussein and Hassan Al-Bakr alliance was the 
fearless and impulsive Shi'a chief of police Nadhim Gazzar. Gazzar had a reputation 
for ruthlessness in his dealings with the regime's opponents, who included the 
"$ S. Henderson, Instant Empire: Saddam Hussein's Ambition for Iraq (San Francisco: Mercury 
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Communists, the Nasserites, the Syrian-oriented (dissident) Ba'thists and of course 
members of the Kurdish movements. 
It is often stated that Gazzar's major grievance against the Party leadership was that 
he considered their attitude to the Communists and Kurds too soft to achieve 
settlement and called for harsher methods to be adopted against them. It seems 
however that Gazzar, like Hardan Al-Tikriti and Salih Mahdi Ammash before him, 
thought that Saddam Hussein was taking more than the lion's share of power. He 
also felt that the Tikriti influence was growing greater and greater with each day and 
that the services he was rendering to the regime were not fully appreciated. 120 To 
remove Saddam Hussein and Al-Bakr from power Gazzar had at first to secure 
control over the army and police. To that end, he duped the Ministers of Defence and 
of the Interior to visit a newly established counter-espionage compound outside 
Baghdad. Upon arrival they were taken hostage. Gazzar had earlier stationed a police 
unit at the airport with orders to open fire at Saddam Hussein and Al-Bakr upon 
arrival from a state visit abroad. When by sheer accident the plane did not arrive on 
time the plotters panicked believing the conspiracy had been discovered. Seven days 
later Gazzar and twenty co-plotters were executed. 121 
Saddam Hussein Consolidates Power 
During the early years of Ba'th rule Saddam Hussein continued to pay lip service to 
the National and Democratic Front which included the Communist Party, the Kurds, 
Nationalists and Independents. But Saddam Hussein viewed all participants in the 
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Front as a "rubber stamps". While he succeeded in winning over a number of 
independents, nationalists and Kurds, the Communists proved difficult to deal with. 
Ba'th relations with the Communist Party reached a crisis point in 1976 when 
Tareeq Al-Sha'ab (The People's Path), the official party organ, was banned. Later on 
a number of junior military officers and young recruits were executed because of 
their affiliation with the Communist Party. 
While dismantling all potential circles of opposition, Saddam Hussein was at the 
same time diligently but quietly assigning one sensitive post after another to 
members of his family or to his Tikriti clan. He did not rest until by 1977, he had 
"complete power over the party, the army, the security services, the courts - over all 
the organs of the Iraqi state'. 122 
Saddam Hussein's populist policies, on the other hand, succeeded in producing a 
somewhat favourable impact on many Shi'as who, except for a handful landowners 
and merchants, had been economically depressed. He embarked upon extensive tours 
of the Shi'a towns and villages, handing out cash presents and granting demands for 
expansion in public works and social services. His huge propaganda machines also 
pictured him as a defender of the poor and needy in society. Saddam however 
angered the Shi'as when, during the late seventies, he felt strong enough to challenge 
the Shi'a age-old tradition of celebrating the annual anniversary of the death of 
Hussein, Prophet Muhammad's cousin. Clashes between Shia demonstrators and 
security forces often erupted and in February 1977 army troops were called to quell 
the Khan Al-Nuss anti-government demonstrations. In that ominous incident in 
122 Simons, From Sumer to Saddam, pp. 284-85. 
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which the Shi'a clergy played a major role,. some pilgrims were killed and 2000 
people were arrested including the influential Muhammad Baqir Al-Haqim. Some of 
those detainees appeared before a special court set up to investigate the incidents. 
Eight religious leaders were executed and fifteen sentenced to life imprisonment. 123 
From 1979 onwards, Hizb AI-Da'wah AI'Islamiya (the Islamic Call Party) which 
was headed by the spiritual leader Muhammad Baqir Al-Sadir was blamed for a 
number of terrorist attacks, bombing raids and assassination attempts on Ba'thist 
leaders such as Tariq Aziz and Michael Aflaq (both of whom incidentally are 
Christian) 124 as well as conducting suicide missions against government buildings 
housing such sensitive organisations as the Baghdad Broadcasting Station, the Air 
Force Command Headquarters, the Iraqi News Agency and the Ministry of Planning. 
In reprisal, thousands upon thousands of Shi'as were imprisoned, tortured or 
altogether liquidated. Others were literally thrown at the Iraq-Iran border or were 
issued with a one-way ticket and forcibly deported. The head of Da'wah Party was 
arrested several times and was later executed with his sister Bint Al-Huda in April 
1980.125 
Iraq Under President Saddam Hussein (1979 - the Present day) 
When, on 16 July 1979, President Ahmad Hasan Al-Bakr officially resigned or was 
pushed to resign few people doubted who his successor would be. Less than two 
123 Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship 
(London: L. B. Tauris, 1990), pp. 198-9. 
124 Upon Aflaq's death in 1989, the government of Iraq issued an impassioned and obviously cynical 
obituary in which it declared that Aflaq had converted to Islam years before his death. See A1- 
Jumhouria March 26th 1989. 
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weeks after his assumption of power as President, Saddam Hussein announced the 
discovery of a plot against him. Within days, twenty two senior party leaders were 
found guilty and executed. With this gory inauguration Saddam Hussein forced all 
opposition to go underground and take exceptional care in developing a viable 
defence mechanism in order to guard against total destruction. Many opposition 
leaders, Shi'a Islamists, Communists as well as nationalists, took advantage of the 
deteriorating relations between Baghdad and Damascus and took refuge in Syria 
which Saddam Hussein had accused of engineering a coup against him. 
The Shi'as were particularly disappointed to discover that Saddam Hussein whom 
they had considered less sectarian and prejudiced against them than his predecessor, 
was even more intent on frustrating Shi'a aspirations and on wiping out any influence 
their religious leaders might have over their traditional strongholds such as Najaf and 
Karbala, and the southern regions of the country in general. Saddam's fears of Shi'a 
agitation grew following the success of the Iranian Revolution in the early weeks of 
1979. He became quite nervous and embarked upon a systematic policy that sought 
to discredit even further Shi'a community and religious leaders. At the same time he 
"began praying with greater frequency, at both Shi'a and Sunni shrines". 126 
When in the summer of 1979, Ayatullah Muhammad Baqir Al-Sadr requested that he 
lead a procession to Tehran to congratulate Khomeini on behalf of the Iraqi Shi'as, 
permission was denied and close surveillance of the movements of Shi'a leaders was 
ordered. Thousands of Iraqi Shi'as, whose fathers and grandfathers were born on 
lu Sheikh Muhammad Naman Al-Ramadhani, Al-ShaheedAl-Sadir; SanawatAl Mihna waAyyam Al- 
Hisar (Martyr Al-Sadir: The Years of Predicament and Days of Blockade) (Qum: A1-Matba'a Al- 
Ilmiya, 1996), p. 324. 
126 Simons, From Sumer to Saddam, p. 309. 
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Iraqi soil were summarily deported and their property confiscated on the grounds 
that they were of Iranian origin. There was of course an economic dimension to these 
drastic measures. The Shi'as had, by tradition, controlled most of the activities of the. 
private sector. By deporting those of Taba'iya Iraniya (Iranian extraction), Saddam 
Hussein's regime was also trying to "liberate" the Iraqi economy from the "clutch" of 
the merchants who were perceived as potential enemies of the state. Although the 
coffers of the regime were overflowing with petrodollars, the assets seized were used 
to buy loyalty from rural Sunnis and Tikritis, especially those working for the 
General Intelligence and Security 'agencies. The discovery of a number of 
assassination attempts on leading Iraqi officials further undermined relations 
between Tehran and Baghdad. 127 
Border skirmishes steadily grew in August and September 1980 and Saddam 
Hussein announced the abrogation of the 1975 Treaty which, among other things, 
partitioned the Shatt Al-Arab waterway along the "thalweg line". Following Iran's 
rejection of this move the war of'words was abandoned in favour of an all out war 
that began in late September 1980 and did not end until 8t` of August 1988.128 
The impact on the lives of the two peoples was immense. In Iraq hundreds of 
thousands of young men lost their lives on the war fronts. Although at the end of 
hostilities the Iraqi government promised to publish the figures relating to the 
number of people killed, wounded or lost, it has not yet made good on its promise. 
Obviously it is too embarrassed to do so. One tragic result of the war against Iran 
was the destruction of Iraqi infrastructure and the collapse of the Iraqi economy: 
121 Yitzhak Nakash, The Shi'as of Iraq (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 137-38. 
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Oil revenues were stagnant, despite several new pipelines. On the 
other side of the balance sheet, Iraq's suppliers, after seven years 
of accepting delayed payments for goods, were being tougher in 
demanding repayment for old debts, and meaner in offering new 
credits. The country was desperately short of money.... [the] 
deficit was more than half of what Iraq was expected to earn from 
oil. The country either had to boost production by 40 percent, and 
hope that the price remained constant, or seek a 40 percent 
increase in oil prices. '29 
The social and economic dislocations caused by the war had not been healed, or even 
addressed, before Saddam Hussein miscalculated yet again in ordering his military 
commanders to invade Kuwait. It was only natural that Saddam Hussein would 
consider such an adventurous course of action in order to lessen, if not bring to a 
speedy conclusion, his dire economic problems. 
Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait did not come as a total surprise to the West. 
As Simon Henderson points out, `the backdoor thinkers and analysts' in Washington 
who had access to diplomatic correspondence and intelligence reports saw Iraq's 
annoyance and edginess and drew attention to Iraq's continuous pressure on Kuwait 
and cautioned against a possible attack by the Republican Guards. 
130 Saddam 
Hussein had hoped that seizing the rich tiny state which previous Iraqi rulers had 
claimed before him as an Iraqi territory, would meet his desperate need for funds and 
end the economic crisis that was strangling the regime. 
Simons, From Sumer to Saddam, p. 310. 
Simon Henderson, Instant Empire: Saddam Hussein's Ambition for Iraq (San Francisco: Mercury 
House, 1991), p. 219. 
130 Ibid., pp. 217-18. See also Wafiq Al-Samarra'i, Hattam Al-Bawwaba Al-Sharqiyq (Destroyer of the 
Eastern Gateway) (Kuwait: Dar Al-Qabas, 1997), p. 218. 
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On 2°d August 1990 he ordered his generals to lead the army into Kuwait. The order 
was based on a number of naive and unrealistic assumptions. 131 It was kept even 
from the Minister of Defence, Chief of Staff and Director of Military Intelligence. 132 
More than any other decision he had taken before, the invasion of Kuwait brought 
upon even more catastrophes on his people and indeed on the neighbouring Gulf 
states. 133 The price for his rash policies is still being paid by his people who have 
been asked again and again to suffer economic privations in every aspect of their 
fives. 134 What aggravated the suffering of the Iraqi people even more was the 
corruption and mismanagement of their economy. Their rich resources had, since 
Saddam Hussein came to power, been squandered on costly military projects such as 
the Tammuz nuclear reactor, which was destroyed in an Israeli air raid in 1981, the 
purchase of sophisticated French and Russian military aircraft that were either shot 
down during Desert Storm or flown to Iran which later refused to return them, or on 
such expensive "capers" as the super gun which the United Nations Special 
Committee for the elimination of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction broke into 
pieces - at Baghdad's own expense. 
135 According to a report by the U. S. Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency, the value of arms transfers to Iraq between 1984 
and 1988 exceeded $29 billion. 136 In accordance with UN resolutions Iraq is obliged 
to pay billions of dollars in reparation for damages caused by the invasion of Kuwait. 
Most expensive of all, of course, has been the human cost. Thousands of young 
131 A. Baram, 'The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Decision Making in Baghdad' in Amatazia Baram and 
Barry Rubin (eds), Iraq's Road to War (London: MacMillan, 1993), pp. 26-28. 
132 Sa'ad Al-Bazzaz's book, Al leneralat Akhir Man Ya'lam (The Generals Are the Last to Know) 
(London: Dar Al-Hikmeh, 1994) is devoted almost entirely to the discussion of this issue. 
133 Al-Samarra'I, Destroyer, pp. 225-27. 
134 Efraim Karste and Inari Rautsi, Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography (London: Brassey's, 1991), 
226. 
135 Ibid., p. 128. 
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Iraqis were consigned to death at the fronts in Kurdistan, along the Iraqi-Iranian 
borders, in Kuwait and indeed in the prisons and concentration camps throughout the 
country. 
The historical development of the modem state of Iraq points to a number of 
unmistakeable features: 
1. Political violence, whether by the ruling regime or opposition groups, is a 
common phenomenon, while peaceful opposition is not part of the political 
tradition of the country. 
2. Opposition groups 'including Kurds, Communists, Arab nationalists, Shi'a 
fundamentalists, etc., have close ties with foreign powers, whether Arab (e. g. 
Nasser's Egypt), regional (Iran) or international (the USSR and the Eastern bloc). 
3. Although the Iraqis have developed a tradition of opposing foreign domination 
(the Ottomans, then the British), no political tradition for opposing ruling 
regimes has evolved. 
While it is now commonplace to refer to the regime of Saddam Hussein as being 
unmatched in Iraq's history, the fact is that Saddam Hussein's regime is not a new 
phenomenon in Iraqi politics: 
The methods Saddam Hussein has used, some of the values he 
espouses and the political logic of the system that he has established in 
Iraq have all been prefigured in previous regimes to varying degrees. 
Indeed, in many ways they epitomise some of the distinctive 
characteristics of the Iraqi state itself, as process and as structure. 137 
136 Details of purchases and suppliers are given in Henderson, Instant Empire, pp. 174ff. 
137 Tripp, History of Iraq, p. 194. 
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Chanter 2: The Political, Religious, Racial and Class Mau of Modern Iraq 
This chapter aims at providing a general background to the Iraqi scene, in the hope 
that it will throw some light upon the condition of the society in which Iraqi political 
opposition developed. Attention will be paid to the socio-economic factors at work in 
Iraqi political life and to their impact on the opposition movement as a whole. This is 
so that the political behaviour of the opposition may be better understood and new 
insights into Iraqi politics yielded. However, the accent of the discussion will be on 
the racial, religious, ethnic and sectarian diversity and the impact of this diversity on 
the political development of the state. The sectarian Sunni-Shi'a rivalry will be 
discussed in some detail as this rivalry has substantially escalated since the Ba'thists 
seized power in 1968. 
In his A Study in the Nature of the Society of Iraq, Ali Al-Wardi relates an interesting 
story about Alexander the Great. The emperor is rumoured to have complained to his 
tutor, Aristotle, that he found it extremely difficult to govern the unruly 
Mesopotamians and that he was considering exterminating all the inhabitants of the 
Land Between the Two Rivers in order to put an end to the countless troubles they 
were making. According to this legend, Aristotle replied that such a course of action 
would be fruitless: "Even if you succeed in killing all of them, you will not change 
the air in that region which infused them with that nature and gave them their traits. 
Besides", said the philosopher, "after their death, don't you know that whoever comes 
to live in that region will surely acquire the same qualities and behave the same 
Way ". 138 The story, as Al-Wardi notes, is probably a fabrication. Nevertheless it is 
138 All Al-Wardi, Dirasa F1 Tabiy'at Al Mujtama' A! Iraqi (A Study in the Society of Iraq) (Tehran: 
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often cited to indicate that the rebellious spirit and discontented and unruly nature of 
the Iraqis go as far back as the days of Alexander. 
There are of course a number of factors which made Iraq, perhaps more than any 
other country in the Middle East, a significant seat of political turmoil, agitation and 
repression in that part of the world. In order to explain this `phenomenon', it has 
become almost axiomatic, especially among scholars with Shi'a sympathies, to assert 
that the country has, since its creation, suffered from a most serious disease which has 
been plaguing its political scene and which has caused an ever widening gulf between 
ruler and ruled. That disease is the monopoly of power by a minority which has 
consistently resorted to the threat and, indeed, brutal use of force in order to impose 
itself on the majority of the people. 139 
Sunni Arab hegemony in modern Iraq, was for a number of reasons, both historical 
and expedient. When the Sunni Ottomans ruled Iraq, most administrative posts were 
almost exclusively entrusted to fellow-Sunnis. This biased attitude strengthened and 
entrenched the Sunnis not only in the government machinery but also in other vital 
areas of Iraqi public life. Following the defeat of the Ottomans in Iraq, the new rulers, 
the British, found it expedient to employ the functionaries of the ancient regime on 
whom they could rely to run the affairs of the newly created state. In short, the power 
wielded by the Arab Sunnis has always been much greater than their proportion 
would entitle them. It is therefore understandable why the majority of Iraqis, be they 
Shi'as, Kurds or other ethnic or religious groups, feel estranged from the domain of 
the state and grow up full of contempt and suspicion for everything that whiffed of 
Intisharat Al-Maktabah AI-Haidariya, 1996), p. 366. 
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the central government. This hostile attitude to what is often seen as a Sunni 
institution is often reflected in the readiness of the non-Sunni Arabs to embrace 
revolutionary ideologies and support opposition movements and parties. The 
proportion of the non-Sunni Arab Iraqis in opposition has, since the creation of the 
modern state, been much higher than their actual proportion in society and many of 
the militant movements have, as Batatu points out, been led by non-Sunnis. l4° 
It is now commonplace to say that until the turn of the century "the Iraqis were not 
one people or one political community" 41 and that in this unstable country the only 
stable phenomena are sectarianism and factionalism. 142 Like Lebanon, but on a much 
larger scale, Iraqi society is characterised by deeply rooted differences which run 
along social, religious, ethnic and linguistic lines. It is composed of sizeable and 
distinct groups. On the social and cultural levels, there are the urbanites and the tribal 
communities, each with its own ideals and code of ethics and attitudes. Like the 
inhabitants of many of the Middle Eastern states, which were mapped out by Britain 
and France, and in the absence of any real identification with a nation state, the Iraqis 
continued to "identify with their immediate social units, such as kin, sect, tribe, 
village, town or quarter". 143 
The immense economic and political changes which have been at work in Iraq 
throughout much of the twentieth century makes the task of providing a concrete 
139 Al-Uzri, The problem of Government, p. 345. 
140 Among other things, Batatu studies the revolutionary movements in Iraq including the Communist, 
People's and Ba'th Parties from this angle and provides detailed percentages and biographical data 
relating to the leadership of both parties. Batatu, Social Classes, pp. 422,424ff. 
"' Batatu, Social Classes, p. 13. 
142 Hassn Al-Alawi, Al- Shia Wa Al-Dawla Al-Qawmmiya 1914-1990 (The Iraqi Shia and the State 
1914-1990) (London: Dar Al Zamora', 1990), p. 11. 
143 Peter Sluglett and MarionFarouk-Sluglett, "Sunnis and Shi'as Revisited: Sectarianism and Ethnicity 
in Authoritarian Iraq", in Hopwood, et at (eds), Power and Society, p. 75. 
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analysis of class, in the words of Hanna Batatu who attempted to do just that, "an 
extremely difficult undertaking"-144 The dislocations and social upheaval which came 
as a result of strategies instituted by the governments of Ba'thist Iraq, or of a 
protracted state of war be it against Iran, the international coalition or the Kurds 
accelerated the rate at which the social map has changed. There were other factors 
which contributed to changes in Iraqi society. These include : 
the rapid build up of monarchic state institutions, the world-wide 
depression of 1929, the land settlement policies of 1932 and 1938, 
the severe shortages and the spiral inflation during the Second 
World War and in the immediate post-war years, the mass exodus of 
the Jews in the late forties and fifties, the sudden inpouring of oil 
money after 1952, and the fourfold increase of the population of 
Baghdad between 1922 and 1957 - there were comparatively swift 
movements into and out of the [social] classes. There were also 
abrupt shifts within them in an upward or downward direction. In 
these movements and shifts were involved not only individuals and 
families, but whole groups. '45 
Population 
The population of modem Iraq grew from 3.5 million in 1932 to 6.3 million in 1957 
and to 16.2 million in 1987. "It is estimated that today [1994], it stands at 22 million, 
more than 70 per cent of whom dwell in urban areas". '46 However, despite the facade 
of "civilisation" - tall buildings, super highways and the like, Iraqi society is still 
responsive to a number of social and cultural forces which pull at it in every direction. 
This multi-faceted tension is not unique to Iraq. All societies pass through such 
phases at one point or other. But what distinguishes the Iraqi experience is its 
144 Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study oflraq's 
Old Landed and Commercial Classes and Its Communists, Ba'thists, and Free Officers (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 5. 
145 Batatu, Social Classes, p. 5. 
146 Taqreer Wazarat Al-Takhtit Hawla Anmat Al-Nummu Al-Sukkani fi Al-Iraq ministry of planning 
Report on Patterns of Population Growth in Iraq), (Baghdad: Ministry of Planning, 1994). 
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intensity and its far-reaching consequences. The bloody struggle to maintain power 
and indeed monopolise it, especially following the 1968 coup, which brought Saddam 
Hussein to power, has left its stamp on the racial map of the country. The forced 
eviction of Kurds particularly along the Iraq-Iran border, the massive Christian 
emigration to the West in the late eighties and early nineties, the deportation of 
thousands of Iraqis of Persian extraction have all had their mark, not only on the 
composition of the Iraqi society, but also on their sense of nationhood and belonging. 
Bedouin vs. Urban 
Generally speaking, the Iraqis have been living under `two conflicting sets of social 
values: the Bedouin values which come from the adjacent deserts, and the civilised 
values emanating from its ancient civilisations', 147 According to Iraq's prominent 
sociologist All Al-Wardi, the Iraqis may be described as a "bewildered people in that 
two roads in opposite directions he before them but they are obliged to take both 
roads at the same time. Unable to do so, they feel compelled to take one road for a 
time, only to get back and take the other at another time". Bedouinism, which is the 
complete antithesis of urban, Western-defined civilisation, has its own ideals and 
values that are deeply rooted in the traditions, attitudes and practices dictated by the 
desert. For bedouinism is in fact "synonymous with the desert and it would be 
difficult for nations that do not inhabit deserts to adopt bedouinism as a social 
system". 148 
147 Al-Wardi, Study in the Society, p. 12. 
1481bid., p. 12. 
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The basic difference between civilisation as it is known in the developed world and 
bedouinism is that bedouinism averts and abhors authority, in any form or shape, 
especially that of the central government and indeed that of the state as a whole, while 
at the same time it tends to attach great importance to tribalism and the sense of 
belonging to one's own clan or tribe. To the Bedouin, the central government is 
nothing but an "apparatus the main duty of which is oppression and tax collection". On 
the other hand, the Bedouin's tribe, clan or extended family is seen to be the ultimate 
refuge and safe haven. Furthermore, while the Bedouins feel it is shameful and indeed 
dishonourable to be subjected to the state to which they also have to pay taxes, they 
consider raiding and looting to be acts of valour, deserving praise and respect. This 
refusal to acknowledge the legitimacy of the state is at the heart of the Bedouin social 
culture. Another aspect of bedouinism is the low regard with which it views people 
who earn a living through a specific craft or occupation. Al-Wardi points out that the 
Arabic word mihna which means "occupation" or "profession" is derived from the 
same roots of imtahana which means to "despise and disrespect". 149 
Despite the fact that the central government in Iraq has, over the last half century or 
so, succeeded in spreading the rule of "law and order" over much of the land, most 
Iraqis have not yet overcome the old Bedouin attitude characterised by suspicion and 
distrust towards government. This attitude is so deeply etched in the national 
consciousness of the Iraqis that it will not be easy to change it. Al-Wardi asserts that 
most modem Iraqis still live under the influence of tribalism, which considers it a 
dishonour to appeal to the government for help. This course of action is widely 
considered as "unmanly"' and runs counter to the ideals of independence, courage and 
1491bid 
, p. 13. 
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challenge. Bedouins prefer to take the law into their own hands rather than enlist the 
help of the judiciary or the police. '50 
From the fall of Baghdad in 1258, and for a number of historical reasons related to 
the hegemony of foreign invaders over their country, the Iraqis developed a hostile 
attitude towards their rulers, which developed into a "psychological complex". While 
Bedouin culture rejects and condemns such qualities as arrogance, haughtiness and 
aloofness, the Iraqis found themselves in a position where they had to live with these 
abhorred traits and even show respect to those arrogant superiors and government 
officials who insisted on being treated as masters. This led most people to adopt a 
defence mechanism, which may be described as a hypocritical attitude towards their 
government. A damaging effect of the complex relationship between ruler and ruled 
was the emergence of a certain set of values in which arrogance was associated with 
government - that is strong and effective government. Humility, on the other hand, 
became an indication of weakness. '5' 
The Social Scene: 
The Mallaks 
When the British conquered Iraq, they found it expedient to cultivate good 
relationships with this privileged and influential class in what was then mostly a rural 
society: the tribal chiefs (sheikhs) and the land owners (mallaks). The latter are to be 
found in the cultivable land in the upper mid-Euphrates, the Khalis area and lower 
Diyala and in the fertile tracts between Kirkuk and Mosul. The conquerors relied on 
150Ibid., p. 176. 
151 Ibid., pp. 312-12. 
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this landed class in no small measure for the administration of the countryside, as the 
occupation forces were particularly cost- conscious and wanted to keep expenditure 
to a minimum. 
To illustrate the influence wielded by this social class we have to remember that in 
1958 in the province of Kut, for example 22 people held 82% of Tapu land and 49 
people 73% of Lazma land. '52 The landed class of society was also used as a possible 
counterpoise to the King in case he deviated from the prescribed course of British 
policy. Batatu points out that the British administration was also interested in the 
landowners and sheikhs, who might one day prove useful, '" against the urban 
dwellers who were more politically conscious. '54 
But the landed class did not in fact constitute a homogeneous whole because they 
differed in their class positions, their status, values and social functions. This is true 
of the Arab sheikhs as well as their counterparts, the Kurdish aghas, who also 
dominated great numbers of peasants. While the big land owners were readily 
identified with the British policies in Iraq, the smaller sheikhs in such mid-Euphrates 
areas as Shammiya and Hindiyya were on the whole sympathetic to the ambitions of 
their tribesmen and some even participated in the 1920 Revolt and subsequent 
uprisings against the pro-British monarchy. 
Nuri Sa'id was quick to capitalise on the power of this class and when he founded his 
Hizb AIItihad Al-Dustouri (Constitutional Union Party) in 1949,17 sheikhs and 
152 Tapu and Lazma involved `a conditional alienation of state land to individuals, the right of 
ownership being in theory by the state, the land reverting to it if not used, in the case of tapu for at least 
three years and in the case of lazma for at least four years. However both were heritable tenures and 
both could be transferred by sale to other individuals'. See Batatu, Söcial Classes, p. 55. 
153 Ibid., p. 93. 
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aghas were among the "the higher Committee" of the party which numbered only 
forty-six persons. '" Following the 1958 coup however the power and status of the 
sheikhs and mallaks were undermined by a series of legislations, which aimed at 
stripping them of their land. 
The Peasants 
The peasants who tilled the lands are particularly concentrated in the flow-irrigation 
regions in central and southern Iraq, rather than in the rain-fed areas. Generally 
speaking, before the 1968 coup they lived in a scattered manner and at some distance 
from the fields in which they toiled. In short they led a miserable life in mud or mat 
huts with their cows or buffaloes, surrounded by refuse and often visited by disease. 
Their luxuries in life, as Batatu points out, did not go beyond a little tea and sugar, the 
drink which had since World War I replaced dates as an after-meals sweet. '56 High 
protein and nutritive foodstuffs were not known to them. Since it was widely felt that 
the land tenure system, often referred to in post-1958 Iraq as the `feudal system! "ls7 
was behind the privation and misery of this class, economic planners in Republican 
Iraq embarked on a stringent agrarian reform programme. The new laws took away 
the land from the sheikhs and landowners, albeit against some sort of compensation, 
and gave it almost free to their peasants, in a serious, but as it turned out fruitless 
attempt, to raise their standard of living. The peasants lacked the necessary funds 
required for farming the land. Worse still, the government did nothing to liberate the 
154 Batas Social Classes, pp. 88-9, 
Iss Ibid., p. 104. 
"6 Ibid., p. 140. 
157 Khadduri, Socialist Iraq, p. 117. 
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water supply which was left in the hands of the old owners of the land who, naturally 
enough, made sure that they kept all the land adjacent to rivers and canals. '58 
The Working Class 
The working class, which had grown gradually during the monarchist regime, was in 
a relatively better shape than the peasants. They became more involved in the 
political developments of the country, following the establishment of the Communist 
Party in 1934. With their allies the students, the working class participated in the 
Wathba and Intifada of 1948 and 1952 respectively. The founder of the Communist 
Party, Yusuf Salman Yusuf better known as Fahad, himself a worker, succeeded in 
securing a following among the urban workers so much so that the working class may 
be said to have drifted to the left in the forties and fifties as a result of his 
organisational skills-159 Favourable legislation was introduced to improve the lot of 
the rapidly increasing working class by successive Republican governments. These 
measures included in 1964 the offering to state workers of shares in the profits of the 
nationalised industries. At present, there are what might be described as two working 
classes in Iraq. Those who work in the public sector are government employees and 
are treated as part of the civil service, while those who work in the private sector may 
be called workers and are treated as such by the relevant trade unions. 
The fiddle Class 
Expansion of the school system, particularly during the latter years of the monarchy, 
helped to expand the middle class and enhance its stature and influence. This class is 
158 Salah Hammoudi, "Al-Isiah Al-Ziraee Fil Iraq: Ma Lahu Wa Ma Alaih (Agrarian Reform in Iraq: 
Pros and Cons", A1-Jumhuriya, 2 August 1978, p. 7. 
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made of a medley of what Batatu calls a people with "middling" incomes such as 
tradesmen, small landowners, members of professions, civil servants as well as 
military officers. More politically conscious and public spirited than the other classes, 
the middle class produced the political as well as the military leaders who were to 
play significant parts in the history of modern Iraq. For it was this class that caused 
most of the agitation which Iraq witnessed towards the end of the monarchy and was 
chiefly responsible for staging the numerous coups in Iraq between 1933 and 1968. 
While the monarchy gave the middle class stature, it did not ensure a middle-class 
income to them. Not known for their altruism, the military middle class in Iraq 
resorted through salary increases and lavish allowances to enhance their position in 
society. The civil counterparts of the military middle class, the salaried government 
employees and a large segment of the private sector lived just above the poverty line 
before 1968, after which the state attempted to redress the situation through 
legislation which included pay rises and income tax exemption. By 1980, their 
situation had improved a great deal and the national income in Iraq shifted in favour 
of this class. 160 
The Shi'a 
Statistics on the ethnic distribution of Iraqis are either not available or deliberately 
inaccurate. Lest they prove to be an embarrassment, successive governments of Iraq 
have always been reluctant to publish figures and statistics relating to ethnic or 
religious divisions. With the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war in 1980, publication of the 
159 Batas Social Classes, pp. 485ff. 
160 Ibid., p. 1127 
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Annual General Statistics was discontinued as it was felt that it might contain 
information of strategic value. 
Ethnically, Iraqi society is made up of an Arab majority who are thought to constitute 
approximately four fifths of the population, and Kurds who make up just under 
twenty per cent. There are also the Turkomans and other minorities such as the 
Assyrians, Armenians, Persians, Chaldeans, Sabeans, Yazidis and others. 161 
As far as division along religious lines is concerned, the vast majority of the Iraqis 
are Muslims who are thought to constitute almost 95% of the population. Besides 
them there exist some of the oldest sects in Christianity. Today, those constitute 
perhaps less than two per cent of the population. 162 But the deepest division in Iraqi 
society is that which splits the Muslims of Iraq, whether Arabs, Kurds or Turkomans, 
into Shi'as and Sunnis. 
When the Prophet Muhammad's cousin All, the fourth caliph died in A. D. 661, his 
oldest son Hasan relinquished any claim to the caliphate in deference to Muawiya Bin 
Abi Suflyan. But when Muawiya died, his son Yezid claimed the throne to which he 
was challenged by Ali's second son, Hussein. The resultant battle ended with the 
death of Hussein and his followers in 680 in the Iraqi city of Karbala which has since 
come to be regarded as a holy Shi'a city. The Muslims who continued to support the 
cause of Ali and his descendants came to be known as `Shi'a' (Ar. the `followers', 
`party') of Ali. As the vast majority of Ali's followers were Iraqis, who fought against 
what they considered an attempt on the part of the Ummayed rulers of Syria to 
161 Azri, Al-, Abdul-Karim, MushkilatAl-Hukm F1 Al Iraq (The Problem of Governing Iraq) (London: 
t62IDar 
AI-AI-Hilana, 1991]), p. 343. 
Batatu., Social Classes, p. 40; see also. A-Alawi, Iraqi Shi'a, p. 41. 
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impose their hegemony, a political dimension to the Shia movement was thus 
introduced from the very start. 
Contrary to popular belief, Shi'aism originated not in Iran but in Iraq. 163 However, 
most Iraqi Shi'as are recent converts. 164 Shi'aism in Iraq first acquired a political 
dimension during the seventh century, following the murder of Hussein, son of All Ibn 
Abi Talib at the hands of the army sent by Yezid, Mua'awiya's son. What aggravated 
the alienation and bitterness felt by the Shi'as and deepened even further the Sunni- 
Shi'a rift, however, was the conflict over Iraq between the Sunni Ottomans and their 
Shi'a adversaries, the Persians. 165 This conflict, which further politicised and polarised 
both Shi'as and Sunnis, started during the reign of the Safavid Shah Ismael who 
converted to Shi'aism towards the end of the sixteenth century. Following a series of 
military victories, he forced his subjects to convert to Shi'aism. This, however, does 
not mean that no Shi'as existed before Shah Ismael in Iran. Shi'as were known to have 
lived in the cities of Qum and Nisapur before the establishment of the Safavid 
dynasty. In 1508 Shah Ismael invaded Iraq and embarked upon a systematic policy of 
persecution towards the Sunnis. His soldiers are said to have killed Sunni scholars and 
destroyed their shrines particularly those of Abu Hanifah and Abdul Qadir Al- 
1.166 
Contemporaneous with Ismael was Sultan Selim, known also to the Europeans as 
Selim the Grim. Selim won this title for having shown himself to be violent and 
ruthless in his dealings not only with his adversaries but also with his own immediate 
'63Abdulla Fahad Al-, NafisL DawrAl-Shi'a Fl TatawurAl-IragAl-Siyasi Al-Hadith (The Role of the 
Shi'a in the Development ofModern Iraq) (Beirut: Dar Al Nahar, 1973), pp. 3-4. 
'64 Ibid, p. 4. 
165 Al-Uzri, Problems of Government, p. 346. 
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family. When Selim heard of the atrocities committed by Ismael, he soon appointed 
himself champion of the Sunnis and ordered the murder of the Shi'as within the 
Empire. 
Upon Selim's death, his son Suleiman ascended to the throne. Suleiman, known as the 
Magnificent, was quite different from his father. Upon wresting Iraq from the Persians 
in 1534, he did not even attempt to avenge himself on the Shi'as. Instead he did what 
he could to refurbish all holy shrines, Sunni and Shi'a as well. This wise policy 
however was not to last long. In 1623, the Safavid Abbas managed to retake Iraq. 
With this reconquest, the Sunnis were mercilessly treated and severely prosecuted as 
"hundreds of thousands" of Sunnis [were] massacred and "thousands" of others sold 
into slavery. 167 A few years later, however, the Ottoman Murad IV reconquered Iraq, 
only to treat the Shi'as the way his Persian predecessor had treated the Sunnis, and his 
troops were said to have slaughtered "about 30 000 victims, mostly Persians". 168 
While still under Ottoman rule, Iraq was always under threat from the Persians, who 
frequently effected successful campaigns against this part or that along the extremely 
long borders between Persia and Iraq. It was therefore inevitable that the Iraqi Sunnis 
would come to view the Ottomans as their defenders and liberators while the Shi'as on 
the other hand felt the same thing towards the Persians. This also meant that even 
when Iraq was not involved, as soon as war broke out between the two competing 
empires, the Iraqis would find themselves divided into supporters and opposition, each 
sect hoping its champion would win. Indeed followers of these two sects often 
1" Al-Nafisi, The Role of the Shia, p. 49. 
167 Batatu, Social Classes, p. 15. 
169 Ibid., p. 15. 
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engaged in `wars of words which frequently developed into recriminations and 
accusations of treason and apostasy". 169 
As far as the Arab world of today is concerned, with the possible exception of the tiny 
Gulf state of Bahrain170, Iraq is the only Arab country in the Middle East with a Shi'a 
majority. Although there are no recent statistics to prove it, this is now commonly 
accepted even by the Sunnis themselves. 
Estimates, however, vary. In his The Iraqi Shia and the State 1914-1990, Hassan Al- 
Alawi points out that according to the British-organised 1919 census, the Arab Shi'as 
constituted 55% of the total population of Iraq, while the Sunnis constituted only 19% 
of the Arab population. 171 Yitzhak Nakash speaks of the Shi'as as forming 56 % of the 
Iraqi population in 1932 while Abdul-Karim Al-Uzdi asserts that the Shi'as in 1947 
made up 59.5% of the total population against 19.7% for the Sunni Arabs. 172 Overall, 
it is estimated that today about ninety-five per cent of the population is Muslim. "The 
Kurds account for between fifteen per cent and twenty per cent of the Muslim 
population, the Sunni Arabs for about twenty-five per cent, and the Shi'as for the rest, 
about fifty-five percent.... The remaining five per cent are Christians, Yazidis and 
Sabeans". 173 
169 All Al-Wardi, A Study, p. 130. 
170 The majority of the Yemenis, particularly in the North are Zaidis who though classified as Shiis are 
quite different from mainstream Shi'asm in a number of fundamental issues chief among which is that 
unlike the rest of the Shiis they do not consider the first three caliphs as usurpers of power. See Al- 
Mawsou'a Al Muyassara Fi Al Adyan waAl Mathahib Al Mu'asirah (Encyclopaedia ofReligions and 
Contemporary Beliefs)(Riyadh: Al-Safeer Printing House, 1988), p. 259. 
171 Al-Alawi, Iraqi Shi'as, p. 45. 
172 Hamid AI-Bayati, Shi'at Al Iraq Baina Al-Ta'ifiya Wa Al-Shubuhat (The Shia of Iraq Between 
Sectarianism and Suspicion) (London, Al-Rafid: 1997), p. 51. 
173 Peter Sluglett and Marion Farouk-Sluglett, "Sunnis and Shi'as Revisited", p. 76. 
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With a few exceptions, the Iraqi Shi'as adhere to Imami Shi'aism, also referred to as 
the "Twelvers". The latter name is based on the belief that the only Imams who were 
qualified enough to lead the Muslims were the fourth Caliph All ibn Abi Talib and his 
eleven descendants, of whom Muhammad Al-Mahdi Ibn Al-Hassan Al-Askari is 
believed to have vanished from Samarra to appear at a later time. 174 Among their 
most fundamental articles of faith is the belief that the choice of the Imam (the leader: 
spiritual and temporal) is too important to be left to laymen or even religious men to 
decide. The incumbent Imam must name his successor and it is the duty of all Shi'as to 
heed the word of the `infallible', for according to the Shi'as, the Imam is above error. 
In this connection they cite Prophet Muhammad's specific mention of Ali bin Abi 
Talib as his successor during what has come to be known as the Ghadeer Day. They 
further refer to All bin Abi Talib's naming of his two sons Al-Hassan and Al-Hussein 
as his successors. '" 
Since the disappearance of the twelfth Imam whose "second coming" is still being 
awaited by the Shi'a faithful, the highest religious authority among the Muslim Shi'as 
is temporarily invested in a religious personage known as Al-Mujtehid Al-Akbar (The 
Greatest Scholar), who is seen as the lawful representative of the (vanished or absent) 
Imam. It is within the Mujtehid's power to issue fatwas (religious decrees) on any 
weighty question deemed of significance to the protection of the interests of the Shi'a 
174Encyclopaedia of Religions, p. 301. The Imams are in chronological order ; 1. Ali bin Abi Talib, 2. 
Al-Hassan bin Ali, 3. Al-Hussein bin All, 4. All Zein Al-Abideen bin Al-Hussein, 5. Muhammad Al- 
Baqir bin Ali Zein Al-Abideen, 6. Ja'ffar Al-Sadiq bin Muhammad Al-Baqir, 7. Musa Al-Kadhim bin 
Ja'far Al-Sadiq, 8. All Al-Ridha bin Musa A1-Kadhim, 9. Muhammad Al-Jawad bin All Al-Ridha, 10. 
Ali Al-Nadi bin Muhammad Al-Jawad, 11. Al-Hassan Al-Askari bin All Al-Hadi, 12. Muhammad Al- 
Mahddi bin Al-Hassan Al-Askari. 
17s Al-Nafisi, the Role of the Shia, pp. 22ff. 
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body-politic. 176 Theoretically, the deciding factors in determining the superiority of 
one Mujtehid over another are his breadth of knowledge, piety and probity. In reality 
however, the Mujtehid's own social intelligence and his ability to command a 
following and enhance his popularity through such tactics as winning over the wealthy 
and influential have become more decisive in securing leadership. nn 
Dissembling 
One of the most important aspects of Shi'aism, which has had a lasting impact on the 
conditions of the Shi'a in Iraq, is their belief in and practice of Tagqiyah (Ar. 
Dissembling). Shi'a vitriolic criticism of the mainstream Sunni jurisprudence, rituals 
and traditions of Islam, and their uncritical bias towards All bin Abi Talib won them 
considerable antagonism across the Islamic world. Taqqiyah was therefore a defence 
mechanism, which the Shi'as felt compelled to use in order to escape danger. 
Dissembling, which was at first resorted to as a necessity, developed with the passage 
of time into an article of faith, which must be adhered to until the "reappearance" of 
the twelfth Imam. Those who abandon Taqqiyah before then stand accused of 
committing a sacrilegious act. The Shi'as base their concept of Taqqiyah on a Qura'nic 
verse which calls upon all believers not to take disbelievers for their friends in 
preference to believers: "Whoso doeth that hath no connection with Allah unless (it 
be) that ye but guard yourselves against them, taking (as it were) security". 178 Shi'a 
clerics also quote their fifth Imam, Jaafar Al-Sadiq as having said: "Dissembling is my 
'76lbida, p. 50. 
177 Nakash, The Shiis of Iraq, p. 209. 
178 The Meaning of the Glorious Qura'n, trans. Muhammad M. Pickthall (New York: The Muslim 
World League, 1977), Sura: AI-Imran, verse 28. 
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religion and the religion of my ancestors. Those who do not dissemble have no 
faith". 179 
Taqqiyah quickly developed from a device to avoid religious persecution into a 
political weapon through which the Shi'as endeavoured to mask their activities and 
cover up their ambition of `redressing' their injuries and restoring what they saw as 
their inalienable right to power. It is for this reason that the Shi'as of Iraq were often 
under suspicion of being disloyal to those in authority even when they go out of their 
way to show their allegiance. In this respect, Taqqiyah may be said to be a futile 
weapon, which could inflict pain upon those who employ it. An ironic reflection on 
the state of affairs in Iraq may be seen in the fact that the population of the Shi'a 
governorates would much prefer a Sunni Muhafidh (Governor) to a Shi'a, as the 
central Sunni dominated government would characteristically view any demand 
submitted by a Shi'a official on behalf of his constituency as suspect and is therefore 
more likely to be rejected or thoroughly investigated, conditions, on the other hand, 
could be improved more quickly if such petitions or demands are taken up by a Sunni 
Governor since his loyalty to the regime is normally not in question. 
Najaf Centre of Shi'a Culture and Politics 
The four most sacred Shi'a shrine cities: Najaf, Karbala, Samarra and Kazumain are 
all in Iraq. Of these four, the most prominent is Najaf, approximately 200 kilometres 
south-West of Baghdad, which came to play an increasingly important political role 
not only in Iraq but in Shi'a affairs throughout the world. Founded in A. D. 1002, 
Najaf has, since the fall of the Safavid dynasty in 1736, been the seat of world 
179 Encyclopaedia ofReligions, p. 302. 
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Shi'aism and despite the fevered attempts by successive Sunni regimes in Baghdad to 
undermine its status, it remains to this day the "Vatican" of Shi'as across the world. '80 
It is the fourth holiest city in Islam after Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem. '8' An 
indication of its significance as the centre of world Shi'aism may be shown by the fact 
that most of the leaders of the Islamic Revolution in Iran including Khomeini, 
Rafsanjani and others were either educated in this city or spent several years there. 
The special status of Najaf was grudgingly recognised by the Ottomans who despite 
their prejudice against the Shi'a, had to treat Najaf in a special way. It is said that 
when Sultan Murad first entered the city he did so barefooted as a sign of respect for 
Imam Ali bin Abi Talib. With the passage of time, and as Ottoman control over the 
territories under their rule slipped during the final stage of the empire, Najaf became 
the base from which religious and political opposition to the Ottomans was launched. 
For this holy city, perhaps more than any other in Iraq, had always considered 
Ottoman rule to be unjust and unlawful. 
In modem times, rebellion against the Ottomans reached a crescendo in June 1915 
when the Najafis expelled the representative of the Ottoman government together with 
all his entourage. From then until well after the fall of Baghdad, Najaf was governed 
by A1-Mujtehid Al-Akbar (the Great Mujtehid, Scholar). 182 When, in 1918, the British 
180 The situation became quite complicated after the eruption of the Iraq-Iran War in 1980 as the 
Iranian and other Shi'a clerics were denied entry to Iraq during the conflagration. Clandestine relations 
however were maintained with all Shi'a centres in the world including the Iranian holy city of Qum, 
Khomeini's power base. 
'$' Al-Nafisi, The Role of the Shi'a', p. 48. 
182lbid, p. 48. 
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attempted to increase control of the city, the Najafis rebelled yet again and killed 
Captain Marshall who was in charge of security in the city. 183 
The establishment of the Iraqi state in the early twenties and the emergence of 
Baghdad as its hub, both politically and commercially, inevitably led to the decline of 
Najaf which had enjoyed what Yitzhak Nakash calls a "semi autonomous status". 184 It 
found it "increasingly difficult to command the focus of identity of the Shi'as in the 
new state". Although still occupying a special place in Shi'a consciousness not only in 
Iraq but throughout the Shi'a world, Najaf now wields less political power than it did 
under the monarchy and after. The British first, and the Baghdad government later, 
embarked upon the task of undermining the power base of the Najaf Mujtehids by 
strengthening the position of the local administrative apparatus first and winning them 
over by paying them handsome sums for their services. 
In later years even those charged with looking after the Shi'a shrines became 
government employees. As the new state possessed all instruments of power it 
imposed a number of restrictions aimed at weakening the status of Najaf and Karbala. 
These measures included, among other things, tight supervision and control of 
pilgrimage, corpse traffic and the flow of aid from the outside world, restricting the 
Muharram observances and the imposition of tight controls on the syllabi of the Shi'a 
educational institutions. 
185 Commenting on the efforts exerted by the Sunni 
governments to isolate the Shi'a Mujtehids and -separate religion from politics, Yizhak 
Nakash writes: 
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The Sunni state reduced the areas of influence of the Shi'a 
Mujtehids in Iraq, and its ability to curtail the activity of the Shi'a 
clergy was nowhere more evident than in its success in limiting 
the size of their constituency by stopping the spread of Shi'aism 
in the country. In 1927 Shia emissaries were arrested near 
Kirkuk while attempting to convert Turkoman villagers to Imami 
Shi'aism. ... In 
blocking any further spread of Shi'aism in Iraq, 
the government was able to end the process of conversion, which 
had taken place in the country mainly during the nineteenth 
century. 
Since Iran became the bastion of political Shi'aism, it exercised an increasing 
influence on the social life of neighbouring Iraq, particularly in Najaf and the other 
Shi'a shrine cities. The yearly pilgrimage to the Shi'a shrines in Iraq, attendance of 
the prestigious schools particularly those in Najaf 87, and the constant flow of 
donations to the Shi'a clergy enhanced Persian influence in the affairs of the Iraqi 
Shi'as especially as "most religious scholars in Iraq came to be either Persian or of 
Persian extraction". 188 This association of Shi'a clergy with Persia was associated 
with many of the atrocities committed against the Iraqi Shi'a Ulama in the name of 
defending national unity. 
Conversion and Spread of Shi'aism in Iraq 
Conversion to Shi'aism started during the mid-eighteenth century in Kufa where Ali, 
the Prophet Muhammad's cousin, is buried. With the settlement of the nomadic tribes 
in that fertile region, Shi'aism spread from that city into the mid-Euphrates to the 
inhabitants of the alluvial plains of the neighbouring country. 189 Conversion to 
186Ibid, p. 88. 
187 An indication of the extent of Persian presence in the Shii centres in Iraq may be seen in the 
following statistics which show the origin and number of students enrolled in the Najaf schools in 
1957: Bahrain, Al-Hasa and Al-Qatif (20 students), Syria and Lebanon (47), India and Kashmir (71), 
Tibet (270), Pakistan (324), Iraq (326), Iran (896). See Al-Nafisi, The Role of the Shi 'a, p. 51. 
'$$ Al-Nafisi, Role of the Shia, p. 50. 
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Shi'aism was beneficial to both the tribesmen as well as the urban communities of the 
shrine cities of Kufa and Najaf: 
While the converted tribesmen were expected to refrain from 
internal disputes and to contribute forces for the protection of the 
shrine cities, the urban dwellers provided the tribesmen with 
access to markets and organised religion. 190 
The process of conversion was intended, as Nakash argues, to lay the foundation of a 
Shi'a state in southern Iraq. Unlike the Wahhabiyya in Arabia and the Sanusiyya in 
Libya, this ambitious attempt was "aborted following the British occupation and the 
subsequent creation of a Sunni state in the country". 191 However, conversion, 
especially of the tribes that settled near Najaf and Karbala because of their proximity 
to water and cultivable land and water, had an immense impact on the ratio of Sunnis 
to Shi'as in the country. 192 
In spreading Shi'aism, the Mujtahids resorted to a number of tactics in which they 
attempted to beautify Shi'aism and present it in a positive light to their co-religionists. 
Among these was employment of religious propaganda which aimed at influencing 
the religious beliefs of the uneducated tribesmen. Travelling Shi'a Mumens (religious 
men) played a great part in winning over a number of large tribes, particularly in 
southern Iraq. 193 There were also those eloquent Shi'a poets and narrators who 
excelled in the art of moving their audience to tears while extolling the virtues of 
Hussein and his brothers and providing graphic details of what they suffered at the 
190 Nakash, Shi'as of Iraq, p. 5. 
19' Ibid., p. 5. 
192 Ibid., p. 269. 
193 Batatu, Social Classes, p. 42. 
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hands of their Ummawi adversaries. 194 The martyrdom of Hussein and his 
companions was the most important episode in the whole history of Shi'aism. It 
shaped Shi'a identity and served as a reminder of their struggle against those they 
considered to be the usurpers of their right to govern. 1115 
Another channel was employment, during the month of Muharram, of the Mawakib 
Husseiniya (passion plays of Hussein), 'which like the medieval mystery plays were 
performed in the streets, market places and public squares. It is to be recalled that 
Hussein was killed on the tenth of this month, hence the commemoration of this tragic 
event each Muharram. In these long processions, thousands of Shi'as march 
rhythmically thumping their breasts to mark Ashura, the day on which Hussein, his 
relatives and followers were all killed. On this annual occasion, black-clad men from 
all walks of life lash their backs with clusters of chains to mourn the death of the man 
they consider as a martyr fallen in the fight against injustice and despotism. 
Throughout these ceremonies drummers and singers chant mourning songs while 
some flagellate themselves as young men spray rosewater on the crowds or dish out 
free food, soft drinks and water. More extravagant than their Christian counterparts, 
those religious plays also contain highly emotive speeches that may be described as a 
combination of dirge and eulogy rendered by professional orators expert in the art of 
using highly charged and emotive language. The point of those processions is to 
"preserve the vitality of the symbol of Hussein and to propagate the Shi'a cause". 196 
Immense attention was also paid to the holy shrines in Najaf, Kufa and Karbala where 
visitors, to this day, never fail to be awed by the sight of the gilded domes, imposing 
194 Al-Wardi, A Study, p. 236. 
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minarets, spacious courts, finest Persian rugs and the highly decorated mausoleums 
housing the descendants of the Prophet Muhammed. 
Shi'a propaganda was quite effective because it played on the psychology of the 
desert dwellers and appealed to the tribal character of the nomadic and semi-nomadic 
Arabs who found their most cherished ideals of manhood, courage, sacrifice, honour 
and chivalry all embodied in the characters of Ali bin Abi Talib and his descendants. 
When for example Abbas, Hussein's brother, was cornered by his Umawi adversaries, 
he continued to fight chanting: 
By God, even though you cut off my right hand I shall forever 
defend my religion and I shall [protect] an absolutely true Imam 
[Hussein The grandson of the righteous and trustworthy 
Prophet. 97 
These stories, which glorify martyrdom, are so effectively recited by the Shi'a 
rawzakhoun (readers) that they have a great psychological impact on their audience 
and provide them with a soothing outlet for their pent up grievances, repressed 
complaints and frustrations. 198 
Until the early part of the twentieth century, the Shi'a and Sunnis did not intermarry. 
For even "in mixed cities they lived in separate quarters and led their own separate 
lives". 199 With the spread of literacy and education and, with the gradual 
secularisation of society, more people offered their daughters to suitors from across 
the denominational divide. Since the laws governing inheritance with regard to wives 
of the deceased are a good deal more generous among the Shi'a than those among 
195 Nakash, The Shi'as of Iraq, p. 142. 
196Ibid., p. 157. 
197 Quoted in Nakash, The Shi'as of Iraq, p. 145. 
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the deceased are a good deal more generous among the Shi'a than those among 
Sunnis, many conservative Sunni parents did not mind giving their daughters in 
marriage to Shi'a men as Shia marriages promised better security for wives. 200 
Although the Ba'thist regime is determined to liquidate even the smallest pocket of 
dissent, under whatever guise it is expressed, the process of conversion to Shi'aism is 
still going on, albeit on a much smaller scale. The task of conversion is made 
relatively easy by the fact that the Iraqi tribesmen of today, like their ancestors before 
them, are intolerant of government - any government. To quote Batatu, their 
association of government with `oppression eased the task of the preachers and the 
transition to Shi'aism". 201 
Despite the, many shortcomings of the regimes which came to rule modern Iraq from 
its creation until the overthrow of General Qassim in 1963 there was positive change. 
Thanks to political prudence and perhaps even tolerance, "sectarian and factional 
barriers began if not to disappear, at least to become of less pressing political and 
social significance". 202 During these decades, less discrimination in Government 
service and the professions was evident. The years immediately before and after the 
creation of Israel in 1948 saw a significant strengthening of the Shi'as as an economic 
force as they began to occupy the empty places of the Jews who had emigrated to 
Palestine. 203 This "Spring of the Shi'as" also witnessed the formation of two cabinets 
by Shi'a politicians; the first by Salih Jabr on 9 October 1947; the second by 
200 Batatu ignores this important incentive and attributes this trend to the 'noticeable change' in the 
social situation of the Shi'as. Sec Batatu, Social Classes, p. 47. 
201 Aid, p. 42. 
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Muhammad Al-Sadr on 29 January 1948.204 This however does not mean that the 
Sunni establishment was going to relinquish its claim to the helm. Among the 
compelling reasons why in 1947, and again in 1948, the Crown Regent asked Shi'a 
figures to form the cabinet was the introduction of new faces to tackle the grave 
political crisis caused by the government's intention to renew the 1922 Treaty with 
Britain. The appointment of Shi'a Prime Ministers however did not signify much, 
since power was normally exercised from behind the scenes. In more recent times 
Saddam Hussein resorted to this age-old tactic203 when in 1991, immediately after his 
defeat in the Gulf War and in the face of mounting opposition and rebellion 
throughout the Shi'a provinces, he appointed a Najafi Shi'a, Dr Sadoon Hammadi, as 
Prime Minister. Hammadi was followed by yet another Shi'a Prime Minister, 
Muhammed Hamza Al-Zubaidi, from the predominantly Shi'a city of Hilla in the 
district of Babylon. 206 
The Kurds 
The Kurds, who are overwhelmingly Sunni Muslims, speak Kurdish, a language more 
akin to Farsi than Arabic. The vast majority of the Kurds live in the districts of 
Duhawk, Suleimaniya and Arbil, which had belonged before the dissolution of the 
Ottoman Empire to the 911layah (Province) of Mosul. 207 The Shi'a Kurds, who make 
up a very small percentage of them, live in the areas adjacent to Iran particularly in the 
Wasit and Misan districts. Like other non-Turkish nationalities, the Kurds, encouraged 
204 Al-Hasani, Prime Ministers oflroq, pp. 331,347. 
205 Other Shia prime ministers in Iraq: Salih Jabr (November - December 1947), Fadhil Al-Jamali 
(March-April 1954), Abdul-Wahab Mirjan (December 1957-March 1958). See Batatu, Social Classes, 
p182. 66 Simons, From Sumer to Saddam, pp. 83,88. 
207 Ibid., p. 76. 
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by the Treaty of Sevres of 1920 and the principles advocated by the U. S. President 
Woodrow Wilson, who sympathised with the claims of ethnic minorities, looked 
forward to the creation of a nation state of their own. Their aspirations however were 
frustrated, following the emergence of Turkey as a military power under Kemal 
Ataturk and the conclusion of the Treaty of Lausanne in which, in return for a number 
of concessions on the part of Turkey, the question of recognising Kurdish right to a 
state was dropped by the Allies. 208 
When World War I came to an end, the Kurdish areas of modern Iraq came under 
direct British rule. A local government however was soon formed to serve as a buffer 
zone between Turkey and Iraq. In the city of Suleimaniya, Sheikh Mahmud, assisted 
by British advisers was assigned the task of running the day-to-day business of the 
Kurdish area. It was agreed then that the Kurdish government should be supervised by 
the High Commissioner himself from Baghdad. Unwilling to play the part of a puppet, 
Sheikh Mahmud soon rebelled as he "refused to acquiesce in British rule". 209 For a 
few weeks between March and June 1919, his men were in control of most of the 
Kurdish Area. 210 But the situation went in favour of the British following an offensive 
which ended in the total defeat of the rebellious Kurds and the imprisonment of 
Sheikh Mahmud himself. 
When Abdul Rahman Al-Naqib formed his first provisional government in 1920, no 
Kurd was assigned a cabinet post because sovereignty over the Kurdish areas had not 
been settled. The High Commissioner therefore continued to retain responsibility for 
2°8 Ibid, p. 77. 
209 Geoff Simons, From Sumer to Saddam, p. 215. 
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these areas. It was only after the signing of the 1922 Treaty between Iraq and Britain 
that the Britain annexed the Kurdish region to Iraq. 
With this annexation, both the British and King Faisal reiterated, among other things, 
respect for the Kurds' right to use their mother tongue in schools, their pledge that no 
Arabs except technical staff would be assigned in that area and that Arabic would not 
be forced upon them. The attempts by Baghdad to impose central authority on the 
Kurdish people were met with vigorous resistance. The Kurds felt particularly 
resentful of the fact that the 1930 Treaty did not have any reference to the them. Many 
felt that Iraq's admission to the League of Nations had strengthened Baghdad's 
position. Following the example of King Faisal, the master of appeasement, 
successive governments tried to win over some of the Kurdish chieftains. A number of 
Kurdish politicians and military men began to occupy important as well as ceremonial 
government posts. Bakr Sidqi, leader of the first coup in the Arab world, to cite only 
one example, was himself a Kurd. But these attempts, as is evident in the de facto 
autonomy of the Kurdish region today, failed to quench the Kurds' thirst for self-rule, 
if not independence. 
During the thirties and forties, the Barzani family played a significant role in 
inflaming nationalist zeal among the Kurds, although they started their struggle 
against Baghdad as tribal chieftains rather than nationalist leaders. The relations 
between the Kurds and the central government then went through an irregular ebb and 
flow which culminated, in 1945, in an all out war between Barazani's forces. 
Baghdad, assisted by the RAF and indirectly by Turkey (which closed its borders to 
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prevent fleeing Kurds from crossing the border) 211 managed to win the day forcing 
the escape of Mulla Mustafa Barzani together with six hundred of his followers across 
Iran and Turkey to seek refuge in the Soviet Union where he stayed until 1958.212 
Despite the intermittent confrontations, the Baghdad central government during the 
monarchy cannot be said to have adopted a ruthless policy towards the Kurds: 
Despite all that is said against the monarchy, it was in point of 
fact a period in which the Kurds were enabled to use their 
national language and occupy important cabinet posts such as the 
Ministry of the Interior. Furthermore, Kurds sometimes became 
prime ministers. No restriction was imposed on their admission to 
Police, Military Academies or to any Higher Education 
Institution. ... Several army commanders came 
from Kurdish 
families. Unlike what happened in neighbouring countries or in 
Iraq at a later stage, There was no restriction of travel or 
213 movement inside or outside Iraq. 
The military men who toppled the monarchy on 14 July 1958 were at first well 
disposed towards Kurdish aspirations and took a sympathetic attitude towards them. 
214 The three-man Presidency Council which assumed the role of head of state 
included a Sunni, a Shia and a Kurd. Furthermore Article 3 of the provisional 
Constitution of the Republic clearly indicates that Arabs and Kurds are partners whose 
national rights are recognised within the Iraqi state. Soon after the return of Mustafa 
Barzani and his colleagues from the Soviet Union after the 1958 coup, the political 
honeymoon ended and hostilities resumed when Qassim's regime could not meet all 
the demands of the Kurds. 
211 Longrigg, Iraq, p. 327; 
212 Geoff Simons, From Sumer to Saddam, p, 301; P. & M. Farouk-Sluglett, Sunnis and Shi'as, p. 77. 
213 Farouq Abbas, Resolution of the Kurdish Problem, p. 32. 
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Throughout the first Ba'thist and the two Arefs regimes there was much talk of Arab 
unity, more specifically a merger between Syria, Iraq and Nasser's Egypt. This 
undoubtedly estranged the Iraqi Kurds who feared that, if and when such a unity did 
materialise, their cause would then be lost in an Arab sea. 215 When the Ba'th seized 
power in 1968, they tried to settle all outstanding issues with the Kurds. After lengthy 
and arduous negotiations between the Ba'thists and the Kurdish leadership under 
Barzani the much vaunted Accord of March 1970 which granted the Kurds 
autonomous powers was signed. But it was soon discovered that the Accord, like 1975 
Agreement between Saddam Hussein and the Shah of Iran, was a tactical move on the 
part of Baghdad intended primarily to gain time and regroup. On the other hand, 
seeking to take advantage Iraq's preoccupation with the war against Iran (1980-1988), 
the Kurds tried to score some victories in their region. Their moves were met with an 
iron fist which did not hesitate to attack them with chemical weapons. The "scale of 
the operations of 1988-89 and the apparent desire of the regime to exterminate the 
Kurdish population"216 attests to what Geoff Simons calls "Saddam's perfidy". 217 
Saddam Hussein's humiliating defeat in the Gulf War however afforded a better 
opportunity for the Kurds to realise their long cherished dream of self-rule. Although 
divided amongst themselves, the Kurds managed nevertheless to overrun most of the 
Kurdish areas and expel the demoralised Iraqi forces from Kurdish soil. Furthermore, 
the imposition on the Iraqi regime of the "no-fly" exclusion zone over the Kurdish 
areas helped the leaders of the major Kurdish parties: the Kurdish Democratic Party 
headed by Mulla Mustafa Barzani's son, Mas'oud and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
215 Farouq Abbas, Resolution of the Kurdish Problem, p. 40. 
216 p. & M. Farouk"Sluglett, Sunnis and Shi'as, p. 78. 
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of Jalal Talbani to consolidate power and establish a de facto separate entity which 
still exists today. 
The Turkomans 
The Turkomans of Iraq are part of the Muslim Turkomans who now live in 
Turkmenistan and in neighbouring areas in Central Asia, with pockets found in Iraq 
and Syria. Like their Arab and Kurdish compatriots the Turkomans are also divided 
along sectarian lines. Those living in Tal A'far, Daquq, Tuz Khurmatu and Qara 
218 Tappa are Shi'a, while those in Altoun Kopri, and Kifri are Sunni. 
Following the breakdown of Ottoman rule in Iraq, the Turkumen's preponderance in 
such Turkish cities as Kirkuk and Arbil gradually lessened. To be sure, the Turkomans 
population of Kirkuk, which was totally Turkish until the mid-twentieth century, had 
by 1959 declined to just over half, on account of the Kurdish migration from the 
surrounding villages. This intensified with the expansion of the oil industry in the 
Kirkuk area. Just as the Shia look to Najaf for guidance, the Turkumem of Iraq looked 
to Constantinople for inspiration. 
Despite their effort to maintain close cultural and social links with Turkey, the 
Turkomen were overtaken by the speed of political developments in Iraq. Instead of 
bonding with their alma mater, their energy was exhausted by their endeavour to 
surmount the threat of Kurdish hegemony in the area which they had controlled 
earlier. This inveterate enmity between Kurds and Turkomans was behind many 
211 Geoff Simons, From Sumer to Saddam, p, xvi. 
21$ Batatu, Social Classes, p. 37. 
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outrageous crimes perpetrated aller the 1958 Revolution, particularly in the bloody 
July of 1959: 
It is significant that all but 3 of the 31 officially reported as 
killed, and all but 6 of the 130 known to have been injured 
in the incidents were Turkumen, and that all but 4 of the 28 
perpetrators of excesses executed on 22 June 1963 were 
Kurds. 219 
In order that they may defend themselves against the perceived threat of the Kurds, 
the Turkmen of Iraq consistently took the side of the government against the Kurds. 
Furthermore, while the Kurds constitute a large proportion of the Communist Party, 
most of the Turkomans gave their support to the Arab nationalist and Ba'thist forces, 
which were locked in battle with the Communists for most of the period following 
the July 1958 coup. 
The Sunni Arabs 
The word Sunni is derived from Sunna which in Arabic means the original and 
corroborated body of Muslim system and traditions particularly those attributed to the 
Prophet himself. Like the rest of the Sunni Muslims throughout the world, the Sunni 
Arabs of Iraq do not question the legitimacy of the succession of the first four caliphs 
who succeeded Prophet Muhammed. 
Most of the Sunni Arabs of Iraq, estimated to make up approximately twenty-five 
percent of the population, live in the triangular area between Mosul in the north, 
Baghdad in the south and the country towns along the Euphrates such as Fallouja, 
219 Aid, p. 912. 
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Ramadi, Hit Ana and Rawa. 220 While the string of cities and country towns lying on 
the Tigris between Baghdad and Mosul are almost totally homogeneous, the religious 
affiliation of the capital Baghdad is mixed. Although certain parts of ancient Baghdad, 
such as Adhamiya, are overwhelmingly Sunni, others, such as Kadhimiya, are 
predominantly Shi'a, and most of the newly built quarters are mixed. During the fifties 
and sixties migration to the capital, particularly from the south and south central 
regions greatly changed the balance in favour of the Shi'a in the capital. 
Because the Ottoman Empire was a "Sunni institution', the Sunnis of Iraq received 
more favourable treatment than the Shi'as: 
It was the Sunnis who made use of whatever governmental 
educational facilities were provided (which were considerably 
increased towards the end of the nineteenth century) and were 
thus able to consolidate their position in the expanding local 
221 administration. 
It is ironic that during the course of the First World War, and unlike the Shia 
population of Iraq, many members of the Sunni Arab bureaucratic and military elite, 
whose loyalty had been taken for granted by the Ottomans, shifted their loyalties from 
the crumbling Ottoman state to the British empire. 222 
Except for the brief periods when Iraq came under Persian rule, the Sunnis have 
always been more upwardly mobile than their Shia counterparts. Most followers of 
the pan-Arab nationalist movements who, among other things, dream of living under 
one Arab flag are Sunnis rather than Shi'a for the latter view such political movements 
as endangering to their own existence. The leaderships of the Istiglal (Independence) 
220 Sluglett, Sunnis and Shias, p. 78. 
221 Ibid., p. 79. 
222 Sluglett, Sunnis and Shl'as, p. 79. 
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Party, Al-Shabab Al-Qawmi (Nationalist Youth) and indeed the ruling Ba'th Party are 
almost exclusively Sunni. During the royal era most, if not all, the aristocracy of 
officials and the ex-Sherifan officers who built the new state were also exclusively 
Sunnis. 
Until 1963, the Arab Bath Socialist Party had to a large extent "the characteristic of a 
genuine partnership between the Sunni and Shi'a `pan-Arab' youth". But as Batatu 
points out, "the role of the Sunnis had risen sharply, while that of the Shi'a had 
decisively declined". 223 In point of fact, this party was soon to be transformed at the 
hands of Saddam Hussein into an exclusively Sunni institution. 224 More than any other 
previous government, Saddam Hussein restricted the two sensitive sectors: the 
military and foreign services, to Sunni Arabs. This identification of the Sunnis with 
the central government in Iraq is behind Sunni aversion to political radicalism and 
revolutionary parties which received far more popular support among the non-Sunni 
Arabs, Kurds and other ethnic and religious groups. Although as intellectuals the 
Sunnis were well represented in the higher levels of the Communist Party, they were 
quite thinly represented in its rank and file. 225 When, towards the end of his rule, 
General Qassim attempted to win over the nationalists and Nasserites and decided to 
follow an even-handed policy towards Communists and nationalists alike, the few 
Communists in such Sunni strongholds as Adhamiya and Mosul, to mention only two 
examples, had to flee their hometowns. This was not because of persecution or police 
harassment but because the vast Sunni majority in these towns abhorred the teachings 
and practices of the Communist Party. 
223 Batatu, Social Classes, p. 1078. 
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Most of the ruling elite in modern Iraq came from the Sunni families of Baghdad and 
Mosul. This concentration of power in the hands of the Sunnis so incensed the Shi'as 
that in 1927 it drove them to express their desire that it would be "far preferable for 
them to return to the days of complete British rule than to be under the control of 
Sunni administration". 226 With the passage of time, however, the ruling elite gradually 
underwent a substantial change in the nature of its composition. Many Sunni families 
from the upper and mid-Tigris towns such as Samarra, Tikrit and Al-Dawr descended 
upon the capital to settle there. More Sunni families came from the Western towns 
along the Euphrates, Ramadi, Fallouja, Hit, Rawa and Ana. 227 The influence of the 
Sunni Baghdadis, which was paramount during the monarchy and well through 
General Qassim's rule, waned with the seizure of power by Abdul Salam Aref, who 
unashamedly favoured and advanced those whose origin was from the Ramadi area. 
The Aref brothers however were surpassed by Saddam Hussein whose bias towards 
the Tikritis has become so proverbial that the feelings of many Iraqis, Shi'as as well as 
Sunnis find full expression in a vernacular poem entitled "Wish that I were born a 
Tikriti" which circulated in secret in Iraq during the Iraq-Iran war. 228 
Besides the security apparatus, armed forces and foreign service the Sunni Arabs have 
also been prominent in the manufacturing field. The reason, in the words of Hanna 
Batatu, is not difficult to discern: 
224Ibid, p. 1079. 
225 Ibid., p. 663. 
226 Nakash, Shiis of Iraq, p. 116. 
1" Al-Uzri, The Problem of Government, p. 43. 
228 Among the many Iraqi poets living in exile, the most vociferous critic of Saddam's sectarianism is 
Mudhaffar Al-Nawwab whose poem `Arous AI-Quds' (The Bride of Jerusalem) devotes many 
passages to the exposition of nepotism, greed, monopoly of power and betrayal of one's principles. 
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Sunni men of capital, being more closely connected than 
moneyed Shi'as with the existing state structure, had on the 
whole less difficulty in securing from the government the 
legislative or financial assistance upon which the progress 
of factories so much depended and therefore were less 
averse to the long term investments that industry 
required. 229 
Christians 
The vast majority of the Christians in Iraq live in the northern region of the 
country, more specifically in the Mosul area, where they populate whole towns and 
villages such as Bashiga and Telkif. Sizeable Christian minorities also exist in 
Baghdad and Basra. Like many other Christian minorities in the Middle East, those 
living in Iraq are descendants of the early Christians who had adopted the gospel 
long before Christianity spread in Europe. As pointed out earlier, most Christians 
viewed the British as "saviours" and showed readiness to co-operate with them 
even against their own compatriots. 
During the monarchy, the Christians as well as the Jews played a significant part in 
economic activities in Iraq, particularly in the import-export sector where they were 
offered preferential terms by the British, and the years immediately following the 
British conquest witnessed a `vigorous advance in the acquisition of landed and 
house property". 230 
A substantial proportion of the Iraqi Christians have, since the fall of the monarchy, 
emigrated to Europe, particularly to Britain. They also settled in the United States, 
Canada and elsewhere. Some Christians played a significant part in , 
the political 
229 Batatu, Social Classes, p. 272. 
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history of Iraq. The man who is behind the establishment of the Iraqi Communist 
Party and the spread of Marxism-Leninism in Iraq is Christian: Yusuf Salman 
Yusuf, better known to the Iraqis and Middle Easterners by his nom de guerre, 
Fahad. Of the sixteen Iraqis who formed the nucleus of the Communist Party in the 
late twenties and early thirties, five were Christians. 231 
The Assyrians 
Many Assyrian Iraqis are descendants of the ancient Assyrian people of Nineveh. 
They inhabit a large area between the lower Zab and the Tigris, stretching from 
Dohuk to Shaykhan and Zakhu in the north to Amadiya, Aqra, and Rawinduz in the 
north-east. The Assyrians are Christians and their church dates back to the first 
century. The present Assyrian population of Iraq however is a mixture of original 
Assyrians and those Assyrians who had thrown their lot in with the Allied Forces 
during the First World War, in the hope that they would be rewarded with a national 
homeland when the hostilities came to an end. 
A considerable number of the Iraqi Assyrians have migrated to Europe and the 
United States in three major waves. The first took place immediately after the 1958 
Revolution when many of them felt unsafe having witnessed the brutality of the new 
regime towards those who were perceived to be pro-Western. Ten years later, 
following the Six-Day war and the 1968 coup in Iraq, more Assyrians left the 
country as the new regime inaugurated its rule with public hangings and calls for the 
extermination of the imperialist stooges and Western lackeys. It was after the Gulf 
230 Batatu, Social Classes, pp. 247-8,261. 231 Ibid, pp. 416-22. 
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War in 1991 that most Assyrians decided to look for a new haven for themselves as 
they felt progressively more alienated from the regime. 
Having sided with Britain during First World War, the Assyrians became a 
responsibility of the British particularly after the British advance, towards the end of 
World War I into, North West Persia. 232 Finding that the Assyrians were denied 
their rights and were ill-treated, Britain extended a helping hand and rescued them 
by offering them at first refugee camps in Iraq then cultivable lands to settle on. 233 
Like other minorities and ethnic groups who did not have nation states, the Assyrians 
were looking forward to the end of the Great War in the hope that their cause might 
be done justice. The British honoured their promise and opened the north of Iraq to 
unlimited immigration. Hopwood estimates that the United Kingdom rescued 
"perhaps one third of their original number". 234 There, they were given lands to 
cultivate, offered a number of tax concessions and thousands of them were recruited 
into a British-officered army where housing and maintenance, among other things, 
were provided. 
Competition between Britain and France over supremacy in the Middle East was 
behind much of the suffering of the unhappy lot of the Assyrians, whose leadership 
was totally unrealistic and blind to the hard realities of life: 
It was the more unfortunate that stories of a vast Greater Assyria to be achieved by 
French assistance gained credence and helped to poison Assyrian-Iraqi relations, 
which the apparent British favour to a foreign and Christian community made 
32 Hopwood, Social Structure, p. 15. 
233 Aid, p. 15. 
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anyhow delicate, and which was unassisted by any pretence of Assyrian devotion to 
Arab and Muslim Iraq. 235 
Part of the problem the Assyrians found themselves in was the fact that most of them 
never really considered Iraq as their home country although they were very well 
treated not only by the British administration, which supervised the Assyrian 
settlement in Iraq but also by the national authority. On account of their high 
expectations and their hopes of returning to their home country victorious, as they 
were on the side of the victorious, they never really attempted to integrate into the 
community in which they lived. It was only in 1926 that it became apparent they 
would not be allowed to go back to their homes. When the scheme to repatriate them 
"in Canada or elsewhere failed"216 there was no other alternative open to them but to 
stay in Iraq and try to adopt it as their homeland. The uneasy ethnic relationship 
between the Muslim Iraqis and the Christian newcomers was behind friction, mutual 
distrust and veiled, as well as open, harassment. 
Commenting on this relationship between the Assyrians and the people in the areas in 
which they settled, Batatu points out that the grudge felt by the Assyrians towards 
their fellow compatriots never really faded despite the passage of many years: 
The Assyrians, a foreign and inassimilable people, whom 
the English had employed as mercenary troops and whose 
very name still irritated Iraqis had nursed a bitter hatred 
against Arab Mosul ever since 1933, when officers from 
234 Ibid. p. 15. 
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236 Ibid, p. 158. 
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this town played a prominent role in the crushing of a 
forlorn Assyrian rebellion. 237 
When Britain announced that it would end its mandate in Iraq, the Assyrians felt 
threatened. On account of their voluntary service in the British-officered Iraq Levy, 
anti-Assyrian feelings intensified against them, especially as they were used to quell 
Iraqi rebellions and punish Arab and Kurdish insurgents. 238 A year after Iraq had 
gained independence some Assyrians tried to flee to Syria in the hope that the French 
would grant them what the British did not, but they were turned back by the French 
and the relationship between the Assyrians and the Iraqis reached its nadir. 239 When 
the Assyrians discovered' that the French were not interested in their problems, they 
returned home with their hopes dashed. From then onwards, deterioration in Assyrian- 
Iraqi relations manifested itself in frequent large-scale armed clashes. 240 King Ghazi's 
ruthless campaign against the village of Simayle, is still commemorated with grief 
among the Assyrians all over the world: 
On the morning of 11 August [1933], a motor machine-gun 
company of the Iraq Army entered the village in good order 
under its officers, and proceeded methodically to the 
massacre of every man in the village. The work was 
complete by early afternoon, and the troops withdrew in 
their vehicles. They returned next day to bury the dead, 
some 315 in number including 4 women and 6 children. 241 
23' Batatu, Social Classes, p. 869. It seems there is unanimous agreement among scholars that the 
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The impact of the Assyrian rebellion and the resultant massacre left deep wounds not 
only in the Arab- or even Kurdish-Assyrian relations but also in the Muslim-Christian 
relations in the country. The term `Assyrian' and by extension `Christian' became in 
the unwritten Arabic lexicon synonymous with `untrustworthy', a `potential traitor' 
with similar connotations to the term `un-American' during the McCarthy period in 
post-war U. S. A. 242 What aggravated Christian-Muslim relations in Iraq was the fact 
that most Iraqi Christians and Jews saw in the British either protectors or `defenders' 
of the faith. As a result, many of them came to be perceived as willing servants and 
miscreants who take the side of the adversary, Britain, which was until recently public 
enemy number one in the region. 
The previous pages have shown that the political entity, which came into being as an 
independent state between the Wars, encompassed a medley of peoples with different 
origins, sects and religions. Religiously, the vast majority of Iraqis are Muslims. 
Christians form small minorities, which are quite active socially, politically, culturally 
and economically. On an ethnic level, the Arabs constitute the majority of the people. 
Kurds constitute a sizeable minority, which has, since the creation of Iraq, been 
seeking to preserve its culture, language and achieve some sort of home rule in the 
Kurd-populated north and north-east region of the country. The Kurds played a 
significant part in the history of the modem state. Some of the most sensitive posts, 
especially in the civil service and the armed forces, were held by Kurds. 
242 The full name of Tariq Aziz, long time Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq is Tariq 
Aziz Hanna. But his family name is always dropped by the government owned and run media as 
Hanna is clearly a common Christian name frequently associated in Iraq with the Assyrians or Tilkaifis 
- the poor Christian inhabitants of a small agricultural village in the Mosul area many of whom took up 
menial jobs including sewage cleaning which the Muslims regarded below their dignity. It is 
significant that upon Michael Aflaq's death in 1989 the Iraqi government declared that Aflaq, the 
founding father of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party had converted to Islam long before his death. 
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The majority of the Muslim Arabs in Iraq are Shi'a. With the possible exception of 
Bahrain, Iraq is the only Arab state with a Shi'a majority. The Sunnis however played, 
and continue to play, a leading part in the political life of the country. It was the Sunni 
officers, who had been serving in the Ottoman army, that led the military operations 
against the Ottomans during World War I. Those same Sunni officers also played a 
most prominent part in building the modern state of Iraq, both during and after the 
British Mandate. The Shi'a religious leaderships, on the other hand, played a vital part 
in the 1920 Revolt. Sunni-Shia cooperation was quite instrumental in ending the 
Mandate and gaining full independence in 1932. 
Despite ethnic, religious and sectarian differences and despite the turmoil over the past 
seven decades, the common denominator which has bound most, if not all, Iraqis 
together was their sense of belonging to an Iraqi political entity. Regardless of their 
ethnic origin, religion or sect, Iraqis often express pride in their "Iraqiness", in the fact 
that they belong to a country with a rich history and vast resources. A pervasive 
feeling of frustration, brought about by the injustices of successive regimes, is among 
the most distinguishing characteristics of the Iraqi society. This feeling of frustration 
has escalated immensely since the Bath Party came to power in 1968. For it was the 
Ba'thists who adopted political violence as the most effective means of 
communication with their adversaries. The unprecedented lengths to which Saddam 
Hussein's regime has gone to silence his critics has had an immense impact, not only 
on the way in which the Iraqi opposition has functioned, but also on Iraqi society at 
large. 
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Chapter 3: Iraqi Opposition From The British Occupation To The Gulf War 
This chapter discusses the development of political opposition in Iraq from the end of 
World War I to the Gulf War of 1991. Attention will be given to the history of 
opposition parties and groupings, which will be traced through the Mandate years, 
Monarchist Iraq and post-1958 Iraq to the dramatic events of the first quarter of 1991. 
The social composition and general aim of the opposition groups will also be briefly 
considered. It is hoped that this chapter will provide. a general background against 
which the post-Gulf War opposition, both inside and outside Iraq, might be better 
understood and analysed. While in chapter I emphasis was placed on the major 
historical events witnessed by the modem state of Iraq, this chapter will provide a 
political map of the Iraqi opposition. It will also focus on the popular responses, both 
organised and otherwise, to the major historic events since the birth of the new nation. 
To understand the history of political opposition in Iraq, it would be instructive to 
remember a saying considered axiomatic by Iraqis in the past: "The Twin Rivers are 
both a blessing and a curse". While the Tigris and Euphrates, so the reasoning goes, 
ensured ample supplies of water, the vital prerequisite for agriculture and hence 
livelihood, they also attracted foreign powers and were the indirect cause of 
successive attacks and invasions which turned their land into a perpetual battlefield. 
As a result, the inhabitants of the Land Between the Two Rivers were, as it were, 
doomed to live under foreign occupation for much of their ancient history. In more 
recent times, the discovery of huge oil reserves in the northern, southern and central 
regions of the country gave Iraq an added strategic importance and made it the focus 
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of rivalry between Europe and the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the twentieth 
century and between European powers themselves later on. 243 
On account of the long history of foreign occupations, whether those by coreligionist 
invaders such as the Ottomans and Persians, or by powers which are far afield from 
Iraq culturally, racially and religiously such as the Greeks in the Dark Ages, the 
Mongols during the Middle Ages and the British during the First World War, the 
Iraqis developed a hostile attitude towards their rulers. This hostile attitude, the 
natural result of oppression at the hands of foreign occupiers, has become so 
ingrained in their national consciousness that it will take a considerable time to 
modify, let alone erase it. Besides, Iraq is, as pointed out earlier, 244 the birthplace of 
Shi'aism, one of the oldest and most resilient organised opposition fraternities. The 
movement never lost its momentum, for Shi'aism has, since the success of the 
Khomeini Revolution in Iran, raised, among other things, hopes among millions of 
Shi'a followers around the world and at the same time inspired terror in many 
quarters, both regionally and internationally, especially as it seeks to achieve its goals 
through armed struggle. 
The Growth of Arab Nationalism 
Political opposition in modern Iraq may be said to have originated during the early 
years of the twentieth century when many Iraqis, particularly those who were Turkish 
educated or those who had come into close contact with the Turks, felt compelled to 
assert their identity and reject the process of Turkishization as a reaction to the rising 
243 Nezar Tawfeeq Al-Hassou, AI-Sira' Ala Sulta Fi! Iraq Al Malaki (Struggle for Power in 
Monarchist Iraq) (Baghdad: Dar Afaq Arabiya, 1984). P. 35. 
244 See Chapter II above pp. if. 
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tide of nationalism in Turkey. 245 During the last few years of the Ottoman Empire's 
life, the oppressive policies followed by them towards the Arabs strengthened the 
Arabs' will to struggle for independence in order to shake the Ottoman yoke once and 
for all. The worsening conditions in the Ottoman occupied territories ensured the 
popularity of any Arab nationalist movement among the educated few. To this end, 
clandestine organisations were set up, whose main aim was to call for legal reforms 
and, with the outbreak of the First World War, independence. Among the better 
known secret organisations are: Al-Qahtaniya, Al Ahd and 246 This rather 
feeble opposition impulse, which lacked both direction and philosophy, was in point 
of fact a hasty response and constituted a form of defence mechanism. It was never 
clearly defined, widespread, or in any way effective. 
With the British occupation of the country during World War I opposition almost 
suddenly become a popular movement with a huge following, particularly in the rural 
areas which came to regard the British as alien usurpers and perjurers since they 
reneged on their promise to `liberate Iraq from the Ottomans". 
247 
Opposition in British-Ruled Iraq 
Anti-British opposition may be said to have been propagated by three major 
groupings: Islamists, Iraqi nationalists and Pan-Arab nationalists. Of the three, the 
Islamists were by far more pervasive and influential. Among the parties which played 
a significant part in inflaming the populace and inciting them against the British was 
245 Hasan Shubbar, Al- Amal Al-Hizbi Fil Iraq: 1908-1958 (Party Political Work in Iraq: 1908-1958) 
(Beirut: Dar Al-Turath Al-Arabi, 1989), p. 20. 
21 Nazar A1-Hassou, Al-Sira' Ala Sultah RI Iraq AI Malall (Struggle for Power in Monarchist Iraq) 
(Baghdad: Afaq Arabiyah, 1984), p. 36. 
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Jam'iyat Al-Nahdha Al-Islamia (Islamic Awakening Society). This politico-religious 
gathering, played a considerable part in the 1920 Revolt, was formed during the latter 
part of 1917 when a number of religious leaders and well-established dignitaries met 
in the Shia shrine city of Najaf for the purpose of organising resistance to British 
rule. Among them were Muhammad Jawad Al-Jaza'ri who headed the Jam 'iya, 
Muhammad Ali Bahr Al-Uloum, Abbas All Al-Rammahi, Abbas Al-Khalili and 
others. The constitution of the Jam'iya stated that the main objectives were ending 
British occupation, establishing the rule of Islam, and extending help to all Arabs and 
Muslims seeking independence. 248 
Jam'iya Al-Nahdha may have been the first political grouping in Iraq to espouse 
violence in order to further their cause. Its role in inflaming the people against Britain 
ignited what many call the "Najaf Rebellion", which in turn paved the way for the 
1920 Revolt. 249 The attack on the headquarters of the British administrator in Najaf is 
a case in point. The operation, which was masterminded and executed by Haj Najm 
Al-Buggal resulted in the death of the British officer W. M. Marshall and some of his 
soldiers . 
250 As might be expected the British responded swiftly and vigorously. The 
city of Najaf was soon besieged and became totally isolated from the rest of the 
country. Upon storming the starved city, a court martial headed by Lieut. Col. 
Leachman who was later to be killed at the hands of Sheikh Dhari, sought to give the 
248 Shubbar, Party Political Work, pp. 37-38. 
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Najafis a lesson they would not forget: 13 men were executed, 7 were imprisoned and 
about 105 were exiled to India. 25' 
While Jam'iyat Al Nahdha was almost an exclusively Shi'a institution, AI Ahd Al- 
Iraqi (Iraqi Covenant Society) was mainly a Sunni gathering. Its founders were for 
the most part secular Sunni Arabs, many of whom had either studied in Turkish 
schools or had even served in the Ottoman army. The Society was originally 
established in Istanbul in 1913 and did not become known as the Iraqi Ahd until 1918 
when difference between its leaders on strategy and priorities led to its division into a 
Syrian and an Iraqi Ahoi 252 
The primary aim of the AI Ahd Society was to achieve independence for Iraq through 
peaceful means, as many of its founding members had been ex-officers in the 
Ottoman army but who had played a significant part in helping the British cause 
during the Great War. Those believed in what the British had promised and expected 
their long cherished wish to be granted as soon as the dust of the hostilities settled. 
When no such thing materialised, most of the Ah leaders became disillusioned and 
turned away from Britain. Impatient with the delaying tactics of the occupation 
forces, some of its leaders resorted in November 1918 to armed struggle and went so 
far as to storm a British military garrison and take commander and troops as prisoners 
of war. In its attempt to wrest independence from Britain. The Ahd sought assistance 
from the old occupiers of Iraq: the Turks who proved quite willing to oblige. They 
supplied the Ahd's envoy with light weapons but not with cannons for fear that they 
may occupy Mosul, which Turkey never ceased to grudge as part of its own territory. 
u'Ibid., p. 62.. 
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Despite the immense disparity in arms, training and discipline the Ahd's initial 
military operations were met with some success. In Telaffar near Mosul, for example, 
their armed men under the veteran Tamil Al-Madfa'i, who was to rise to prominence 
throughout monarchist Iraq, managed to inflict heavy losses on the British forces, 
killing the commanding officer Major J. E. Barlow and his assistants and evicting the 
British troops from the area. 253 
Rapid developments however overtook the Ahd. The eruption of 1920 Revolt in the 
mid-Euphrates created an unprecedented upheaval. On top of this, came the 
expulsion, a month later, of Faisal's government from Syria. The latter episode put an 
end to the Ahd's dream of founding an independent pan-Arab state in which Iraqis, 
Syrians and other Arabs in the region could live under one banner. 254 
Disillusionment with the British led a number of Iraqi dignitaries, particularly among 
the Baghdad social and religious elite to form in February 1919 a political party 
aimed specifically at fighting the British presence in Iraq and then to achieve 
independence. Jami yat Haras Al-Istiglal (Guardians of Independence Society) 
included such eminent figures as Muhammad Baqir Al-Shibibi, Jalal Baban, Yusuf 
Al-Suwaidi, Jaffar Abul Timman, Dr Sami Shawkat, Muhammad Al-Sadr and others 
who were later to occupy prominent positions in independent Iraq. These included, 
in the case of Al-Sadr and Al-Suwaidi, premierships. The most significant fact about 
the Haras AI-Istiglal is its social composition. Even at that early stage in the political 
history of Iraq, its leadership, which included secular and religious men, Sunni and 
252 Shubbar, Party Political Work, p. 42. 
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Shi'a ulamas, Arabs and Kurds, rose above sectarianism and any social, ethnic or 
religious divides. 
Although in its general orientation, the Ahd society was nationalist Iraqi rather than 
pan-Arab, it was also, theoretically at least, open to non-Muslims. The Society may 
be considered as another Islamic grouping which strove to expel the British. Many of 
its founders, such as Muhammad Al-Sadr, were in fact either prominent clerics, or 
descendants of highly revered religious families such as Al-Shibibi, later to be called 
the "Poet of the 1920 Revolt". On account of the social and religious influence of its 
leadership, the broad-based Haras Society gained wide popularity throughout the 
country and received substantial contributions from sympathisers and supporters from 
across the country. 255 So strong was the desire of the Haras to organise and unite 
resistance to foreign rule that it sought to attract as many sympathisers as it could. To 
that end, it directed its attention towards the young. Soon enough the first youth 
organisation in Iraq, known as the Jam'iyat Al-Shabiba Al-Ja ffariya which was 
founded in 1919 and comprised mainly students and adult learners, dissolved itself 
256 and joined the Haras. 
This initial success was not to continue for long. In their attempt to widen the circle 
of opposition, the Haras leaders approached the Ad Society with a view to forming a 
"national front". They persevered despite the fact that many of its leaders viewed the 
Ad Society as a suspect grouping, whose actions betrayed a lack of enthusiasm for 
independence. The negotiations between the two Societies produced no result and the 
255Muthakarat A! -5a»'id Gati'Al Awwadi (The Memoirs ofAl-Sayyid Gati'Al Awwadi), ed., Kamil 
Salman Aljubouri (Baghdag: Al-Diwani Press, 1987), p. 13. 
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project was finally abandoned. This early effort at forging a united opposition front 
was, as will be discussed later, the first of many such ill-fated attempts which failed 
because of the suspicions, accusations and counter accusations exchanged between 
the different opposition groupings. 257 
Regular contacts with other religious and political groupings were however 
maintained. The weekly meetings, which were held in mosques and public places 
particularly in Kadhimiya in which a Haras Society leader would incite the populace, 
went down quite well with the people. As expected, this worried the occupation 
forces which could not tolerate such public gatherings in which the British were 
denounced and vilified. In August 1920, the British forces banned such gatherings, 
arrested most of the Haras leaders and caused the rest to flee the country. 258 
Opposition in Mandate Iraq 
During the period 1921-1932, Iraq witnessed a number of dramatic developments in 
the political arena. Political parties and groupings mushroomed and the political 
awareness of the masses grew even more acute, as many of the political parties, 
which used to operate underground came out into the open and began to propagate 
their ideas in order to attract newcomers and influence the public. During that decade 
ten political parties were established. These were Al-Nahdah Al-Iraqiya (Iraqi 
Renaissance Party), Al-Watani Al-Iraqi (Iraqi National Party), Al-Hurr Al-Iraqi (Iraqi 
Free Party), Al-Umma (the Nation Party), Al-Taqaddum (Progress Party), Al-Sha'b 
(the People's Party), Al-Watani Al-Iraqi-Mosul (National Iraqi Party-Mosul), Al- 
Istiglal (Independence Party), AI Ahd Al-Iragya (Iraqi Covenant Party) and Al-Ikha' 
257 Ibid., pp. 44-45. 
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AI-Watani (National Brotherhood Party). Except for AI-Watani Al-Iraqi and Al- 
Nahdha Al-Iraqi, most of these parties were weak and had no real following among 
the people. 
Exploiting the freedom of expression, the Watani and Nahdha parties were, albeit for 
a short time, quite active. They organised mass demonstrations and rallies in which 
they demanded an end to British involvement in Iraq's affairs. 259 Most of the 
founders of these two parties had been involved in politics since the days when the 
three Willayas of what is now modem Iraq were under Ottoman rule. While the 
Watani was founded by lawyers, businessmen, religious men from Sunni and Shia 
communities, the Nahdha was predominantly Shi'a in composition. 260 These two 
parties, which are more akin to ad hoc political Committees than to modem political 
parties, had no clear philosophy or well defined social vision and their main political 
aims were, in many ways, almost identical in that they both sought to achieve 
independence and bring Iraq out of Britain's orbit. 261 
Prompted by a desire to exert maximum pressure on the newly created regime in 
Baghdad, which was weak before the power of the High Commissioner, the 
leadership in both parties entered into negotiations aimed at uniting their resources 
and merging their forces. The joint rallies and demonstrations drew ever increasing 
crowds. On the first anniversary of King Faisal's accession, 23`d August, 1922, the 
two parties called for a mass protest demonstration. While speakers from the newly 
258Ibid 
., p. 72. 259 Wamidh Omar Nadhmi, Shafeek Abdul Razzaq and Ghanim Salih, Al-Tattawour Al-Siasi Al- 
Mu'asir Fil Iraq (Political Development in Contemporary Iraq), (Baghdad: Baghdad University Press, 
[11981J), p. 173. 
Al-Nafrsi, p. 199. 
261 Shubbar, pp. 92-93. 
127 
unified parties were addressing the demonstrators someone suddenly shouted "Down 
with the Mandate" and 'Down with England". 262 This was enough to provide Sir 
Percy Cox, the High Commissioner with the necessary casus belli. His response was 
immediate and severe. The headquarters of both parties were closed and sealed, their 
two organs AI Mufid and Al Rafidan were banned. Many leaders from both parties 
were exiled. From the Watani Party the following men were banished: Hamdi Al- 
Pachachi, Muhammad Mahdi Al-Basir, Ja'ffar Abul Timman and Abdul-Ghafur Al- 
Badri. From Al-Nahdha Party Amin Al-Charchafchi and Abdul-Rasoul Kubba were 
deported. These unpopular measures alienated even further the Mandate government 
from the people. 263 
Al-Nahdha remained banned until 1924 when, at the hands of the then prime minister, 
Yasin Al-Hashimi, it was permitted to resume activities. Al-Hashimi wanted to use 
the party as a vehicle to support him against his rival, Abdul Muhsin Al-Sadoun. 
However, it was not until 1927, when the party became fully active and influential. Its 
official organ, Al Nahdha, which continued to wag an unrelenting war against 
`British stooges" in the government achieved great popularity among the educated 
Iraqis. Following its closure in November 1927, the party soon dwindled into 
oblivion, never to recover again. 
264 
AI-Watani may be said to have fared better than Al-Nahdha. In July 1928 when its 
original founder, Jaffar Abul Timman, was granted the necessary permit most of the 
262 Hasan Shubbar, Al- Amal Al-Hizbi F11 Iraq: 1908-1958 (Party Political Work in Iraq: 1908-1958) 
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old members quickly rejoined the party. Al-Watani practically led Iraqi popular 
opposition during 1928 and 1929, when the government was accused of being 
especially harsh on students. 
In an attempt to contain the threat posed by political parties, some of which had 
become a thorn in the side of the government, King Faisal proposed that all Iraqis join 
one single party so that their efforts might be better directed towards the building of 
the nation. The idea was extensively debated, with the press welcoming it at first. 265 
But the idea was abandoned when it became clear that the public would not stomach 
it. 
Mention should be made of the role played by Jabhat Al-Ta'akhi (Fraternal Front) 
which was made up of the Watani (National Party) and Al-Ikha' Al-Watani (National 
Brotherhood Party). The Front which came into being in November 1930, fought 
mainly against the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty which was seen as a `veil for continued 
British direction of their country". 266 The Front proved quite influential in wide 
sectors of the community, organising general strikes and inciting public opinion 
against the government of Nuri Al-Said, who was ousted in October 1931. The Front 
lost its grip on public opinion after some of its leaders either resigned or were won 
over by the establishment. The fatal blow came in March 1935 when all political 
parties were banned at the hands of Yassin Al-Hashimi's government. 267 
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Opposition: from independence to Declaration of the Republic 
AI-Hashimi's move against the free exercise of political activities in Iraq may have 
been inspired by the Turkish example. Hasan Shubbar points out that the Turkish 
ruler had earlier spoken to Nuri Al-Said about the advantages of one-party rule and 
the disadvantages of a multi-party system which could bring about chaos and 
perpetual disturbances. 268 However, the period immediately following independence 
witnessed dramatic developments as far as party political work is concerned: it saw 
the birth of, amongst other grass root political organisations, the two most influential 
political parties in the history of the country: the Communist party in 1934 and-later 
on, during the late forties, its rival the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party. To pursue their 
goals, these two parties, as well as the other political organisations had either to 
operate underground or to use front organisations through which they could spread 
their ideas and attract supporters to their cause. 
Jama'at AI Ahali (the People's Group) was the earliest political opposition 
organisation to resort to clandestine means in order to broaden its popular base. The 
Ahali group, which was made up of young intellectuals and Western educated men, 
was established early in 1931 but did not become recognised as a popular movement 
until a year later when it published the now defunct daily AI Ahali. This was to play a 
very important role over three decades. Among its founders were: Abdul-Qadir 
Ismael, who later became the secretary general of the Communist Party, Muhammad 
Hadid, later to become General Abdul Karim Qassim's political and economic arm, 
Ibid., p. 146. 
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and Abdul Fattah Ibrahim, who later founded Al-Sha'b (People's Party). Kamil Al- 
Chadirchi, the doyen of Iraqi reformist opposition joined Al Ahali group a year later. 
Through its two front organisations, Society for the Eradication of Illiteracy and the 
Baghdad Club, the Ahalf group managed to attract a number of young enthusiasts as 
well as old politicians. Many of the social dignitaries and influential men won over by 
the Society for the Eradication of Illiteracy later became prime ministers. These 
include Dr Fadhil Al-Jamali and cabinet members such as Khalil Kannah, Sadiq Al- 
Bassam, Nasrat Al-Farisi and a host of others who were to play an important role in 
the political history of modem Iraq. The secret organisation behind the front 
organisations was called Al-Jam'iya Al-Sirriya Al-Sha'biya (the Secret Popular 
Society) which in 1934 was joined by Hikmat Suleiman, who was well connected and 
had close links with a number of high ranking ambitious army officers. In 1936 
Hikmat Suleiman succeeded in luring the Ahali group to lend its full support to 
General Bakr Sidqi's coup which brought Hikmet Suleiman to the fore and who in 
turn relied heavily on members of the Secret Society. With many of the Secret 
Society leaders in the cabinet, Bakr Sidqi's rule may be said to represent the first 
government made up largely of opposition elements. It was only a matter of time 
however before the Ahail group realised that their hasty support of the coup had 
backfired. Although on the face of it General Sidqi was not even a cabinet member, 
he was in point of fact the real power with whom all authority resided. On account of 
the bad performance of the government on almost every level, the Ahali group, which 
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was rightly identified with the coup, lost much of its popular support and caused a 
number of its leaders to abandon it in disgust. 269 
The Communist Party 
Although the Communist Party has adopted 31 March 1934 as its official birthday, 
the Marxist movement in Iraq goes back, as Batatu points out, to as early as 1924.270 
Between 1924 and 1934 a number of Marxist cells had been separately formed in 
Baghdad, Basrah and Nasiriya by young mostly middle class men who had, for one 
reason or another, been to Russia and had fallen under the spell of Communist 
teaching. But these early cells, however, were not well organised and, apart from 
expressing disenchantment with Arab history and traditions, had no clear vision of 
what they were seeking and offered no realistic alternative to existing institutions. 
Avoiding the newly-coined Arabic term 'Shiyu'iya' (Communism) which was laden 
with unpopular associations the Baghdad cell founded a secret organisation under the 
name of Jam'fyatMukafahatAI-Isti'mar Wal Istithmar (Society for the Eradication of 
Imperialism and Exploitation). 27' 
The three small Communist organisations succeeded in co-ordinating their efforts, 
and in 1935 the first issue of Kifah Al'Sha'b appeared bearing the words `organ of the 
Central Committee of the Iraqi Communist Party' in its subtitle. But the party was 
soon to suffer the first of many devastating blows, exemplified in the execution, 
imprisonment and harassment of its members and sympathisers. Luckily for the 
Communist movement in Iraq, one of its founding leaders, iron-willed Yusuf Salman 
2691bid., p. 157. 
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Yusuf, better known by his nom de guerre `Fahad' was pursuing a course of study in 
Moscow during this period. Upon his return in December 1938 he embarked upon the 
arduous task of reconstructing the party, avoiding most of the old Communist cadre 
and opening a new chapter in the history of Communism in Iraq. Fahad wanted to 
mould the party in his own image. He also sought to build a party and along Stalinist 
lines, where any form of criticism or opposition, real or imagined, would not be 
tolerated. 
In order to monopolise authority Fahad dismissed his potential rivals and critics 
trashing them with all sorts of accusations. Despite his heavy-handed measures and 
perhaps because of them, the party, throughout Fahad's chairmanship was plagued 
with numerous rifts, schisms and inner fighting. Between Fahad's return from 
Moscow and his execution in 1949 the Communist party underwent at least four 
major shake ups when Central Committee members rebelled against his leadership 
and formed rival Communist organisations. In point of fact the rifts and internal 
turmoil even crept into the cells and party organisations operating in prisons. 
For more than two decades after its establishment, the Iraqi Communist Party had 
mainly attracted young intellectuals, students and labourers. Through this period the 
reputation and influence of the Communists went through many ups and downs. In 
1941, for example the Communist Party supported Rashid Ali Al-Gailani's National 
Defence government only to turn against it, siding with the British who had earlier 
suppressed it but who were now fighting on the side of the Soviet Union against Nazi 
Germany. Ignoring anti-British popular sentiments, some Communists went so far as 
271 Shubbar, Party Political Work, p. 164. 
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to eulogise British statesmen whose names at that time invoked sad memories and 
bitterness. 272 More damaging to the Communist Party was the attitude adopted 
towards the question of Palestine especially following the publication of the UN 
Partition Plan and the subsequent creation of the state of Israel. The Iraqi Communists 
showed remarkable insensitivity when they slavishly followed the official Soviet line 
regarding recognition of the Jewish State. What further rendered the Communist 
movement suspect in the eyes of many Iraqis was the extraordinarily high proportion 
of Iraqi Jews within the party. The Iraqi Jews, writes Batatu, exercised 
leading functions in the League Against Zionism and in the 
women's organisation of the party, and concentrated heavily as 
they were in the capital, contributed in strength to the lower and 
middle echelons of the Greater Baghdad party organisation. 
Moreover, for brief periods after the capture of Fahad - to be 
precise in April to August 1947 and in December 1948 to 
February 1949 - Jews guided the destinies of the party. 
273 
As in other parts of the Arab world however, 274 the fifties witnessed the gradual 
growth of the Communist party which had become more actively involved in inciting 
the public against successive governments. It was during the Suez crisis that its 
popularity, along that of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, shot up due to the staunch 
anti British and pro-Nasser attitudes it had adopted. With the fear that the monarchists 
might lose their grip on the situation and with the identification of the Communists as 
the most dangerous underground organisations capable of influencing intellectuals 
272 One such article was written by the Secretary General of the Communist Party (Al-Shararah) 
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and illiterates alike, successive governments were intent on eradicating the 
Communist influence from such front organisations as the Democratic Youth, 
Students' Union and the League for the Defence of the Women's Rights. 275 
On account of the severity with which Communist members and their sympathisers 
were persecuted, 276 the party adopted a highly intricate and secretive organisational 
structure which was not easy to infiltrate. The Party was therefore singled out for 
ruthless punishment. Sympathisers were jailed and dismissed from schools or work 
while leading members were deprived of their citizenship, and still others were 
executed. During the years just preceding the 1958 coup, the word `Communist' 
became in official lingo synonymous with `subversive' or `terrorist'. What further 
weakened the Communist opposition in Iraq was the strategy laid down for the Party 
by what Batatu calls a "devil-may-care secretary" whose rash and ill-advised 
leadership cost the Party dearly. 277 The party's strong opposition to the Baghdad 
Pact, which struck a popular chord among Iraqis, and the effective Soviet propaganda 
machine in the form of Arabic broadcasts manned almost entirely by Iraqi 
Communist exiles kept the Communists afloat until the 1958 coup which brought 
them as close as they ever got to the helm of authority. 
It has to be remembered that throughout its history, the Communist Party, which 
succeeded in winning over many intellectuals, labourers and young students from a 
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wide range of social and ethnic groups, was always viewed with suspicion by many 
segments in society, particularly the traditionalists and the Islamists. 278 On the other 
hand, rival parties were quite envious of the dedication and commitment of its 
followers and were also suspicious of its intentions. Iraqi politicians were so 
apprehensive of the new breed of young dedicated enthusiasts, who had fallen under 
the spell of the Communist slogans, that they came to consider them as alien bodies in 
the political structure of the country and refused to recognise them as a political party. 
The Communists succeeded above all else to give a generalised expression of the 
bitter feelings of the masses and 
fertilised these feelings with Communist ideas, and promised, if 
only they could band together, a conclusion of their problems far 
more favourable than any they dared to hope. 279 
When, in 1954, the National Front was formed, the Communists signed the 
communique as individuals and not as a distinct political group 280 It was in fact not 
until 1957 that the Iraqi Communist Party broke their isolation and formally `joined 
hands with the National Democrats, the Ba'th and the Independence party'. 281 
The Arab Bath Socialist Party 
Although the Ba'th Party had been in existence since 1947, its activities were never 
felt at a popular level in Iraq until the mid fifties. Its pan-Arab philosophy found a 
favourable echo during the Suez crisis when many Arabs came to view Gamal Abdul 
278 In his memoirs, Communist Party Central Committee member Zeld Khairi defends championing the 
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Nasser as the Saladin of the modem age, who would expel all foreign influence from 
the Arab region and return the lands lost in the first round of hostilities between the 
Arabs and Israel in 1948. Students and young people were particularly enamoured 
with the three aims which the Ba'thists aspired to: unity, liberty and socialism. Unlike 
the Communists, who could draw on the experiences of the intellectual output of a 
world power, the Ba'thists only had Michael Aflaq, who was regarded by all Ba'thists 
then as their authoritative teacher. His thoughts were: 
A mixture of essentially humanitarian nationalism and aspects of 
individualism of the enlightenment, the democratism of the 
Jacobins, ... the class standpoint of 
Marx, the elitism of Lenin, 
and over and above that, a strong dose of Christian spirituality 
and nationalistically interpreted Islam. The mixture is often 
mechanical. In other words Aflaq makes no serious attempt to 
synthesise the ideas that he imbibed. 282 
Despite the serious flaws and shortcomings of Ba'thist ideology and because of the 
emphasis on the role of Islam and the importance of Arab traditions their party found 
it much easier than the Communists to penetrate the political scene. Furthermore, it 
was not confronted with any real hostility on the part of the security apparatus which 
had singled out the Communists as subversive elements. The Communists, to the 
exclusion of almost all other opposition groupings, were hotly pursued and 
persecuted. In a way McCarthyism remained in Iraq a long time after it had peaked in 
the United States. 
During the last five years or so of the royal regime, when popular sentiment was 
decidedly hostile to practically whoever came to form a cabinet, the Ba'thists made 
some gains in the street but, unlike the Communists, found that their base was still not 
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solid enough to enable them to organise protest demonstrations or call for general 
strikes. During that period all political parties, those officially licensed as well as 
those underground, were particularly active in denouncing government policies and 
for calling for democratisation and resisting moves to rebind Iraq to the West in a 
new alliance which was to be known as Baghdad Pact. In the 1954 election, and 
despite the corruption which characterised it, the opposition managed to win eleven 
seats in a Majlis (parliament) of 135.283 The Arab Ba'th Party which284 by 1954 had 
only attracted some five hundred members was still quite weak and its strategies were 
laid down by `neophytes in politics'. 285 They could not even string out a few names 
286 to put forward candidates, let alone win seats in the parliament. 
The 1956 Suez crisis may be said to be the first opportunity which enabled the 
Ba'thists to widen their popular support. A year later they joined the National Front 
which already included the Istiglal (Independence) Party, the Walani Al-Dimocrati 
(National Democrats) and a number of Communist sympathisers. 
Nationalist Reformist Parties 
Before the Ba'thists and Communists wrested popular support from the other political 
groupings during the late forties and throughout the fifties, political opposition was 
chiefly led by bourgeois parties made up of professionals, bureaucrats, proprietors 
and young intellectuals. The main thrust of these parties was the elimination of 
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corruption in government, liberalising civil laws, the organising of free elections and 
the termination of political and military ties with Britain. 287 These parties included 
nationalist Al Istiglal (Independence), the leftist Al-Sha'b (the People), socialist Al- 
Walani Al-Dimocrati (National Democrats) and others. Despite the fact that they were 
no more than a handful of individuals with enough resources to publish dailies 
carrying their own vision of the future, they nevertheless played a significant part in 
mobilising people and focusing public opinion on national issues. The poorer strata of 
the masses did not feel particularly attracted to the mild programmes of those 
bourgeois groupings and remained a little suspicious of their aims. 
Al-Istiglal (Independence) Party 
This nationalist Party was established in 1946 and its founding members included a 
number of middle-class intellectuals who were not new to the political scene in Iraq. 
Some had in fact been members of other political parties before. Chief among the 
aims which the Istiglalis sought to achieve were Arab unity and the support of Arab 
countries in their struggle to gain independence. Special attention was given to the 
question of Palestine. Through its organ Liwa' Al-Istiglal (Independence Banner) 
impassioned editorials condemning the Jewish state and calling for the reinstating of 
the Palestinians consistently appeared consistently appeared. 
The Istiglal Party reached its highest point of popularity in 1948 when, following the 
creation of the state of Israel, it led massive protest demonstrations and helped in the 
effort to secure financial support and recruit volunteers to take part in operations 
28 7 AI-Hasson, Struggle for Power, p. 70. 
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against the Israelis. 288 Although its political influence was widely acknowledged, the 
party never really took root among the masses. These were more interested in populist 
revolutionary movements than in traditional party ideologies or bourgeois mentality 
The Istiglalis did not appeal to post World War H Iraq which was witnessing a 
historic phase in which dramatic events followed one upon the other in the Arab 
world: the Partition Plan of Palestine, the Arab-Israeli War of 1948, the Egyptian 
coup of Gamal Abdul Nassir, the eruption of the Algerian Revolution, nationalisation 
of the Suez Canal and its aftermath, the expulsion of British army officers from 
Jordan, the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal, U. S. marines "landing" in Lebanon to thwart 
a pro-Nassente uprising and America's use of World Bank loans to blackmail Nasser 
into submission. 
Although few in number, those lawyers and foreign-educated intellectuals continued 
to wield considerable influence from the day the Party was founded until id dissolved 
itself or rather it died a natural death in the early sixties. The Istiglalis were 
signatories of the National Front of 1954 and that of 1957. They also managed to win 
a number of parliamentary seats in the 1954 election. When the 1958 coup took place, 
the founder of the party, Muhammad Mahdi Kubba was chosen to join the three-man- 
Presidency Council which was, at least in theory, the highest executive office during 
the Qassim era with full Presidential authority. 
Al-Hizb Al- Walani Al-Dimocrati (National Democratic Party) 
This mildly socialist but essentially conservative Western-type party was founded by 
Kamil Al-Chadirchi and others who were mainly upper middle class lawyers, 
288 Shubbar, Party Political Work., pp. 195.7. 
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enlightened social dignitaries and land owners in 1946. Most of the founding 
members were members of the Ahail group which had come to prominence following 
General Bakr Sidqi's coup behind which they stood. In this newly formed grouping 
they continued more or less to work for the same objective: socialism and democracy. 
The party however suffered from internal divisions. Some of the more zealous 
members, such as Abdul-Wahab Mahmud who later became Secretary General of the 
Law Society under General Qassim, and Kamil Qazanchi, President of the other 
Communist front, the Peace Partisans, felt compelled to leave the party and join the 
Communists when they realised that Chadirchi and his two associates Hussein Jamil 
and Muhammad Hadid would not budge. When the 1958 coup took place General 
Qassim heavily relied on the support of this party and offered cabinet posts to its 
members, sympathisers or ex-members. 289 With the end of the first Republican 
regime, this party whose members, though not Chadirchi himself, were identified 
with General Qassim, became moribund, and with Chadircchi's death in the late 
sixties the party has never been heard of. 
29o 
Hizb Al-Sha'b (People's Party) 
Al-Sha'b Party was at first a secret organisation which circulated anti government 
pamphlets among its members and sympathisers who were like the Istiglalfs and the 
National Democrats drawn from the educated well-to-do stratum of the middle class. 
Founded in 1942 the Party was not licensed until 1946. Two opposed factions 
surfaced within the leadership of the Party from the beginning: a Marxist group which 
openly called for the adoption of socialism as a guiding ideology and a less radical 
289 Ibid., pp. 201-202. 
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one which counselled moderation and gradual reform. The internal division however 
did not last long. In 1947 the government, accusing the Party of engaging in 
clandestine subversive activities and of receiving financial support from `unknown 
sources", withdrew its license and forced the Party to go underground. Soon after 
most of the radical elements joined the Communist camp while the rest preferred to 
leave politics altogether. 291 
Al-DhubbatAl-Ahrar (Free Officers) 
The acute disappointment felt by Iraqis of all walks of life, particularly young 
officers, at the humiliating outcome of the Arab-Israeli war of 1948, deterioration of 
the political situation at home and the success of Nasser's coup in Egypt encouraged a 
number of military officers to form a secret organisation with the specific aim of 
toppling the royal regime. It is now accepted that the earliest "cell" of this secret 
organisation was formed in September 1952, hardly two months after Nasser's coup. 
Captain Rifa't Al-Haj Sirri and Lieutenant Colonel Rajab Abdul Majid started 
recruiting young officers into the new organisation which the then Brigadier Abdul 
Karim Qassim and later Colonel Abdul Salam Aref joined two years later. 292 The 
plotting officers did not have a specific ideology or a well defined agenda. The 
officers, who included nationalists, leftists and others with Islamist orientation, had 
only one overriding concern: to topple the pro-British royal regime at any cost. In 
point of fact there was disagreement even on this issue. The then colonel Isma'il Al- 
290 Nadhmi, Political Development, p. 189. 
291 Shubbar, Party Political Work., pp. 197. 
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Aref who was the first officer to approach the Abul-Karim Qassim and ask him to 
join the secret organisation states that : 
During 1955 the free officers started to discuss the fate of the 
monarchy and form of government they intend to establish in 
Iraq. In these discussions two trends surfaced. Some officers 
wanted to end the monarchy, declare Iraq a republic immediately 
the revolution achieves success and form a Revolution Command 
Council which is to be entrusted with running the affairs of state 
for a short period of time after which a popular government 
democratically elected should take over all responsibilities. Other 
officers held a different view. These sought to preserve the 
monarchy for a while and then eliminate the crown regent and 
Nuri Al-Said and his clique according to what the Revolution 
Command Council saw fit. Once the new regime is firmly 
established Iraq may then be declared a republic either through a 
referendum or a decree to be issued by the Revolution Command 
Council. 293 
Although no specific programme had been agreed upon before the army officers won 
power, it became evident during the first weeks of the Republic that the new regime 
sought, amongst other things, to fight the land owners and put an end to the age-old 
laws governing cultivable land, untie the Iraqi Dinar from the Sterling, abrogation of 
the Baghdad Pact Treaty, establish full diplomatic relations with the then socialist 
bloc, free all political prisoners and, in short, to give Iraqis an opportunity to run their 
own affairs and improve their living conditions. 
294 
Despite the lack of real discipline and numerous loopholes which characterised the 
Free Officers Organisation, these few middle-ranking officers, whose conspiratorial 
movement was more than once betrayed or discovered295, managed to execute one of 
2931bid., 104. 
294 Al-Alawi, Abdul Karim Qassim, pp. 128-30. 
295 Detailed descriptions of these and other close shaves are provided by AI-Aref, Secrets, pp. 124, 
128-132. 
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the easiest and most successful coups in modern history against a regime that had 
several mutual defence treaties with its neighbours and was closely bound with 
Western powers. The reasons for the unexpected success are not difficult to discern. 
Resentment with the uncritically pro Western policies of Baghdad especially in the 
post-Baghdad Pact years, the Communist propaganda machine, which was churning 
out endless accusations and allegations, the dangerous spread of "a little knowledge", 
which made many Iraqis susceptible to elegant-sounding slogans, the rise of Arab 
nationalism following the 1952 coup in Egypt and Nasser's manipulation of the state- 
owned mass media and his highly effective and emotive rhetoric which cast a spell on 
the listeners and inflamed the imagination of millions of Arabs east and West of Suez 
ripened the political climate and made the Iraqis yearn for change, Another factor 
which made the coup possible was the fact that the Security apparatus was not as 
pervasive, intrusive or as indeed half as ruthless as it was later to become in 
Republican Iraq when under President Saddam Hussein, it became a government 
above the government. 
The Islamic Opposition: The Muslim Brotherhood 
Many of the leading figures in the political parties during the occupation and Mandate 
years were religious men who espoused patriotism with their religious mission. 
Fatwas against the British were issued and in their weekly khutbas (sermons) they 
often enjoined the faithful to fight British colonialism and expel foreign influence 
from Iraq. Far from being modem political parties, the religious groupings, which had 
earlier resisted ottoman rule were soon to direct their criticism towards the British- 
installed government. Their methods remained practically unchanged as they 
confined their activities to places of worship and public occasions. The religious 
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movement however did not organise itself into modern political parties until after the 
end of World War II when the government promulgated the Parties and Societies 
Law, which legalised all political parties, except the Communists. 
The Muslim Brotherhood was among the first Islamic parties licensed to operate in 
Iraq in 1948. It was in a way an extension of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and 
was therefore exclusively Sunni. Although the Muslim Brotherhood attacked Britain, 
Zionism and corruption in their organ Al-Hisab (The Reckoning), they were not 
considered a serious threat to the government. They were in general tolerated or were 
not in any sense persecuted until 1959 when the leader of the Party, Muhammad 
Hamid Al-Sawwaf, who had gone underground after 1958, was accused of treason for 
conspiring to oust General Qassim and condemned to death in absentia. 296 Following 
the 1968 coup however most of the Ikhwan leaders were physically eliminated. 297 
Hizb Al-Tahrir Al-Islami (Islamic Liberation Party) 
More ambitious and aggressive than the Muslim Brotherhood was the Hizb Al- 
Tahreer Al-Islam!, which was founded in Iraq shortly after its establishment in 
Jerusalem in 1952. There were in fact no organisational links between the Party and 
Jerusalem. The founders of the party simply emulated the methods of the then Jordan- 
based party and operated quite independently of Jerusalem. AI-Tahrir Party was more 
vociferous in its criticism of the contemporary affairs than were the Muslim 
Brotherhood, which enabled it to win over many of the Brotherhood's young and 
enthusiastic members, whose thirst for rebellion had not been satisfied by itsr rather 
Shubbar, Party Political Work, pp. 252ff; AI-Arcf, Secrets, p. 376. 
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conservative leadership. Despite repeated attempts at obtaining a license to operate 
openly in the country, the party remained underground until the late sixties when it 
left the political scene completely after the detention and later execution of the 
mastermind behind the party, Hussein Al-Adhami. 298 
Hizb Al-Da 'wah Al-Islamiya (Islamic Call) 
While the Muslim Brotherhood and the Tahrir were entirely Sunni parties, the 
Da ivah Al-Islamya was exclusively Shi'a. This party which was to play a significant 
part in later years, was established in Najaf in late 1957299 by a number of prominent 
Shi'a clerics including Muhammad Baqir Al-Sadr. Al-Sadr's execution at the hands 
of President Saddam Hussein's regime is still commemorated throughout many parts 
of the Shi'a world particularly in Iranwith which Al-Sadr had close contacts. 
Throughout the years 1958-1968 Al-Da'wah Party concentrated on building its power 
base particularly among school teachers and young government civil servants, many 
of whom were given grants and scholarships to pusue higher education at its two front 
institutions Kulliyat Al-Fiqh (College of Islamic Jurisprudence) in Najaf and Kulliyat 
Usul Al-Deep (College of Islamic Principles) in Baghdad 300 
High Tide of Opposition and State Responses 
Compared with the waves of executions, use of poison gas and physical elimination 
of all political opposition in Republican Iraq, particularly since the Ba'thist so called 
2' Hasan Al-Saced, Nawateer Al-Gharb: Safahat min Mallaf Ilagat Al-Lu'ba Al-Dawliya ma'Al-Ba'th 
Al-Iraqi 1948-1968 (Guardsmen of the West: Pages from the File on International Relations with 
Iraq's Bath 1948-1968) (Beirut: Mu'asast Al-Wihda Lil Dirasat wa Al-Tawtheeq, 1992), p. 247. 
2" Shubbar, Party Political Work, pp. 253-54. 
299 11asan Al-Saced, Gyardsmen, p. 249. 
300 Ibid., p. 250. 
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"White Revolution" of 1968, the measures taken against the clandestine groupings 
and political dissidents in monarchist Iraq appear quite moderate. This is despite the 
hanging of three members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the 
execution of the four colonels known as the "Golden Square" who had seized power 
and imposed the "National Defence" regime in 1941. Despite the charges Batatu 
levels against Nuri as-Sai'd and Crown Prince Abdul-Ilah in which he points out that 
these two men "were never tender with the lives of their peoplei3o1, it is now widely 
accepted among Iraqis and non-Iraqis that the royal regime, for all its suppression of 
the opposition was indeed far less repressive than the regimes which succeeded it. 302 
During the fifties, with the possible exception of Nasser's UAR which offered much 
propaganda support but little material help to the Pan-Arab nationalists in Iraq, and 
the Soviet Union which granted those Communists who could make the journey to 
Moscow leave to remain, no power, regional or international extended any real 
assistance to the various Iraqi opposition groups. During the monarchist period, 
effecting a political change in Iraq was not on the agenda of the Western or even 
regional powers with many of which Iraq had close ties, particularly Turkey, Jordan 
and imperial Iran. Because both the UAR and the USSR considered the Baghdad Pact 
as a threat to their security, these two countries welcomed any Iraqis associated with 
the opposition. This explains why these two countries spared no time in recognising 
the new republican regime. 
303 
Despite the scarcity of external support, the opposition was very much alive and 
301 Batatu, Social Classes, p. 802. 
302 Interview with Iraqi National Accord Assembly leader Salah Omar Al-Ali in London on February 
9`h 1998. 
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active inside the country albeit under the surface for much of the time. Under the 
royal regime it was not really dangerous for Iraqis to be known as sympathisers with 
this political grouping or that. Most University students for example did not hide their 
political preferences or even their affiliations although they knew that there were, as 
one might expect, informers amongst them. Even military officers, the supposed 
defenders of the regime, often expressed criticism of the government without much 
fear. 304 
Ebb of Civilian Opposition 1958-1968 
The 1958 revolution unleashed the long suppressed opposition to the unpopular 
regime. Soon after the new inexperienced rulers had embarked upon the destruction 
of one institution after another in a series of hasty decrees and unstudied moves, the 
general public grew more disillusioned about what the coup could bring about. The 
rift between the Arab nationalists who were impatient to declare a merger with the 
former United Arab Republic and the Communists who saw in such a move a deadly 
blow to their ambitions became so intense that in 1959 bloody clashes between these 
two camps and their sympathisers occurred in Mosul and later in Kirkuk. During the 
five years that followed the coup each of these two factions worked assiduously to 
win the military government to its side. Throughout this period the public steadily 
grew more disenchanted with politics and political change. From 1963, when General 
Qassim's regime was toppled in a bloody coup at the hands of a few Ba'thist and 
nationalist officers, to the 1968 so-called "White Revolution" which brought Saddam 
303 Al-Zubaidi, Laith Abdul-Hasan, Thawrat 14 Tammuz Fl Iraq (14`' July Revolution in Iraq), 2nd ed., 
(Baghdad: Dar Al-Yaqdha Al-Arabiya, 1981), p. 210. 
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Hussein to power, political opposition was a costly and dangerous game almost 
exclusively played by the military, with the public mainly as onlookers. 
The Iraqi opposition which had before the 1958 coup maintained at least a fragile 
front in the face of their common enemy, the royal regime, became deeply divided 
after General Qassim had shrewdly, if briefly, manipulated the acute rivalries 
between the political parties to remain in power. A few months after the coup, there 
appeared a great divide within Iraqi society which separated the Iraqi nationalists, 
who were the main supporters of the General and those Pan-Arabists who called for 
an immediate merger with Nasser's Egypt. The first group was led by the 
Communists and their supporters; the second by the Ba'thists. Qassim's reliance on 
the Iraqi Communist party to counter the influence of the Pan-Arabists made the latter 
potential enemies of his rule. On the other hand his vacillation and hesitation to give 
full reign to the Communists gradually eradicated the support of the Communists and 
weakened his own position. This policy of what May Chartouni Dubarry calls 
"systematic division" did not however salvage the worsening political situation which 
was awash with all sorts of rumours of impending coups at the hands of one potential 
putschist or another. Ironically, until the end of his regime General Qassim believed 
that no opposition party or grouping could topple him. He felt he could always rely on 
the armed forces as he did when he quelled the Shawwaf uprising in Mosul led by an 
305 
adventurous Nasserite army colonel. 
Between 1958 and 1968, military officers were both the instigators and instruments of 
304 Ismail Al-Aref, Asrar Thawrat 14 Tammuz Wa Ta'sisAl lumhuriyaAI Iraqiya fr Al Iraq (Secrets of 
the 14th July Revolution and the establishment of the Republic in Iraq) (London: Lana Publications, 
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all political change in Iraq. They 
participated fully in the game of alliances and counter-alliances, 
coups and counter-coups the rules of which were defined by 
Qassim. For these parties, launched on their frantic course to 
power, the military leader or leaders represented both a trump and 
a central stake. The realisation of their ambitions has necessarily 
to cut across the alliance, either with the ruling faction (such as 
the support of the ICP [Iraqi Communist Party] for Qassim), or 
with a group of putschist officers (such as the alliance between 
the Ba'thists and the hard core of the pan-Arabist officers). All 
these parties seemed to support the principle of a coup d'etat as 
an instrument of political change and thus contributed to the 
encouragement and reinforcement of factional struggles within 
the Iraqi army. 306 
All governments, which came to power between 1958 and 1968 were a result of 
coups, some quite bloody, carried out mostly by middle class military officers with 
close ties to the regime itself. Despite all claims to the contrary, the political parties 
were too weak to initiate a coup or start a popular uprising. Various coups were 
attempted against General Qassim by those who were his own comrades. The short- 
lived putsch of March 1959 in Mosul was planned and carried out exclusively by a 
few mostly middle-ranking officers headed by Qassim's colleague, Colonel Al- 
Shawwaf. Similarly, the declaration of the Second Republic following the 8t' 
February 1963 coup was the work of disaffected young and ambitious officers, some 
of whom had a Ba'thist background. Nasser who had been openly calling upon the 
Iraqis to rise against the "Divider of Iragi307 provided little more than fiery anti- 
Qassim radio commentaries read by the infamous Egyptian propagandist Ahmad 
Saeed. 
303 May Chartouni Dubarry, "The Development of Internal Politics in Iraq from 1958 to the Present 
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The 1e November 1963 coup was championed by Abdul Salam Aref and a few 
disgruntled Pan-Arabist officers who were in high positions during the first Ba'thist 
regime. Even the 1968 so-called 'White Revolution' against the Aref regime was in 
point of fact a plot executed mainly by those same officers with whom the security of 
the Aref regime had been entrusted: the Chief of Military Intelligence, Abdul Razzaq 
Al-Nayif and the Commander of the then Battalion of Republican Guards, Ibrahim 
Al-Dawoud. These regimes were not established on a wave of popular feeling and did 
not have any real support among the public. Their relatively easy success (and 
downfall) is attributed mainly to the fact that Iraq during the sixties had not yet 
known the ruthless security apparatus that was to launch violent onslaughts on any 
one whose loyalty was not guaranteed. During that troubled period, many Iraqis 
began to discover that politics was a dangerous game, one which was to turn fatal 
under Saddam Hussein's presidency. This meant that following the deep 
disappointment of the 1958 coup, most Iraqis came to lose all expectations that the 
new governments were capable or even willing to do much to improve their lot. 
Opposition Parties 1968-1991 
Apart from the struggle for power among the different factions within the Ba'th 
Party308, the period immediately after the 1968 coup was relatively quiet in so far as 
the opposition movement is concerned. Saddam's "White Revolution" set out to win 
over all potential rivals or enemies such as the Communists, the Nasserites and the 
Syrian oriented or so called "left wing Ba'thists" as well as a number of independent 
nationalists. In 1973 a National Progressive Front was formed. This included the 
306 Jbid pp. 29-30. 
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ruling Ba'th Party, the Communist Party and the Kurdish Democratic Party. This 
political structure was just another "fron" which was not different from the other 
organisations such as the Tala-ie (Pioneers) for primary school children, Futuwwa 
(Vanguards) and Kashaffa (Scouts) for teenagers, Shabab (Youth) for the over 
eighteen year olds, and a host of other mass organisations intended to consolidate the 
Ba'th position in every sphere of life in the country and to block the infiltration of any 
ideologies or anti-Ba'thist political rivals into any social or economic stratum. 309 
While the Ba'th government managed to integrate wide sectors of Iraqi society into 
the Party proper, or into one of its front organisations, it failed to establish a solid 
base in the Shi'a strongholds of Najaf, Karbala, Kufa and the rest of the shrine cities 
of the country. These remained, for the most part, loyal to the religious leadership 
embodied in the Imams of Najaf to whom by tradition all the faithful among the Shi'a 
of the world turn for guidance. 310 Most inhabitants of these cities remained alienated 
and became increasingly sympathetic towards the one Shi'a party which stood up to 
the Ba'th regime, namely the Hizb Al-Da "wah Al-Islamiya (Islamic Call Party). 311 
The Communists 
In their long political history in Iraq the Communists have, as pointed out earlier, 
passed through many ups and downs. At one point during the Qassim regime and 
301 The Arabic name 'Qassim' means `divider', hence the phrase. 
309 Cf. Peter Heine, 'Political Parties, Institutions and Administrative Structures' in Hopwood, Iraq: 
Power and Society, pp. 44-5. 
310 Developments in Iran following Khomeini's takeover had produced the Shia holy city of Qum as a 
rival centre of Shi'a' religious authority. 
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again during the mid-seventies they held cabinet posts. 312 At other times, they were 
ruthlessly hunted by the authorities. Throughout the period from 1934 until recently 
internal divisions and struggle for power characterised most of its activity. Following 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc the, Iraqi Communist Party lost 
its lifeline and consequently much of its influence and popularity. Aziz Muhammad 
who headed the Central Committee for twenty eight years from 1967 to 1992 failed to 
adapt to the changing international and regional climate and was replaced by Hamid 
Majid Musa, a Shi'a party worker from the city of Hilla on the mid-Euphrates. 
Among the splinter groups which mushroomed, especially after the great rift of 1967 
were: Al-Kifah Al-Mussalah (the Armed Stuggle) which was founded in 1969 by Aziz 
Al-Haj, Munadhamat Jaish Al-Tahreer Al-Sha'bi (People's Liberation Army 
Organisation) which was established in the mid sixties by Mu'een Hussein Al-Nahr; 
Al-Munadhama AI Markisiyya Al-Lininiyya (the Marxist-Leninist Organization) 
which was founded in Damascus in 1976; AI-Raya Al-Hamra' (the Red Banner) 
which is devoted to the propagation of Che Guevara's tactics; Harakat AI-Talee'a Al- 
Deemocratiya (Democratic Pioneers Movement), founded in Baghdad in 1979, 
Munadhamat AI A'mal Al-Shiyou 7 Al-Iraqi (Iraqi Communist Action Organisation) 
which was established in Moscow in 1983 and a host of other mini groupings which 
were to leave the political arena following the collapse of Communism in Europe. 
The Communists enjoyed wide popularity in the period immediately following the 
July 1958 Revolution. The USSR's stand vis-a-vis the "Tripartite Aggression" against 
Nasser, the sale of Czech arms to Egypt and the use of effective propaganda tactics 
312 Communist Naziha Al-Dulaimi was the first Iraqi woman to join the cabinet in 1959. In 1973 
Secretary General of the Communist Party Amer abdullah was appointed state minister. See Geof 
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won Communism and the Communist parties wide popularity. In Iraq, the 
Communists grew so influential following the July 1958 Revolution that General 
Qassim, at first himself a Communist sympathiser, felt threatened and towards the 
end of his regime turned against them. When the Ba'thists seized power in 1968, they 
made various accommodations with the Communist Party. These culminated in the 
appointment in May 1972 of two Communist leaders as cabinet members and the 
signing of the National and Patriotic Front Charter in July 1973.313 But relations 
between the Ba'thists and the Communists were soon to turn sour. Hardly two months 
had passed than the Communist Party 
was acknowledging that the Patriotic Front coalition had been 
transformed into an instrument of the Bath Party; in June the ICP 
Central Committee urged an end the Ba'th dictatorship and the 
creation of a democratic system of government in Iraq. Later in 
1979 Communist partisans began activities in support of the Iraqi 
KUrdS. 314 
During the period between 1979 and the 1991 Gulf War, the Communists were 
subjected to ruthless suppression, which pushed most of its party cadres and members 
to seek refuge either in the marsh areas, Kurdistan or abroad, especially in Syria 
which supported practically any ant-Saddam activities. 
The Islamists 
AI-Da'wah Party 
Although AI-Da "wah had been in existence even before the 1958 coup, its political 
activities were not felt until the late sixties. This exclusively Shi'a grouping was and 
Simons, From Sumer to Saddam, p. 294. 
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still is devoted to the toppling of the Ba'th regime and the establishment of a 
revolutionary Islamist government along the lines of Khomeini's Iran. In point of fact 
the two Imams, Al-Sadr and Khomeini, had a great deal in common when it came to 
political action and the means of achieving their aims. From the very beginning the 
AI-Da 'wah party encouraged confrontational tactics. Although during the Qassim era 
it had adopted a more or less wait-and-see attitude in which its main activities were 
directed not against the Qassim regime but against the Communist party in an attempt 
to resist what was then called "the Communist Tide", the Da'wah Party changed its 
tactics and became increasingly more violent in the period following the 1968 
coup. 315 
When relations between Ba'thist Iraq and the Shah's Iran deteriorated into a grave 
crisis following the Shah's unilateral abrogation of the 1937 Treaty governing the 
partition of the Shat-Al-Arab waterway, the Ba'thists, who had yet to establish their 
firm hold over the country, turned to the Shi'a religious leadership for help. Baghdad 
wanted the Najaf Imams to mediate between Iraq and Iran in order to avert an 
imminent confrontation. When no positive response was obtained a ruthless campaign 
of terror was launched against all Shi'a institutions, organisations and individuals. 
The measures included among other things: appropriation of funds, closure of 
religious schools and colleges, mass deportation of Iraqis of Iranian origins, 
imprisonment and execution of Shi'a activists. 316 Special attention was given to the 
armed forces to ensure complete obedience: 
315 All Al-Mu'min, SanawatAl, 7amr: MasiratAl-HarakaAl Islamiya Fit Iraq 1957-1986 (Smoldering 
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The ubiquity of Ba'thist commissars in all units, the appointments of 
officers whose qualification was loyalty to Saddam Hussein, rather 
than military competence, the rapid rotation of officers to ensure that 
they formed no bonds of solidarity either with each other or with the 
men under their command. .. had been the techniques whereby loyalty, or at least absence of effective conspiracy had been 
assured. 317 
More repressive measures were introduced following the success of Khomeini's 
takeover. Early in 1980 the Revolution Command Council deemed it an act of treason 
to join the Da'wah Party and all members, real or suspected, were executed almost 
without any trial. 318 When the Iraq-Iran war broke out, the Ba'thist regime did its 
utmost to limit the damage and scope of operations carried out by the military wing of 
Da'wah Party which claimed responsibility for a number of operations against Iraqi 
forces along the Iraq-Iran border as well as the shelling or bombing of many strategic 
sites throughout Iraq and abroad. 319 Among the many spectacular operations were the 
bombing of the Iraqi Embassy in Beirut, the headquarters of the Iraqi Air Force, the 
Baghdad Broadcasting Station and the Ministry of Planning which was almost 
adjacent to the Republican Palace and General Intelligence installations. 
Commenting on the role of the Da'wah Party in opposing Saddam Hussein's regime 
Ali Al-Mu'min asserts that the Da'wah Party 
was aware of Saddam's intention of waging war with the help 
of foreign as well as the Shah's ex-military experts. It 
therefore hastened to notify the Islamic leadership in Iran of 
these plans. The Islamist officers within the Iraqi armed forces 
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wo, Tahlil(The Political Map of Iraqi Opposition: Survey andAnalysis) (Qum: Dar Al-Dalil Lilsahafa 
wal Nashr, 1994), p. 40. 
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too did their utmost to provide details of the plan to the Islamic 
Republic. Despite repeated warnings by the Iraqi Islamists, 
and for many reasons related to the internal situation prevalent 
in Iran then, the government of Abu Hasan Bani Sadr 
[President of Iran at the time] failed to take any precautionary 
measures to resist the imminent Iraqi offensive. 3 0 
The anti-war attitude adopted by the Da'wah Party incensed the Ba'thist regime and 
prompted it to invent new methods of torture and suppression. The party's 
uncritically pro-Khomeini stand may be seen in one of the pamphlets in which the 
Party declares that its war against the Baghdad regime would continue even if "the 
Islamic Republic of Iran agreed to a cease-fire". 321 Such an attitude cost the Party and 
its sympathisers dearly: countless children were orphaned, thousands of women 
widowed and still many more people found themselves both homeless and stateless as 
they were dumped en masse at the border with Iran or flown out of the country to 
Cyprus. 322 The long arm of the Iraqi Intelligence service reached far and wide. A 
number of leading figures were executed in Lebanon, Iran, the United Arab Emirates 
and Sudan. On the other hand, political pressure was exerted on foreign countries to 
extradite Da'wah members. 
323 
The severity with which the Da'wah party and other dissident groups were treated 
`gives no real indication of the strength of Shi'a opposition. It was, as Peter and 
Marion Sluglett put it, 
more indicative of the regime's absolute determination not to permit 
the formation of the smallest pocket of dissent either there [the Shi'a 
Holy Cities] or anywhere else in the country. In consequence it is, 
320 pj_MUMin, Smouldering Years, p. 228. 
321 Al-Mu, min, Smouldering Years, p. 232. 
322 The two volumes of Al-Abbasi's Black Pages from Ba'this Iraq include gruesome details of 
unimaginable methods of torture which the author alleges to have based on real experiences and 
eyewitness accounts. 
3 Al-Mu'min, Smouldering Years, p. 233. 
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extremely difficult to make any but the most tentative assessment of 
the extent of Shi'a opposition as a phenomenon, and in particular of 
the appeal of such parties as AI Da "wa outside the traditional religious 
centres, particularly in the Shi'a agglomerations in Baghdad. 324 
By and large, Al-Da'wah Party has proved to be the most active Shi'a opposition 
group in Iraq. To achieve its objectives, the party adopted a four-stage strategy. The 
first, described as the intellectual phase necessitated the study of the Qura'n, the 
Traditions and the education of the party cadres in the ways of Islam so as to 
immunize and safeguard their followers against secular aberrations. The second was 
the political phase, which is intended to introduce members to the realities of political 
work. Seizing power was the third stage, while government and supervision 
constituted the fourth and last phase. 325 The adoption of staged political work had a 
negative impact on the party in that leaders of the Da'wah were so obsessed with 
adhering to this strategy, which they firmly believed to have been followed by the 
early Muslims, that little progress was achieved. What confounded this internationalist 
party's programme was the fact that each Islamic country had its own specific 
circumstances, which required a different political agenda. Preoccupation with the 
four-stage strategy, furthermore, made it quite difficult for the party to crystallize a 
comprehensive political theory. 
326 
There are of course a range of Shi'a opposition movements and parties attempting to 
unseat the regime'of Saddam Hussein. These include: 
324 Peter Sluglett and Marion Farouk-Sluglett, "Sunnis and Shi'as Revisited: Sectarianism and Ethnicity 
in Authoritarian Iraq" in Hopwood, Iraq: Power and Society, p. 88. 
325 Adel Raouf Al Asmal Al Islam! Fi Al-Iraq: Qiraa Naqdiya LI-Masirat Nisf Qarn 1950-2000 
(Islamic Action in Iraq: A Critical Reading of Developments Over Half a Century 1950-2000) 
(Damascus: Al-Markaz Al-Iraqi Lil-Dirasat Wa Al-Ilan, 2000), pp. 186ff. 
3261bid., p. 189. 
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Al-Majlis Al-A'la Lil-Thawta Al-Islamiyya f: Al-Iraq (Supreme Council of the 
Islamic Revolution in Iraq) 
When it was first created in Tehran in 1982, the Council was originally envisaged to 
provide an umbrella organization under which all Islamic opposition groups would 
operate. The Council, which is strongly backed by the Islamic government of Iran, has 
a military wing, which actively participated in the Iraq-Iran war, fighting on Iran's 
side. Ayatullah Muhammad Baqir Al-Hakim, who created the Council, is still at the 
head of its organizational structure. Al-Shahadah (Martyrdom) which is published 
weekly in Tehran is the official central organ of the Council. 
The Majlis, created and based in Iran, looked upon the Islamic revolution as a source' 
of inspiration and model to be emulated in every respect. Just as the Islamic 
movement in Iran had posited Khomeini as a leader and symbol of the revolution, the 
Majlis also strove to find its own "symbol" to lead the Iraqi Islamic project. To that 
end, it chose Muhammad Baqir Al-Hakim, son of Ayat Ullah Muhsin Al-Hakim, the 
Najaf-based Marji' A'la (supreme Shi'a cleric) during the sixties and seventies. The 
choice of the energetic Baqir Al-Hakim to be at the head of the Majlis brought 
immediate political advantages. Many religious Imams and ordinary Iraqis soon 
joined the Majlis, attracted mainly by the religious and social weight the younger 
327 Hakim carried. 
Munadhammat Al- `Amal Al-Islami (Organization of Islamic Action) 
This organization was created in 1976 by Muhammad Taqi Al-Muddarissi, Sheikh 
32' ]bid, p. 308. 
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Muhsin Al-Husaini, Kamal Al-Haidari and other Iraqi expatriates particularly thjose 
living in Kuwait. Its headquarters moved immediately the Khomeini regime seized 
power in Iran. Unlike the Da'wah Party, which, as stated above, has a four stage- 
strategy to achieve its objective of seizing power in Iraq, the Munadhama seeks to 
achieve the same objective through armed struggle which it believes should constitute 
the only stage to rid Iraq of its present rulers. To indoctrinate its members in its 
revolutionary ideology, of burning and nullifying the four stages, the Munadhama 
placed great emphasis on the concept of Jihad (holy war) and has published a number 
of pamphlets, the most important of which is Hay Alal Jihad (Respond to the Call of 
Jihad). 328 The organization carried out a number of suicide missions in Iraq -during the 
late seventies and early eighties. Internal divisions however have weakened the 
organization which has managed to open many branches in Iraqi Kurdistan as well as 
the Gulf states, especially in Bahrain and in some Iranian cities. 329 
Harakat JundAl-Imam (The Imam's Soldiers Movement) 
This is a splinter group which rebelled against the Da'wah Party in 1969. It was 
created in Baghdad by Sami Al-Badri who, unlike the leadership of the Da'wah party 
which concentrated on violent political action, wanted more emphasis on religious 
education and specifically the dedication of the movement to the ennobling of the 
"awaited Imam" after which the movement is named. The leaders of the movement 
are mainly based in Damascus and London. 
329Ibid., pp. 261f. 
379 Adel Raouf, "Munadhamat Al-Amal Al-Islami: A1-Ta'sees Wa Al-Maseera" (Organisation of 
Islamic Action: Foundation and Development", Dirasatlragiya (Iraqi Studies), vol. 11,1999, p. 6. 
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HarakatAl-Mujahidin Al-Iragiyyn (Iraqi Fighters' Movement) 
This movement was created in Damascus in 1980. It is particularly dedicated to 
violence and is said to have been behind a number of suicide missions in Iraq. 
Following the execution of its leaders, most of its cadres joined the Supreme Council 
of Islamic Revolution and assumed high offices there. 
Al-Da'wah Al-Islamiya (Islamic Call) 
In 1980, many members of the Basrah branch of Da'wah Party rebelled against their 
superiors and formed their own grouping, dropping the word hizb (party) from their 
newly formed organization. This splinter group has managed to enlist the support of 
Tehran. 
Al-Tajamu' Al-Islami Al-Iraqi (Iraqi Islamic Grouping) 
The Tajammu' was created in the late eighties in London. This opposition group is 
more like a forum than a political organization. Muhammad Bahr Al-Ulum is a pivotal 
character in the Grouping which like many of the opposition groups in Iraq has no real 
popular base. 
Al-Haraka Al-Islamiya Fil Iraq (Ialamic Movement in Iraq) 
This movement also known as AI-Khalissiyoun (followers of Al-Khalissi) was 
established by the sons of the late Sheikh Mahdi Al-Khalisi who had fought against 
the British during the occupation period. This Shi'a movement has inherited the good 
relations which the late Khalissi, through his moderation and vision, had cultivated 
with the Sunni politicians and religious men in Iraq. The movement is based in 
London. It has close links with Damascus. 
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Harakat Al-Wifaq Al-Islami (Islamic Accord Movement) 
This movement which was established in 1980 was almost exclusively devoted to the 
defense of those Iraqis who were deported en masse during the late sixties when the 
Ba'thists came to power and during the early eighties when the relations between Iraq 
and Iran deteriorated into a protracted armed struggle. Chief among its aims is the 
defense of the cause of those deported to whose interests the movement is allegedly 
devoted. Al-W faq AI-Islam!, which had earlier been called the MuhalUareen (the 
Deportees), was first based in Tehran but later moved to Damascus. 
Nationalist and Pan-Arab Opposition 
The vast majority of the leaders of Pan-Arab opposition parties who took part in the 
effort to unseat the regime of Saddam Hussein in the period following the invasion of 
Kuwait are either ex-Ba'thists, ex-military officers or ex-members of the Arab 
nationalist party, AI-Istiklal (Independence), which was supplanted after the 1958 
Revolution by the more radical and staunchly populist Ba'th party. The main 
opposition groups which will be taken up shortly are: Al-Hizb Al-Ishtiraki (the 
Socialist Party), AI-Haraka Al-Ishtirakiyya AI Arabiyya (Arab Socialist Movement) 
and A1-Tajamm' AI-Qawmi AI-Dimocrati (Democratic Nationalist Grouping). 
Some of the nationalist activists, such as Mubdir Al-Wayyis, leader of the Hizb Al- 
Ishtiraki (Socialist Party) had taken part in one or more of the military coups in Iraq 
during the turbulent decade 1958-1968. Others such as Abdul-Ilah Al-Nasrawi, leader 
of AI-Haraka AI-Ishtirakiyya AI-Arabiyya (Arab Socialist Movement) and Ahmad Al- 
Haboubi, leader of Al-Tajamm' Al-Qawmi AI-Dimocrati (Democratic Nationalist 
Grouping) were quite active during the late fifties and sixties and held cabinet and 
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other distinguished political posts. Many of the Pan-Arab nationalists joined the the 
Iraqi chapter of the Nassente Arab Socialist Union . Unlike 
its Egyptian Nasserite 
prototype, the short-lived Iraqi counterpart, which had been envisaged as an umbrella 
organisation for all Arab nationalists, never really took root and remained an 
ineffectual organisation besotted by division, personal jealousies and lack of direction. 
When, following the 1968 coup, the Arab Socialist union was finally dissolved, many 
of its members left the country either for Syria or Egypt, where most of the present 
nationalist parties were founded. 330 
Al-Hizb Al-Ishtiraki (The Socialist Party) 
This is basically a Nasserite party. When it was first established in Baghdad in 1966 it 
was envisaged as a nucleus for all nationalist socialist Arab movements striving for 
unity and the establishment of socialism. Its leadership which is now based in Syria 
publishes Al-Ishtirakf (the Socialist) which is the official organ of this dwindling 
grouping. AI-Hizb Al-Ishtiraki is now associated with Mubdir Al-Wayyis who was a 
military officer of junior rank when he left Baghdad following involvement in a failed 
attempt in June 1966 to oust President Abdul-Rahman Aref. Al-Wayyis attended most 
of the conferences held by the opposition abroad. 
Al-Haraka Al-Ishtirakiyya Al-Arabiyya (Arab Socialist Movement) 
Al-Haraka, which is now based in Lebanon, has no specific ideology other than the 
implementation of what is called "Arab socialism" and the glorification of Nasserism. 
Its figure head is Abdul-Ilah Al-Nasrawi who has maintained good relations with both 
330 Muhammad Jamal Barout, Harakat Al-Qawmiyeen Al Arab (Arab Nationalist Movement) 
(Damascus: Markaz Al-Dirasat Al-Strateejiya, 1997), p. 288. 
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Arab and Kurdish leaderships. Al-Nasrawi played a prominent role in the feeble 
Nassente organisation, the Arab socialist Union, which was, theoretically at least, "the 
ruling party" during the mid-sixties. 331 
Al-Tajamm' Al-Qawmi Al-Dimocrati (Democratic Nationalist Grouping) 
This is another Nasserite entity. Established in Cairo during the eighties, it is now 
mainly associated with Ahmad Al-Haboubi, a Shi'a Arab nationalist who had held a 
cabinet post twice during the Brothers Aref regime. In 1968, Al-Haboubi left Baghdad 
for Cairo where he continued to live until the early nineties when he began to shuttle 
between London and Cairo. The main activities of this "grouping" is issuing 
statements on major Arab developments. 
Foreign Influence 
While regional and international powers played little or no role in supporting or 
influencing Iraqi opposition during the period from the establishment of national rule 
up to the 1968 Ba'thist coup, foreign involvement in Iraqi opposition increased from 
the late seventies onward. The first country to support, organise and even arm 
opposition groups was Iran. Khomeini and Rafsanjani who had spent several years in 
Najaf and had cultivated strong ties with many Shi'a groups opened up the newly 
established Islamic Republic to a variety of Shi'a opposition groups. 
Syria, on the other hand, which was accused by Saddam Hussein of plotting to 
overthrow his regime in July 1979, became a refuge for all so-called "leftist" Ba'thists 
or Syrian Wingers as well as for some independents and Communists. Syria's 
331 Ibid., pp. 244ff. 
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blockage of the export of Iraqi oil in 1981 and its pro-Iranian stand during the eight 
year war between Iraq and Iran undermined Syria's popularity in the eyes of the Iraqis 
who were battling it out with the Khomeini regime and who were struggling to 
survive. Inevitably this attitude would reflect negatively on all opposition groups 
supported by Damascus. The huge propaganda machine in Baghdad succeeded in 
etching even deeper Syria's image among the Iraqi masses as an Un-Arab state. 
The fact that some Iraqi opposition groups were embraced by Tehran and Damascus 
tarnished the reputation and standing of Iraqi opposition in the international scene. 
These two countries were high on the list of the states supporting terrorism. Small 
wonder then that the Iraqi dissident groups failed to elicit the sympathy and support 
of many states in the region, Europe, the United States and elsewhere. With the 
outbreak of the Iran-Iraq hostilities, Iran and Syria played an even more active role in 
supporting Iraqi opposition groups. Both countries of course had vested interests in 
the opposition movement. They were seeking to extract maximum advantage of the 
groupings, which they supported and working towards the achievement of their own 
hidden agendas. 332 
The social tensions and special circumstances surrounding the creation and 
development of the modern state of Iraq were clearly reflected in the Iraqi opposition 
movement over the period extending from independence in 1932 to the invasion of 
Kuwait in 1990. The emergence of Iraq as a political entity following World War I 
was the result of the accelerated development of numerous powers within Iraqi 
society. Iraqi nationalism, Pan-Arabism as well as rise of Islamic tendencies and the 
332 Interview With INC Executive Council President Chalabi in London on 116' September 1999. 
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concept of Jihad (holy war) went, singly and collectively, to form an effective 
opposition to foreign hegemony over Iraq. The efforts exerted in the years that 
followed British occupation were crowned with the declaration of Iraq as a unified 
independent entity. 
Political Islam emerged for the first time in Iraq during British occupation. Both 
Sunni and Shi'a Islam played a significant part in opposing British policies in Iraq. 
The most important role played by the traditional religious circles was leading the 
1920 Revolt against British domination. But the impact of religious movements ebbed 
following independence and the end of a British military presence in Iraq. Between 
independence in 1932 and the end of the monarchy in 1958, the main objective of the 
religious opposition (both Shi'a and Sunni) was not to seize power but to fight against 
the dangers which, from its own point of view, posed serious threats to the fabric of 
Iraqi society. Throughout the fifties and sixties, these threats were increasingly seen 
in the spread of secular ideologies, especially in the rise of Communist influence and, 
from the early sixties onwards, that of the Ba'thists. 
On the other hand, the aim of the secular opposition, such as Pan-Arab nationalist 
Ba'thists or Internationalist Communist Party or the then pro-Nasser groupings, was 
to seize political power as that was considered the only means to effect fundamental 
reforms of the political system. Generally speaking, the sectarian, religious and racial 
differences played little or no part in shaping the policy or defining the leadership of 
these groups. 333 Most of these parties included Sunnis and Shi'as, Arabs and Kurds, 
Christians and Muslims at the helm. This state of affairs contrasts with the situation 
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that obtained following the success of the Iranian revolution in 1979 and the start of 
Saddam Hussien's presidency, the two significant events which were to have 
undeniable effects on the Sunni-Shi'a rivalry and consequently on the course of Iraqi 
opposition. The immense impact of these two events may be summarized as follows: 
1. The Ba'th Party, especially Saddam Hussein's regime, adopted a highly anti- 
clerical secular attitude, which opposed all forms of religious ideologies. It also 
sought, and to a large extent succeeded, in marginalising if not silencing the 
traditional religious leaderships. In so doing, the Ba'thists were attempting to 
nationalize religion and impose the will of the state on all aspects of religious 
activities. 
2. The regime constantly sought to end the traditional independence of the religious 
Shi'a institutions and leaderships, especially those of Najaf and Karbala. It aimed 
to replace loyalty to the spiritual leader with allegiance to the head of the regime. 
To that end, it imposed a total ban on the age-old Shi'a communal rituals and 
celebrations, considering them a form of unacceptable political protest. 
3. With the deterioration of Iraq's relations with Iran, the. Baghdad regime enforced a 
number of measures aimed at lessening the traditional Iranian influence in Iraq. 
These included extremely harsh punishments, imprisonment, confiscation of 
assets and deportation. 
4. The success of the Iranian revolution in 1979 was seen by the Baghdad regime as 
a strategic threat to its very existence. Its survival instinct pushed it to resort to 
333 Nazih N. Ayubi, Overstating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East (London: I. B. 
Tauris, 1995), p. 112. 
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extremely harsh and inhuman methods to crush any sign of dissent among the 
Shi'a and to commit atrocities in order that' it may be spared a similar fate to that 
of the exterminated regime of the Shah. 
5. The resounding victory of the Iranian revolution, on the other hand, inspired Iraqi 
Shi'a leaders and encouraged them to engage in clandestine political activities in 
the hope that an Islamic republic in Iraq might be established on the ruins of the 
Ba'thist regime. 
6. On account of the long protracted Iraqi-Syrian conflict, Damascus embraced the 
Shi'a and Kurdish opposition in order to apply pressure on the regime in Baghdad. 
The strategic alliance between Syria and Iran, on the other hand, which was at 
least in part designed to weaken the Iraqi regime, was a constant source of worry 
to Baghdad. The price of this worry was more than amply paid by the Shi'a 
opposition. What further aggravated the situation was the eruption in 1980 of 
hostilities between Iraq and Iran and its development into what the Iraqi regime 
called a "war of destiny". Throughout the eight-year confrontation Khomeini 
insisted that toppling the regime of Saddam Hussein and the establishment of an 
Islamic republuc in Iraq were pre-requisites for ending the war. 
Throughout the period under discussion, the opposition movement was primarily 
aimed at reforming the political and economic systems, establishing political and 
economic independence of the state, and achieving social justice. In so far as Iraq's 
Arab policy is concerned, the opposition consistently attacked the position of 
successive governments on the Palestinian question. There were basic differences as 
to the definition of the highest interests of the Arab nation. On Iraq's relations with 
the great powers, the opposition attacked the policies of political or military alliances 
168 
during the Cold War. More specifically, Iraq's close ties with the West during the 
monarchist regime were under constant attack. On the other hand, the constant tilt 
towards the Eastern bloc during the period from the proclamation of the republic to 
the invasion of Kuwait was especially singled out for severe and hostile criticism. 
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Chapter 4: Iraqi Opposition: from the Invasion of Kuwait to the Vienna 
Conference 1992 
This chapter deals with the immediate aftermath of the 2°a Gulf War which, among 
other things, defeated Saddam Hussein and evicted his forces from Kuwait. The 
chapter starts by discussing the reasons behind Saddam Hussein's invasion of 
Kuwait then moves on to investigate the various factors which led to the immense 
success and also the sudden fall of the popular revolt referred to as Intifadat 
Aathar (the March Intifada) by Iraqis opposed to Saddam's regime and as 
Mu'amarat Al-Ghadr wa Al-Khiyana (Conspiracy of Betrayal and Treason) by the 
Baghdad government and its propaganda machine. 334 A composite picture of the 
forces which took part in the March Intifada and those who tried to exploit it to 
their political advantage, will also be provided. The objectives, social composition 
and political or religious orientation of the insurgents will also be taken up. 
Attention will also be focused on the role of regional and international powers 
especially that of Iran and Syria in supporting or manipulating some of the major 
Iraqi opposition groups. The chapter ends with an assessment of the role played by 
the first post-Gulf War opposition umbrella organisation Lajnat Al Amal Al- 
Mushtarak (Joint Action Committee) which, for a variety of reasons, was born 
dysfunctional. 
334The word 'intifada' did not become part of the English political jargon until the late eighties when 
European and U. S. journalists started giving wide coverage to the Palestinians' uprising in the Israeli 
occupied West Bank In Iraqi politics, the word 'intifada' normally refers to the November 1952 
Uprising during the royal regime. See Hanna Batatu, The Old Social classes and the Revolutionary 
Movements of Iraq (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 6668ff. 
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Prelude to Crisis: Iraq From August 1988 to August 1990 
Despite the all-out war which raged between Iraq and Iran for eight years from 
September 1980 to August 1988, Saddam Hussein's regime managed to come out of 
the conflagration practically unscathed, if not even stronger than he had been, both 
militarily and in matters related to the internal security of the regime. No serious 
challenge was in fact posed either by the external enemy or indeed by the traditional 
opposition groups supported and financed by. either Syria or Iran. Except for a few, 
operations, the Iraqi opposition working on Iraqi soil was unable to make their 
presence widely felt, let alone shake the Baghdad government or topple it. 
Throughout the Iraq-Iran war period, due to the regime's ruthless measures, 
opposition activities inside Iraq practically came to a halt as all dissidents or those 
suspected of having links with them were physically eliminated, except of course 
those who managed to flee the country to escape certain execution' or 
"disappearance". 335 On the economic and financial fronts, the eight-year war 
however left Saddam Hussein's embattled regime totally bankrupt and heavily 
burdened with foreign debts from "brotherly" and "friendly" countries. The fall in 
the price of oil meted out a severe blow to the crumbling Iraqi economy. 
The two years which separate the First and Second Gulf Wars (1988-1990) marked 
a decisive period in the history of contemporary Iraq. This short span shaped or 
rather etched even deeper the political characteristics of the Iraqi leadership and led 
to the dangerous path which the regime felt compelled to take. It is now 
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commonplace to say that Iraq neither lost the war against Iran nor won. it. The only 
`victory" which Saddam Hussein was perhaps entitled to claim was the fact that 
Iran, with its vast resources and manpower, did not, or could not, win the war 
against him. However, the most significant outcome of the military confrontation 
was the moulding or the shaping of a regime which came increasingly to contain a 
complex mass of inherent contradictions: immense military might, at least by 
regional standards, and a political leadership of wide ambitions both locally and 
regionally but fettered by empty coffers and a broken economy. The regime's 
trumpeting of imaginary victories and heroism against the "centuries old" enemy, 
"the infidel Persians" may be said to have backfired in that the regime became a 
captive of its own vaunting self-aggrandizement. Despite the fevered attempts of 
the propagandists to boost the morale of the masses, the Iraqis were looking 
forward to a respite from the agonies and tragedies brought about by the oppressive 
regime which had sent their children to the front and confiscated their civil liberties 
and human rights, all in the name of "unity", "freedom" and "socialism", 336 
Throughout these two years the Iraqis felt quite betrayed as no improvement 
whatsoever was felt either in the economic domain or in the field of human rights: 
As the immediate pressures ceased, the population 
looked forward to its "peace dividend" -- a secure peace 
with Iran, a return to Iraq's pre-war prosperity and "more 
democracy" by which was meant a loosening of the 
regime's severe war-time repression. But there was no 
peace with Iran, only a cease-fire.... There was no 
prosperity after the cease-fire.... Nor was there any 
3351n Saddam Hussein's Iraq, "disappearance" is a euphemism for death or murder. For a list of high- 
ranking officers, Ba'thist old guard and politicians of ministerial rank or above purged by the regime 
from its seizure of power in 1968 through to the second year of the Iraq-Iran war, see Maldya, 
Republic of Fear, pp. 292-296. 
3 Seeking to echo the slogans of the French Revolution, Sorbonne educated Michael Aflaq, founder 
of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party coined the Party's motto. 
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significant loosening of the regime's war-time 
repression. 337 
What complicated the situation even further was the fact that the end of the Iraq-Iran 
war coincided with the dramatic changes in East Europe, which were later crowned 
with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The fall of Nicolae Ceausescu, Erich Honecker 
and their ilk inspired terror in the heart of the Iraqi dictator who was suddenly heard 
making references, albeit few and far between, to democracy, a new constitution, 
transparency in government, pluralism and social prosperity. He even issued an all- 
embracing amnesty for dissidents and opposition groups living in exile. 338 These 
protestations however did nothing to alleviate the fear and suspicion Iraqi dissidents 
then as now felt towards him. The regime was once again snubbed when its call fell 
on deaf ears. 339 The complications and repercussions on the economic front 
furthermore frustrated the high hopes of Iraqis who were trying to build their 
shattered economy. 340 These developments pushed the beleaguered leader to revert to 
the age-old ploy of creating a crisis and diverting attention to a 'foreign' enemy. This 
time however the 'foreign' enemy was the tiny fellow-Arab country, Kuwait. 
To Saddam Hussein, oil rich Kuwait represented an easy way out of his predicament 
and was furthermore the elixir which would heal all that his economic and political 
policies had undone. He thought that if he invaded Kuwait and annexed it, he would 
be able first to cancel the huge debts owed to Kuwait itself, intimidate other creditor 
Gulf states into abandoning their demand for payment, as well as using the booty to 
337Laurie Mylroie, The Future of Iraq (Washington, D. C. : The Washington Institute for Near East 
Policy, 1991), p. 29. 
3381bid, pp. 29-30. 
339 Geoff Simons, From Sumer to Saddam (London: MacMillan, 1996), pp. 333ff. 
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pay other foreign debts. 341 Furthermore, Iraq's sense of relative deprivasion, as Nazih 
Ayubi points out, was particularly exacerbated by the presence of less advanced but 
much richer neighbours and its anger at what it considered "lack of understanding 
and cooperation on the part of those on whose behalf it had fought for eight years". 342 
But, as Jill Crystal points out, there were other reasons for Saddam Hussein's 
decision to invade his southern neighbour, internal to Iraq, that had little to do do 
with Kuwait: 
These include not only Iraq's dire economic 
circumstances, but Saddam Hussein's concern with the 
potential economic and political demands of a large, 
restless and still mobilized army, and a general population 
that had suffered through a long, hard war with Iran with 
virtually nothing to show for its years of sacrifice. 343 
The Invasion of Kuwait and its Impact on Iraqi Opposition 
The impact on the Iraqi opposition of Saddam's invasion and annexation of Kuwait 
was overwhelming. It turned most of the rank and file of Iraqi troops into potential 
opposition men. Some of those "hundreds of thousands of angry soldiers, bitter at 
Saddam Hussein for starting a war they could not win, s344 who crossed the line into 
Iran or Saudi Arabia, came to join this Iraqi opposition group or that. Another 
development occurred which was to boost the morale of exile Iraqi opposition 
organisations. Political refugees, who had never attracted any real attention from 
34°Simons, Iraq from, pp. 340-41. 
341 Wahib Sufi and Adnan Sufi, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and The Gulf Crisis: A Case Study of 
International Crisis Management (Beirut: Dar Al-Saqi, 1993), p. 41. 
342 Nazih N. Ayubi, Overstating the Arab State: Politics and Societyin the Middle East (London: I. B. 
Tauris, 1995), p. 337. 
343 Jill Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf. " Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), updated edition, pp. 173-74. 
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their host countries, suddenly found themselves accorded an immense welcome. In 
short, developments were moving at a much faster rate than the Iraqi opposition, 
which had been moribund for years, could comfortably deal with. 
The universal condemnation of the invasion provided the opposition groups with a 
golden opportunity to exploit to the full the world's outrage at Saddam Hussein's 
misadventure. At the time, most opposition groups living in exile felt that the 
invasion would definitely lead to the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime. This 
rather pervasive attitude was based not only on the intense international 
condemnation but also on what they called Iraq's fatigue. Opposition political 
support started coming from a variety of sources. It became apparent however that 
the opposition groups felt that the Iraqi masses, who were still licking their wounds 
from the Iraq-Iran War, were not prepared to enter into yet another bloody 
experience which could prove as protracted as the previous one. On top of this, the 
new enemy was not a third world power like Iran, but the only super power in the 
world, backed diplomatically by the whole world community and militarily by thirty 
nations and by many others financially and technically. 
The invasion and subsequent annexation of Kuwait necessitated the redeployment of 
Saddam Hussein's forces to subjugate Kuwait. In this sense, it was generally 
perceived that the invasion weakened the regime's grip on internal affairs and 
encouraged foreign powers, both regional and international, to support and even 
adopt certain groups or individuals opposed to the Baghdad government in an 
attempt to use the opposition card to bring down his regime. 
344AndrCW Cockburn and Patrick Cockburn, Out of the Ashes: The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein 
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The Intifada 
No sooner had the cease-fire agreement been announced than an armed opposition to 
Saddam Hussein's regime quickly spread throughout the Shi'a populated provinces. 
With the exception of a few pockets in the province of Basra, all southern and south- 
western provinces rebelled against the central government: Kut, Babylon, Karbala', 
Najaf, Dhi-Qar, Maysan and Muthanna. In these areas and over a period of just a few 
days the central government's authority collapsed, bringing total chaos to these 
provinces. 345 
Most researchers who have taken up the March Intifada speak of it as a spontaneous 
response to the conditions prevailing at the time. On the other hand, there are those, 
admittedly few, who speak of advance planning and direct foreign intervention. 
Wafiq Al-Samarra'i, ex-Chief of Iraqi Military Intelligence who fled to the West in 
1994, stresses that the popular uprising was in point of fact pre-meditated and had 
been organized well ahead of time. Among the reasons Al-Samarra'i cites to support 
his claim are the supposed mobilisation by Iran of armed units made up of Iraqi ex- 
patriots living in Iran and recruited by the Supreme Council of the Islamic 
Revolution in Iraq all along the Iraq-Iran border in the central sector. He also cites 
the discovery of telecommunication networks inside Iraq as proof that the uprising 
received substantial operational foreign support. 
346 
What is certain however is the participation of Iranian-trained Iraqi exiles in the 
uprising. Charles Tripp asserts that 
(New York: Harper Collins, 1999), p. 14. 
345WafIq Samarrai, Destroyer of Eastern Gateway, pp. 413ff. 
M1bid., p. 413-14. 
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Baqir Al-Hakim, head of SCIRI sent a few thousand 
of his organisation's Badr Brigade across the border to 
help the rebels, whose numbers were swollen by army 
deserters fleeing the military disaster in the south. 347 
Documents seized by the Iraqi regime at the height of the Intifada clearly implicate 
the Islamic Republic in the uprising against the regime of Saddam Hussein. In one 
such document a military order was issued, commanding all local recruits and those 
who have crossed the border from Iran to be accountable only to the representative of 
Ayatullah Baqir Hakim. 348 Discussing the "Iranian role" in the Intifada, Amir Taheri 
points out that Tehran `sent large quantities of food and medical supplies' in an 
attempt to win over the Shi'a population of southern Iraq. He further notes that it was 
"perfectly possible that the convoys were also used for shipping arms to Shi'as and 
Kurdish forces inside Iraq". 349 Others speak of "solid evidence of Iranian support for 
the insurrection in Shi'a-dominated southern Iraq". 35° 
On the other hand, scholars sympathetic with the Shia cause in Iraq scoff at the 
"myth of Iranian intervention", emphasising that the uprising was a natural 
expression of the suppressed emotions of anger, disappointment, bitterness and 
revenge at the political and religious persecution from which they had been suffering 
for the last three decades. 351 While there is no hard evidence of direct involvement 
by Iran or Iranian-supported elements in the Intifada, there is of course, as Taheri 
points out. "every reason to believe that such involvement could have taken place 
347 Charles Tripp, A History oflraq (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 256. 
348 Adel Raouf, Al-Asmal Al-Islami Fi Al-Iraq: Qiraa Naqdiya Li-Masirat Nisf Qarn 1950-2000 
(Islamic Action in Iraq: A Critical Reading of Developments Over Half a Century 1950-2000) 
(Damascus: Al-Markaz Al-Iraqi Lil-Dirasat Wa Al-Ilam, 2000), pp. 444-45. 
349Amir Tahiri, `Iran reveals its hand as ayatollah's army moves on Iraqi towns' The Daily Telegraph, 
, 5" March, 1991. 
33° Joseph Fitchett, `Mounting Iraqi Unrest: Evidence of Iran's Role, ' International Herald Tribune, 
6`h March 1991. 
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out, "every reason to believe that such involvement could have taken place and that 
some 10,000 armed men could have crossed Iran's frontier into Iraq". 352 
Causes of the Intifada 
The reasons behind the eruption of the Intifada immediately after the Gulf War was 
over, are not difficult to discern. The shameful military defeat undermined, albeit 
temporarily, the regime's grip on power, exposed its weaknesses and shamed even 
further the political leadership which had been living an enormous lie. The sudden 
disruption of vital services, the disappearance of all vestiges of authority from cities 
and towns, and the preoccupation of the armed forces and security apparatus with the 
external adversaries encouraged large sections of Iraqi society to seize what they 
considered an opportune moment to oust the ruthless regime which, in 1988 had 
thought nothing of gassing its own people. 353 
On the other hand, when the aerial bombardment of Iraqi positions in Kuwait and 
Iraq started, morale among the Iraqi armed forces was, for a variety of reasons, at its 
lowest as the military, who lacked faith in Saddam Hussein's cause, felt they were 
fighting a losing battle. In point of fact, even 
Saddam himself implied in certain postwar discussions with his 
officers that he was aware that some of them felt that the Iraqi 
army was forced to fight a formidable enemy against which they 
had no chance In one awards ceremony, he tried to convince his 
officers: "We knew that the enemy would use against us 
sophisticated weapons... we prepared for it and studied these 
weapons like the Apache ".... Saddam was evidently worried 
about his officers' loyalty, and in one meeting he jokingly 
suggested that they would stage a coup d'etat against himself so as 
352olM rcveals its hand, ' The Daily Telegraph, 5' March 1991. 
353Simons, From Sumer to Saddam, p. xvi. 
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"not to disappoint the West". 
354 
The situation of the soldiers was deplorable. While Saddam Hussein continually 
resorted to the age-old policy of targhib (enticement) and tarhib (terror) when 
dealing with the officer corps as with other high officials in the regime, he had 
nothing to offer the 1.5 million strong army3Ss but tarhib. During the run up to the 
Gulf War, the soldiers, made up largely of conscripts, were ill-fed and exhausted. 
Despite ruthless punishments which extended to their families, desertion was the 
order of the day. In point of fact, desertion rates were so staggeringly high that only 
few units in the army "can boast 65 percent to 70 percent of their authorized 
manpower". 356 As soon as Desert Storm started, thousands of old and new recruits 
fled the battle zones with their weapons and munitions which they took to their 
homes or hideouts. 357 It is to be remembered that before the military operations of 
Desert Storm started, an immense psychological campaign had been launched to 
undermine the already low morale of the Iraqi armed forces stationed in Kuwait and 
in the south and south-west of Iraq. General Khalid Bin Sultan refers to a vast 
`psyops' operation in which among other things, millions of leaflets were dropped 
over Iraqi lines: 
Among the most effective was one designed as a `pass' 
promising the holder a warm welcome in the Kingdom [of 
Saudi Arabia].... Waving this pass, thousands of Iraqi 
troops crossed our line to surrender. 358 
354Baram, Towards Crisis, p. 46. 
3551bid., p. 46. 
3mlbid., p. 48. 
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Besides the psychological factor and economic suffering of the rank and file, there 
was also the political climate in the region and, indeed, throughout the world as a 
whole, which was quite conducive to rebellion. Upon Saddam's defeat, calls for 
toppling his regime came from almost every quarter. 359 In one of his statements on 
the necessity to evict Saddam Hussein from the Iraqi political scene, U. S. President 
George Bush said: 
There is another way for the bloodshed to stop, and that is 
for the Iraqi military and Iraqi people to take matters into 
their own hands and force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to 
step aside. 360 
Regardless of the reasons and actual motives behind them, these calls incited the 
Iraqis and sent them what looked like a clear message to rebel against the pariah 
regime, which had brought untold miseries to them: 
In late February 1991, the coalition allies began suggesting that the Iraqi 
people should rise up and overthrow Saddam Hussein and his tyrannical 
regime. The peace would be easier on Iraq, declared Western politicians, if 
Saddam were to go. On 28 February 1991, soon after the cessation of military 
action, [British] Prime Minister John Major told the House of Commons that 
Iraq would remain an 'international pariah' while Saddam Hussein remained in 
power. In the same spirit a spokesman for the Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak 
Shamir. continued to demand the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, urging Iraqi 
commanders to demonstrate 'courage, desire and ability' to bring him down'. 361 
But such a task was virtually impossible to carry out. The armed forces, the 
paramilitary People's Army, the Police as well as the carefully selected Intelligence 
3590ne such call came from the President of Iran who did not mince his words when, in a public 
speech, he addressed the Iraqi leader urging him "not to stain further his bloodied hands by killing more 
innocent Iraqis. Yield to the people's will and resign". See Simons, From Sumer to Saddam, p. 34. 
36° President George Bush, Speech to the Employees of the Raytheon Missile Systems Plant in 
Andover, Mass., on 15"` February 1991. See www. csdl. tamu. edu/bushlib'papers/1991/91021504. 
html. 
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officers had been completely infiltrated by handpicked officers and agents, mainly 
from Saddam Hussein's hometown, Tikrit who were directly linked to Saddam 
Hussein. All attempts aimed at staging a coup in the past had failed because of the 
horrible fate of plotters and assassins and the pervasiveness of Saddam's agents. 362 
The Spread of the Intifada 
The immediate impact of the humiliating defeat of Iraq's forces and their tragic 
disorderly retreat from Kuwait was soon to be felt across most of Iraq. The first 
popular reaction to the military defeat that was soon to snowball into a frenzied 
insurgency against the regime of Saddam Hussein was recorded in Basra, the largest 
and predominantly Shi'a city in southern Iraq. 363 Basra is adjacent to Kuwait which 
is, according to Saddam's propaganda machine, a "branch" of the Iraqi or more 
specifically, the `Basra tree". 
The first spark of the Intifada 
seems to have started around the time that the formal cease-fire in 
the Gulf War came into effect at 5: 00 A. M. on February 28 1991. 
A column of tanks fleeing from Kuwait rolled into Sa'd Square, a 
huge rectangular open space in downtown Basra. The commander 
at the head of the column positioned his vehicle in front of a 
gigantic mural of Saddam in military uniform located next to the 
Ba'th Party Headquarters Building in the Square. Standing on the 
chassis of his vehicle and addressing the portrait, he denounced the 
dictator in a blistering speech.... A crowd assembled. The 
atmosphere became highly charged. The commander jumped back 
into his tank and swiveled the gun turret to take aim at the portrait. 
He blasted away with several shells. A delirious crowd cheered 
""Simons, From Sumer to Saddam, p. 32. 
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him, chanting, `Saddam is finished. All the army is dead'. 3M 
Soon after the arrival of the retreating and demoralized troops in Basra, the situation 
in that city suddenly exploded. From downtown Basra, the uprising soon spread 
northward to the adjacent provinces. Nasiriya and Amara were soon to catch fire. In 
the city of Nasiriya situated on the Euphrates in southern Iraq, a few miles from the 
ancient ruins of Biblical Ur, the four police stations strategically located throughout 
the city were attacked. There were similar incidents in other areas. The mostly Shi'a 
rebels chose their targets carefully. These stations were not only ugly monuments of 
repression but were also accessible buildings where large quantities of weapons were 
stacked. 
365 
Armed with the weapons seized from the police stations, the rebels then moved to 
other targets which they overran with relative ease. Akram Al-Hakim, the Shi'a 
Islamist and President of Iraqi Human Rights Watch, points out that in Nasiriya as in 
other cities, as soon as the rebels were in control, they immediately set up what they 
called "field courts" which, as their name might suggest, dispensed fast-track 
revolutionary justice, seeking to avenge the injustices of the past. 
366 
For lack of independent or objective sources and witnesses, it is still difficult to 
assess the claims and counter claims made by the opposition groups on the one hand, 
and the Baghdad government, on the other, about the wide-spread looting, shooting 
3'Kanan Makiya, Cruelty and Silence: War, Tyranny, Uprising And the Arab World (London: 
Pernguin, 1993), p 59; See also: Majid Al-Majid, IntifadatAl-Sha'b Al Iraqi: A. D. 1991/A. H. 1412 
(Beirut: Dar Al-Wifaq, 1991), p. 22; Akram Al-Haldm, Dictatorship, p. 17. It is ironic that Hussein 
Al-Samarra'i, the military man who sparked off the Shi'a' rebellion against Saddam Hussein was 
himself a Sunni. See Ibrahim Nawwar, Iraqi Opposition and the Struggle to Topple Saddam (London: 
N Publications, 1993), p. 71. 
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of perceived suspects without proper trial, burning of government records and 
documents, destruction of civil centres and release of non-political prisoners. All 
these acts were committed during the March Intifada. While Saddam Hussein's 
regime blames the excesses on the opposition, the opposition groups emphasise that 
government agents had penetrated their ranks and embarked on these atrocities in 
order to undermine credibility of the opposition. 367 
Karbala and Najaf Rise in Arms 
Accounts of the rebellion in the Shi'a holy cities differ on details but all agree that 
the revolt of Karbala started at the end of a funeral procession of one of the Gulf War 
victims. As the mourners left the mosque, shouts of La Ilaha lila Alla, Saddam 
Adduwu Allah (No God but Allah, Saddam is the enemy of God) were heard in the 
courtyard of the shrine of Al-Abbas, son of Prophet Muhammad's cousin Ali. When 
the mourners descended upon the deceased's house to offer their condolences they 
discovered that the police and security men had been keeping a close watch on them. 
In this tense situation, the police opened fire, which was returned. The confrontation 
resulted in the death of 15 men. 
368 That was more than enough to kindle the revolt. 
The angry mourners were soon joined by a throng of armed men who immediately 
headed towards the Traffic Police Headquarters, then Customs and Patrol Police 
stations which fell into rebel hands after some resistance. All this took place on 2nd 
March. After that the rebels pushed towards the Governorate, which they overran, 
366Ibid, p. 33. 
367A1_Majid, Uprising and the Iraqi People, pp. 40ff. 
369Ibid., p. 25. 
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capturing large quantities of weapons and ammunition. 369 
A similar story occurred in Najaf when young men, fifteen to twenty-four years old, 
came running out of the alleyways and back streets in groups: 
About a hundred persons at most in each group, all carrying clubs and 
qamat (swords). Two or three had pistols.... They were shouting Ya 
Saddam sheet iydak; Sha'b Al-Najaf ma yridak (Saddam remove your 
hands, the people of Najaf don't want you). Also they were shouting Maku 
Wali Illa All, Inreed Hakim Ja fari (No ruler but All, We want a Ja'fari 
370 [Shi'a] ruler). 
The demonstrators then started towards the sahan "courtyard" of the holy shrine. 
When the security men saw the armed throngs approaching, they fled but not without 
some resistance which resulted in the death of a number of young men. Upon 
securing the holy shrines, the rebels then turned to the police stations and, having 
overpowered the guards, captured the commander of the security police who was 
executed on the spot for refusing to cooperate. From there the rebels then headed 
towards the army units on the outskirts of Najaf As with the policemen, the soldiers 
took to their heels without putting up much of a fight. 371 Estimates as to the numbers 
of people killed during the Najaf Intifada vary considerably. Rebel sources according 
to Kanan Makiya put the number of Ba'thists killed at over four hundred during the 
first day. 372 
In short, between the 2nd and 15`s March 1991, the Intifada had spread from the 
southernmost tip of Iraq in Basra to cover most of the mid-Euphrates and north 
3691bid, pp. 28-9. 
370Maliya, Cruelty and Silence, p. 66. 
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provinces. Even in the Sunni strongholds, such as in parts of the Anbar and Mosul 
areas, where resentment against Saddam Hussein's regime was not as prevalent as it 
was in the predominantly Shi'a' areas, many of the Bath leaders were targeted. 
Fearing that the Intifada might engulf the capital, Saddam Hussein imposed a 
midnight to dawn curfew in Baghdad. Security measures were tightened even further 
when all exits and approaches to the city were sealed and carefully monitored. 
Despite these measures armed demonstrators took to the streets of the predominantly 
Shi'a part of Baghdad known as Saddam City as well as in other parts of the 
capital. 373 
The Intifada Assessed 
That the March Intifada was started by elements within the Iraqi armed forces is 
quite significant. It clearly shows that one of the staunchest parts of the apparatus 
which Saddam Hussein had been using to impose his dictatorial rule was becoming 
responsive to the popular sentiments which called for political change. Another point 
to be remembered about the Intifada was the fact that it broke the great psychological 
barrier which had, for a long time, practically paralysed all attempts to effect political 
change in Iraq. The destruction of Saddam Hussein's mural at Sa'ad Square in Basra 
was in a way a symbolic event which encapsulated the fall of the idol so fiercely 
feared and detested by the Iraqis. For security reasons, all the military officers who 
joined the Intifada, did so in their personal capacity, not as uniformed soldiers in the 
armed forces. Some officers who were sent to crush the Intifada could not bring 
themselves to fire against the rebelling masses, gave themselves up and surrendered 
373A detailed "diary" of the Uprising is given in Nawwar, The Uprising, pp. 89ff. 
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to whoever happened to be in command at the time. Others helped the Intifada by 
secretly providing the rebels with arms and munitions smuggled out of their units. 74 
The military who took part in the Intifada came from practically all units within the 
armed forces, except the Republican Guards. The officers in this corps were 
"handpicked Sunnis who came mainly from Mosul, Tikrit or Ramadi and whose 
loyalty and that of their families had been proved long before they were admitted to 
this elite force". 375 In resorting to excessive and ruthless methods against the Intifada 
rebels, "most officers in that corps, felt they were fighting a sectarian war against the 
Shi'as". 3'76 
The dramatic turn of events failed to ensure success of the uprising, both at the 
military and popular level. Many Iraqis who had welcomed it at first felt unsure 
about what the unknown future might hold for them at the hands of what they 
considered a leaderless rabble. Some feared that the alternative would be even worse 
than the repugnant regime of Saddam Hussein. 
Among the chief factors which led to its failure was the fact that the Uprising 
targeted the periphery and ignored the centre, Baghdad, the seat of government and 
hub of all political and economic activities. Lack of any clear strategy on the part of 
the rebels provided Saddam Hussein with ample opportunity to think out counter 
measures, regroup and launch a viciously savage counter attack. The opposition 
parties which, on the eve of Desert Storm, had agreed to organize their activities and 
374 Interview with Wafiq Al-Samarraei on 5`h April 1999. 
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adopt a political agenda through which they promised to enhance co-operation and 
efforts to topple the regime of Saddam Hussein abandoned the said agreement as 
soon as the situation in Iraq flared up. 37 
With the possible exception of the Tehran-based Supreme Council of the Islamic 
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), which deployed its recruits to the mid-Euphrates region 
to organise the masses and lead them, all other Opposition groups adopted a wait- 
and-see attitude. The sudden popular surge against the Baghdad regime had taken 
them by surprise. Many of these groups hoped that they alone would monopolise the 
political arena and glean the fruits of the Uprising, without sharing them with their 
fellow opposition parties. It is ironic that the Uprising which should have unified all 
forces endeavouring to unseat Saddam Hussein should itself divide them and sow 
even more seeds of suspicion and recrimination among them. 
Another factor which alarmed the rebelling masses and raised new fears amongst 
them was the fact that the pro-Iranian anti-Saddam forces had jumped the gun and 
behaved irresponsibly. The supporting forces which crossed the borders from Iran 
came waving Iranian flags and carrying pictures of Supreme Council of the Islamic 
Revolution Chairman, Muhammad Baqir Al-Hakim, while others were wearing a red 
band round the head, the emblem of the Revolutionary Guard in Iran. This move, 
argues Ibrahim Nawwar, would have been understood had it come as a preparation 
for the establishment of a new regime and then only after that of Saddam Hussein 
had been toppled. 378 
During the heat of the Intifada, physical elimination was a widely used tactic 
"'Nawwar, Iraqi Opposition, p. 75. 
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throughout the provinces of the South. It seemed as though the rebels had nothing in 
their minds but vengeance and retaliation for crimes committed by the regime. The 
Uprising's 'revolutionary legitimacy' became dependent on the ability to eliminate 
indiscriminately and without trials. In the North, the situation was quite different. 
The Kurds, admittedly far more experienced than their southern fellow countrymen, 
adopted an ancient tactic whereby new alliances were formed between them and the 
troops deployed by Saddam Hussein in their area. In so doing they managed to win 
over thousands of the 'Pursan (knights) corps' the Baghdad-officered Kurdish 
militia. 379 
The total absence of any leadership or coordination among the rebelling provinces 
was a yet more damaging shortcoming. Inexperienced young men who had no 
military training took charge of a great task which even professional soldiers would 
have found difficult. Apart from the non-existent leadership, there were many 
logistical difficulties which the enthusiastic young men of the south had to grapple 
with. Desert Storm had destroyed the infrastructure of practically all tele- 
communication in Iraq. Even more damaging, the rebels who managed to take over 
in many provinces had no awareness of counter-intelligence or precautionary 
measures. Security was often breached and the rebels were easily infiltrated by 
supporters of the Saddam regime who bowed before the tornado of popular anger, 
only to pounce at the rebels at the first available opportunity. Elements from the 
Ba'th Party and General Intelligence often spread rumours which proved even more 
destructive to the cause of the rebels than canon-fire. Infiltrators also provided 
3781brahim Nawwar, Iraqi Opposition, p. 75. 
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speedy and regular reports on the movements and plans of the rebels, which made the 
task of Saddam Hussein's forces much easier. The rumour which was spread among 
the rebels to the effect that the Iranians were ' on their way to offer succour had a 
devastating effect. When the hours and days passed with no such succour ever 
arriving, frustration, panic and bitterness seized the rebels some of whom were 
driven to despair. 
Scarcity of food and fuel was at its worst when the Intifada broke out, coming as it 
did on the heels of the Gulf War which had devastated most of the oil refineries in 
the country. The situation became even worse when, among other brutal measures, 
the forces of Saddam Hussein imposed a blockade on all rebelling towns and cities 
cutting off electricity and water supplies. The ensuing tragic situation pushed 
thousands to flee their homes and lands to other areas. All these measures were taken 
against untrained civilians, deserters and ex-army conscripts who only fought with 
rifles and other light weapons against modem tanks, heavy artillery and surface to 
surface missiles. 
Sectarian transgressions were among the serious mistakes made by the Intifada. It is 
reported that during the turbulent weeks of March 1991, Sunni Muslims were 
forbidden from performing their daily prayers in their mosques unless they adopted 
the Shi'a form of azan (prayer call). This obviously alarmed large segments of the 
community who would otherwise have sided with the rebels. According to Iraq's ex- 
Head of Military Intelligence who defected to the West in 1994, the sectarian 
orientation of the Shi'a rebels manifested itself amply in the slaughter of numerous 
Sunni officers for no reason other than their denominational origin. These crimes 
were exploited to the full by the Saddam regime, which was struggling for survival 
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against what many had considered at the time an unstoppable popular revolution. The 
excesses were soon portrayed as an Iranian intervention and a Shi'a plot aimed at 
undermining the Sunni establishment. The use of the sectarian card proved quite 
effective and the military, which was officered mainly by Sunnis, rallied behind 
staunch Sunni Saddam Hussein in his hour of need. Assisted by a great Western 
conspiracy of silence, inspired by fears that a Khomeini-type revolutionary regime 
might replace that of Saddam Hussein, the army succeeded in quelling the Uprising 
in a matter of days. 380 
More importantly, the parties, which supposedly led the Intifada or at least 
participated in it did not have a political framework that encompassed the whole Iraqi 
political spectrum. The parties in the North represented only the Kurds whereas the 
parties which were directly involved in the South and mid-Euphrates regions were 
universally Shi'a. Instead of joining forces, or at least coordinating operations, the 
Shi'a fought their own war unassisted by fellow citizens fighting the same enemy. 381 
Contradiction between the slogans put forward by leaders of the Intifada and what 
was actually practised was yet another factor which undermined credibility of the 
rebels and contributed to their rather abrupt fall. While they called for the formation 
of a provisional government to be entrusted with the task of ensuring the smooth 
transfer of power to democratically elected representatives, the Shi'a Islamists were 
forcing their own agenda on the people. The call for the establishment of law and 
order in which individuals were assured of fair trials was soon replaced by arbitrary 
380Interview with Wafiq A1-Samarraei on 
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sentences and on-the-spot executions. 382 
The Intifada and the Outside World 
Lack of any regional or international support may be cited as another reason for the 
collapse of the uprising. Far from being altruistic, the attitude of neighbouring 
countries was dictated by their national interests and strategies. Except for Jordan, 
most, if not all, neighbouring countries stressed that while Saddam Hussein remained 
in power, stability and peace in the Middle East would always be under threat. The 
mass media in these countries joined their Western counterparts in smearing even 
further the character of Saddam Hussein and voicing support for the oppressed 
masses of Iraq. During the height of the Intifada, when toppling the Iraqi dictator 
became a real possibility, these countries suddenly changed their strategy, declaring 
that they would not interfere in the internal affairs of Iraq. It is widely accepted now 
that the regional powers preferred to deal with 'the devil they knew rather than adopt 
and support an unknown leadership which might one day threaten their interests and 
stability as Saddam Hussein had repeatedly done. To extricate themselves from a 
possible political predicament, the oft-repeated cliches of preserving Iraqi territorial 
integrity and rejecting foreign intervention were often used as a pretext to dissociate 
themselves from the rebels and the opposition forces in general. 
On the international scene, interest in the Intifada, which had generated considerable 
sympathy, 383 soon subsided. The United States, which had earlier on called on the 
Iraqis to topple Saddam Hussein, did practically nothing to help the rebels. In point 
382Ibid 
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of fact many high ranking U. S. officials declared that their primary aim of evicting 
Saddam Hussein had been achieved and that they were not interested in marching on 
to Baghdad or in toppling the Iraqi dictator. President George Bush for one "appears 
to have retreated from his wartime call to the Iraqi people to overthrow their 
leader". 384 General Colin Powell, Chairman of the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, among 
others, demonstrated the typical attitude of the West when he pointed out that "better 
the Saddam Hussein we know than an unknown weak coalition, or a new strong man 
385 who is an unknown quantity". 
The prospect of a Shi'a crescent extending from Iran across Iraq and ending with 
southern Lebanon never ceased to alarm Western and Israeli strategists and indeed 
some regional powers as well. In Tyranny's Ally, David Wurmser refers to the sudden 
shift in U. S. attitude towards the Intifada and points out that the United States was, 
for a number of reasons, more interested in a military coup than a popular uprising 
and that Washington was attempting 'to get rid of Saddam Hussein, not his 
regime'. 386 George Bush's attitude towards the regime in Baghdad had an immense 
impact on the popular feelings of the Iraqis who had hoped the U. S. administration 
would come to their rescue, believing Bush's repeated statement that he had no 
argument with the Iraqi people. The sudden shift in U. S. policy pushed most Iraqis to 
see Bush in a new light. To them Bush's words were as credible as those of "a fox 
who says he sympathises with the chickens he is about to devour". 387 
384`Bush shuns rebels to avert a Shi'a regime in Baghdad, " The Independent, 9' March, 1991. 
385"Britain and U. S. part over Iraqi rebels, " The Guardian, March 131h 1991. 
386David Wurmser, Tyranny's Ally: America's failure to Defeat Saddam Hussein (Washington: AEI 
Press, 1999), p. 11. 
387"Can the Allies Be Trusted? ", New Horizon, No. 382, June 1991, p. 2. 
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Birth of the Joint Action Committee (JAC) 
The invasion of Kuwait provided the highly disparate and squabbling Iraqi 
opposition groups with a favourable international atmosphere in which diplomatic, 
financial and political support was offered. Encouraged by the prospect of the 
imminent fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, the two countries which had been 
hosting most of the Iraqi opposition groupings, Syria and Iran, pushed these 
groupings to hold a general conference to be devoted to the coordination of efforts, 
with a view to forming a united front. Differences between rival groups were 
temporarily patched up after much deliberation over a period lasting five months 
between the major opposition groups. The meetings resulted in the publication of a 
joint communique, which was signed by representatives of the major Islamic, Arab 
nationalist, Kurdish and democratic opposition groups The Communique, which 
heralded the birth of a new umbrella organisation, was announced on 27th December 
1990, when it looked as though Saddam Hussein's days were numbered. 
Among other things, the communique called for: 
1. Toppling the dictatorial rule and repealing all inhuman and unjust legislations 
forced upon the Iraqis by the regime 
2. Forming a coalition government made up of all political groupings which oppose 
the Saddam Hussein regime. 
It is significant that the overture of the communique was dedicated to the 
condemnation of Iraq for starting the Iraq-Iran which had ended with a UN brokered 
cease-fire agreement in August 1988. This obviously indicates the immense 
influence Iran had over the conference. 
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Prior to the Damascus Communique, Iraqi opposition groups had been deeply and 
openly divided and consumed by recriminations and accusations. In point of fact a 
whole month of meetings and consultations was spent on whether the communique 
to be adopted at the conclusion of the gathering should be headed with the Arabic 
basmala (In the name of Allah, the Merciful, the Compassionate). 388 Some 
opposition factions were at each other's throat. This was especially true in the 
Kurdish region where rival groups often tried to resolve their differences through 
violent means. 389 
As might be expected, ideological, tactical and strategic differences were deepened 
even further by the rivalry between Tehran and Damascus for influence in the post- 
Saddam era. What complicated the task of the opposition groups was the fact that 
within the same organisation, there was little or no coordination between those living 
in exile and those who were in Iraq. Furthermore, conditions inside Iraq were such 
that any cooperation or coordination between opposition groups was almost 
unthinkable for fear of infiltration and betrayal and also because most of these groups 
distrusted each other's intentions. To complicate matters even further, there were of 
course some opposition figures and even groupings who were, and perhaps still are, 
suspected of having strong links with one Western power or another. Against this 
background of mutual distrust and suspicion and amid much media fanfare, however, 
an important conference was held in the Syrian capital. The communique was signed 
by practically all those who had any political weight in the anti-Saddam camp. These 
388Besides the differences in ideologies between the Islamists on the one hand and the nationalists, 
communists and non-religious groupings on the other, 
it was feared that such a preamble to the 
conununiqud might give the impression that the Islamists were in control of the Opposition movement. 
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included 17 groups: 
1. Al-Majlis AI A'la Lil-Thawra AI Islamiya (The Supreme Council of the Islamic 
Revolution) (Muhammed Baqir Al-Hakim) 
2. Hizb AI-Da'wah ('Islamic Call) (Al-Asifi) 
3. Munadhamat AI Amal Al-Islami (Islamic Action Organization) (Al-Muddaris) 
4. Hizb Al-Bath (Renaissance Party) (Mahdi Alaiwi Al-Obeidi) 
5. Al-Tajamu'Al-Iraqi Al-Dimocrati (Congress of Iraqi Democrats) (Salih Duggleh) 
6. Al Kutla Al-Islamiya (Islamic Bloc) (Muhammad Al-Al-Alousi) 
7. Harakat Al-Mujahideen Al-Iraqiyeen (Iraqi Mujahideen Movement) (Bayan 
Jabur) 
S. Jama'at Al-Ulama' Al Mujahideen RI-Iraq (Coalition of Mujahideen Clerics in 
Iraq) (Hasan Al-Nouri) 
9. Al-Hizb Al-Dimocrati Al Kurdistan (Kurdish Democratic Party) (Mas'oud Al- 
Barazani) 
10. Al-Ittihad Al-Walani Al Kurdistan (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) (Jalal Al- 
Talbani) 
11. Hizb AI-Sha'b Al Dimocrati (People's Democratic Party) (Sami Abdul-Rahman 
389Interview with Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq representative in London, Dr 
Hamid Al-Bayati on 15 March 1999. The communiqu6 was finally published with the basmala at the 
top of the document. 
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12. Hizb Kadihi Kurdistan (Kurdish Proletariat Party) (Abdul-Khaliq Zanganah) 
13. Al-Hizb Al-Ishtiraki AI-Kurdi (Kurdish Socialist Party) (Rasoul Mamend) 
14. Al-Hizb Al-Shiyou'i Li Iqlim Kurdistan (The Communist Party of the Kurdish 
Region) 
15. Al-Haraka Al-Dimoqratiya Al Athouriya (Assyrian Democratic Movement) 
16. Al-Hizb Al-Shiyou'I Al-Iraqi (Iraqi Communist Party) (Kerim Ahmad) 
17. Al Hay'a Al-Arabiya Al-Mustaqillah (Independent Arab Group)390 : 
1. General Hasan Al-Naqib 
2. Mubdir Al-Wayyis- Al-Hizb Al-Ishtirakiy Fil Iraq (Socialist Party of 
Iraq) 
3. Abdul-Ilah Al-Nasrawi- AI Haraka Al-Ishtirakkiya Al-Arabiya (Arab 
Socialist Movement) 
Of the above 17 groups, it was agreed that five major parties would be granted extra 
administrative powers and would be empowered to convene a national conference, 
accept or reject new members and engage in negotiations on behalf of all signatories 
of the JAC communique. These were: 
1. AI Majlis AI-Ala Lil-Thawra Al- Islamiya (Supreme Council of Islamic 
Revolution) 
390The three signatories attended the conference as individuals and not as a political organisation. 
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2. Hizb AI-Da xwah (Islamic Call) 
3. Hizb Al-Ba'th Al Arabi Al-Ishtiraki (Arab Ba'th Socialist Party) 
4. Al-Hizb Al-Shiyoui Al-Iraqi (The Communist Party) 
5. Al-JabhaAl-Kurdiya (The Kurdish Front) 
Long before the formation of the Joint Action Committee, Damascus and Tehran 
were intensely but discreetly trying to ensure full control over the opposition groups 
they were hosting. The fact that the Communique was signed in Damascus rather 
than Tehran had only symbolic significance in that it highlighted the Arab dimension 
of the struggle of the Iraqi people. The preparatory consultations and meetings which 
preceded the Damascus Communique were held in Damascus and Tehran alternately. 
However, because it was widely believed that Saddam Hussein would make his exit 
from the political equation as soon as the belligerency chapter was closed, Syria and 
Iran did all they could to provide their own political fronts that would fill the vacuum 
left by Saddams departure. The groupings which had signed the Joint Action 
Committee Communique were perhaps even more optimistic about their future role 
than their patron states. To mobilise world public opinion which, thanks to Saddams 
gassing of the Kurds in Halabcha and his invasion of Kuwait, was quite sympathetic 
if not enthusiastic about the opposition project, representatives of the Joint Action 
Committee toured Arab and foreign capitals and met senior officials there including 
some heads of state. 391 
Despite the guidelines contained in the Communique which enjoined all signatories 
Interview with Iraqi National Accord Assembly leader, Salah Omar Al-Ali on 1" March 1999. 
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to cooperate and support each other 'to achieve the noble aim of toppling the regime 
of Saddam Hussein', some parties tried to reap as much political and material gains 
as was possible even at the expense of their fellow signatories. To this end, some 
groups sent their own emissaries and organised a variety of activities without the 
knowledge or approval of the Committee. Although Syria and Iran were aware and in 
a way involved in it, the outside world was still not fully mindful of the deep 
divisions and differences between the various opposition groups. But the Western 
powers did perceive with some dismay the close association between the opposition 
groups and the two Middle Eastern players. 
Soon after the second Gulf War, there was a growing awareness among Iraqi 
opposition circles that real international help would not be forthcoming until and 
unless opposition groups distanced themselves from Damascus and Tehran which 
were not among the most popular regimes in Western or indeed the conservative 
Arab states. The non-Islamist groups were the first to emphasise their independence 
from the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Islamists, on the other hand, attempted to 
project a moderate image of themselves to the outside world. This was especially 
true in Britain where it was often reiterated that the Iraqi Islamic movement posed no 
future danger to Western interests. 392 
The new circumstances required the opposition forces, which had suddenly found 
themselves involved in high level negotiations, to come in contact with a range of 
diversified political organisations, not only outside the structure of the Committee 
but also outside the traditional Damascus-Tehran axis. As more financial and moral 
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support was secured, a number of groups could now decrease their dependence on 
the regional powers, which continued for some time to enjoy maximum influence on 
the Committee. Other players however appeared on the field. Saudi Arabia 
cautiously but significantly engaged in dialogue with a number of political groupings 
which had turned to Riyadh for political and diplomatic support. 
New Groups, Old Hands 
No sooner had the Damascus-based Joint Action Committee been formed than a 
number of Iraqi groups and individual dissidents started to cast suspicion on the very 
foundation upon which the Committee was established. They charged the Committee 
of failing to represent all shades of the political spectrum of Iraqi politics and that it 
was trying to monopolise political action and exclude many who had played 
significant parts in the patriotic struggle against Saddam Hussein's regime. They also 
accused the Joint Action Committee of operating under the influence of the 
Damascus-Tehran axis. 
These dissidents, who were mainly based in London, sought to take part in the 
organised opposition effort, but were careful not to fall into the same hole in which 
the older opposition groups had found themselves. Most of these dissidents preferred 
the Saudi gateway, as Saudi Arabia had no specific ambitions in Iraq and 
furthermore enjoyed a respectable Arab and international position. 
Among the first grouping to claim a place in the Joint Action Committee was Al- 
Majiis Al-Iraqi Al-Hurr (Free Iraqi Council) which was officially launched on 
392Interview with an ex-Islamic `Da'wah' (Call) leader, Dr Muwaffaq Al-Rubai'in London on 17`x' 
May 1999. 
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February 10th 1991.393 The Council members were mainly drawn from middle class 
liberals, Western oriented and right-wing intellectuals headed by Sa'ad Salih Jabr, 
founder of the Hizb Al-Umma Al-Jadid (New Nation Party), which he dissolved as he 
sought to broaden his base and distance himself from any specific ideology. 
A few days later, on 274' February 1991, the formation of another grouping was 
declared: Al-Wffaq Al-Watani AI-Iraqi (Iraqi National Accord). The founding 
members of Al-Wifaq were mainly ex-military officers and, old, mostly Sunni, 
Ba'thists disillusioned with the policies of Saddam Hussein. This group included 
Salah Omar Al-Ali, Salah Al-Shaikhli, Tahseen Mu'lla and others who had at one 
point or other held high positions in Saddam Hussein's regime. Like the Free Iraqi 
Council, this group also wanted to appeal to as wide a public as possible, hence they 
avoided use of the word `party' in their newly formed movements. 
The 5 +2 Formula 
Representatives of these two new organisations moved to Damascus to meet the Joint 
Action Committee and discuss ways of joining forces in order to maximize pressure 
on the then highly fractured regime in Baghdad. The Joint Action Committee 
welcomed the two organisations as new additions to the original seventeen-member 
group. But the National Accord and the Free Council rejected the offer, which would 
have placed them as numbers 18 and 19. The Wfaq and the Majlis Hurr insisted that 
they were not political parties but representatives of broad political currents394The 
Free Iraqi Council stressed that they were the true spokesmen of the Iraqi democrats 
393Interview with Mr Sa'ad Salih Jabr on 1" March 1999. 
394 Interview with Salah Omar Al-Ali, Iraqi National Accord Assembly leader in London on 1't March 
1999. 
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while the National Accord insisted that they represented the Arab nationalist 
movement. After a lengthy discussion, a new formula was reached, known as the 5+2 
formula. Within the new formula the two newcomers were given a status comparable 
to the largest five395 organisations within the 17 groupings which had signed the 
Damascus Declaration. These had been in the political arena for decades and in their 
struggle against the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein or even against those who had 
ruled Iraq before him, had sustained many losses in human life. 
Having agreed on this sensitive issue, the 19 political gröupings within the 
framework of the new 5+2 formula then headed to Beirut to hold a national 
conference upon which high hopes hung. The gathering was widely covered by the 
international media which had not yet discovered that division was an inherent and 
tragic flaw of the Iraqi opposition. 
The Beirut Conference 
Two weeks after the end of Gulf War hostilities, hundreds of Iraqis converged on the 
Lebanese capital to meet for two days (13th - 1e March 1991) in order to 'devise 
ways of saving the Iraqis from dictatorship and safeguard the territorial integrity of 
the nation'. The conferees who came hurriedly from far and wide were soon to 
discover that these lofty aims were not easy to achieve. In fact, much to the dismay 
of the millions of silent Iraqi dissidents, even the task of holding a follow up 
conference to discuss ways and means of achieving those aims proved too difficult. 
The Beirut conference, which was attended by an impressive number of 450 Iraqi 
395Apart from the question of proportion and the history of political struggle, the Joint Action 
Committee felt it was impractical to involve all 17 organisations in negotiations and dealings with the 
world. 
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personalities linked, with varying degrees, to the opposition movement had a major 
defect: there was no agreed agenda. 
The newly created Al-Wfaq Al-Watani (National Accord), headed by Salah Omar 
Al-Ali and Al Majlis Al-Iraqi AI-Hurr (Free Iraqi Council), headed by Sa'ad Salih 
Jabr also attended the Conference. A number of independent figures, religious 
leaders and Trade Unions representatives also attended. In addition to the impressive 
gathering of Iraqi exiles, representatives of the governments of Lebanon, Syria, Iran, 
Kuwait as well as envoys from a variety of Arab and Islamic liberation movements, 
mass media and human rights organisations were also present at the Conference. 
As the conference did not have a specific agenda, it was decided that a number of 
Committees should be formed in order to oversee discussion of the various issues 
expected to be raised at the meetings. These Committees were made up of the parties 
attending the conference: 
1. Foreign Relations Committee 
2. Administrative Committee 
3. Kurdish Question Follow Up Committee 
4. Information Committee 
5. Legal Committee 
6. Military Committee 
7. Political Committee 
8. Financial Committee 
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Table 1: The Beirut Conference 
1. . -II-llajlisAl-AIa 
Lil-ThawraAl-Islamiva (Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution) 
Headed by Muhammad Baqir Al-Hakim. The Supreme council is based in Tehran and has 
branches in London. Damascus and Beirut 
2.. AI-Haraka Al-Islamiva fi Kurdistan. 1l-Iraq (Islamic Movement of Kurdistan) 
Represented by Sheikh Ali Abdul-Aziz, Imam of the Halabcha Mosque, 
3. A1-Tajammu'Al-Islami AI-Iraqi (Iraqi Islamic Grouping) 
The most important Islamic figure in this organisation was Muhammad Bahr Al-Uloum. 
4. Hizb Al-Da 'wah Al-Islamiva (Party of Islamic Call) 
The most secretive of all opposition groups. Its spokesman was Muhammad Al-Asi[i 
5. A'IunadhamatAl-ama/Al-Islami (Islamic Action Organisation). 
Headed by Muhammad Tai Muddarrissi 
6. HarakatAl-MujahideenAl-Iragiyeen (Movement oflragi Mujahedeen) 
7. llarakat Jund AI-Imam (The Imam's Fighters Movement) 
Headed by Sami Al-Badri 
8. Jama'atAl-Ulama'A1-Alujahideen Fit Iraq (grouping ofAlujahideen Scholars oflraq) 
Headed by Muhammad Baqir Al-Nasiri 
9. Al-Ittihad Al-Islami Al AI-Turkomani (Turkoman Islamic Union) 
10. A number of Islamic groupings not represented in the Supreme Council of the Islamic 
Revolution in Iraq also attented the Beirut Conference. These included Al-Ikhwan Al- 
Muslimoun (Muslim Brothers) and Hizb Al-Tahrir (Liberation Party). Unlike the Shi'a 
Islamic groupings referred to above, these two are exclusively Sunni. 
1. AI-Ilizb A1-Dimocrati A1-Kurdistani (Kurdish Democratic Party) 
V Headed by Mas'oud Barzani(represented 
by Izzi Al-Deen Barwarf) 
2. AI-Ittihad Al-Walani A1-Kurdistani (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) 
Headed by Jalal AI-Talbani 
3. Hizb Al-sha'b AI-Kudustani (People's Party of Kurdistan) 
Headed Sami Abdul Rahman 
40 sr 4. Al-Hizb A1-Ishtiraki A1-Kurdistani (Socialist Party of Kurdistan) 
l_4 4oL Headed 
by Rasoul Mamend 
1. IIizb Al-Bath AlArahi A1-Ishtiraki (Arab Ba'th Socialist Party) 
L o Headed by Mahdi Al-Ubaidi 
2. Independent Nationalists 
Headed by General Hasan Al-Naqib 
H z 
/. Al-11izh AI-Shivou'i AI-Iraqi (Iraqi Communist Party) 
Headed by Aziz Muhammad 
W 
,. ý 2. Al-Tajammu'111-Dimocrati Al-Iraqi (Iraqi Democratic Grouping) 
Headed by Mubdir AI-Wayyis 
l- CA 
" These parties often call themselves the Democratic Front 
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Having listened to the litany of crimes committed by the Saddam Hussein regime, 
the conference set out in general terms the steps needed to free the Iraqi people from 
the yoke of the repressive regime. These were contained in a final communique, 
which was signed by the delegates. The recommendations appealed to Arab and 
Islamic countries to recognise the Iraqi opposition as the legitimate representative of 
the Iraqis until they chose their own representatives in freely held elections. Other 
recommendations -referred to the necessity of establishing coordination Committees 
to take charge of contacts with the outside world. Apart from the communique, no 
tangible results were achieved and the conferees spent most of their time and energy 
talking about the need to talk about the Iraqi crisis. To that end, it was also agreed 
that a conference be held in Riyadh within two months. 
Iraqi Opposition and the `Proportion War' 
The dramatic developments inside Iraq in the aftermath of the March Intifada and the 
sudden turn of events in favour of Saddam Hussein's regime took the optimistic Joint 
Action Committee by surprise. No sooner had the delegates folded camp than the 
main Kurdish parties announced that they would negotiate with the Iraqi president in 
order to reach a peaceful settlement to the Kurdish question. Although the move was 
seen as stab in the back, there was not much the non-Kurdish opposition groups 
could do about it. 
Despite the disappointments and failures of the Iraqi uprising, which came as a 
terrible blow to the opposition parties, attempts were made to reconvene a second 
conference in Riyadh. The two London-based groupings, the National Accord and 
the Free Iraqi Council, which apparently had wider ambitions and sought to create an 
alternative leadership for the Iraqi opposition, were particularly active in the period 
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immediately following the Beirut conference. The rifts and mutual suspicions which 
had become even deeper after the suppression of the Intifada, the internal bickering 
within each party and the mushrooming of splinter groups made the task of 
reconvening the expanded Joint Action Committee impossible. Among the other 
obstacles which stood in the way of convening the proposed Riyadh conference was 
what came to be known as the `proportion war' in which each political grouping 
wanted to insure a high proportion of representation before it agreed to attend any 
national conference. The Islamic Shi'a bloc, which reiterated that it had a long 
history in opposing Saddam Hussein and that it had suffered more casualties at the 
hand of the regime sought to acquire a largerproportion of representation. In so doing 
they were trying to insure that they would play a significant part in post-Saddam 
Iraq. 396 
The First London Exploratory Conference 
After a difficult period of shuttling between London, Tehran, Damascus and Riyadh, 
and arduous contacts made by the Free Iraqi Council and the National Accord group, 
on the one hand and many of the opposition groups which mushroomed in exile, 
especially in Britain on the other, it was agreed that an "exploratory" conference 
should be held in London on 5t' July 1991. The aim of the conference was to discuss 
ways and means of coordinating opposition activities and also to implement the 
Beirut Conference recommendation regarding the holding of a general conference to 
be attended by representatives of all opposition groupings. Most of these groups were 
now trying to distance themselves from the Tehran-Damascus axis, which they felt 
396 Interview with Dr Muwaffaq Al-Rubai'i in London on 5t` March 1999. 
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had been dominating the activities of Iraqi opposition. 397 The organisations which 
attended the exploratory conference included: 
1. Al-Wifaq Al-Watani Al Iraqi (Iraqi National Accord) 
2. Al Majlis Al-Iraqi Al-Hurr (Free Iraqi Council) 
3. Kawadir Hizb Al-Da wah (Islamic Call Cadres)398 
4. Islamic Forces Grouping (Jund Al Imam: Sa'ad Jawad) 
5. National Committee for the Salvation of Iraq 
6. The Faili Kurds Movement (Abdul Jald Al-Faili) 
7. Union of Iraqi Democrats (Farouq Ridha'a) 
8. National Assyrian Grouping (Yatroun Darmu) 
9. Free Officers Movement (Faris Al-Jadir) 
10. Abdul Hussein Sha'ban (Independent) 
11. Independent Kurds (Feriad Rashid) 
12. Kurdish Movement in Kurdistan (Ihsan Abdul-Aziz) 
13. Al-Tajammu' Al-Democrati Al-Iraqi (Iraqi Democratic Assembly represented by 
Salih Dugla) 
The Exploratory Conference aimed at reactivating the opposition movement inside 
and outside Iraq and at involving as many opposition groupings as possible, a task 
which the Joint Action Committee had failed to achieve. The July gathering resulted 
in: 
1. Forming a Contact Committee which was entrusted with the task of setting up an 
action plan, and a preparatory Committee for the purpose of convening an all 
397Interview with Faris Al-Jadir, Free Officers Movement representative on 1' February 1999. 
39SThis is a splinter group of Hizb Al-Da'wah (Islamic Call Party). 
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party conference within three months 
2. Contacting the Joint Action Committee, as well as all European-based opposition 
groupings and urging them to cooperate and coordinate efforts. 399 
From its base in Damascus, the Joint Action Committee viewed the latest 
development with misgivings especially as it feared that those who took part in the 
London Exploratory Conference might supplant it and shift the focus of attention 
away from Syria. The Joint Action Committee received several letters from the 
newly formed Contact Committee in which the latter counselled speeding up the 
process of holding the much awaited national conference. 400 But no response was 
ever received to the numerous requests. On 7th September 1991 the National Accord 
and Free Iraqi Council felt compelled to send a delegation to Damascus in order to 
set up a preparatory Committee which would take upon itself the task of convening 
the national conference. 401 In view of the increase in the number of Iraqi opposition 
"movements" and "fronts" and `uunions", it was agreed that new political grouping 
wishing to join the Joint Action Committee should be allowed to do so without any 
difficulty. . 
This resulted in the formation of the 7+7 formula which was entrusted with the 
preparation for the national conference. To the original seven (5+2) group, the 
following parties were added: 
1. Jabhat AI-Qiwa AI-Islam 'rya (The Islamic Forces Front) 
2. Union of Iraqi Democrats (Farouq Ridha'a) 
399 Minutes of the first exploratory meeting held in London on 5`h July 1991. 
400 I have obtained copies of a number of such memoranda, the last of which was sent on 23rd 
September 1991. 
"Interview with Sa'ad Salih Jabr on 1'` March 1999. 
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3. Islamic Action Organisation (Ahmad Al-Katib) 
4. Muhammad Bahr Al-üloum 
5. Muhsin Daiza'ee 
An extra representative from each of the following: 
6. The Ba'th Party 
7. The Communist Party402 
It was further agreed that the 7+7 Committee should hold its first meeting in 
Damascus on 22°d September 1991 in order to prepare for the long awaited 
conference. But the meeting never took place as the Joint Action Committee felt that 
its position might be undermined, as relations between JAC and the Contact 
Committee developed into an undeclared but severe and highly suspicious rivalry. 
The Joint Action Committee then instructed its representatives403 in London to resort 
to delaying tactics in their dealings with the London based opposition groups. The 
Iraqi Free Council responded angrily at JAC's failure to implement the 7+7 formula 
and condemned its determination to block any call for a general conference. 404 This 
led those who attended the 1" London Exploratory conference to meet again on 26a' 
September 1991 to consider the situation in the light of JAC's attempt to stall for 
time. One result of the meeting was activating the Contact Committee, the name of 
which was changed to "Contact and National Coordination Committee". The new 
Committee was entrusted with the responsibility of preparing for the general 
4021nterview with (pro-Syrian) Ba'th Party representative inLondon, Mahmud A1-Sheikh Radhi in 
London on 15th April 1999. 
These were: Mahmud Al-Sheikh Radhi (Bath Party), Abdul-Latif Rasheed (Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan), Muhammad Muhammad All (Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution), Ahmad Al-Katib 
(Islamic Action Organisation), Haider Abbas (Islamic Call), Majid Al-Yassiri (Communist Party) and 
Majid Al-Haj Hamoud (Secretary, London Branch, Joint Action Committee). 
404Free Iraqi Council Memorandum to JAC Secretariat Bureau in Damascus, 
dated 25th September 1991. 
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conference. 405 
Against this development, the Joint Action Committee felt even more threatened by 
the goings on in the London arena. The Committee felt compelled to respond to the 
letters sent by the Contact Committee. On 30th September 1991, the Joint Action 
Committee wrote to the Contact Committee expressing a desire to participate in any 
general conference which might be organised. JAC then instructed its representatives 
in London to expand and include new elements to insure that the Joint Action 
Committee remained the guiding force of Iraqi opposition. To that end, a 33-member 
Committee which included a wide range of political orientations was announced. Its 
members included: 
1 Maid Al-Haj Hmoud (Independent) 
2 M. Bahr Al-Uloum (Independent, Shi'a religious scolar) 
3 Hani Al-Fikaiki (Independent, ex-Ba'thist) 
4 Abu Haider Al-Husaini (Supreme Council of the Islamic 
Revolution) 
5 Ibrahim Ahmad (Independent) 
6 Muhsin Daz'ai Inde endent Kurd) 
7 Ahmad Al-Chalabi (Independent) 
8 Nawzad Ahmad Aziz (Independent) 
9 Muhammad Hamawandi (Independent) 
10 Ittihad Al Dimocratiyeen (Union of Democrats) 
11 Abdul Sahib Al-Hakim (Human Rights -Iraq) 
12 Laith Kubba (Independent) 
13 Albert Yelda (Assyrian Movement) 
14 Abu Muhammad 
AiWakil 
(Al-Tajammu' AI-Islami Al-Iraqi) (Iraqi 
Islamic Assembly) 
15 Mahmud Shamsa (Independent) 
16 Maid Al-Yasiri (Iraqi Communist Party) 
17 Latif Rasheed (Kurdish Front) 
18 Hoshiar Al-Zibari (Kurdish Front) 
19 Hussein Al-Mousawi (Jama'atAi-Ulama) (Religious Scholars 
Group) 
20 Abu Ahmad Al-Ja'fari (Islamic Call Part 
405Minutes of the Contact Committee meeting on 26th September 1991. 
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21 Sa'ad Jawad Jund AI-Imam (The Imam's soldiers) 
22 Ahmad Al-Katib (Munadhamat AI Amal AI-Islami) (Islamic 
Action Organisation) 
23 Mahmud Sheikh Radhi (Arab Ba'th Socialist Party) 
24 Dalshad Miran (People's Party of Kurdistan) 
25 Muhammad Al-Rubaii (Democratic Assembly) 
26 Ala'Uddin Hussein (Socialist Party) 
27 Hussein Al-Sadr (Independent) 
28 Nouri Al-Bahrani asserite Unionist Assembly) 
29 Haider Abbas (Islamic Call Party) 
30 Muwaffak Al-Ruba'I (Islamic Call) 
31 Subhi Al-Jumaili (Iraqi Communist Party) 
32 Sabah Kadhim (Independent Iraqi Commission) 
33 Ihsan Ali (Islamic Movement of Kurdistan 
Negotiations between the "Contact and National Coordination Committee" and the 
"London Branch of the Joint Action Committee" continued until mid-November 
resulting in agreement on implementation of the 7+7 formula and designating the 
preparatory Committee for the general conference. It was also agreed that the names 
of the said Committee should be released on 74' December 1991. Nothing came of 
this agreement as once again representatives of the opposition fell out with each 
other over the proportion allotted to each party. 406 
Conscious of the need to overcome the obstacles in the way of unified action against 
Saddam Hussein, JAC announced in Damascus early in January 1992 that it was 
planning a general conference for all Iraqi parties opposed to the regime of Saddam 
Hussein. Athough no specific date or venue was fixed, a preparatory Committee for 
the planned gathering was formed. The Committee included the following groups 
and personalities: 
406Memorandum from JAC Secretariat Bureau to JAC London Branch dated 18th November 1991. 
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1. The Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution 
2. The Islamic Mission (Al-Da'wah Al-Islamiya) 
3. Kurdish Democratic Party (Masoud Al-Barazani) 
4. Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (Jalal Al-Talibani) 
5. Arab Bath Socialist Party- the Iraq Command 
6. The Communist Party 
7. Iraqi National Accord (Al-W faq Al-Watani AI Iraqi, Ayad Alawi and Salah AI-Ali) 
S. Iraqi Free Council (A1 Majlis Al-Iraqi AI Hurr, Sa'ad Jabr and Sadiq Al-Attiya) 
9. Independent Iraqi Group (Al-Hai'a Al Iraqiya Al Mustaqilla) 
10 Dr Muhammad Bahr Al-Uloum (Shi'a religious scholar) 
11 Islamic Action Organization (Munadhamat Al Amal AI-Islami) 
12 Iraqi Democratic Assembly (AI-Tajammu' Al-Dimocrati Al-Iraqi, Salih Duglah) 
13 Iraqi Democratic Union, London (Ittihad Al-Dimacratiyeen All Iraqiyeen) 
14 Democratic Nationalist Assembly (AI-Tajammu' Al-Qawmi Al-Dimocrati) 
15 Assyrian Democratic Movement (AlHaraka AI-Dimocratiya Al Ashuriya) 
16 National Reform Movement (HarakatAl-Islah Al-Watani; Sami Izara Al-Ma'jawn) 
Ti Supreme Council of Iraqi Tribes (Al Majlis AI-A'la Lil Asha'er Al-Iragiya, Hussein Al- 
Sha'lan 
18 Islamic Union of Iraqi Turkomans (AI Ittihad AI Islami Li Turkoman Al-Iraq) 
19 Socialist Party (Al-Hizb AI Ishtiraki, Mubdir Al-Wayyis) 
20 Arab Socialist Movement (Al-Haraka Al-Ishtirakiya Al-Arabiya, Abdul Ilah Al-Nasrawi) 
21, Islamic Movement in Kurdistan (AI-Haraka AI-Islamiya Fi Kurdistan) 
22, Iraqi Officers Movement (Harakat AI-Dhubbat AI-Iragiyeen) 
23 The Islamic Bloc (Al-Kutla Al-Islamiya) 
24 Socialist Party of Kurdistan (Al-Hizb Al Ishtiraki Al-Kurdistani) 
25 Democratic Union in U. S and Canada (Al-Ittihad AI-Dimocrati Fi America wa 
Canada) 407 
407Minutes of the 3`d session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2°d Conference of Iraqi opposition 
parties in JAC headquarters, Damascus on 7`h January 1991. 
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To iron out a working paper reflecting the views, strategies and orientations of the 
diverse Iraqi opposition groups, a number of specialized Committees were soon 
formed. These were 
1. Foreign Relations Committee 
2. Political Committee 
3. Administrative Committee 
4. Kurdish Question Committee 
5. Information Committee 
6. Legal Committee 
7. Military Committee 
8. Financial Committee 
Once again, the meeting proved a dismal failure in that it became, as it were, a 
battlefield where the `proportion war' was fought. 408 In short, the participants failed 
to produce an acceptable plan for convening a national conference. At this juncture, 
Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iran applied joint pressure in order to narrow down the 
differences between opposition parties. These attempts were doomed to fail. 409 
Despite universal agreement on the necessity to remove Saddam Hussein, the 
differences were far too deep to be overlooked or covered over as there was no 
408Interview with London ex-representative of Iraqi Democratic Union, Dr Walid Al-Tamimi on 10th 
March 1999. 
4ogNawwar, Iraqi Opposition, p. 33. 
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common denominator, or common objectives. However, some members of the JAC 
London Branch felt that they could no longer coordinate work with the Secretariat 
Bureau in Damascus. Chief among those was Dr Ahmad Chalabi who called for a 
meeting at the end of January 1992 to be attended by representatives of all political 
parties in the United Kingdom. Although the meeting did not attract the same amount 
of media attention as the Beirut or the First London Exploratory Conferences had 
done, many consider the Basil Hotel meeting a landmark in the history of Iraqi 
opposition because it signified a new orientation towards the West, particularly the 
United States. It was felt that it would be easier to convene a national conference in a 
European environment rather than a Middle Eastern one. Following a series of 
meetings, Dr Al-Chalabi received the JAC London Branch approval to proceed with 
his proposal to hold a national conference on European soil which would be 
convened in the name of JAC London Branch and not the Damascus based JAC 
Secretariat Bureau. 
Chalabi's call was opposed by the Ba'thists as well as the Communists. During this 
period the Iraqi National Accord and the Free Iraqi Council became locked in endless 
internal squabbles which ended with the breaking away of some leading figures from 
the two groupings. Salah Omar Al-Ali founded the Iraqi National Accord Assembly. 
He added the word 'Assembly' in order to distinguish it from the original National 
Accord which Ayad Allawi presided over after Al-Ali's departure. The Free Iraqi 
Council meanwhile witnessed yet another upheaval. Sadiq Al-Attiya rebelled against 
Sa'd Salih Jabr and broke away from the Council amid a mass of accusations and 
counter accusations. Both Ayad Allawi and Sadiq Attiya responded positively to 
Chalabi's call for a national conference to be held in Vienna. 
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Failure of Joint Action Committee 
The development of Iraqi opposition, especially in the post-Gulf War era, shows that 
the political groupings were in fact waging two wars on two different fronts: one 
against the regime of Saddam Hussein; the second against each other. The suspicion 
and distrust with which opposition leaders view each other is deeper than any 
reconciliation attempt could ever dispel or lessen, however sincere and disinterested. 
Greed was another factor. Interest in monopolising financial and moral support from 
this quarter or that was another factor which divided the opponents of Saddam 
Hussein. Squabbles over the proportion of representation and insistence on obtaining 
maximum influence was particularly harmfull. Each political grouping, citing its past 
struggle and sacrifices, wanted to acquire a high proportion of representation before 
it would agree to attend any conference. 
410 
Among the other reasons which contributed to the failure in the attempt to forge a 
united front was the arrogance of the Islamic bloc, which looked down with disdain 
upon the other political groupings. This arrogance stems from its relatively wide 
Shi'a support and glorification of its own role in the opposition movement. For these 
reasons, the Islamic front paid little or no attention to attempts made at coordinating 
opposition activities. Its leadership still insists it is capable, on its own, of leading the 
Iraqi masses to victory over Saddam Husein. 
The Kurdish question further complicated the task of uniting the opposition groups 
410lnterview with the London representative of the supreme Council, Dr Hamid Al-Bayati on 15th 
March 1999. The Islamic bloc insisted that they should be allotted 40% of the seats. The Kurds on the 
other hand would not accept less than 20%. The leftists and socialists, the so-called Democratic Front 
also insisted on 20% of the seats. This would leave the Arab nationalists, independent and liberals 
only 20% which was totally unacceptable to them. 
214 
While non-Kurdish parties struggle in order to topple the rule of Saddam Hussein 
and install a more humanitarian and democratic regime in Baghdad, the Kurds see 
their struggle through nationalistic eyes. Their aim is not to liberate Iraq from the 
dictatorship of Saddam Hussein but to achieve some sort of autonomy in the 
predominantly Kurdish areas in Iraq. In furthering their nationalist cause, the Kurdish 
movement thinks nothing of contacting Saddam Hussein, negotiating with his regime 
or concluding agreements with him. 
Regional involvement in the affairs of the Iraqi opposition weakened the movement. 
The hegemony of Syria and Iran, for example, over many of the opposition groups 
based in their territories may be considered another reason for the paralysis of the 
opposition movement. In accepting to operate under the wings of Damascus or 
Tehran, many opposition groups subjected their activities to political considerations 
directly related to the interests of the host country. Needless to say that neither Syria 
nor Iran would allow any of its protege groupings to cross the limits set for them. 
Rifts and internal division wreaked havoc on the performance and standing of Iraqi 
opposition. The widening gap between the London-based groups of Wifaq and Majlis 
is a case in point. Among other things, their publications, which were supposed to be 
dedicated entirely to the discrediting of the Saddam Hussein regime, were for lengthy 
periods of time, battlefields where personal vendettas and feuds were fought. The 
Iraqi opposition in exile, says Karen Dabrowska, "are fighting in the same trench- but 
its guns are not always pointing in the same direction". 411 They had no agreed 
strategy of how to rid Iraq of Saddam Hussein's regime. However, practically each 
411Karen Dabrowska, "Fighting in the Same Trench", New Horizon, No. 382, June 1991, p. 9. 
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party or grouping had its own approach to this question. The Islamic groups, for 
example, believed in armed struggle and popular revolution. The Kurds, on the other 
hand, often adopted guerrilla tactics to attain their goal of establishing home rule. 
The Communists were also in favour of armed struggle, while the Wifaq group were 
convinced that the ideal way to topple the regime was either through a military coup 
or, at least, a palace revolution. 412 
JAC tried hard to lay down a political framework for all groups seeking to overthrow 
the regime in Baghdad. But the project was met with the insurmountable difficulty 
resulting from the overpowering political urge of each party to impose its own 
hegemony on the rest of the groups. JAC furthermore had no public relations 
philosophy and did not speak with one voice. It failed miserably in mobilising the 
Iraqis, both among the ex-patriots and inside Iraq, to rally behind its banner or rise 
against the oppressive regime in Baghdad. Each party was, as it were, blowing its 
own trumpet. Besides their publications, the Iran-based Islamists had a relatively 
powerful Arabic-speaking broadcasting station, capable of reaching most of the 
heavily Shi'a populated areas in southern and south-eastern Iraq. The Syrian-based 
groups on the other hand had access to the official Syrian media and had their own 
publications. 413 
412 Abu Tharr Al-Saghir, Al-Mukaradha Al-Iraqiya Min Zawiya Ukhra (Iraqi Opposition: From A 
Different Point of View(Beirut: Mukssasat Abu Tharr Lil-Dirasat, 1999), p. 104. 
413 A detailed list of opposition publications is given in the Bibliography under "Opposition Pamphlets 
and Newsletters". 
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Chapter 5: Iraqi Opposition from Vienna to Salah Al-Din: Birth of Iraqi 
National Congress (INC) 
This chapter will discuss the rifts and serious disagreements, which continued to 
plague Iraqi opposition from the Beirut conference to the emergence of the Iraqi 
National Congress (INC). Attempts will be made to explore the reasons behind the 
divisions within each group and to investigate the factors behind the emergence of 
new hitherto unheard of opposition groups. The factors which led to the convening of 
the Vienna and Salah Al-Din conferences will be discussed in some detail as these 
two important gatherings gave rise to a new formula for joint opposition action. They 
furthermore crystallized a serious attempt to adopt fresh strategies towards the Iraqi 
regime and the world community at large. 
The part played by the Kurdish movement and its support of the opposition, whether 
in the preparation for the Vienna conference or during the period following it, will 
also be taken up. It will be seen that the Kurds who had earlier chosen to stay away 
from the opposition after the Beirut conference, had an immense impact on 
revitalizing opposition operations against the regime of Saddam Hussein, following 
their decision to rejoin the Iraqi opposition movement. Their cooperation facilitated 
the return of the opposition movement to its native homeland. 
Towards Vienna: Paving the Way 
Despite its failure, the Beirut conference was in many ways the first important step 
towards harmonizing the efforts of the deeply divided and mutually suspicious Iraqi 
opposition groups. The widely publicized gathering which was attended by 
practically all the political parties, small and large, as well as an impressive array of 
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Iraqi opposition figures produced little in terms of concrete results. The outcome fell 
far short of the expectations not only of the Iraqis in general but also of those of the 
participants themselves. The conference, as well as the meetings held outside its halls, 
did however help crystallize a number of common objectives shared by the all 
participants. These common objectives may be outlined as follows: 
1. That the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the group 
surrounding him as a precondition for change; 
2. Endorsement of the territorial integrity of Iraq; 
3. Acceptance of the principles of democratic election and 
constitutional government; 
4. Acceptance of the need for special status [for the Iraqi 
Kurds] based on a degree of self-government. 414 
It is to be noted however that outside the framework of these declared objectives, 
each party had its own particular agenda which reflected its sectarian, nationalistic or 
ideological interests. While the Kurds were interested in supporting any regime that 
recognises their right to self-determination or the establishment of a federal state in 
which they might have full control of their affairs, the liberals and Democrats were, 
on the other hand, after a secular democratic government in which the clerics would 
hold no sway or influence. 
As far as the organised Shi'a Islamists were concerned, most of them, especially 
those based in Iran, were under the influence of Tehran, which openly encouraged 
them to seek establishment of an Iranian-style Islamic republic in Iraq. 415 This 
became quite clear in the period immediately following the March Intifada in which 
414Rend Rahim Francke, "The Opposition, " in Fran Hazelton, Iraq Since the Gulf War: Prospects for 
Democracy (Zed Books: London, 1994), p. 156. 
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4 
the Shi'as played a most crucial role. During the period in which the JAC was trying 
to convene a general conference for the opposition groups, the Shi'as insisted that 
they get the lion's share of the number of seats, 416 
Differences among members of the JAC Committees over the proportion to be 
allocated to each opposition party in the conference confounded and deepened even 
further the recriminations and familiar accusations and counter accusations which 
were later to paralyze and destroy the very existence of the JAC Damascus office. 
With the differences over the proportion of representation came the insistence of the 
Shi'a groups that a specific reference be made to the suppression of the Shi'as at the 
hands of the Saddam Hussein regime. As a precondition for attending the planned 
conference, they further insisted on recognition of the right of the Islamist Shi'a 
parties to be at the forefront of any future leadership of post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. 
This demand further aggravated the problem and angered secular and non-Shi'a 
groups. 417 Despite these differences which prompted a number of secular and non- 
Shi'a opposition parties to declare that they would boycott the conference, a majority 
decided that a meeting should take place. 
After long and arduous negotiations it was also decided that "liberated' Iraqi 
Kurdistan would be an ideal venue for such a long waited patriotic gathering. 
Contacts were made with the Kurdish parties in control of Iraqi Kurdistan. The 
Kurdish front indicated that they had no objection to holding such a national 
gathering, provided that the proposed conference should include in its agenda an item 
415lnterview with Muhammed Bahr Al-Uloum in London on 5t' September 1999. 
4i6Rend Rahim Francke, "The Opposition", p. 72. 
4171nteMew with Muhammed Bahr Al-Uloum in London on 5t' September 1999. 
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specifically referring to the right of the Kurds to federalism, not autonomy, as JAC 
had earlier proposed, as the only acceptable solution to the Kurdish problem. This 
new dimension confounded the efforts of the JAC and rendered the task of convening 
the bickering and mutually suspicious groups even more difficult. JAC's failure to 
mobilize Iraqi opposition groups or to persuade them to get together was a 
disappointment to Iraqis as well as those following developments in Iraq, although 
Western intelligence and security experts were not surprised at the lack of success in 
this matter. 418 
The Iraqi National Congress (INC) 
To break the impasse, the JAC London Branch came up with a new idea: holding a 
conference in a European capital, away from regional rivalries and sensitivities. This 
came after its members had voted overwhelmingly in favour of such an 
undertaking. 419 The man behind the move to shift the venue of the proposed 
conference to the West was the wealthy financier Ahmed Chalabi who was little 
known in Iraqi opposition circles. Chalabi's enthusiasm was largely based on U. S. 
assurances that he would receive full backing if he succeeded in bringing together the 
squabbling opposition groups. 
420 He had received these assurances when he contacted 
U. S. officials in Washington seeking support for his project. 421 Following the U. S. 
promise of support, Chalabi hastened to convince Iraqi opposition of the vital role of 
the international community, especially the United States, in effecting political 
418James Walker, "Iraqi Opposition Agree to Disagree", The limes, 20th February 1992, p. 8. 
419Interview with Mahnmud Al-Sheikh Radhi, pro-Syrian Arab Ba'th Socialist Party Politbureau 
member in London on 1" September 1999. 
420David Wurmser points out that strong and clearly worded guarantees from the highest levels of the 
U. S. government encouraged and protected [Chalabi's] INC. See Tyranny's alley (Washington, D. C: 
The AEI Press, 1999), p. 14. 
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change in Iraq. 422 To that end, he made extensive contacts with a number of 
opposition groups, veteran politicians and dissident intellectuals in order to mobilize 
support for the proposed conference. His attempt produced some results. To prepare 
for the conference, the JAC London Branch created a seven-man Preparatory 
Committee, often referred to as the Secretariat. Its members were: 
1. Muwaffaq A1-Rubai'ee 
2. Muhammad Bahr Al-Uloum 
3. Laith Kubba 
4. Hani Al-Fikaiki 
5. Ahmad Chalabi 
6. Latif Rashid 
7. Muhammad Muhammad Ali423 
The Committee held its first meeting at the beginning of February 1992 and agreed 
to intensify efforts to hold a conference in a European capital. Vienna was chosen as 
the most appropriate venue on account of its neutrality and also for cost 
considerations. It was also agreed that the planned gathering will be called the Iraqi 
National Congress (INC). 
On 15th March 1992, a number of known opposition figures and civil rights activists 
met at the headquarters of Sad Salih Jabr's Free Iraq Council to endorse the call for 
421 Interview with Ahmed Chalabi in London on 116' September 1999. 
422Interview with Abdul Hussein Shaban in London on 20th September 1999. 
4231nterview with Muwaffaq Al-Rubaiee in London on 2' September 1999. It is to be noted that the 
Arab Sunnis were not represented in this Committee. Except for Latif Rasheed who was a Kurd, all the 
other six members were from the Shi'a sect. Apart from Hani Al-Fikai d, who was a secular Shi'a and 
Ahmed Chalabi, a pro-West liberal, all the other members were committed Shi'a Islamists. 
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the proposed Vienna conference and to express support for the Preparatory 
Committee of the JAC London Branch. This important meeting was attended by: 
1. Dr Sa'ad Jawad 
2. Abdul Hussein Sha'ban 
3. Muhammad Abdul Jabbar 
4. Firyad Hwaizi 
5. Sabah Allawi 
6. Sami Faraj Ali 
7. Petroun Darmou 
8. Abul Halim Al-Ruhaimi 
9. Muwaffaq Fattouhi 
10. Riyadh Al-Yawour 
11. Sa'ad Salih Jabr 
12. Hussein Haider 
13. Sheikh Abu Haider (Muhammad Muhammad Ali) 
14. Hani Al-Fikaiki 
15. Dr Latif Rashid 
16. Tahseem Mu'allah 
17. Abdul Amir Allawi 
18. Aziz Ullayan 
19. Ahmad Abdl Hadi Chalabi (Ahmad Chalabi) 
20. Ayad Allawi 
The conferees signed a document stressing, among other things, the need for: 
a) thinking out and developing a political discourse that would be acceptable to 
the opposition groups as well as the outside world 
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b) ironing out an appropriate plan for toppling the regime of Saddam Hussein 
and establishing a body to be entrusted with the task of coordinating 
opposition work. Such a framework was to be called "the National Council for 
the Salvation of Iraq' aza . 
Other meetings soon followed. Ahmad Chalabi, Hani Al-Fikaiki, Adeeb Al-Jadir and 
Muhammad Bahr Al-Uloum contacted Masoud Al-Barzani in Vienna to brief him on 
their initiative in order to enlist the Kurds' support and ensure their presence at the 
intended conference. 425 The response was quite positive. Barzani promised not to 
spare any effort in making the conference a success, having been assured that the 
conferees would endorse the Kurdish call for self-determination. Upon conclusion of 
this deal, preparations for the conference took a more serious turn. 426 
It was apparent that Ahmad Chalabi was counting heavily on international actors, 
particularly the United States, whose support he deemed absolutely necessary for any 
political change in Iraq. Chalabi further boasted that he was able to guarantee 
American support for the opposition. 427 His assertions received some attention, 
especially as most, if not all of those expressing enthusiasm for the conference, were 
hoping in effect to resist attempts by the regional powers, particularly that of Syria 
and Iran to influence the course and outcome of Iraqi opposition work. It is ironic that 
many nationalists and pan-Arabists preferred to hold the conference in a European 
capital, away from any of the numerous `fraternal" Arab states. 
428 
424Unpublished minutes of the meeting dated 15th March 1992. 
425lnterview with Ahmed Chalabi in London on 11"b September 1999. 
426Interview with ex-Communist Party Politbureau member, Majid Al-Yasseri in London on 1R 
December 1999. 
42? Interviw with Majid Al-Yassiri on 1" December 1999. 
4 Interview With Muwaffaq A1-Ruba'ee in London on 2nd September 1999. 
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The question of financing such an ambitious undertaking was a great source of 
worry to prospective participants. Abdul Hussein Shaban, who worked closely with 
Ahmad Chalabi, related that on one occasion Hani Al-Fikaiki asked Chalabi who 
would "sponsor" the conference and foot the bill; Chalabi quickly responded: "I 
Will» 429 This pledge, coming as it did from an extremely wealthy financier, put an 
end to these worries. However, Shaban, asserts that the United States had provided 
Chalabi with enough funds to cover the conference costs. 43° 
In the meantime, the JAC Damascus office kept a close watch over these 
developments, voicing concern over the turn of events and expressing fear that the 
proposed conference would undermine its authority and cast a suspicious light on the 
true identity of Iraqi opposition. Despite the fact that many of its members were not 
genuinely averse to the holding of the conference in a European capital, they did 
nevertheless feel quite embarrassed before Damascus and Tehran, both of which kept 
expressing concern that the JAC was in danger of being sidestepped or even hijacked. 
Both capitals also feared the consequences of the fact that the London-based groups 
were attracting some serious international attention, especially from the United States 
and Britain. 
429Chalabi paid $50,000 while the rest of the conference expenses was paid by the U. S. 
administration. Interview with Ahmed Chalabi in London on 11th September 1999. 
430lnterview with Abdul Hussein Sh'ban in London on 20`h September 1999. However, in their out of 
the Ashes: The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein (New York: Harper Collins, 1999), Andrew Cockburn 
and Patrick Cockburn note that the wealthy Chalabi had been recruited by the CIA which welcomed 
the fact that he was known to be rich as that helped "explain any money that we might be giving him", 
p. 51. See also Michael C. Gunter, The Kurdish Predicament in Iraq (London: St Martin's Press, 1999) 
where he points out that "although it is clear that INC has been able to obtain some financing, details 
were for a long time murky and contradictory", pp. 44-45. 
224 
Scorning JAC's objections to the Vienna project, the JAC London branch succeeded 
in forming a Committee for the specific task of preparing an agenda for the planned 
gathering. The Committee included the following members: 
1. Leith Kubba 
2. Muhammad Bahr Al-Uloum 
3. Hani Al-Fikaiki 
4. Muhsin Daza'ee 
5. Latif Rasheed 
6. Tahseen Mu'lla 
7. Abdul Hussein Sha'ban431 
Having drawn up a rather extensive agenda for the Vienna meeting, the Committee 
then extended invitations to 150 opposition figures who were asked to attend, not as 
representatives of their political organisations, but in their personal capacity. It was 
thought that such an arrangement would avoid the pitfalls which had confronted JAC 
and at the same time offer some newcomers a chance to participate as equals and not 
as representatives of fledgling groups. 
432 The conference was at first scheduled to 
take place between 12th and 15th April 1992.433 The invitation letter, signed by Dr 
Laith Kubba, on behalf of the "the Conference Secretariat", stated that the. intention 
""Interview with Abdul-Hussein Sh'aban in London on 20th September 1999. 
432lnterview with Muhammad Bahr Al-Uloum in London on St` September 1999. 
433This date however was later changed and the conference was held between 16th and 19th June 1992. 
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of the gathering was "to end the fragmentation of the Iraqi opposition and formulate a 
workable plan for overthrowing Saddam Hussein". 434 
In an attempt to absorb the regional powers' anger, the Preparatory Committee sent 
letters to the governments of Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia explaining the reasons 
which had prompted the JAC London branch to seize the initiative and call for the 
Vienna conference. They cited the fact that they had been repeatedly disappointed by 
JAC Damascus office's prevarication and inaction. The letter addressed to Syrian 
Vice-President Abdul Hakim Khaddame appealed for help in urging the JAC 
Damascus office to participate in the conference. 435 
The letter produced no positive result. In order to thwart the efforts of the London 
branch, the JAC Damascus office, which suspected that "the London branch was 
formulating a hidden agenda for the conference"436, resorted once again to delaying 
tactics. 437 To that end, it urgently asked all members of its London branch to come to 
Damascus for a "decisive session" in order to discuss the best possible means of 
holding the second general conference and also to "fix the date and venue of the 
proposed gathering, to settle the question of the proportion of representation and to 
form a steering Committee". 438 The call fell on deaf ears and preparations for Vienna 
accelerated. To make sure that as many people as possible attended, the gathering was 
rescheduled to be held on 16''-19th June 1992, two months after the original date. 
434The invitation was published in a JAC (London Branch) press release dated 16th March 1992. 
435preparatory Committee's letter (unpublished), dated 13th March 1992 and signed by Muhammad 
Bahr Al-Uloum. 
436Karen Dabraowska, "Iraqi Opposition: Sweet Dreams and Harsh Realities, " Al Muhajir, XVI, 15th 
November 1993, p. 12. 
437 Interview with Abdul-Hussein Sha'ban in London on 20th September. 
438JAC Damascus office Secretariat letter (unpublished) dated 1'7`b March 1992. 
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Reaction to the Vienna Conference 
With the possible exception of the Kurdish Front, almost all opposition groups 
including the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, JAC Damascus 
office, Islamic Da wah Party and National Democratic Accord Assembly (Tajamu' 
Al-Watani Al-Democrati Al-Iraqi) expressed anxiety over the way in which the whole 
affair was handled. Some parties hastened to denounce the call for the conference as 
suspect and even hostile. As expected, the JAC Damascus office directed the very 
few members of its London branch who were opposed to Vienna to publicly declare 
their dissociation from the conference. 439 In a press release, just six days before the 
meeting, those who remained loyal to the JAC Damascus office derided the project as 
"hasty and premature" and published a press release insisting that it was unwise to 
hold the conference under the then prevailing conditions and that more time was 
needed to "ripen the efforts" in order to ensure success. 
440 
Sa'ad Salih Jabr's Free Iraqi Council, which had originally welcomed the idea of the 
Vienna conference, also expressed anxiety over what he called the "JAC London 
branch's monopoly of all preparatory efforts for the conference". This, Jabr asserted 
ran counter to "the aspirations of the oppressed masses of the Iraqis, inside and 
outside Iraq". In a letter addressed to "the brethren, members of the Preparatory 
Committee", Jabr, speaking for the Council, called for a "wider involvement" of other 
movements as the Preparatory Committee was "of one colour". While it did not 
threaten to boycott the scheduled conference, the Council called for an urgent 
4391nterview with Mahmud At-Sheikh Radhi, pro-Syria Arab Ba'th Socialist Party Politbureau 
member in London on 1" September 1999. 
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"consultative meeting" in order to reconsider the question of representation and "put 
an end to the policy of creating facts on the ground and putting all opposition groups 
before a de facto situation". 441 
The Iraqi Communist Party on the other hand expressed "deep regret" that, in stead of 
consolidating opposition efforts to bring about political change in Iraq, the proposed 
Vienna conference would intensify ethnic and religious divisions not only among 
opposition parties but also among Iraqis at large, by upholding sectarian arguments 
which speak of Iraqis as Sunnis, Shi'as and Kurds. In a statement on the eve of the 
conference, Communist Party Political Bureau member Fawzi Kerim declared that 
the Communists would "have nothing to do with the Vienna conference" and that 
they would boycott its meetings. The only way in which Iraq "might be saved from 
the tyranny of Saddam Hussein's regime", the statement added, "is not to divide the 
Iraqis into Sunnis, Shi'as and Kurds but to acknowledge its four major forces: the 
democrats, the Arab nationalists, the Kurdish nationalists and the Islamists", 442 
Salah Omar Al-Ali's Tajammu' Al-Wifaq (Accord Assembly) denounced the 
conference as "it represents only a segment of the Iraqi opposition" which was not 
entitled to speak for all opposition groups. Salah Omar Al-Ali feared that the 
Conference might "endorse calls already heard in certain opposition quarters for 
negotiations with the Saddam Hussein regime". In its editorial, Al-Wifaq, organ of the 
Tajammzs' explained the Kurds' involvement in the conference by emphasizing that 
440JAC London Branch Press Release dated 10th June 1992. This is the last document bearing the name 
of JAC which ceased to exist following the 
Vienna conference 
441 Iraqi free Council Letter dated 7th April 1992. 
""Zlragl Communist Party, Statement by Comrade Fawzi Karim on the Vienna Conference (n. P., n, d) 
pp. 1-2; see also Al-Hayat Newspaper, 14th 
June 1992, p. 7. 
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their presence in Vienna did not mean "approval of the conference but a gesture 
indicating that the Kurds would not abandon opposition work". 443 
The Islamist groups also viewed the conference with apprehension and suspicion. The 
Da'wah Party leadership which remained silent as some of its cadres were engaged in 
a dialogue with the Preparatory Committee, finally decided to boycott the conference. 
However, since some of its members were interested in heading for Vienna, no 
official denunciation was published. 444 The Supreme Council of the Islamic 
Revolution in Iraq, on the other hand, toyed with the idea of accepting the invitation 
to Vienna only to decide against it later. No decision was taken until 9th June. 445 
Then, in a press release circulated in Beirut on 19t' June, Sheikh Abu Maitham Al- 
Saghir, spokesman for the Supreme Council, accused those who called for the 
conference of "playing into the hands of certain international powers which aim to 
create rifts and divisions among the opposition groups and also to prolong the life of 
Saddam Hussein's regime". In its statement, the Supreme Council asked rhetorically, 
"How can one expect success or tangible results out of a conference held in Vienna, 
situated as it is so far away from the fatherland? "446 Despite this denunciation 
however the SCIRI London office representative did appear in the halls of the 
conference. But the embarrassed Council immediately published a statement 
emphasizing that its representative, Dr. Muhammad Muhammad All (Abu Haider) 
had been asked to stay away from the conference and that he was sacked upon his 
443A1-Wifaq, 19' June 1992. 
'94 The Kuwaiti newspaper, Qabas, 19`h June 1992. 
445Interview with Muhammad Baqir A1-Hakim, Al-Hayat, 9t' June 1992. 
446AI-Hayat, 19th June 1992. 
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refusal to comply. His presence was therefore in his own personal capacity and had 
no bearing on the attitude of the leadership of SCIRI towards Vienna. 447 
The call for convening a conference in Vienna only came after the failure of the 
Damascus-based JAC to implement one of the Beirut conference recommendations 
which called for marshalling all anti-Saddam Hussein forces and rallying all 
opposition groups in a general conference to be held as soon as possible. The 
Damascus JAC's internal bickering and indecisiveness rendered it almost totally 
paralysed, making it lose grip on opposition forces. This was a major factor which 
drove the JAC London office to launch the Vienna initiative. JAC lacked, above all 
else, cohesion and unity of vision. Most of its members sought to serve their own 
narrow interests, be they personal, partisan, or sectarian. This ultimately led to a 
widening of the gulf separating opposition groups from each other. Furthermore, 
JAC's monopoly of, or attempts at controlling and dominating political opposition to 
the exclusion of all other opposition groupings estranged many political organisations 
and prompted them to search for loopholes and ways of breaking this monopoly. On 
the other hand, a number of weighty opposition figures who had been ignored and 
sidestepped by JAC Damascus office felt that one way of regaining their prestige or 
political standing was to move against Damascus-based JAC and discredit it. 
The Kurdish question however was among the most important factors which pushed 
the call for the Vienna conference forward. The Kurds who have repeatedly been at 
the forefront of opposition work saw in cooperating with those who called for the 
Vienna conference an important opportunity to apply pressure on the Baghdad regime 
44Interview with Dr. Muhammad Ali's sucessor as SCIltI in London, Dr Hamid Al-Bayati in London 
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which had entered into lengthy but inconclusive negotiations with them. 448 
Understandably, the Kurds would join any effort aimed at bringing them closer to 
realizing their national dreams in northern Iraq. On the other hand, organisers of the 
Vienna conference sough to enhance their profile and acquire an added international 
dimension through alliance with the Kurds, towards whom considerable attention was 
paid since the gassing of Halabcha and the mass exodus of the Kurds across the 
borders of Turkey and Iran immediately after the end of Gulf War. 
Rifts and Splits Among Opposition Parties 
The period from early 1991 to June 1992 witnessed the emergence of dozens of 
opposition groups hitherto unheard of. Over this short period, the number of groups 
including the Kurdish as well as the parties operating under the umbrella of the 
Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, rose from 20 to almost 100.449 
This however was a sign of weakness rather than strength. Many of these newly- 
formed groups included only "a handful of signatories who had no specific vision or 
programme for political change in Iraq, while other organisations were seen as 
business opportunities by political entrepreneurs". 45° With the increase in the number 
of new groups, this period also witnessed the eruption of rifts, secessions and 
division. This was accompanied by virulent attacks, counter attacks and smear 
campaigns in every direction. 
on 15`h March 1991. 
448Interview with Latif Rasheed, PUK London representative, in London on 17th January 2000. 
4491brahim Nawar, Al Mu'aradha Al Iraqiya Wa! Sira' Li-Isqat Saddam (Iraqi Opposition and the 
Struggle to Topple Saddam), (London: N Publications, 1993), p. 35. 
450lnterview with Ghassan Al-Attiya in London on 1" October 1999. 
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Al-Majlis Al-Iraqi Al-Hur (Free Iraqi Council) 
In order that we may understand the reasons behind the split of the Free Iraqi Council, 
it might be necessary to glance at the circumstances under which it was established. 
In this connection, the first thing to be remembered is that it was hurriedly formed 
while the second Gulf War was still raging. The first meeting of the founding 
Committee was held on 1& February 1991, almost three weeks after the beginning of 
the war against Iraq. The meeting was held at the residence of Sadiq Attiya. The 
invitation which was sent to almost a hundred Iraqi exiles in Britain was signed by 
Sa'ad Salioh Jabr, head of the now defunct Hizb Al-Umma AI-Jadid (New Nation's 
party) 451 During this meeting Sa'd Jabr declared the dissolution of his Nation's Party 
stressing that he was attending the meeting in his personal capacity and that he 
expected that those present who came from different political, social, ethnic and 
cultural backgrounds were doing the same. In a secret ballot, a central Committee, 
made up of 25 members chaired by Sa'd Jabr, was elected. 
Like all other political Iraqi. groupings in exile, the council stated as its most 
immediate objective the toppling of Saddam Hussein, "the cause of all catastrophes 
which had befallen Iraq and the region". 
452 Its manifesto also reiterated its 
commitment to democratic and constitutional rule, political plurality and free 
enterprise as the only means to salvage Iraq from its present quagmire. The Council is 
also on record as having confirmed its commitment to offering the Kurds the right to 
self-determination, within a "federal Iraq", an aim which has created a good deal of 
controversy among Iraqi unionists, both Arabs and Kurds 
as3 But instead of toiling to 
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achieve these aims, the Council soon fell prey to the now familiar affliction of 
internal division. 
Hardly a year after the creation of Al Majlis a number of the founding Committee 
members, headed by Sadiq Al-Attiyah, withdrew from Al Majlis. Among the first to 
leave was Hussein Al-Sadre, the Supreme Guide of the Council. Others soon 
followed, including the Oxford University professor emeritus Fakhri Shihaband ex- 
Brigadier Abdul Wahab Al-Amin, one of the early members of the Free Officers 
Movement which toppled the royal regime in 1958. On 4t' February Sadiq Al-Attiya 
issued a declaration signed by what he called the 'Provisional Leadership of the Free 
Iraqi Council" in which Sa'd Salih Jabr was dismissed by "the majority of the 
Founding Committee ". 454 
When Al-Attaya's attempt to oust Jabr, who controlled the finances and publications 
of the Council failed, he then hastened to form a rival organisation, called "Al-Majlis 
Al-Iraqi AI-Hurra Al-Hai'a Al-Ta'seesiyah" (Free Iraqi Council-Founding 
Committee). 455 He retained the original name of the Council adding only the two 
words: "Founding Committee", because most of those who rebelled against Jabr were 
co-founding members. It is still unclear what caused the rebellion. There are those 
who attribute the rift to differences over the management of the party's funds. Others 
speak of Jabr's alienation following various reports which accused him of financial 
irregularities and establishing contacts with certain elements suspected of maintaining 
451This is obviously an echo of Hizb Al-Umma (Nation's Party) which was created by Salih Jabr, 
Sa'ad's father. 
452The text of the party's manifesto, which was dated 10th February, was published in the London 
based A! -Sharq Al-awsat daily on 12'x' 
February 1991. 
453See paragraph six, under the section entitled, Aims of the manifesto. 
454"Provisional leadership of the Free Iraqi Council" decision dated 40' February 1992. 
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links with the regime of Saddam Hussein. 456 Jabr however denied all these allegations 
and downplayed the serious rift. He published a press release in which he referred 
only to the "regretful resignation of some colleagues". However he did indicate that 
the reason behind the "rebellion was that those who attacked me were sectarian Shi'as 
who did not take kindly to my secular and liberal views. Although a Shi'a myself I 
was accused of standing against the Shi'a cause". asp 
AI-Wifaq Al- Watani Al-Iraqi (Iraqi National Accord) 
The story of the rift which split the Wifaq group into two rival camps and pushed 
many of its original founders to dissociate themselves from the movement is not very 
different from that of the Council. The only difference is that Jabr disarmed his 
critics and adversaries by adopting a policy of gracious silence towards the rebels. 
His references to them in interviews and in the press were surprisingly civil and 
benign compared with those common in the political discourse of other groups, 
particularly that of the Wifaq. 
Al-Wifaq Al-Watani Al-Iraqi (Iraqi National Accord) was born on Saudi soil on 27th 
February 1991, although its official launch was in March 1991 in Beirut, during the 
first important gathering of the Iraqi opposition after the first Gulf War. The founding 
members were mainly ex-Ba'thist enthusiasts living in Europe, particularly in 
London, and some ex-officers living in Saudi Arabia. Chief among those who 
attended the Riyadh preparatory meetings were: the physician, Dr Ayad Allawi, the 
assThis group ceased to exist three months after its establishment. 
" 
456 Interview with Hazim AI-Sha'lan member of the Political Bureau of Al Majlis Al Iraqi Al-Hurr- 
Al-Hai'a Al-Ta'seesiyah (Free Iraqi Council- Founding Committee) in London on 15`h September 
1999. See also Nawar, Opposition, p. 36; Communique dated 21' January 1992 signed by the 
secessionist leader Sadiq Al-Attiya. 
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economist, Dr Salah Al-Sheikhli, the physician Dr Tahsin Mu'allah and one of 
Saddam Hussein's old cronies who was member of the highest ruling body in Ba'thist 
Iraq, the Revolution Command Council, Salah Omar Al-Ali who comes from Tikrit, 
birthplace of the Iraqi dictator. For the first few months, it appeared that the Wifaq 
was capable of mobilising serious opposition against Saddam Hussein, as its 
leadership comprised a number of veteran politicians and some foreign educated 
intellectuals and professionals. On account of the promise of change they projected, 
they enjoyed wide support from practically all regional powers. In its heyday, the 
movement's leaders were received by heads of state and government and were given 
VIP treatment in many countries in the Middle East. 458 
Although their Ba'thist origin served as a common denominator between most of 
them, it also carried with it some old rivalries and inherited differences. However, the 
youngest of the founding members, Ayad Allawi, was elected, by consensus, as the 
Secretary General of INA. 459 From the beginning, however, personal differences were 
apparent between Dr Allawi and Mr Al-Ali from the beginning. According to Dr 
Salah Al-Sheikhli, "suspicion ruled their relationship and they clashed almost every 
time the leadership held a meeting". 460 The strained relationship between the two men 
continued to deteriorate until 1e February 1992, when Salah Omar Al-Ali convened 
a meeting in Riyadh which was attended by some Iraqi dissidents living in Saudi 
457Interview with Sa'ad Salih Jabr in London on 20th September 1999. 
45slnterview with Salah Omar Al-Ali in London on November 20th 1999. 
459Baghdad, organ of Iraqi National Accord, 15th November 1991. 
41Interview with Dr Salah Al-Sheikhli in London on 15th October 1999. 
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Arabia, a few of whom, according to ex-Political Bureau Salah Al-Shaikhli, `were 
members of Iraqi National Accord". 461 
During that meeting, only one item was on the agenda: the proposal to dismiss Dr 
Allawi for alleged financial and administrative irregularities. The communique in 
which Dr Allawi's dismissal was contained cited "Allawi's involvement in sowing 
the seeds of sedition, division, hatred and discontent" among Iraqi refugees, his 
dissemination of "lies, fabrications and calumnies" and his refusal to abide by the 
"Wifaq rules of procedure" and persistence in imposing his will on the Executive 
Bureau. 462 On 13'' May 1992, Salah Al-Ali declared the establishment of a new group 
to be called Tajamu' Al-Wfaq AI-Watani Al-Dimocrati AI-Iraqi (Iraqi National 
Democratic Accord Assembly). 
Five days after his dismissal, Dr Ayad Allawi, however retaliated by declaring the 
dismissal order null and void and emphasizing in a press release on 17th February 
1992 that Mr Salah Al-Ali was suspended. Allawi continued publication of the 
weekly Baghdad and has retained the original name of Al-Wifaq Al-Watani Al-Iraqi 
(Iraqi National Accord) to this day. 463 
Al-Ali countered by launching a weekly publication called AI-Wrfaq, as the organ of 
the purged organisation. Ironically, this rift helped accelerate the convening of the 
Vienna Conference. The dismissed members hastened to contact a number of 
"Interview with Salah Al-Shaikhli on in London 15th October 1999. 
"Decision of the "Founding Committee" on 12th February 1992 published in Baghdad, the official 
organ of the Wifaq. Baghdad 
is registered in London in the name of Salah Al-Shaikhli and Ayad 
Allawi in their personal capacity. This is why Ayad allawi, the "dismissed" Secretary General 
managed to retain the right to continue its publication despite protests by Salah Al-Ali. 
463"Tas_hih" (Correction), Baghdad, 17`x' February 1992. 
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marginal opposition groups to round up support for a conference to be held in a 
Western capital, away from the influence of Syria, Iran or Saudi Arabia. 
Al-Da'wah Al-Islamiya (Islamic Call) 
Objecting to the mounting influence of Iran on the policies and attitudes of Al- 
Da'wah Party, a number of Party members decided on 11th December 1991 to leave 
the Party and create a movement of their own, called Harakat Kawadir Hizb Al- 
Da'wah AI Islamiya- Al-Iraq (Al-Da'wah Party Cadres' Movement-Iraq). Its aim was 
primarily to shake off any Iranian influence and concentrate on issues directly related 
to Iraq. ` 64 In other words, they sought to stress the Iraqi rather than the regional or 
international role in the efforts exerted to achieve political change in Iraq. They were 
especially opposed to the translation of Iranian slogans into Arabic and then adopting 
them as the Party's own. They also sought closer cooperation with other Iraqi 
opposition groups regardless of the Iranian attitude towards these groups. The new 
splinter group was led by Muhammad Abdul Jabbar who was the Information officer 
of the Da'wah Party in London. In their statement, which was released upon the 
launch of the Movement they called upon all patriotic Iraqi Islamists to reject any 
attempt to place the Islamic movement under Iranian custody. 
465 
One of the factors which helped the organisers of the Vienna conference bring 
together so many disparate elements of the Iraqi opposition was the disunity and 
intra-factional strife which pushed the newly created splinter groups to seek allies 
464Interview with the Movement's leader, Muhammad Abdul Jabbar in London on 4`s October 1999. 
"Statement on the occasion of the creation of the Cadres dated 11th December 1991. 
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under the banner of Vienna. Other groups hurried to Vienna to make their voice heard 
and enjoy recognition as political players in their own right. 466 
The Vienna Conference (16th -19th June 1992: Major Events) 
Except for- the two main Kurdish parties, the PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) and 
KDP (Kurdish Democratic Party), practically all major political parties boycotted the 
conference. ` 67 Nevertheless, those who called for the meeting succeeded in 
assembling 170 delegates, who came from numerous, Islamist, nationalist, democratic 
and liberal opposition groups. But they attended the conference in their personal 
capacity, not as representatives of their political movements. Those were not chosen 
at random but according to a fixed quota agreed by the Preparatory Committee. The 
quota reflected a tendency to put the secular parties on an equal footing with the Shi'a 
Islamists, who had more than the lion's share in the previous conference in Beirut and 
who were insisting on a bigger role in decision making. Chalabi however managed to 
convince the preparatory Committee of the need to avoid appearing as though the 
Islamists had the opposition movement under their control, especially after it became 
apparent that the United States did not favour an Islamist alternative to the regime of 
Saddam Hussein. 468 Following a heated debate as to who should get what percentage, 
an unwritten agreement was reached on the following quota: 
1. The Shi'a Islamist trend 35.3% 
2. Democrats, Liberals and Independents 35.3% 
3. The Kurds 23.5% 
4. Turkomans 5.8% 
469 
""Interview with Ahmed Chalabi in London on 11th September 1999. 
467Francke, Opposition, p. 172. 
""Interview with Majid Al-Yassiri on 1" December 1999. 
469lnterview with Head of Kawadir Hizb AI Da'wah (Al-Da'wah Party Cadres)Muhammad Abdul 
Jabbar in London on 15`h September 1999. 
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Immediately after the opening session, the specialised Committees formed out of 
delegates as well as some members of the Preparatory Committee started 
deliberations on the issues referred to them. These Committees were: 
1. The Constitutional Committee 
2. The Economic Committee 
3. Human Rights Committee 
4. Fieldwork Coordination Committee: 
a. Information sub-Committee 
b. Financial sub-Committee 
c. Research sub-Committee 
d. Public Relations sub-Conunittee 
The recommendations contained in the reports of these Committees stressed, among 
other things, the need to build a democratic Iraq based on equality and justice where 
the rights of all Iraqis: Arabs, Kurds, Turkomans and other minorities are protected 
by a new constitution to be promulgated upon removal of the regime of Saddam 
Hussein from power. The recommendations further stressed the need for the 
eradication of the racist and chauvinistic policies of "Arabization" and 
`Ba'thisization" of the Iraqi society. They called for a democratic and free election 
under international supervision to be held soon after the political change is effected. 
Great attention was paid to ex-Iraqi officers living in exile. These were considered 
valuable assets and every effort should be made to organize them and put their 
potentials at the service of the revolution against Saddam Hussein. As for the 
economic future of Iraq, the recommendations spoke of the need to reconsider the 
trade and industrial priorities in such a way as to provide remedial solutions to its 
battered economy. Rescheduling Iraq's massive foreign debts was considered of vital 
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importance. The need to transfer Iraq's frozen assets to the opposition and the 
Kurdish area was to be further investigated and discussed with the United Nations 
and the countries concerned. 
Numerous speeches were given at the conference. The opening address was given by 
Dr Ahmad Chalabi's cousin, Hassan Chalabi. After reiterating that it was necessary to 
"topple the regime of Saddam Hussein through the cooperation of the Iraqi people 
with its armed forces". Chalabi asked the conferees to "break the psychological 
barrier which had frightened them of using such terminologies as "self- 
determination", "federalism" and "autonomy" when discussing the future of Iraq". ago 
He also stressed the need for Iraqi opposition to coordinate their efforts with "Arab, 
regional and international powers in a spirit of trust and respect for common 
interests". He further emphasised the necessity for adopting a `well-balanced, 
reasonable and calm political discourse" so as to achieve a total break with the 
practices and policies of Saddam Hussein's Iraq. 471 
In his address to the conference, Muhammad Bahr Al-Ulum, a highly respected Shi'a 
scholar, lauded the March Intifada and called upon the international community to 
"support our effort to save Iraq from its present tyrannical rule and end the suffering 
of its masses". He also called for ending the UN imposed sanctions on Iraq and 
implementation of Resolution 668 which, among other things, deals with the 
necessity to respect human rights in Iraq. Like other speakers in the conference, he 
reiterated support for the safe havens in northern and southern Iraq, stressing at the 
470Address by Dr. Hassan Chalabi in Watha'iq Al Mu'tamar Al-Watani Al-Iraqi (Proceedings of the 
Iraqi National Congress Conference, Kenna 16` -19' June 1992(n. p., n. d. ), p. 120. 
471 Chalabi, "Address" in Proceedings, p. 121. 
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same time the need for the Iraqi opposition to speak with one voice. He expressed 
hope that the future of Iraq would be free from "sectarian and racist oppression". 472 
Among the significant speeches delivered in the conference was the hour long address 
of the Kurdish PUK leader Jalal Talibani, who vehemently attacked "the dictatorship 
of Saddam Hussein which constitutes the only real danger to the Iraqi people and its 
national unity". 473Talibani went on to stress that unless "this regime is toppled, its 
evils and atrocities will continue to plague Iraqis, Arabs, Kurds and other citizens as 
well as the whole region". Looking to the post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, Talibani called 
for the creation of a "democratic state built on freedom, equality, social justice and a 
truly independent Iraq founded on national unity and a constitutionally guaranteed 
right to self-determination for the Kurds within the framework of an independent and 
Democratic Iraq". 474 In his remarks on the future of Iraq Talibani looked back in 
anger at the modem history of Iraq and posed two questions: "What to do once we 
have toppled dictatorship and become free? What is the alternative? " He then asks 
rhetorically: 
Do we revert to the old Iraqi political structure which was forged by 
the British occupiers and which was readily accepted and revered by 
successive reactionary and dictatorial regimes? We utterly reject this 
structure which was based on injustice, despotism and the rule of a 
racist and sectarian minority which know no other means to run the 
affairs of the country except terrorism, dictatorship and the exercise of 
chauvinistic oppression against the Kurdish people ... and the 475 
sectarian oppression of our Shi'a brethren. 
472Babr Al-ülum, "Address" in, in Proceedings, p. 94. 
473Address by Mr Jalal Talibani in Proceedings, p. 98. 
1741bid., p. 106. 
4"Talibani's Address in Proceedings, p. 105. 
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Talibani stressed the fact that the Kurds, like their Arab compatriots in Iraq yearn to 
live within a unified Kurdish state, pointing out that it would be unfair to force the 
Kurds to live under conditions determined and dictated by others. 
Apart from his call for self-determination, Al-Talibani's address contained practically 
nothing new within the context of the political discourse of the opposition. His call 
upon the leadership of the Iraqi opposition forces to use Kurdistan as a base from 
which to launch operations against the regime of Saddam Hussein is not without 
significance. 476 It manifests a strong desire to acquire a more important role for the 
Kurds in deciding the future course of Iraq. Through this invitation Talibani also 
hoped to enlarge the profile of the Kurds and thus push forward the newly declared 
demand for a separate Kurdish entity within a federal Iraq. 
Unlike Talibani who unambiguously stressed the need for the creation of a federal 
Iraq, KDP leader Masoud Barzani, through his representative at the conference 
referred in general and vague terms to the need for what he called a "patriotic 
alternative to solve the Kurdish question". 
477 Hoshiar Zibari, who spoke for Masou'd 
Barzani's Kurdish Democratic Party reiterated the common and inseparable destiny 
of Arabs and Kurds, stressing the spirit of fraternity and partnership "within a unified 
,ý 478 democratic Iraq .j 
In his speech, Muhammad Al-Alousi, a Sunni Arab Islamist felt that the whole 
atmosphere of the conference smacked of ethnic (Kurdish) and sectarian (Shi'a) 
476Talibani's Address in Proceedings, p. 103. 
417Address by Hoshiar Zibari in Proceedings, p. 128. 
418Address by Zibari, Watha ? q, p. 127. 
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prejudice against the Sunni Arabs. 479 He therefore attempted to provide what he 
considered an objective and unbiased view of the regime of Saddam Hussein through 
his emphasis on the fact that Saddam Hussein did not target any specific sect, group 
or party, but oppressed all Iraqis regardless of their ethnic, cultural, social or religious 
background. Saddam Hussein massacred "Communists as well as Ba'thists, Sunnis as 
well as Shi'as, Arabs as well as Kurds, Jews and Christians as well as Muslims". 480 
Of the 170 who attended the Vienna gathering, a "national assembly", made up of 87 
members was created. Seventeen of them were chosen to sit on the "Executive 
Committee". These were: 
Muhsin Daza'ee KDP Kurd London & Kurdistan 
Hoshiar Zibari KDP Kurd London & Kurdistan 
Latif Rashid PUK Kurd London & Kurdistan 
Sadi Ahmad Pira PUK Kurd Austria & Kurdistan 
Muhd. Abdul Karim Islamist (I) Shi'a London 
Laith Kubbah Islamist (I) Shia London 
Akram Al-Hakim OIM Shia Syria 
Muhd. Al-Alousi IB Sunni Riyadh 
Aziz Aliyan UID Shi'a London 
San-d Azara MNR Shi'a London 
Salah Al-Shaikhli Wifaq Sunni London 
Muhd. Abdul Jabbar Da "wah Shi'a London 
Aziz Qadir Turkoman (I) Sunni London 
""Interview with Muhammad Al-Alousi in London on 20th August 1999. Al-Alousi pointed out that 
his speech, contained in 
a working paper submitted to the Secretariat was not included in the 
proceedings of the conference. 
480lnterview with Muhammad Al-Alousi in London on 20th August 1999. 
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Hussein Shalan I 
All Abd Al-Aziz IMK 
Ahmad Chalabi I 
Shi'a London & Riyadh 
Kurd London & Kurdistan 
Shi'a London 
Abdul Hossein Shababan I Shi'a Londonaal 
The Final Communique of the Vienna Conference 
The final communique of the Vienna gathering dealt with a number of issues at the 
forefront of which was the necessity to use all available means to topple of the regime 
of Saddam Hussein so as to put an end to "sectarian and racial discrimination" in Iraq 
and establish "the rule of law" which respects human rights and guarantees civil 
liberties to all Iraqis "regardless of their ethnic, religious or social background". 
The communique recognised the diversity of Iraq's ethnic, social and religious 
backgrounds. It called for total equality among all Iraqis recognising the rights of the 
Kurds to self-determination within a unified Iraq. The conference also called for 
"granting the rights of the Turkomans and Assyrians both culturally and 
administratively". The conference also stressed the need to end the "injustices from 
which the Shi'a Arab majority have been suffering". The participants hailed the 
democratic elections which had taken place in Iraqi Kurdistan deeming them a 
significant step towards the establishment of democratic rule in Iraq. Specific 
481DUK Democratic Union of Kurdistan 
I Independent 
IB Iraqi Bloc 
D&, - Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan 
KDP Kurdish Democratic Party 
MNR Movement for National Reform 
pIM Organisation of Islamic Movement 
UID Union of Iraqi Democrats 
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references were made to Iraq's war with Iran and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. These 
were blamed on "Saddam Hussein's recklessness and insistence on waging a war, the 
consequences of which were already known". 
From the time the idea of the Vienna conference was first broached until its 
conclusion, the procedures followed by the Preparatory Committee sometimes 
sacrificed democracy for expediency and consensus. In addition to a general 
assembly of 87, the conferees also elected an executive Committee of 25 charged 
with carrying out the recommendations of the general assembly. The main tasks of 
the general assembly were to: 
1. Deal in the name of the Iraqi people with the international community, 
particularly with neighbouring countries 
2. Seek to obtain the right to use the frozen assets of the Iraqi government 
forfinancial relief and liberation efforts 
3. Work towards the adoption of UN resolutions forbidding the Iraqi regime to use 
sophisticated heavy weapons to suppress the popular uprisings 
The communique paid the Iraqi Armed Forces considerable attention, pledging to 
restructure these forces in a such a way as to guarantee their respect of the 
constitution, dedication to building the nation and defending its soil, away from the 
course of conspiracies, aggression and narrow-minded loyalties. 
On the economic level the conference expressed its support of private enterprise, 
emphasising at the same time the role of the state in development process. While all 
attempts aimed at weakening the regime of Saddam Hussein were supported, the 
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continuation of the economic embargo of Iraq was a source of great concern, as its 
heavy burden is borne by the Iraqi masses. 
The Vienna Conference Assessed 
The Vienna Conference was the fruition of the efforts of the Preparatory Committee 
of the JAC London Branch which took upon itself to organise a broadly based 
gathering of opposition forces seeking to effect political change in Iraq. The fact that 
the conference did take place is, in itself, a great success given the complexities and 
inter-party rivalries, jealousies and deep suspicions among the opposition groups. 
Attendance was quite impressive, despite the boycott declared by most parties on the 
one hand and the Committee's insistence that conferees should abandon their partisan 
identity before they entered the conference hall, on- the other. Despite its 
shortcomings the conference furthermore provided organised opposition work with a 
political frame of reference, becoming at the same time, as it were, a foundation upon 
which future political organisational structure could be built. 
On the negative side, the Vienna Conference marginalised the role of political parties, 
concentrating instead on individuals. The conference moreover attached such great 
significance to the international factor, that the role of Iraqis in effecting political 
change was almost eclipsed. It was noticeable that Sunni Arabs were scantly 
represented. Marginalization of the Sunni role throws some suspicion on the 
orientation of the conference, as it ignores the political realities inside Iraq. It became 
apparent that the conference was consumed with the Kurdish and Shi' questions to 
the exclusion of the suffering of the Sunnis at the hands of the Saddam Hussein 
regime. The open support of the UN-imposed exclusion zones in northern and 
southern Iraq however was seen by many as a serious mistake, not just a public 
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relations blunder. This stance gave Iraqis and others in the region the impression that 
the partition of Iraq was not an alarmist fabrication of Saddam Hussein intended to 
rally internal support around him, but a real threat to Iraq's territorial integrity. 
The main objective of the organisers of the Vienna conference was to offer an 
alternative to the idle JAC Damascus office, which had become handicapped by the 
Syrian regime's political interests and inhibited by the wider inter-Arab and regional 
rivalries. The aim was to use a gathering in a European capital to build a new political 
structure. This would incorporate and embrace all the main trends of Iraqi society and 
develop a strong and united, rather than unified, opposition movement, which would 
share one common goal: the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime. It would enjoy 
the international community's support and be able to present a serious challenge to 
the regime in Baghdad. 
Thus, the hope was that the conference would be able to achieve rather an over- 
ambitious objective, and that the gathering could emerge and produce a credible 
substitute for the fragmented opposition movement whose leaders were, as the Beirut 
Conference attested, deeply divided, suspicious and acrimonious. Furthermore, the 
conference was based on the assumption that despite their different ideological 
orientations, religious and ethnic loyalties, those politically active individuals who 
were invited to participate in the conference would be able to disconnect themselves 
from their backgrounds and commitments to one political group or other and be 
assimilated into the new political structure. 
Certain organizers, namely Ahmad Chalabi, realised that the Iraqi opposition 
movement was a potentially viable movement with wide appeal, but seriously 
suffering from a leadership vacuum. He perceived the conference as a' golden 
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opportunity to present himself as an independent leader unconnected to any of the 
main ideological or ethnic groups. Chalabi's enthusiasm was displayed in his effort to 
organise and influence the conference, motivated by his broad personal ambition and a 
position underpinned by his impressive academic and business credentials, reputed 
personal wealth, reinforced by noticeable links with Western governments, particularly 
the United States. 
Preparations for the Salate Al-Din Conference 
Despite its many shortcomings, the Vienna conference managed to focus world 
attention on the political apparatus which came into being in the Austrian capital, 
INC. From Vienna onwards, it was possible to speak of the INC as a major umbrella 
organisation for opposition to the regime of Saddam Hussein. For it soon established 
offices in London, Salah Al-Din and Washington with an information network and, 
later on, created a broadcasting station. It also sponsored foreign tours for opposition 
figures and facilitated contacts between its members and the international community: 
Among the first tours to be organised by INC was that which both Kurdish leaders 
Barzani and Talibani to Washington in the second week of August 1992.482 Although 
details of the meetings with U. S. officials have not emerged, it is thought that the 
American administration had urged the opposition parties to present a united front if 
it sought international recognition. On his way home, Masoud Barzani stopped in 
Damascus to invite INC and non-INC members to meet in Kurdistan, in order to 
prepare for a second but broader-based gathering of the opposition. While in 
482Karniran Husni, "Al Dhaw' Ziyarat Wafd Mutamar Vienna Lilmuaradha Ila Washington"(In the 
lit of the Visit by the Opposition Vienna Conference Delegation to Washington", A1-Hayat, p. 7, 
August 1992. 
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Damascus Barzani discussed his initiative with the Syrians who indicated, as he later 
pointed out, "their full support to any effort exerted to unite Iraqi opposition". 483 
The reasons which prompted Barzani to engage himself so directly with the 
opposition which he had abandoned immediately after the Beirut conference are not 
difficult to discern. To the Kurds, the widely acclaimed INC, which had the backing 
of Washington and the West in general, provided new possibilities. The planned 
meeting on "national soil seemed a step forward from the Beirut and Vienna 
conferences. For the first time since the end of the second Gulf War, the opposition 
would meet on the Iraqi field of battle, away from the pressures and calculations of 
the regional and international powers. In reality however Kurdistan was a "U. S. 
protectorate" as it was and remains a "safe haven" protected albeit only from the air 
by U. S., British and, for some time, French planes. 
Iraqi Kurdistan: The Post-Gulf War Era 
The international U. S-led campaign to dislodge Saddam Hussein's troops from Iraqi- 
occupied Kuwait offered the Kurds new possibilities and revived old aspirations, as 
they had been fighting the regime of Saddam Hussein, long before the West could 
even see through the policies of the `Butcher of Baghdad". 484 Despite initial 
hesitation, many Kurds welcomed the Gulf War, believing it to "put an end to 
Saddam Hussein's dictatorship'4SS . Rebellion followed immediately after Saddam 
483 "Baraani Discusses Initiative to Unite Iraqi Opposition", Al-Hayat, 27th August 1992. 
4841H her TV interview with Saddam Hussein, excerpts from which were aired on June 20 1999 on 
ABC, an American broadcaster told President Saddam Hussein in Baghdad that Western media was 
beginning to portray him as a dictator calling him, among other things, the Butcher of Baghdad. 
Saddam Hussein scoffed at the idea, stressing all these accusations were lies. See Michael M. Gunter, 
The Kurdish Predicament in Iraq: A Political Analysis (London: St Martin's Press, 1999), p. 36. 
485Michael M. Gunter, The Kurds of Iraq: Tragedy and Hope (London: MacMillan, 1997), p. 50. 
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Hussein's defeat especially as the Kurdish leadership "became aware that the morale 
of the remaining units was low and that the numbers of deserters and of reservists 
who failed to report for duty was high". 486 For a variety of reasons, similar to those 
which had led to the failure of the southern Intifada, the rebellion collapsed after a 
dramatic initial success in which most of the Kurdish cities fell with unimaginable 
speed. It is now commonplace to speak of the huge territorial gains made by the 
Kurds as having little strategic importance as they could not be held against the better 
equipped and battle-hardened Iraqi troops, once they devoted their attention to this 
question. 487 
Saddam Hussein's response came much sooner than any had expected. Immediately 
after he crushed the Intifada in the south, his troops marched forward and speedily 
recaptured Iraqi Kurdistan in full view of the whole world which had been allied by 
its rejection of Saddam Hussein's regime. There were of course reasons for the 
indifference shown by the outside world to this development. Among a number of 
expedients and political considerations, Western fears that Iraq might be Balkanized 
and the possibility, perhaps even certainty, that intervention in support of the Kurdish 
cause might anger Turkey, Syria and Iran which also have Kurdish minorities, pushed 
the West to allow Saddam Hussein to retake the northern and north-eastern part of his 
country. 
486Anthony H. Cordesman and Ahmed S. Hashim, Iraq: Sanctions and Beyond (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1997), p. 76. 
487Gunter, Kurds, p. 52. 
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Mass Exodus 
Although the Kurdish resistance was expelled from the large cities of Kurdistan, it 
nevertheless succeeded in establishing a de facto autonomy for the Kurds in a large 
area, since even after Saddam Hussein's onslaught, Kurdish fighters continued to 
hold the mountainous area. 488 But Saddam Hussein who had been allowed by the 
U. S. -led allies to retain some if not most of his elite forces mainly to keep the Shi'a 
population of the south in check, used his tanks and artilleries ruthlessly against the 
Kurds in the north. Saddam Hussein's forces, now fighting against disorganised 
armed civilians and paramilitary units and not against the most formidable powers in 
the world, used all it could to defeat the Kurdish resistance and restore what was left 
of the reputation it lost in Safwan489. The crushed Kurdish rebellion had a tragic 
outcome: the fleeing by any means of hundreds of thousands of Kurds fearing the 
wrath of Saddam Hussein into the mountains along the Turkish and Iranian borders 
had "turned roadways into ribbons of humanity". During April and May 1991, `under 
some of the most despicable conditions imaginable, approximately 1.5 million Kurds 
had fled to Iran and another 450,000 to Turkey". 490 Many of the refugees from 
Kirkuk and other northern cities told Human Rights Middle East Watch that 
They had witnessed attacks by Iraqi helicopters on the columns of 
the fleeing Kurdish civilians, or reported passing refugees along 
the escape routes who had been wounded or killed in such attacks. 
Taken together, the testimonies suggested that they were not 
488Gunter, Kurds, p. 59. According to a Human Rights Watch report, the Kurds "control 16,000-square 
miles, roughly one-tenth of Iraq, and four fifths of the land claimed by Iraqi Kurds as their ancestral 
homeland. The zone includes two of Iraq's Governorates (Suleimaniyya and Duhuk), and much of a 
third (Arbil). Its current population of about three million inhabitants is almost entirely Kurdish, with 
small numbers of Turkomans and Christians (Assyrians, and Armenians)". See Endless Torment: The 
1991 Uprising In Iraq And Its Aftermath (New York: Human Rights Watch/Middle East, 1992), p. 12. 
4 The humiliating cease-fire conditions were signed in a tent, in place called Safwan along the Iraqi- 
Kuwaiti boarder. 
490Gunter, The Kurds, p. 84. 
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isolated events. There were also reports of attacks on refugees by 
tank fire. 491 
The political, economic and cultural impact of the Kurdish mass exodus to southern 
Turkey was so overwhelming that there were those in Turkey who thought the flow of 
refugees was "the sneakiest form of aggression" by Saddam Hussein. 492 Apart from 
the quite heavy financial cost of hosting hundreds of thousands of Kurdish refugees, 
Turkey was especially concerned that Iraqi Kurds might lend support to separatist 
Kurdish movement in Turkey led by the Communist Kurdish Party, Kurdistan 
Workers Party, better known as the PKK. It was for this reason that Turkish attitude 
towards the displaced Kurds of Iraq was ambivalent: hospitality, albeit lukewarm, 
towards the uninvited new comers and deep concern that they might overstay their 
welcome in which case Turkey's own Kurdish problem might be further complicated. 
The Kurdish Safe Haven 
Responding to the crisis, Turkish President Turgut Ozal, who once described Saddam 
Hussein to President George Bush as "the most dangerous man in the world", 493 
hastened to find a solution that might meet the humanitarian needs of the dislocated 
Kurds and at the same time spare Turkey the heavy economic and political burden the 
refugees' influx might entail. On April 15th 1991 "Operation Provide Comfort", which 
had received strong backing from United Kingdom Prime Minister John Major and 
French President Francois Mitterand, was launched. This Nato-led Operation, as it 
""Human Rights Watch, Endless Torment, p. 65. 
4 Gunter, The Kurds, p. 54. 
493Amatzia Barani, Building Toward Crisis: Saddam Hussein's Strategy For Survival (Washington, D. 
C.: Washington Institute For Near East Policy, 1998), p. 111. 
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soon emerged, was basically not "strictly a humanitarian gesture". 494 Its primary aim 
was "appeasing Turkey" rather than looking after the immediate humanitarian needs 
of the displaced Kurds. `Provide Comfort' soon transferred this role to the United 
495 Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). To provide a climate of 
security for the local populations and the international humanitarian personnel who 
were operating in a precarious environment, an "exclusion" or "no fly" zone was 
imposed on the areas lying north of the 36th parallel. 496 Regardless of the legality of 
the "Safe Haven", with all its connotations and implications of a humanitarian 
purpose, it was in many ways a pragmatic expedient which was not without some self- 
serving motives. This was particularly true of on the part of Turkey which strongly 
supported Operation Provide Comfort. Turkey's overriding concern was the fear that 
Iraqi Kurdistan might become a base for the PKK in its war against the Turkish 
authorities. 
Soon after Masoud Barzani's Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and Jalal Talibani's 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) established themselves as the uncontested 
masters of Iraqi Kurdistan, they approached Saddam Hussein in an attempt to reach a 
new autonomy deal. In negotiating with Saddam Hussein, the two leaders angered all 
non-Kurdish opposition groups which saw the Kurdish move as an act of betrayal. 
Furthermore the two leaders acted without the support or approval of the regional or 
a94David Wurmser, Tyranny'sAlly: America's Failure to Defeat Saddam Hussein (Washington, D. C. 
The AEI Press, 1999), p. 11. 
495Dlawcr Ala'Aldeen, "Playing by the Rules" in Franz Halliday, cd., Iraq Since The Gulf War 
(London: Zed Books, 1994), p. 234. See also Anthony N. Cordesman and Ahmed S. Hashim, Iraq: 
Sanctions and Beyond (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), p. 78. 
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international powers. 497 In a letter addressed to Masoud Barzani, Free Iraqi Council 
leader Saad Salih Jabr vehemently attacked the Kurdish move and called upon the 
Kurdish negotiators to reconsider their position, singling out the exchanges of kisses 
with Saddam Hussein when the blood of Iraqi people "has not yet dried", 498 
Regardless of the hype that accompanied these long protracted talks, both parties 
were merely buying time. Saddam Hussein was trying to regroup the remnants of his 
defeated army. The Kurds, on the other hand, were doing all they could to round up 
international support to their cause. It is significant that halfway through the 
negotiations with Saddam Hussein, Talibani embarked upon a seven-nation tour "to 
solicit support for the next phase of the struggle", leaving his partner whom he "fully 
authorized" to complete the dialogue with the Baghdad government. '" The 
negotiations however failed to meet the Kurdish demands. As a result, Saddam 
Hussein imposed an embargo on the Kurdish areas, withdrawing at the same time 
government officials and economic support . 
500 From then onwards Iraqi Kurdistan 
existed in a state of limbo, still part of Iraq yet under the political control of Kurdish 
parties and largely cut off from the rest of the country by an economic embargo 
imposed the Iraqi Government. 50' 
The situation in Kurdistan soon turned chaotic with Kurdish militias running their 
areas as personal fiefs. Despite the problems posed by corruption, need and insecurity 
496Muhammed Ahmad, Regional and International Influences on Iraqi Kurdistan: 1991-1996, 
Unpublished M. A. Thesis, University of London SOAS (1997), p. 37. 
" Ahmad, Influences, p. 39. 
498Gunter, Kurds, p. 62. See also Michael M. Gunter, The Kurdish Predicament in Iraq: A Political 
analysis (London: St Martin's 
Press, 1999), p. 28. 
499Gunter, Kurds, p. 72. 
S0° Ahmad, Influences, p. 38. 
50' Sarah Graham-Brown, Sanctioning Saddam: The Politics of Intervention in Iraq (London: I. B. 
Tauris, 1999), p. 213. 
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and contrary to what the Baghdad regime had expected, the impact of these 
developments which had resulted from the internal embargo hardened Kurdish 
resolve and in fact pushed them to seek another alternative: the election of a 
legislative council not simply to fill in an administrative vacuum, but to create a 
decision making centre and establish a constitutional and legal entity to act as the 
Kurdish northern government. 502 Some went further and hoped that the Kurds could 
"provide a democratic model for the rest of Iraq". 503 
Elections in Kurdistan 
To that end, and in the face of severe denunciations by Baghdad that the elections 
were an act high treason, the voting did take place on 19th May 1992. The results of 
the parliamentary voting, which was not seriously contested by. the participating 
parties, showed a slight edge for Al-Barzani's KDP over Talibani's PUK, with the 
former winning 50.22, the latter 49.78 percent of the vote. 5°4 To placate regional and 
international powers, both Al-Talabini and Barzani, who were different in their 
attitudes and approaches to solving problems, hastened to reiterate that they were not 
seeking full independence, but it is difficult to believe that they were not yearning to 
establish an independent state. 
505 
Since no decisive victory by either party was achieved in assembly seats, the two 
Gunter, Kurds, p. 89. 
503Falaq Al-Din Kakai, "The Kurdish Parliament, " in Fran Hazelton, ed, Iraq: Since the Gulf War 
(London: Zed Books, 1994), p. 119. 
504Gunter, Kurds, p. 92.. 
505 Interview with INC External Relations chairman, Hoshiar Zibari in London on 15th January 2000. 
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leaders agreed to put aside their differences and accept a joint leadership position 
with the KDP willingly ceding one of its assembly seats to the PUK. s06 To make up 
the government, a coalition formula was adopted: 
The head of parliament is a member of the KDP. The head 
of council of ministers (the prime minister) is a member of 
the PUK. Each has a deputy from the other party. The 
ministries were formed in a similar way: as a general rule, a 
minister from one party has a deputy from the other. There 
are also ministers from the Assyrian Democratic Movement 
and the Communist Party. 507 
Federation: A New Objective 
The success of the Kurdish Front in forming a coalition regional government on 19" 
May1992 came just a month before the Vienna Conference which both parties 
attended. Speaking from a relatively strong position and with a spirit of hope, the 
Kurdish Front asked their Arab opposition counterparts to recognise the Kurds' right 
to self-determination with the word `federalism' being floated about. The Front also 
demanded to receive some of the frozen Iraqi funds abroad. In effect the Kurds were 
seeking recognition of their "de facto government and state in the area of northern 
Iraq under their control". 
508 
To the dismay of a number of opposition groups, the Kurdish Parliament became 
even more vociferous about federalism, which it saw as the solution to the whole 
Kurdish problem. On 4t' October 1992, it issued a. communique in which it briefly 
506Ahmad, Influences, p. 40. 
507Teresa Thornhill, Sweet Tea nth Cardamom: A Journey Through Iraqi Kurdistan (London: Harper 
Collins, 1997), p. 211; Kakai, Parliament, p. 123. 
'Gunter, Kurds, p. 95. 
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surveyed the reasons behind depriving the ancient nation of "its legitimate right to 
independence". The Lausanne Treaty of 1923 had dashed Kurdish hopes for the 
independent state promised them by the Treaty of Sevres of 1920. Then came the 
successive revolts against the central governments in Baghdad, in response to their 
failure to abide by article 3 of the provisional constitution issued after the 14th July 
1958 revolution. Referring to the long suffering of the Kurds at the hands of the 
Saddam Hussein regime, the comunique pointed out that international sympathy for 
the Kurds was aroused only after TV footage of the mass exodus which followed the 
collapse of the March Intifada had been shown worldwide. The communique 
concludes with an historic recommendation: 
Exercising its duties and its rights to decide the destiny of Iraqi 
Kurdistan in accordance with international commitments and 
conventions, has agreed unanimously to specify the legal 
relationship with the central government of Iraq as one of 
federal union within a parliamentary, democratic Iraq based on 
a multi-party system and respect for human rights. 509 
The Shaglawa Exploratory Talks 
Following the formation of the INC in Vienna, which embraced a number of JAC 
powers and individuals including the Kurdish front, the JAC Damascus office 
practically ceased to function and soon disappeared from the political scene. 
However, the Preparatory Committee which the JAC Damascus office had entrusted 
with the task of organising a second conference made one last attempt at reviving the 
S09Jtalics mine. Text of the Kurdish Parliament Communique dated 50' October 1992, in Kakai, 
Parliament, p. 132. 
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JAC. It called upon the Vienna Conference members as well as a number of other 
opposition figures to attend an enlarged meeting to be held in Damascus in August 
1992. The response to the call was quite negative. With the collapse of this project, 
JAC ceased to exist, although its members who went their separate ways continued 
political work but under the banner of their own political groups. 
In August 1992 Masoud Barzani visited Damascus within the framework of an 
extended tour organised by the INC in order to enlist regional and international 
support for the Iraqi opposition. Having secured Damascus's blessing for holding a 
general conference in Kurdistan, Barzani met twice with members of the defunct 
JAC who had boycotted the Vienna conference and invited them to engage in a 
national dialogue with a view to promoting and enhancing coordination among 
opposition parties. To create a new mechanism acceptable to all prospective 
participants, it was agreed to create an "Opposition Dialogue Committee". It was 
made up of the following: 
1. Masoud Barzani* 510 
2. Jalal Talibani* 
3. Dr Kemal Fuad* 
4. Sami Abdul Rahman* 
5. Yaqoub Yousuf Yunadim 
6. Muhammad Bahr Al-Uloum* 
7. Ayad Allawi* 





Assyrian Democratic Movement 
Shi'a Religious Scholar 
National Accord 
Independent 
510Except for Barzani who delegated Hoshiar Zibari to represent him, the asterisks signify that relevant 
member had attended the Vienna conference. 
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9. Mahdi Al-Ubaidi 
10. Mubdir Al-Wayyis 
11. Gen. Hasan A1-Naqib* 
12. Ibrahim Al-Ja'fari 
13. Muhammad A1-Haidari* 
14. Muhsin Al-Husaini 
15. Abbas A1-Bayati 
16. Munawar Al-Habib 
17. Mudhaffar Arsalan* 
18. Rashid Al-Hadithi 
19. Shafiq AI-Qazzaz 
20. Rahim Ajeena 
Ba'th Party 
Socialist Party 
Independent Iraqi Group 
Al-Da'wah 
SCIRI 
Islamic Action Organisation 
Islamic Union of Iraqi Turkomans 
Supreme Council of Iraqi Tribes 
Turkoman Nationalist Party 
Accord Assembly 
Free Iraqi Council 
Iraqi Communist Party 
At the Shaglawa preparatory meeting, Masoud Barzani, who was speaking from a 
position of strength after his victory, albeit by a very small margin, in the Kurdish 
elections, welcomed the delegates and once again reiterated his wish to see all 
opposition parties united. Referring to the Beirut and Vienna conferences, which were 
boycotted by so many parties and movements, Barzani hoped that their present 
endeavour would be more successful as it sought to enlarge voluntary participation in 
organised opposition work . 
511 He then touched upon the situation in Kurdistan and 
pointed out that the Kurds had over a short period of time built their own democratic 
institutions, that the "autonomy" which they theoretically enjoyed under the Bath 
regime had become anachronistic and that it had become necessary for all freedom 
S' 'Text of address by Masoud Barzani at the Shaglawa preparatory meeting on 23`d September 1992. 
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lovers to recognise the Kurds' right to self-determination "Federalism will not 
partition Iraq and the Iraqis are capable of safeguarding their national unity". 
"' 
In the discussions which followed, Ahmad Chalabi stressed that he had accepted the 
invitation to attend because he was interested in broadening the base of INC, which 
had created a mechanism for opposition work. By way of indirect self- 
aggrandizement he further pointed out that through contacts initiated by INC, the 
United States, Britain and France had accepted to release one billion dollars of the 
frozen Iraqi funds abroad. He added that the south must be protected from the 
atrocities of Saddam Hussein and should therefore be declared a safe haven. 
513 
In his comments on what Chalabi had pointed out, Jalal Talibani agreed that "the 
Shi'as were being tortured" and that `eve should create the proper circumstances for 
them and enable them to receive humanitarian needs. There is a genocide going on in 
the south". 514 He then commented on the future relationship between Arabs and 
Kurds in Iraq and indicated that in the following few days, the Kurdish parliament 
would promulgate a constitution for Kurdistan which contains a specific reference to 
federation. Talibani asked those present to support the coming move or else `eve 
would not be able to deal with you". 
515 He then moved on to the thorny question of 
proportional representation. After a long heated debate in which each party was trying 
to inflate its power and popular base the following percentages were accepted: 
sizlnterview with Abdul Hussein Shaban in London on 2d Octobert 1999. 
513Interview with Mahmud AI-Sheikh Radhi, pro-Syrian Arab Ba'th Socialist Party Politbureau 
member in London on September 1' 1999. 
S14Ibid. 
sus Interview with Abdul Hussein Shaban on 2nd October 1999. 
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35% Islamists (33% Shi'a, 2% Sunnis) 
25% Kurds 
6% Turkomans 
16% Arab Nationalists 
3% Communists 
3% Assyrians and Christians 
4% Democrats 
4% Liberals 
4% Iraqi Tribes 516 
It was further agreed that: 
1. a general conference for Iraqi opposition be held in Kurdistan in October 1992 
2. the Arabic word `Muwahhad'(Unified) be added to the `Iraqi National Congress' 
although the English acronym INC should remain unaffected because it had 
gained wide circulation. 
3. the planned conference should establish three leadership bodies: the general 
assembly, the executive Committee and the presidential council 
4. that the general assembly of the planned conference should be made up of 174 
members: 87 new members plus the other 87 members of the Vienna conference 
general assembly 
516 Interview with Abdul Hussein Shaban, Secretary of the INC Executive Committee on 2"d October 
1999. T his agreement was never written or published. 
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5. a preparatory Committee should be formed to extend invitations and take charge 
of all arrangements necessary for the planned conference. The preparatory 
Committee should include: three members from the Islamists (Da'wah, SCIRI, 
Islamic Action Organisation), three from the Vienna Conference (Muhammad 
Bahr Al-Uloum, Ahmad Chalabi and Tahseen Mualla), two from the Kurdish 
Front, one Arab Nationalist and one Communist. 
At the conclusion of its five days meetings, the Dialogue Committee issued a final 
communique in which it emphasised its resolve to work towards creating a proper 
mechanism that would ensure coordination and full cooperation of all opposition 
groups working against the regime of Saddam Hussein. It also reiterated its total faith 
in democracy and respect for human rights as the only solution to Iraq's chronic 
tragedies. Reviewing the catastrophic circumstances under which the Iraqis had been 
made to live over the past twenty years, the final statement blamed the dictatorship of 
Saddam Hussein and his reckless policies which had resulted in untold miseries and 
sufferings for Iraqis from all walks of life, regardless of their ethnic or religious 
origin. 517 
The statement however singled out the Shi'as as being the main target of Saddam 
Hussein's wrath. A litany of crimes and atrocities against them was then recited with 
specific references to Saddam's crimes against "the holy shrines in Kerbala and 
Najaf'. It also appealed to the international public opinion to press for the declaration 
of the area below 32 ' parallel as a safe haven in the south and support any initiative 
517AI-Bayan Al-Khitami Li-Ijtima' Al-Mu'aradha Al-Iragia in Salah Al-Din and Shaqlawa (Final 
Communique of the Iraqi Opposition Meeting in Salah Al-Din and Shaglawa 23'd -2'71ö September 
1992), Al MalafAl Iraqi, October 1992, vol. 11, p. 1. 
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calling for protection of the peaceful Arab Shi'as in the central and southern parts of 
the country. The final statement further appealed to the UN Security Council not to 
lessen the ban imposed on the exports of Iraqi crude until and unless the regime of 
Saddam Hussein was in full compliance of UN Resolution 688, which among other 
things, demands that the Iraqi regime put an immediate end to the suppression of 
innocent civilians in Iraq. The statement further called upon the international 
organisation to allocate part of the frozen Iraqi funds to the humanitarian needs of the 
Iraqis in order to alleviate their suffering under embargo conditions. 
The principle of Arab-Kurdish fraternity was then touched upon. The right to self- 
determination should be guaranteed to the Kurds within a unified, independent and 
free Iraq. References to the Turkomans and Assyrians were made within the context 
of respect for all social, religious and ethnic groups whose equality should be 
protected in a new fair-principled constitution. The elections in Kurdistan were hailed 
as a harbinger of freedom and democracy in the new Iraq. The statements ends with 
an appeal to "members of the ruling party" in which they were enjoined to come back 
to the people's fold. All Iraqis `will embrace you with open arms, once you decide to 
. join the march for freedom" 
518 
Salah Al-Din Conference 
A month after the preparatory meetings in Shaglawa, 234 delegates representing 
almost all shades of the political spectrum in Iraq descended upon the Kurdish resort 
town of Salah Al-Din, meeting, for the first time, on Iraqi soil. Among the significant 
recommendations of the conference was the call upon the international community to 
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"develop the southern no-fly zone into a safe haven" to protect the Shi'as in the south. 
Rejecting accusations that the opposition was carrying out a partition agenda, the 
conferees stressed their support for the right to self-determination for the Kurds 
within the context of one indivisible Iraq. The conference also stressed its gratitude to 
the regional powers for supporting the Iraqi "patriotic movement". Specific 
references were made to Syria, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the Islamic Republic of 
Iran. 
The National Assembly membership was expanded to include all those who attended 
the conference who numbered 234. Ex-General Aref Abul Razaq, who had 
participated in five coups between 1958 and 1968 was named its Speaker. A 
presidential council was also created. This was made up of Muhammad Bahr Al- 
Uloum, a senior Shia scholar, Masoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdish Democratic 
party (KDP), and the Sunni ex-General Hasn Naqib, who had been living in exile 
since 1970 when he fell victim to one of the earliest purges of the armed forces. 
519 A 
twenty-six man "Executive Council" headed by no other than Ahmad Chalabi was 
also created. Its members were: 
1. Ayad Allawi 
2. Abdul Saftar Al-Duri 
3. Taub Shibib 
4. Hani Al-Fikaiki 
5. Aziz Alyan 





sis"Fib Communique", Al MalafAl Iraqi, p. 3. 
519This is council was, according to Ahmed Chalabi, modelled on the three-man Council of Presidency 
which acted as head of state throughout the 
Qassim regime. Like Qassim's "Council of Presidencvy", 
the newly created council included a Shi'a, a Kurd and a Sunni. Interview with Ahmed Chalabi in 
London on 2°d September 1999. 
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6. HiShi'ar Zibari Kurd (KDP)52° 
7. Sami Al-Askari Shi'a (Da'wah) 
8. Muhsin Dazaee Kurd (KDP) 
9. Ahmad Chalabi Shi'a (Ind. ) Chairman 
10. Kemal Fuad Kurd (PUK) 
11. Mudhaffar Arsalan Turkoman (NTP) 
12. Bayan Jabr Shi'a (SCIRI) 
13. Sarni Azara Shi'a (Reform Movement) 
14. Albert Yelda Assyrian (ADP) 
15. Latif Rashid Kurd (PUK) 
16. Ali Abdul Aziz Kurd (IMK) 
17. Humam Hammoudi Shi'a (SCIRI) 
18. Izzat Shabander Shi'a Q IM) 
19. Jassim Hussein Shi'a (Da'wah) 
20. Sami Abdul Rahman Kurd (KDP) 
21. Muhammad Abdul Jabbar Shi'a (Da'wah Cadres) 
22. Muhammad Muhammad Ali Shi'a (Independent Islamist) 
23. Falih Al-Samarra'ee Sunni (Iraqi Islamic Party) 
24. Abdul Hussein Shaban Shi'a (Ind. ) 
25. Abdul Razzaq AI-Safi Shi'a (Communist Party) 
26. Nizar Haidar Shi'a (IAO) 
520ADP Assyrian Democratic Party 
IAO Islamic Action Organisation 
IMK Islamic Movement in Kurdistan 
Ind Independent 
JIM Jund AI-Imam Movement 
KDP Kurdish Democratic Party 
PUK Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
NTP National Turkoman Party 
SCIRI Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq 
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To carry out the policies of the INC, a number of specialised Committees were 
created. These included: Relief Works, Economic, Information and Operational 
Resistance. The Relief Works Committee which was headed by All Tahsin Husseini. 
The Committee was primarily concerned with coordinating international relief 
activities throughout Iraq. The Economic Committee issued a blue print of its vision 
of post-Saddam Hussein Iraq in which it saw no other alternative to free enterprise as 
the solution to Iraq's down-trodden economy. The 23-member Information 
Committee was headed by Muhammad Abdul-Jabbar. Among its recommendation 
was the creation of a number of Information Bureaus in some regional and 
international capitals and the enhancement of contact between INC and world media 
as this might give Iraqi opposition much needed exposure. 
The Operational Resistance Committee, which included a number of Iraqi officers 
who had defected to the opposition camp at different times was entrusted with the 
task of soliciting military assistance from friendly and neighbourly states in the 
region. The Committee recommended that better use of the Iraqi military living in 
exile be made. One of its recommendations called upon the Gulf War international 
coalition to return seized Iraqi arms and equipment to the INC. The Committee also 
appealed to the United Nations to release some of the frozen Iraqi funds so as to 
enable INC to purchase much needed arms and munitions. 
521 
The final communique of the conference contained the now familiar condemnation of 
the repressive policies of the regime of Saddam Hussein and the necessity of working 
collectively towards the noble objective of toppling the Baghdad regime and the 
5211nterVieW with Resistance Committee member General T. Al-Yassiri in London, Oct. 120' 1999. 
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establishment of free and democratic rule in Iraq. Specific reference was made to the 
"Shi'a Arab majority" who were especially targeted by the regime of Saddam 
Hussein. The communique further stressed the need for recognising the Kurds' right 
to self-determination, considering federalism as a base for future relations between 
Arabs and Kurds in Iraq. 
Unlike the Vienna conference which was widely boycotted by all non-Kurdish 
parties, the Salah Al-Din gathering drew less criticism from the Iraqi opposition 
parties. Many of the parties which had sent delegates to Salah Al-Din voiced serious 
objections to the way in which the conference was administered or to the final 
communique, or to this aspect or that of the conference. Those who boycotted Salah 
Al-Din included: 
1. Arab Bath Socialist Party - Iraqi Command (based in Damascus) 
2. Iraqi Socialist Party (based in Damascus) 
3. Iraqi Socialist Movement (based in Damascus) 
4. Nasserite Unionist Assembly (based in Damascus) 
5. National Reconciliation Group (based in Damascus) 
6. Independent League (based in Damascus) 
7. Democratic Accord Assembly (based in London) 
8. Iraqi Democratic Assembly (based in London) 
9. Free Iraqi Council (based in London) 
10. National Democratic Islamic Assembly (based in Damascus) 
11. Imam A1-Khalisi's Office (based in Damascus) 
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The objections raised against Salah Al-Din were many and varied. Above all, the 
Arab nationalists saw in the proposed federalism for the Kurds a partition plan aimed 
at serving U. S. interests in the region. This objection received the blessings of Iran, 
Turkey and Syria as these three countries had sizeable Kurdish minorities and did not 
wish to be "contaminated by the virus of federalism". 522 Hardly a month had passed 
after the Salah Al-Din conference when the foreign ministers of the three countries 
met in Ankara to voice objection to the federal plan. 523 
Most parties also targeted procedural matters. and criticised the organisers' lack of 
transparency. Among other things, the organizers were accused of being ill-prepared 
on many counts and of resorting to undemocratic ways in drawing up the list of 
delegates. No agenda had been prepared and most of those who attended the 
conference did not know each other. The old objections to the quota allotted to 
prospective participants were also raised. Behind the scenes U. S. involvement was 
also a major source of criticism. 
524 
The Islamic Movement in Iraq, headed by Jawad Al-Khalisi, a member of a highly 
influential religious family in Kadhimiya, Baghdad, who is known for his 
encouragement of closer Sunnis-Shi'a cooperation, issued from his exile in Damascus 
a statement accusing those who went to Salah Al-Din of being puppets in the hands of 
the Americans. Its statement, which was entitled "About the Meetings Under the 
American Umbrella in Salah Al-Din", is indicative of the attitude of this Shia cleric 
whose family had actively worked against British interests in Iraq during the early 
522Abdul Hussein Shaban, Asifa Ala Bilad Al-Shams (A Storm Across the Land of the Sun) (Beirut: Dar 
A1-Kunouz A1-Adabiya, 1994), p. 221. 
523Shaban, Storm, p. 221. 
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stages of national rule. 525 Al-Tajamu' Al-Dimocrati AI-Iraqi (Iraqi Democrats 
Assembly) condemned the Salah Al-Din conference and deplored the press reports 
which had alleged that the Democrats had participated in the conference. Vigorously 
denying such an "unfounded lie", the unnamed spokesman for the Democrats called 
upon all other "opposition forces to reconsider their erroneous positions before it is 
too late". 526 Some Arab nationalists who had attended the Shaglawa meetings 
boycotted the Salah Al-Din conference. These include Mahdi Al-Obaidi and Mubdir 
Al-Wayyis and a number of Arab nationalists, ex-Ba'thists and independents who 
were mainly based in Damascus and operated under Syrian wings. 
When Syria realised that Salah Al-Din would be an extension of Vienna and that the 
United States was involved in the preparation and organisation of that gathering, it 
asked its proteges to fold camp and return to Damascus. In the Syrian capital, an 
urgent call was made for a conference embracing all Arab nationalists to be held in 
Damascus on 1e-15th October. The statement issued at the conclusion of the two- 
days meetings contains no criticism of the Salah Al-Din conference to which, indeed, 
they made no reference. It did however announce the formation of a Coordination 
Committee for Nationalist Action. The Committee included some well known 
nationalists who had served as cabinet members, senior diplomats as well as a number 
of high-ranking ex-military officers. Prominent among whom were: 
1. Wa'il Al-Hilali Arab Ba'th Socialist Party (Iraqi Command) 
2. Mahdi Al-Ubaidi Arab Ba'th Socialist Party (Iraqi Command) 
524interview with Salah Omar Al-Ali, leader of the National Democratic Accord Assembly in London 
on 20`h November 1999. 
suCommunique Text published in AI MalafAl Iraqi, vol. 12, December 1992, p. 5. 
Text of Democrats' statement inAI MalafAI Iraqi, p. 5. 
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3. Hamid Sultan Arab Ba'th Socialist Party (Iraqi Command) 
4. Fadhil Al-Ansari Arab Ba'th Socialist Party (Iraqi Command) 
5. Safa' Al-Falaki Arab Ba'th Socialist Party (Iraqi Command) 
6. Abdul Sattar Al-Douri Arab Ba'th Socialist Party (Iraqi Command) 
7. Adib Al-Jadir Arab Nationalist 
8. General Hasan Al-Naqib Independent Iraqi Commission 
9. Abdul-Ilah Al-Nasrawi Arab Socialist movement 
10. Sa'ad Al-Zubaidi Free Unionist Officers Movement 
11. Amir Ali Action Today Movement 
12. Muhsin Al-Uthari Arab Nationalist 
13. General abdul Amir Al-Ubaisi Arab Nationalist 
14. AI-Sheikh Radhi Mahmud Arab Ba'th Socialist Party (Iraq) 
15. Mubdir A1-Wayyis The Socialist Party of Iraq 
16. Nouri Al-Bahrani Nasserite Democratic Assembly 
17. Mahmud Shamsa Arab Nationalist. 527 
The Coordination Committee, however, was still-born. Apart from launching a little- 
read weekly bulletin called Al-Watan, which continued to be published in Damascus 
until late 1999, the Committee has had no other political activity. The representatives 
of Saad Salih Jabr's Free Iraq Council, Shafeeq Qazzaz and that of Salah Omar Al- 
Ali's National Democratic Accord Assembly, Rashid Al-Hadithi also withdrew from 
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the conference when they saw a "second Vienna" in Salah Al-Din. They strongly 
objected to the tendency to adopt federalism as a solution to the Kurdish question. 
Despite these withdrawals and condemnations, the Salah Al-Din conference remains 
a significant landmark in the development of Iraqi opposition to the regime of 
Saddam Hussein. It was the first important gathering which succeeded in bringing 
together the established as well as the new political parties, individuals as well as 
groups. The strategy adopted by the Salah Al-Din conference provoked the regional 
powers and raised serious suspicions about the orientation of its organisers. The direct 
involvement of the United States in Iraqi opposition, which was clearly indicated in 
the open support of American officialS528 as well as in statements by the chief 
spokesman of the Iraqi opposition leaders529 made regional powers fear that the 
American project, which, among other things, adopted federalism with the Kurds and 
the imposition of safe havens in the Kurdish and Shi'a parts of Iraq, aimed at 
partitioning Iraq along sectarian and ethnic lines. The formation of a three-man 
Presidential Council made up, as it was of a Sunni, a Shi'a and a Kurd made the Salah 
Al-Din conference smack of sectarianism. This orientation was rejected by all 
regional powers which also feared that the INC came to supplant the JAC, which had 
been operating under the patronage of these regional states. 
SZ'"Bayan Sadir Un Igtima' Mumathilin Un Al-Qiwa Al-Qawmiya Al-Arabiya Fi Al-Iraq" (Statement 
by Representatives of Arab Nationalist Powers in Iraq), AI MalafAl Iraqi, vol. 12, November 1992, p. 
4. 
5 The then Secretary of State, James Baker met with a delegation from the INC headed by Masoud 
Barazani, Ahmed Chalabi and Muhammad Bahr Al-Uloum immediately after the Vienna conference. 
The gesture was intended as recognition of the legitimacy of INC and also as an indication of approval 
and support. See Al-Safer newspaper, 22nd July 1992, p. 3. 
s'' In an interview with Al-Hayat newspaper, Chalabi justifies involving the U. S. in supporting INC 
by stressing that "dealing with the great powers, particularly the United States of America has become 
inevitable, especially as the ruinous adventures had made Washington an essential party in the Iraqi... 
question", A1-Hayat, 10th July, 1995, p. 4. 
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The Salah Al-Din Conference: An Assessment 
The year 1992 witnessed intensive attempts at creating an organisational structure to 
lead Iraqi opposition. During the second half of the year, two important gatherings 
were organised: the first was held in Vienna in June; the second on Iraqi soil, Salah 
Al-Din in September. These two conferences were held against a negative 
background which had been brought about by a number of factors. Especially 
significant were the activities and practices of the new opposition, which came into 
being after the invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. In order that the period in question 
may properly be assessed, a number of points must be emphasized: 
Leadership vacuum 
Unlike the Iranian experience, which had produced a unified opposition leadership 
embodied in Khomeini who coordinated domestic and exile opposition efforts to 
topple the regime of the Shah of Iran, the Iraqi opposition experience did not have a 
unified command or an individual with enough popularity, charisma or gravitas to 
lead or guide the opposition to shake the regime and oust Saddam Hussein. Two 
whole years of consultations, deliberations and meetings failed to produce a 
leadership with enough legitimacy and authority which qualified it to fill the vacuum. 
Rifts and Internal Squabbles 
Although the Iraqi opposition was by no means a model of unity and solidarity before 
the invasion of Kuwait, the period which followed the invasion witnessed 
unprecedented intense inner rebellions and plots, which showed that each group had 
placed its own agenda and sectarian, nationalist or regionall 
interests above the higher 
Iraqi national interests. In theory, the two conferences therefore aimed at finding 
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common ground on which a minimum agreement between the conflicting parties 
could be reached. 
International and Regional Support 
The two conferences sought to gain international recognition for the opposition 
movement and to steer it away from the conflicting interests of regional powers. The 
experience of the two years following the Gulf War showed that the opposition was 
seeking regional or international recognition in the form of political and material 
support from neighbouring countries such as Syria, Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia or 
from Western powers especially from the United States. The desire to project an 
image of independence was reflected in the choice of Vienna and Salah Al-Din as 
venues for the two conferences. The organisers of the two gatherings had hoped that 
geographical neutrality of the conference would reflect the free will and political 
independence of the opposition. 
Loss of Faith 
The two conferences were held against a background of widespread disappointment 
and despondence that no single political party and perhaps even the whole opposition, 
which claim to have a large following inside Iraq, could topple or even shake the 
regime of Saddam Hussein. Despite the painful blows meted out to the regime during 
the Gulf War and after, the opposition had practically done nothing to indicate that it 
could threaten the central government authority or influence the man in the street. No 
exile political organisation succeeded in exploiting the weaknesses of the regime 
during the Gulf War and in the period immediately after. This failure deprived all 
opposition parties of the opportunity to prove their legitimacy and credibility within 
the framework of the opposition itself and before the Iraqi people. 
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Chapter 6: Iraqi Opposition from the Salah Al-Din Conference to Saddam 
Hussein's Invasion of Arbil 
This chapter continues the discussion of post-Gulf War Iraqi opposition and 
concentrates on the successes and failures of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) in the 
effort to topple the regime of Saddam Hussein during the period following the Salah 
Al-Din Conference of October 1992 to August 1996, when Saddam Hussein's troops 
stormed Arbil, the regional capital of Kurdistan. Attention will be paid to the INC's 
successes and failures, its impact on the Iraqi scene and the public as well as public 
perceptions of this organization. The activities of the INC on the diplomatic and 
military fronts will be dealt with in some detail. Attention will also be given to INC's 
links with the outside world, especially with the United States, its main international 
backer. It is hoped that some light will be thrown on INC's perceived ties with the 
Central Intelligence Agency and on the impact of this perception on the INC as a 
whole and its Executive Council President, Ahmad Chalabi in particular. 
This chapter will also discuss the highly controversial question of INC funding, the 
wide divergence of views within the INC as well as the way in which the INC was 
run. The impact of Chalabi's highly centralized management, secrecy and 
recklessness on the mass defections of a number of political groups will also be 
analyzed. The chapter also touches upon the non-INC members, especially the 
Constitutional Monarchy movement, which was launched on 20th June 1993. It ends 
with an assessment of the performance of the INC on the national and international 
scene, where the role of the Shi'a Islamic groupings will be discussed. Special 
emphasis will be given to the impact of INC-Kurdish relations on the struggle against 
the regime of President Saddam Hussein. 
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Since its birth in Salah Al-Din, the INC attempted to establish itself as the main 
coordinating body for the Iraqi opposition. Given the history of the Iraqi opposition 
movement, such a task was immensely difficult to achieve. Small wonder then that 
the Iraqis (in general, and the old opposition parties in particular) coolly received the 
INC and viewed its creation with skepticism and doubt. However, desperate to get rid 
of the Baghdad regime and willing to stand behind any attempt which might help 
achieve that objective, many political groups and prominent dissidents cast asidesso 
their suspicions and responded favourably to the initiative of Ahmad Chalabi, the 
Iraqi financier who had been little known heretofore, despite his reputable and highly 
respectable family name. Many of those who attended the constituent conference in 
the Austrian capital had never met the man or known anything about his political 
background or history, except two things: first, Chalabi was a descendant of one of 
the wealthiest Baghdadi families and, second, he was involved in the much publicized 
scandal of the Jordan-based Petra Bank. Despite all that, they were willing to give the 
newly created body a chance. 
531 It was against this background that Chalabi sought to 
win the confidence and trust of the leaders of the long-established opposition parties. 
One of the earliest steps, which throws a positive light on the INC, was its decision to 
base its headquarters on Iraqi soil. This move, at least for a time, enhanced INC's 
credibility, not only among the Iraqis who came to view all foreign-based opposition 
groups as ineffective operators and lackeys, but also in international circles, which 
soon became more open to contacts with INC. 
532 From its base in the mountains of 
"°Rand Rahim Francke, "The Opposition", Iraq Since the Gulf War: Prospects for Democracy, ed, 
Fran Hazelton (London: Zed Books, 1994), 2"d ed., p. 171. 
"'interne, with Salah Omar Al-Ali, leader of the National Democratic Accord Assembly in London 
on 26th January 2000. 
532Sarah Graham-Brown, Sanctioning Saddam: The Politics of Intervention In Iraq (London: I. B. 
Tauris, 1999), p. 64. 
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Salah Al-Din in Kurdish northern Iraq, the new energized INC, aided by generous 
political and diplomatic U. S. support, soon embarked upon an ambitious but arduous 
project of gaining international recognition as the legitimate representative of Iraqi 
opposition. 
The much publicized inauguration of INC headquarters in Salah Al-Din, which sits 
high on the edge of the dramatically beautiful Zagros montain, was a highly festive 
event. For the INC "had taken over an entire hotel, decorating it with lurid posters 
depicting the imminent defeat of Saddami333 and invited dozens of supporters and 
well wishers representing a wide range of political schools of thought. The 
newcomers came fully equipped with technical staff who occupied many buildings: 
one to run INC's radio and TV services and one that produced its newspaper. "It was 
like a mini-state, fondly recalls one INC activist of those days". 534 
The move to Salah-Al-Din was welcomed not only by Iraqis in general but by most 
international circles, which had not forgotten Saddam Hussein's invasion of his 
"sisterly neighbour". It was especially hailed by the U. S. and Britain, which saw the 
move as creating a further opportunity for applying pressure on Saddam. To that end, 
Washington, which was practically behind its creation, did not begrudge the INC any 
necessary funds to help it function efficiently. Through the CIA, it began to channel 
funds to the INC to enable it to carry out its propaganda war against the Baghdad 
533Andrew Cockburn and Patrick Cockburn, Out of the Ashes: The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein 
(New York: Harper Collins, 1999), p. 173. 
5341bid., p. 173. 
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The February 1993 Conference 
On 1&-21" February 1993, the INC Executive Council held its first meeting since 
the October consultative meeting. This event, which turned out to be the most 
important of the INC regular gatherings in Salah Al-Din, was also attended by the 
three-man Presidential Council. Reiterating their resolve to continue the struggle 
against the regime of Saddam Hussein, the participants then formed a number of 
specialized Committees in order to follow up and report on the specific tasks assigned 












Iraqi National Accord 
PUK 
Sami Azara Al-Majoun 
Muhammad M. Ali 
Arab and Islamic Relations Ayad Allawi 
Financial Kemal Fuad 
Research and Studies Abdul-Razzaq Al-Safi 
Economic Mudgaffar arsalan 
Iraqi Communist Party 
Turkoman 
Information Muhammad Abdul-Jabbar Da *wah Party 
535Sarah Graham-Brown, Sanctioning Saddam: The Politics of Intervention In Iraq (London: I. B. 
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It was further agreed that Salah Al-Sheikhli, of the Wifaq (National Accord) group, 
act as official spokesman for the INC Executive Council. 
Another offshoot of the conference was the 25-member "Constitutional Council" 
which was formed to help the INC Executive Council carry out its policies. Eight 






Mustafa Jamal Al-Din 
Muwaffaq Fattuhi 
Falak Al-Din Kaka'ee 
Dara Sheikh Tawfeewq 
Iraqi National Accord 
Da'wah Party 
SCIRI 
Iraqi Communist Party 
Independent Islamist 
Iraqi Democratic Union 
KDP 
PUKs36 
The August 1993 Conference 
The third conference, which was attended by members of the INC Executive and 
Presidential Councils, took place in Salah Al-Din in the summer of 1993. Over a 
period of two weeks (July 21" - August 2°d) , the participants had ample time to 
discuss the performance of the INC during the previous six month's and to respond to 
Tauris, 1999), p. 116. 
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the numerous challenges, both on political and humanitarian levels, which were 
confronting the Iraqi people in general, and the popular opposition inside the country 
in particular. The impact of the UN embargo on Iraq took up much of the long 
Conference agenda. Other matters discussed included the outcome of foreign tours 
made by INC members to a number of regional and European states. 
While no call for the lifting of the embargo on Iraq was issued, a fact which was later 
to cause the INC much political trouble, the conference did however speak of "the 
untold miseries of the Iraqi people because of UN sanctions, which were hitting the 
masses quite hard". On the situation in the north, particularly along the Iranian- 
Kurdish border, which was witnessing a number of Iranian incursions into the 
Kurdish-controlled area, the INC took a somewhat mild stand. Instead of condemning 
it as an act of aggression against Iraq, it only referred to these military attacks, 
supposedly against Kurdish rebels based in Iraq, as "regrettable military operations in 
large areas in the provinces of Arbil and Suleimaniya". Mindful of the need to keep 
friendly relations with the outside world and in order to contain a volatile crisis, the 
INC soon decided to dispatch a delegation to the Islamic Republic of Iran to "encircle 
the problem in such a manner as to solidify the historical relations between the two 
countries and peoples and protect the sovereignty of the Iraqi Republic and safeguard 
the principles of good neighbourliness". 
537 
536 The remaining 17 were to be named at a later stage. Ex- Executive Council Secretary General 
Abdul Hussein Shaban points out that on account of differences as to who should be included, no 
the whole idea was abandoned. Interview with Abdul Hussein Shaban in agreement ent was 
Jrnuary 2000. 
537"Press Release on the Joint Session of INC Presidential and Executive Councils", Al MallafAl Iraqi 
(Iraqi File), 1993, vol. X, p. 18. 
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The political discourse of the INC was characterized by an emphasis on the necessity 
to rise above partisanship in the face of the common enemy. In order to continue 
efforts to establish itself as a credible authority, much of the conference time was 
devoted to the elusive question of opposition unity. While the idea of declaring a 
provisional government was briefly alluded to, its formation would have created deep 
rifts in the opposition. This became abundantly clear from the emphasis placed on the 
necessity to cooperate with all opposition parties, which were still operating 
independently outside the INC umbrella. This emphasis on unity however was, as it 
turned out, not genuine enough. It was, according to one significant participant, 
nothing but "a slogan for local and indeed international consumption". 
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The February 1994 Conference 
Unlike previous INC gatherings in Salah Al-Din, the third session took only five 
days, from 1" to 6t' February 1994. Disappointed by the fact that the Saddam Hussein 
regime was attracting less and less attention and by the perception that the need to 
topple him was not high enough on the agendas of the Western powers, the INC 
turned to UN resolutions relevant to Iraq to enlist the support of the international 
community. Much attention was devoted to the discussion of Resolution 688, which, 
among other things, demanded an end to the repressive policies of the regime. The 
final statement of the conference sought to remind the outside world of its obligations 
not necessarily towards the suffering Iraqi people, but towards its own resolutions. It 
once again reiterated the INC's resolve to topple the dictatorial regime of Saddam 
538lnterview with Ex-Executive Council Secretary General Abdul Hussein Shaban in London on St' 
January 2000. 
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Hussein and emphasized the need to develop good relations with neighbouring, Arab 
and Islamic states in such a manner as to strengthen the stand of Iraqi opposition. 
Attempting to enhance its popularity among the Shi'a population of Iraq as well as the 
Shi'a opposition groups, the INC reiterated its determination to ensure that the no-fly- 
zone, imposed by UN Security Council Resolution 688 on 50` April 1990339, was 
extended in such a way as to include all Iraqi airspace. It, furthermore, pledged to 
continue its drive for the establishment of a safe haven in the Shi'a populated south of 
Iraq. The action plan promulgated by the INC called for "exploiting the regional and 
international sympathy for our people so as to enhance the potentials of our people to 
fight against dictatorship and establish the alternative government of its choice". 54° 
This session coincided with an important tripartite meeting of the foreign ministers of 
Turkey, Iran and Syria in Ankara. While no details emerged from the ministerial 
meetings, the press release, issued at the conclusion of the Ankara gathering, pointed 
out that the three countries stressed the importance to regional and world peace of 
Iraq's territorial integrity. The INC welcomed the position adopted by the three 
countries and their call for the necessity to preserve Iraq's unity, although it saw in it a 
reiteration of the three countries' silent agreement on taking a firm stand against the 
realization of the Kurdish desire for independence. The INC statement dealt with this 
delicate question tactfully. It stressed the need "to see an end to the internal embargo 
imposed on the Kurdish region and the south" and indirectly criticized the three 
neighbours of Iraq for posing as guardians of Iraq's national unity. "We the Iraqis, 
5 Michael Gunter, The Kurdish Predicament in Iraq: A Political Analysis (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1999), p. 36. 
S't°sINC Final Statement on the Joint Executive and Presidential Councils in Salah Al-Din of February 
711994", Al MallafA1 Iraqi, vol. 27,1994, p. 15. 
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more than any other party, are more vigilant", said the final statement. 541 It further 
stressed that the territorial unity of Iraq was in no danger of being breached or 
saz fractured, except by Saddam Hussein's regime itself 
During this session, more new Committees were formed. These included: the 
International Affairs Committee, INC's Relations with Arab and Islamic States, 
Financial, Administrative and the 1994 Plan Committees. 543 
The June 1994 Conference 
The next INC session was held on 21" June 1994. This session was characterized by 
the absence of many key figures in the Presidential and Executive Councils, who 
stayed away from Salah Al-Din, either because they had withdrawn from the INC or 
as a protest against what they perceived as the high-handed manner in which Chalabi 
dealt with the opposition delegates. 
544 Those who attended session were compelled to 
dub their gathering a "consultative" session. The participants were: Masoud Barzani, 
General Hassan Al-Naqib and INC Executive Council President Dr Ahmad Chalabi. 
The final statement also referred to the attendance of some members of the General 
Assembly as well as a few of the Consultative Constitutional Council. 545 
In the statement released at the conclusion of the session, the Kurdish question 
figured prominently. A call was issued to the international community to "remedy the 
5411bid, pp. 15-16. 
5421bid., p. 15. 
543"Final statement of the INC Presidential and Executive Councils Joint session", Al MallafA1 Iraqi, 
vol. 12, pp. 15-16. 
5 Interview with Ex-INC Executive Council Secretary General, Abdul-Hussain Shaban in London on 
5th January 2000. Shaban quotes ex-Presidential Council member Bahr Al-Uloum as saying; "When I 
come over to the INC headquarters 
in Salah Al-Din I feel totally isolated from the rest of the world and 
that everything was dependent on Chalabi who is in full control of the INC coffers. Chalabi was quite 
reluctant to invite INC executives to meet 
lest they criticize him or call for new elections". 
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hardships experienced by the Kurdish people on account of the continued double- 
edged embargo imposed on the Kurdish region". 546 The statement further stressed the 
need for the Kurdish movement to hold a national conference devoted to the 
settlement of the most pressing issues facing Kurdistan. It also included an 
endorsement of the `federal option" as the best solution to the Iraqi crisis. 
It was clear from the final statement that the INC felt that the political wind was 
blowing against it. Profound concern was voiced over the "attempts made to end the 
isolation of the dictatorial regime by some states, which were only interested in 
making selfish and narrow-minded economic gains" . 
547The statement also included a 
rebuttal of the criticism directed against the INC, which had been accused, among 
other things, of inaction. It reiterated the importance of operations on the domestic 
front and expressed surprise at those who seek to belittle INC's achievements in this 
regard. 548 
INC's Media Activities 
Broadcasting Corporation 
The INC resorted to the media as a means to mobilize Iraqi and international opinion 
against the regime of Saddam Hussein, and to voice its own views on the situation in 
Iraq and also how best to tackle the question of effecting a long-overdue political 
545"INC Statement Assessing Situation", Al MallafAl Iraqi, vol. 31,1994, p. 13. 
546Ibid., p. 13. 
547Ibid., p. 13. INC Executive Council member Talib Shibeeb, points out that the embargo on the 
regime of Saddam Hussein was eroding adding that "Turkey and Russia are showing signs of tilting 
towards the Baghdad regime. Official and parliamentary delegations from France, Italy and Germany 
visited Iraq lately. On the other hand, the political stance of UN Security member states Spain and 
Brazil was vacillating'. See Talib Shibeeb, "Al-Azma Al-Iraqiya wa Al-Bahth an Hal Al-Mughaier" 
(The Iraqi crisis and the search for an alternative), AI-Hayat, 18th June 1994, p. 6. 
548INC Final Statement on the June 21' Session", Al MallafAl Iraqi, vol. 31,1994, p. 13. 
283 
change in Baghdad. Although characterized by adopting partisan positions and all 
that is related to the Iraqi question, the Broadcasting Corporation (Hafy'at Al-Irsal) 
did make an attempt, on occasion, to present objective news and analysis. S49 
This brainchild of the Baghdadi maverick banker, which was based in Iraqi 
Kurdistan, was owned and supervised directly by INC President Ahmad Chalabi, not 
the INC as an organization. 55° Officially, the Broadcasting Corporation falls within 
the domain supervised by the "Media Committee" chaired by Muhammad Abdul- 
Jabbar, who candidly admitted, "this Committee was absolutely powerless". "' But 
this was hardly a secret. Almost all INC members knew at the time that the 
Broadcasting Corporation was in fact a tool in the hands of Ahmad Chalabi who 
intended to use it in order to raise his own profile within the Iraqi community and to 
serve as a personal propaganda machine. Chalabi's propaganda strategy magnified 
and exaggerated INC's achievements and sought to present the united front of the 
Iraqi opposition under the INC banner. But he also attempted marginalise and 
belittle the part played by rival or opposition groups outside the INC. While it may 
have enhanced INC's reputation in the outside world, this opportunistic and 
propagandistic attitude was one of the factors which pushed numerous opposition 
figures and groups to quit cooperation with the INC, leading some to take hostile 
stands not only against it but also against its main backer, the United States. ss2 
549Interview with ex-Media Committee chairman Muhammad Abdul Jabbar in London on 4t' October 
1999. 
55olnteme, with Nabil AI-Musawi in London on 15th February 2000. According to Al-Musawi, the 
Broadcasting Corporation was the conduit through which U. S. funds were dispatched to the INC. 
"'Interview with Muhammad abdul-Jabbar in London on 4th October 1999. 
552 Ibid. 
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The Broadcasting Corporation transmitted news and comments over the radio for 
most of the evening (Baghdad time) at a rate of seven hours a day. Its reach 
extended to the whole Kurdish region, Baghdad and many parts of Western, central 
and southWestern provinces including the regions of Kerbala, Babil, Najaf, Wasit 
and Anbar. The INC also had a TV station, which transmited documentary 
programmes, news and analyses for an equal period of time each day. The INC TV 
channel's footprint however was limited to the Kurdish region and neighbouring 
areas. 553 
As far as print journalism was concerned, the INC published a weekly bulletin, 
which appeared simultaneously in two editions: the London edition and that of the 
northern region of Iraq. The Corporation's London Office housed the Press Bureau 
which supplied Western media, political, diplomatic and intelligence circles with 
INC progress reports, updates and press releases. 
INC's Official Organ : Al-Mutamar (The Congress): 
Besides the Broadcasting Corporation, Ahmad Chalabi and Salah AI-Sheikhli started 
Al Mu'tamar (The Congress), which was the official organ of the INC. This Arabic 
language newspaper was at first edited and distributed from London. But, quite 
rightly, Chalabi saw that Arabic language newspapers, distributed to Opposition 
exiles outside Iraq, would have no effect as far as INC's major aim, the replacement 
of the Saddam regime, was concerned. The head office ofAI Muatamar was therefore 
moved to northern Iraq, where it is still edited. From its headquarters in Salah-Al-Din, 
the INC began to publish AI Mu'tamar in full, with a special abridged edition 
553 Ibid 
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distributed outside Iraq. 554 No figures are available as to the volume of its 
circulation. It is thought however that it was not widely circulated within Iraq itself, 
as the "crime of criticizing the head of state", according to a 1989 law issued by the 
Revolution Command Council, Iraq's highest ruling body was "punishable by 
death". 555 
INC's Military Wing 
In attempting to effect political change in Iraq through military action, the INC did 
not have any specific plan or even a clear idea of how to topple the regime of Saddam 
Hussein. Within the INC, opinions as to what to do varied widely. There were those 
who called for the ousting of Saddam's regime through a coup. Others preferred an 
Iranian-style popular uprising, while still others preached Afghan-style guerrilla 
warfare. Then there were those who envisioned the end of Saddam Hussein's regime 
as a natural result of an alliance between armed marsh dwellers in the south, on the 
one hand, and northern-based INC and Kurdish forces, on the other. 556 
It was against this background that the military wing of the INC was created. 
Estimates as to the number of those who came to carry arms under the INC banner 
have not been confirmed. However, General Wafiq Al-Samarraee, who was to 
command the failed INC military project against Saddam Hussein in March 1995, 
stresses that it was made up of more than 500 men. This number however does not 
include the Kurdish ' Pesh Mergha" (troops) who were drawn from the two main 
Kurdish parties, the PUK and the KDP. ss7 
5541nterview with Salah AI-Shaikhli in London on 8`h February 2000 
s511nterView with General Wafiq Al-Samaraee in London on 14 March 2000 
"Interview with General Tawfeeq AI Yassiri in London on 14th February 2000. 
ss, lnterview with General Wafiq Al-Samaraee in London on 1'` March 2000. 
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The INC troops were mainly defectors and deserters between 18 and 40 years old. In 
addition to being trained in the use of light and medium weapons, they also received 
political instruction on the "abuses of Saddam" and the "meaning of democracy". 
Unmarried cadets were paid 1,000 Iraqi dinars, which was 
approximately two and a half times as much as Kurdish civil 
servants received. Food and medical services were provided 
without charge and a hospital had been set up in Shaqlawah. 
Given these benefits and financial woes of Saddam, many had 
been attracted for economic reasons. Others joined for 
ssa ideological ones. 
In establishing a military wing within the INC, Ahmad Chalabi was not only trying to 
provide "teeth" for the INC and help it persuade the U. S. administration to allocate 
financial help to the Iraqi opposition, but also seeking through this stratagem to 
consolidate his own hegemony over the INC. 
559 Washington however was not fully 
convinced of the feasibility of Chalabi's military project. However, Chalabi's 
enthusiasm may be explained by his belief that the only way to undermine Saddam 
was from below, by "sapping the dictator's power from a base in liberated Kurdistan" 
through such means as propaganda and the "encouragement of defections by officials 
of the regime and desertions among the army". 
560 But the American administration 
had a different idea: 
In November 1993, he [Chalabi] flew to Washington to 
unveil an ambitious plan to foment mutinies in ' army units 
around Iraq, which would eventually spread to Baghdad and 
topple Saddam. Addressing officials from the CIA, the State 
department, and the Pentagon..., he gave precise details of 
558Michael M. Gunter, The Kurdish Predicament in Iraq; A Political Analysis (New York St. Martin's 
Press, 1999), pp. 42-3. 
5591nteMew with General Wafiq Al-Samaraee in London on ld March 2000. 
56°Andrew and Patrick Cockburn, Out of the Ashes: The resurrection of Saddam Hussein (New York, 
Harper Collins, 1999), pp. 166. 
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the adventurous scheme and outlined the support he would 
need from the United States to carry it out. Then he flew 
home and waited for a response. There was none. 561 
INC Foreign Tours 
Soon after its creation, the INC started to dispatch envoys to many parts of the world 
including the United States, Europe and Arab states. It also sent delegations to 
United Nations sessions to lobby on specific points. One of the earliest INC tours 
was to Holland where a delegation made up of a number of Executive Council 
members met the Dutch Foreign Minister. 562 The suffering of the Shia in the south 
of Iraq was discussed and according to the delegation head, the Dutch Foreign 
Minister, "expressed support for the idea of deploying international observers in the 
southern parts of Iraq where the people were subjected to the authorities' 
» 563 suppression . 
A few days later another INC delegation headed by SCIRI Political Advisor 
Homam Hamoudi visited the British Foreign Ministry, where he met Douglas Hurd 
and some MPs. The British Foreign Ministry condemned the evil practices of the 
Iraqi regime and "pledged to bring the question of southern Iraq to the attention of 
Prime Minister John Major". 564 
An indication of the warm reception accorded to the INC delegates is given by the 
fact that the Iraqi envoys were received by the highest statesmen of the countries 
visited. In the United States, for example, the INC delegation, which was made up of 
56V1bid., p. 167. 
5 Wafd Min Al-Muaradha A1-Iragiya Yujri Muhadathat Fi Holanda" (Iraqi Opposition Delegation 
Hold Talks in Holland), Al-Hayat, May 5th1993, p. 3. 
5631bid. 
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Executive Council member Muhammad Bahr Al-Uloum, General Hasan Al-Naqib, 
KDP's leader Mas'oud Barzani, Jalal Talbani, PUK's leader met Vice-President Al 
Gore, Secretary of State Warren Christopher and other top officials including the 
National Security Advisor. According to INC accounts of the meetings, "all 
American officials stressed that there would be no dialogue, softening of attitude, 
normalization or any dealings of any sort with [Saddam Hussein]". 565 
INC's Visit to Kuwait: A Divisive Element 
On 20th November 1993, an INC delegation made up of a number of INC's 
Executive Council members headed by Ahmad Chalabi, began an official week-long 
visit to Kuwait. The delegates were met by the Emir of Kuwait, Sheikh Jabir Ahmad 
Al-Sabah, Crown Prince Sheikh Sa'd Al-Sabah, Deputy Premier and Foreign 
Minister Sabah Al-Jabir Al-Sabah as well as a number of MPs and policy makers. 
The delegates expressed full support of UN resolutions on Iraq and Kuwait and 
reiterated INC's respect for the sovereignty and independence of Kuwait as a 
member of the League of Arab States and the United Nations. The delegates also 
expressed their firm belief "that there would be no peace between Iraq and Kuwait 
as long as Saddam Hussein remained in powee,. s" 
The visit to Kuwait proved quite controversial. Even before it took place, it had 
triggered a violent wave of criticism. While no objection was raised to INC's 
intention of attempting to have access to Kuwaiti media in order to be better 
equipped to highlight INC's role and broadcast Iraqi opposition's stances on national 
564"Hurd Yaltaqi Wafdan Min Al-Muaradha Al-Islamiya Al-Iraqi" (Hurd Meets Delegation 
Reresenting Iraqi Islamic Opposition), A1-Hayat, May 13th, p. 4. 
56 INC: New U. S. Policy Assessed", Al Ma11afA1 Iraqi, vol. 17,1993, p. 11. 
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and regional developments, many political groups and personalities resented INC's 
"intention of seeking to obtain $500m in financial support" and INC's declared 
ratification of the newly established demarcation lines of the Iraqi-Kuwaiti borders 
which they felt had been forced upon defeated Iraq through UN Resolution 723. 
Saad Jabr's Free Iraqi Council, for one, issued on 14th November 1993 a press 
release in which he denounced INC's declared willingness to embrace the situation 
on the ground as "hasty and irresponsible", especially as neither the INC nor any 
opposition party had any `mandate from the Iraqi people to speak on its behalf on 
this highly delicate question which should be decided by a freely elected 
government in Iraq". 567 
The negative impact of the Kuwaiti visit cannot be exaggerated. A wide range of 
groupings and individuals representing all shades of the Iraqi political spectrum 
hastened to voice their condemnation and utter rejection of what proved a highly 
unpopular move. Among other things, the visit reminded many in Iraq of the now 
defunct bargain which had been struck in 1963 between a delegation representing 
the short-lived first Ba'thist regime in Iraq and the state of Kuwait. 5 
One of the strongest condemnations came from a group of 90 Iraqi dissidents 
comprised of academics, intellectuals, professionals, artists and journalists living in 
-"Statement on INC's visit to Kuwait", AI MallafAl Iraqi, vol. 24,1993, p. 5. 
m'"AI Majlis Al-Iraqi Al-Hur Yentagid Ziarat Wafd A1-Mu'tamar Lil-Kuwait" The free Iraqi council 
Criticizes the INC's Visit to Kuwait", Al MallafAl Iraqi, vol. 24,1993, p. 5. 
S611It is now an open secret that Kuwait was a venue of "the more important meetings" between the 
Bath Party and representatives of CIA, which was widely seen as having put its weight behind the 
Ba'thists who sought to and eventually succeeded in toppling the regime of General Qassim. See Hana 
Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton U. P., 1978), p. 985. 
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exile, mainly in Europe. In their statement, the signatories accused the INC of 
seeking to profiteer at the expense of the Iraqi people: 
The great powers have no right to chop off a part of Iraq 
and then re-demarcate the borders in order to serve their 
oil interests in the region and deprive Iraq access to the 
sea. The legal and proper way of tackling this question is 
through negotiations between two legitimate 
governments in Iraq and Kuwait. The outcome of such 
negotiations should then be ratified by a directly elected 
legislative council in Iraq and the Kuwaiti Parliament. If 
differences arise then the matter must be referred to the 
International court of Justice in the Hague. We therefore 
appeal to all Iraqis to abort these designs and undermine 
any scheme aimed at usurping Iraq's rights and 
sovereignty. 569 
Another angry reaction came from the Islamic Movement in Iraq. The movement's 
London Office issued a statement containing a scathing attack on the INC, accusing 
it of playing with fire. It reminded those involved in negotiations with the Kuwaitis 
that neither they nor any party other than a democratically elected government had 
the right to decide such a "question of destiny". It also rejected INC's claim that it 
embodied the hopes and aspirations of all Iraqis, stressing that the Iraqis will never 
abide by any agreements which may have been reached. 
570 
An indication of the immense suspicion with which many Iraqis viewed the Kuwait 
visit may be seen in the fact that even INC Secretary General, Abdul-Hussein 
Shaban criticized, albeit indirectly, the attempts made by INC to use the question of 
'69 "Bayan Sadir an Majmoua Iraqiya Mu'aridha Li-Qarar Tarsim Al-Hudud Bain Al-Iraq Wa Al- 
Kuwait- (An Appeal by an Iraqi Group Opposed to the Re-Demarcation of Borders Between Iraq and 
Kuwait), Al MallafAI Iraqi, November 1993, vol. 23, pp. 3-4. 
570 press Release dated 18th November 1993, signed by Muhammad Jawad Al-Kadhimi and 
Muhammad Mahdi Al-Khalisi for the AI-Tajammu' AI Islams Al-Watani Al-Dimocrati (Democratic 
Patriotic Islamic assembly) and Abut Amir Alwan for Iraqi Islamic Party. 
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Iraqi-Kuwaiti border demarcations as a means to extract maximum financial profit. 
In response to a question put to him by the editor of Sawt AI-Iraq (Voice of Iraq), 
organ of Da'wah Party, about INC's policies, Shaban stressed that "there were some 
[within INC] who lean towards accepting the [UN] demarcation resolutions in return 
for money, a `handful of silver' and some media and political support. He also 
indicated that the border issue was "too important and sensitive an issue" to be dealt 
with by the opposition, especially as the two sides, Kuwait and the INC are not 
equal. sn 
It became quite clear from the outset that the INC foreign tours were planned and 
organised by INC Executive Council president Ahmad Chalabi `who did not even 
take the trouble to inform the chairman of the External Relations Committee". $72 
Furthermore, the process of selecting the INC emissaries was monopolized by 
Chalabi. What angered many even inside the INC was the fact that preparations for 
foreign tours were made solely through Chalabi's own office which paid for all 
expenses incurred by these foreign tours. 
573 These early signs of Chalabi's personal 
hegemony came to alienate many of the opposition groups, which later felt compelled 
to sever relations with the INC. 
Despite the validity of much of this criticism, the fact remains that the energetic 
Chalabi felt that the INC envoys were either too slow to act or lacked enthusism for 
sn KHiwar Maa AI-Diktawr Abdul Hussein Shaban Amin Srr Al -Maifis Al Tanfithi Lil- Mutamar Al- 
Watani Al-Iraqi" (Interview with Dr Abdul Hussein Shaban, Secretary General of INC Executive 
Council), SawtA! Iraq, 1" December 1993, pp. 1-4. 
372Interview with INC External Relations chairman, Hoshiar Zibari in London on 15th January 2000. 
573Interview with INC Presidential Council member, Muhammad Bahr Al-Uloum in London on 5 th 
September 1999. 
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the INC cause, preferring to advance their own partisan arguments abroad. 574 When 
the INC had to choose representatives to Europe, Chalabi asserts that " Hoshyar 
Zibari, who was officially responsible for relations with Europe, refused to go, and 
had to be replaced by Nabil Musawi". 575 Blaming others for the malfunction of the 
INC, Chalabi further points out that: 
Ayad Allawi who had been nominated as officially responsible 
for INC relations with Arab and Islamic countries, decided not 
to participate in the INC visit to Saudi Arabia, and was very 
busy travelling elsewhere and working on Wifaq (INC) 
business. Salah Al-Shaikhli found it difficult to act as 
coordinating spokesman for the INC since other INC members 
would make separate statements to the media. Furthermore 
Ayad Allawi made it plain on several occasions that there 
should be an inner caucus of the effective movements within the 
INC who should manage INC affairs. 576 
INC Finances 
The question of INC finances was, from the start, viewed with suspicion by large 
segments of Iraqi opposition parties, including some operating under INC's own 
umbrella. Speculations and generally circulated stories about U. S. funding of the 
INC were rife from the day the INC was established. The INC however is partly to 
blame for this highly damaging reputation which made it look like it was nothing but 
514When Sheikh Sami Al-Maajoun was slow in getting down to work on the Constitution, Ahmad 
Chalabi had written, speedily and efficiently, by lawyers whom he employed. Interview with INC 
Presidential Council member, Muhammad Bahr Al-Uloum in London on 5t' September 1999. 
snlnterview with INC Executive Council President Ahmad Chalabi in London on 1111 September 
1999. 
5161bid "Ideally", Chalabi quotes Allawi as having suggested that "the proposed caucus should 
include: Ahmad Chalabi, Wifaq, KDP, PDK and SC1RP'. 
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"a creature of the West and as a front which the West supported only because it 
suited Western designs for Iraq". 577 
To make matters worse, the INC was, in its publications and media interviews 
making much of the impact U. S. financial aid had on expelling the Soviets from 
Afghanistan. Furthermore, the INC did not hide its intention of seeking foreign aid 
from whichever quarter it came. In September 1993, AI Mallaf Al-Iraqi published 
the minutes of the INC Executive council in which its members spent much of the 
session, which had originally been devoted to the discussion and appraisal of INC's 
visit to Washington, on how best to approach Kuwait and obtain half a billion U. S. 
dollars in return for endorsing the new demarcation lines along the Iraqi-Kuwaiti 
borders. 578 Even the Iraqi Communists, traditionally the most vigorous opponents 
and bitter enemies of the Gulf States were enthusiastic about the visit. Their 
representative at INC, Amir Abdullah, longtime Secretary General of the 
Communist Party, continued to push for obtaining the $500m as a loan to "be 
debited to the future government of Iraq". 579 
Up until now, details of who was financing the INC have until now been puzzling and 
murky. Rumours and accusations of corruption and profiteering multiplied when the 
571Anthony H Cordesman and Ahmed S. Hashim, Iraq: Sanctions and Beyond (Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), p. 65. David Wurmser stresses the fact that some members of the 
CIA and the Clinton administration "had envisioned the INC as a public relations tool to weaken and 
distract the regime; they had never intended it to create a real insurgency or to perform in the main 
theatre of operations in the plan to get rid of Saddam. Some feared that if the rebellion went awry it 
could embroil the United States directly, others held that it could lead to the dissolution of Iraq, or to a 
broad-based revolution and consequently anarchy, if it succeeded. At any rate, all agreed that the INC's 
activity threatened the Sunni core of the current regime in Baghdad, from which they hoped a coup 
would still come". See David Wurmser, Tyranny's Ally: America's Failure to Defeat Saddam Hussein 
(Washington, D. C: The American Enterprise Institute Press, 1999), p. 15. 




three members of the tripartite Presidential Council, the INC's highest policy-making 
body said on separate occasions that they did not know where the funds came from 
and that such a "question is for [Chalabi]. He has the details". 580 Following a most 
important meeting in the American capital with the then Secretary of State 
Christopher Warren and Vice President Al Gore in the spring of 1993, Muhammad 
Bahr Al-Uloum, one of the three members of the INC's presidential council, added to 
these uncertainties when he declared: 
Neither I nor any member of the INC leadership has any 
knowledge of any U. S. funds paid to the INC to this day. He 
then claimed, however, that the United States had already 
matched the $50 million contributed by some Arab states and 
some Iraqi financiers. The perceived need for secrecy and Al- 
Uloum's inexperience in dealing with covert U. S. support 
probably explain his incoherence on this matter. Further 
remarks by Al-Uloum indicated that before the spring of 1993, 
certain Iraqis in opposition to Saddam had squandered more 
than $40 million given them by the United States. 58' 
The situation was not helped when a leading American newspaper stressed on 12th 
April 1995 that the CIA had been involved in covert activities aimed at unseating the 
regime of Saddam Hussein since 1991 and that, among other things, the Clinton 
administration scaled down its contribution from $40 million in 1992 to less than 
$20 million because no tangible results had been achieved by the INC. 582 Against 
this tide of mounting negative information, which was detrimental to the reputation 
and standing of Iraqi opposition, the INC had to respond. Whilst Chalabi was in 
Kurdistan, he instructed the INC's London office to refute these "allegations and 
580Interview with Muhammad Bahr Al-Uloum in London on 5th September 1999. See also Michael A. 
Gunter, The Kurdish Predicament: A Political Analysis (New York: St Martin's Press, 1999), p. 44. 
58Vbid., p. 44. 
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subversive and hostile propaganda exercises". On 28th April 1995, an INC statement 
was distributed to the press, categorically denying receipt of funds from any source, 
local, regional or foreign: 
On 11th April [1995] The New York Times, published a totally 
unfounded story claiming that the Central Intelligence Agency had 
asked Congress to earmark $150m for certain parties in the Iraqi 
opposition including the INC in order to disrupt and unsettle the 
regime of Saddam Hussein. The newspaper also claimed that the 
Agency had in 1992 allocated $40m to weaken the Iraqi President, 
that it later reduced this amount to $20m and that the INC was 
among those opposition groups which were receiving funds from 
that establishment. These details were said by the lady reporter to 
have been supplied by the U. S. administration. 
The INC utterly denies receipt of any funds from any American, 
foreign or Arab government, and stresses that these fabrications are 
totally untrue. The INC also declares that the Executive Council 
has decided to demand that the newspaper publish the names of the 
parties alleged to have received any such funds. We reiterate that 
all members of the INC Presidential and Executive Councils work 
for free on voluntary bases, prompted by their patriotic 
commitments and sense of responsibility towards their own 
people. 583 
But such refutations did little or nothing to alleviate the suspicion with which even 
members of INC's own leadership viewed INC funding. In withdrawing from the 
INC, the Communist Party cast aspersions on the way in which the INC finances 
were administered: 
One of the negative aspects of INC's operations is its 
financial policies. There is no clear budget or balance sheet 
showing the sources of INC's finances. There is furthermore 
no specific body or Committee responsible for INC's 
spending. This situation places the INC under all sorts of 
582E. Sciolino, "CIA Asks Congress for $19 Million to Undermine Iraq's Rulers and Rein In Iran", 
New York Times, 12u' April 1995, p. 4. 
583"INC Executive Council Statement, London, dated 28`h April 1995", Al Mallaf Al Iraqi, vol. 45, 
1995, p. 27. 
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suspicions and prompts people to speak ill of this state of 
aff6rS. 
584 
Soon after publication of the Communist Party's statement, the INC countered by 
stressing that Iraqis should, despite differences of opinion, never lose sight of their 
main target: unseating the regime of Saddam Hussein. The INC's statement went on 
to say that "discussion of question of funding resulted in agreement on the necessity 
to diversify sources and that proper procedures would be followed to regulate INC's 
spending policy, in accordance with a budget plan to be prepared by relevant offices 
under the supervision of the Financial Office". 
585 
The question of INC funding is still shrouded in mystery. There is no conclusive 
evidence as to what the financial resources of the INC were, except allegations, 
counter-allegations and accusations. However, despite the fact that there is no proof 
that the vast amount of INC expenditure comes from Chalabi's own account, as he 
insists, the question of foreign funding remains a more logical explanation. It is here 
that the U. S. role as a likely financial backer emerges. On the other hand, there is 
little to suggest that the INC has received any Arab funds, as all Arab states mistrust 
both Chalabi and the INC. 
Targeting Chalabi's One-Man Show 
Despite the vilification campaign and subversive propaganda which the Baghdad 
regime continued to launch against INC President Ahmad Chalabi, and despite the 
584ommunist Party Memorandum to the INC's Executive Council dated 150' January 1994", Al- 
MallafAl-Iraqi, vol. 12, p. 22. 
585-Statement by INC Executive Council In Response To The Communist Party Memorandum", 
Al MallafAl-Iraqi, vol. 1994, p. 24. 
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immense difficulties and challenges, with which the INC was confronted, he 
managed, thanks mainly to his U. S. backers, to give a facade of resilience and 
continuity. Although almost all those who resigned from the INC directed their 
criticism towards INC president Ahmad Chalabi, the vast majority did not mention 
his name openly but referred to him either indirectly or in his official capacity. 
However, with the passage of time and with the mounting frustration over INC's 
failure to produce tangible results, attacks on Chalabi became more virulent and 
personal. An example of this may be seen in a letter by the leader of Iraqi Democrats, 
Muwaffaq Fattouhi, who was an elected member of INC's Consultative Committee. 
In his letter, Fattouhi expresses bitter disappointment not only at Chalabi himself but 
also at practically everybody associated with the INC Councils, Committees and 
National Assembly: 
I hereby reiterate once more, with extreme sorrow, that no respect 
whatsoever has been shown to any Committee or body within the 
INC, nor to any resolution adopted by the INC since its creation 
until now. I will go further and declare that while I do not wish to 
hold any particular person or party responsible for INC's failure to 
accomplish the aims which had been defined upon establishment of 
the INC, I declare that Dr Ahmad Chalabi's responsibility in 
rendering the INC inactive and paralyzed is great. Let me also put 
on record that everyone (be they individuals, parties, blocs or 
independents) has taken part in the process, which has driven the 
INC into this unenviable situation, on account of their leniency, 
easygoing, self-serving approach and, above all, their reluctance to 
make him [Chalabi] account for his persistent violation of the 
constitution and resolutions of the INC as well as the principles of 
democracy and collective leadership. 586 
Chalabi's personal hegemony over the affairs of the INC prompted many critics to 
attribute all political and operational failures of the INC to Chalabi's style of 
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management which they saw as highly individualistic, secretive and autocratic. He 
was so notorious for strengthening his grip on every joint in the INC that a "new 
political terminology was added to the political lexicon: `Chalabi's one-man 
show"' ss7 
To enhance his standing amongst the Iraqi opposition, Chalabi squandered a great 
deal of INC's money on propaganda and public relations exercises. His overriding 
concern was to appear as the uncontested leader of the INC and the future leader of 
Iraq. Admittedly, he was quite successful in this respect. Over a short period of time, 
"he rose from an unknown entity to become a household word in Iraqi opposition". 588 
While he supervised the day-to-day business of INC's London Office, Chalabi needed 
a publicity apparatus and spin-doctors to highlight his activities and present him in 
favourable light. To that end, he chose Ms. Rand Al-Rahim, a close confidante and 
good friend of his to take charge of Chalabi's public relations activities through the 
Iraqi Foundation in Washington. 589 
The U. S. A and Ahmad Chalabi 
In the face of mounting criticism, the INC resorted to a new defence mechanism. 
Casting aside its hyperbolic bent, it now adopted a more realistic and more 
apologetic tone of voice. This change however was inevitable as INC failures 
accumulated and detractors multiplied. Above all else, however, was the fact that 
586"Dr Muwaffaq Fattouhi's Resignation from the INC", Al MallafAi Iraqi, vol. 50,1996, p. 54. 
587Adel Raouf, "Qiraa Fi Tajribat Al-Mutamar Al-Watani A1-Iraqi", Dirasat Iraqiya (A Reading of 
INC's Experience), Iraqi Studies, Vol. 2,1997, p. 13. 
588Interview with ex-INC spokesman Salah Al-Shaikhli in London 5`s October 1999.. 
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U. S. -INC relations were going through a period of cooling off, if not of 
deterioration. A tragic misunderstanding had compounded the situation: 
While the INC and its allies were under the impression that 
they were operating with the full support and "unqualified 
backing of the United States government, the White House 
and the CIA simply regarded the INC as a useful 'thorn to stick 
in Saddam's flesh, along with sanctions and whatever 
subterranean plot could be concocted to overthrow the dictator 
by means of a palace coup. In other words, the INC was only 
half of a two-pronged U. S. strategy.... The INC brought an 
added bonus in that the adherence of the Kurds to this 
opposition group forestalled Kurdish moves towards 
independence, something that was always anathema to 
America's ally Turkey, facing its own Kurdish insurgency. 590 
David Wurmser goes so far as to suggest that in 1995, the United States had 
deliberately rendered Chalabi "toothless", not only before other opposition groups 
with which the CIA had established close contacts, but also in the eyes of the 
political powers in Kurdistan, the adopted home and base of the INC. 
391 The 
embattled INC president was therefore compelled to soften his attitude and attempt 
to mend fences with the opposition groups, both within the INC and outside it. This 
can be seen from the numerous statements released by its London office or voiced 
directly by Ahmad Chalabi through media interviews. 
5191nterview with Saad Salih Jabr in London on 1" April 1998. However, in a telephone conversation 
with Ms Rahim on April 28th 1998, she stressed the 
fact that the Institute was totally independent and 
that she focuses her research projects on Iraqi opposition. Interviews with a wide variety of Iraqi 
opposition groups however have shown that the 
Iraqi Foundation was perceived to be one of Chalabi's 
media fronts. 
59°Andrew and Patrick Cockburn, Out of the Ashes, p. 57. 
591, David Wurmser, Tyranny's Ally: America's failure To Defeat Saddam Hussein (Washington, 
D. C: The American Enterprise Institute, 1999), p. 15. 
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One such statement came in the form of a press release circulated among Iraqi 
opposition figures and later published in Al-Mallaf Al-Iraqi in August 1995. In it, 
Chalabi seeks to justify INC dealing with the United States as being the direct result 
of "the adventures of the Saddam Hussein regime which made the United States an 
essential element in the Iraqi equation". 592 He then attempts to disarm INCs critics 
by admitting that mistakes were made: 
True, many mistakes were made in the course of INC action. But the role 
played by political powers outside the INC was confined to belittling the 
achievements of the INC. They did not launch any initiative aimed at 
developing Iraqi opposition performance so that greater achievements 
might be realised. Within the INC, responsibility is borne by all. Just as 
no achievement can be credited to this party or that, no failure may be 
attributed to this group or that. We all bear equal responsibilities in 
failures and successes, each according to their actions and resources. 
This neither constitutes a condemnation of any particular party nor an 
attempt to shun responsibility. ... 
It is therefore incumbent upon all of 
us, inside the INC and outside it, to search for ways of supporting Iraqi 
opposition activities and improving its performance in such a way as to 
surmount internal impediments so that we may devote all our energy to 
the more difficult and more noble task of toppling Saddam Hussein. We 
further believe that a responsible dialogue on the national level may 
perhaps help obliterate the causes of misunderstanding which strained 
relations among Iraqi opposition movement, including the INC. It is 
indeed regrettable that so many parties have either suspended their 
membership or withdrawn completely from the INC. But let this 
unfortunate development prod us to review the situation and examine our 
course of action so that we may heal the fault lines which have appeared 393 in its body. 
5 Ahmad Chalabi, "Al-Mu'tamar Al-Watani Al-Iraqi A1-Muwahhad Wa Masouliyat Al-Qiwa Al- 
Siyasiya" (The INC and the Responsibilities of the Political Powers), Al MallafAi Iraqi, vol. 44,1995, 
p. 18., 
593Ibid., pp. 18-9. 
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Boycotts and Withdrawals from the INC 
It has become axiomatic among Iraqi circles to say that most of the problems, which 
were confronted by the INC leadership, were inherent in the nature of political 
opposition work in Iraq, which was always couched in secrecy and mistrust of others. 
Those now seeking to replace the dictatorial regime of Saddam Hussein with a truly 
democratic regime were not really used to concessions and compromise for the good 
of the whole. But there were other difficulties. To many within the INC, Ahmad 
Chalabi was an "administrator, used to running a bank rather than a political 
movement". 594 Admittedly, according to Abdul-Hussein Shaban, Chalabi was quite 
efficient and effective himself. He was however understandably inclined to be 
impatient with people less committed to working long hours than himself. He would 
act rather than consult, especially as consultation delayed effective and speedy 
action. 595 
Criticism of the INC and Ahmad Chalabi in particular was never in short -supply. 
Hardly a few months after the Salah Al-Din Conference had boasted of a new 
beginning of concerted action against the regime of Saddam Hussein and of new 
initiatives to include all the other parties which were still operating outside the 
umbrella of the INC, than a wave of resignations and withdrawals began to bedevil 
the INC. In so doing, many of the opposition groups came to reflect similar attitudes 
to those of Iraqis inside the country who did not, in the main, believe that the INC had 
any credible plans to bring about change in Iraq or, according to Cordesman and 
Hashim, any 
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tangible agenda on how to avoid a collapse of central authority once 
Saddam was overthrown, or meaningful plans to reconstruct Iraq in 
the post-Saddam era. Furthermore, the exiles' integrity and political 
judgement were questioned by many Iraqis. Many exile groups were 
seen as paid agents of Western or Arab intelligence services and 
governments, or as tainted by having strong ties with an Iran that is 
seen as the historical enemy. Iraqi officials like Barzan Al-Tikriti 
encouraged such feelings by denouncing the opposition for 
'prostituting' themselves to foreign governments. 596 
Besides the wave of resignations and withdrawals from the INC there was also much 
criticism in the Arabic language press over various personalities within the INC. 
Members of the opposition, both inside and outside the opposition, were all too 
inclined to criticize each other and contradict each other's statement in the leading 
Arabic press, which was mostly based in London. This public airing of dirty linen 
may have made good copy, but was in no small measure damaging to the image of 
the Iraqi opposition. 
Al-Kutla Al-Islamiya 
Among the earliest to freeze its membership of the INC was Al-Kutla AI-Islamiya 
(the Islamic Block) which declared on 240' January 1993 that it would no longer sit on 
INC's Committees "unless its leadership reviewed its policies in such a way as to 
reflect the wishes of the Iraqi masses". 
597 It furthermore accused the INC of being a 
tool in the hands of the United States, "the arch enemy" of the Iraqi people. The 
statement in which it announced its withdrawal was quite accusatory: 
"Interview with Abdul-Hussein Shaban in London 5t` January 2000. 
5951bld. 
5 Anthony H. Cordesman and Ahmed S. Hashim, Iraq: Sanctions and Beyond (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1999), p. 67. 
597"The Islamic Bloc in Iraq Declares withdrawal from Iraqi National Congress", Al MallafAI-Iraqi, 
vol. 25,1994,9.12. 
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After the 1968 coup, the real situation became crystal clear to 
all discerning Iraqis. America was not only the mastermind 
behind the aggressive war against Iran, which was started in 
order to exhaust the resources of both countries, it was also 
behind the invasion of Kuwait. Through this invasion, the 
United States was hoping to realize its long-term strategies, at 
the forefront of which, is the tightening of its psychological and 
political control over the region. It also aims at pushing the 
Arabs to shamefully surrender to Israel in return for nothing. 
The United States is furthermore working assiduously to 
prolong the life of Saddam Hussein's regime as much as 
possible in order to ensure that its interests are not undermined. 
It was also behind the brutal suppression of the Iraqi Intifada of 
March 1991. All that the United States is interested in is to use 
the Iraqi opposition as a card, which it could wave in the face of 
Saddam Hussein if and when he demurs or shows any 
reluctance to carry out U. S. orders. "" 
Executive Council Me nberAbdul SattarAl-Duri 
Abdul-Sattar Al-Duri, the veteran Ba'thist, who until February 1990 held important 
political and diplomatic posts, was among the earliest politicians to announce 
withdrawal from the INC's Executive Council. Al-Duri, who had . represented the 
Ba'th Party in the first National Front to be formed after the establishment of the Iraqi 
republic5", published the text of his resignation letter on 7t' February 1993. In it, he 
pointed out that he was disappointed by the results of the Salah Al-Din conference 
which `Fell far short of his expectations". He issued an impassioned appeal to Iraqis 
of all persuasions and ethnic descent to form an alternative opposition organization 
devoted to toppling the presidency of the current [INC] Executive Council and the 
"convening of a preparatory meeting to be attended by all opposition parties" in order 
to democratically elect a new leadership qualified to spearhead the struggle of our 
people to liberate Iraq from "dictatorship, isolation and famine". 600 Al-Duri's call 
-'"Ibid. p. 11. s'interview with Abdul-Sattar Al-Duri in London on 18th February 2000. 60°L, etter signed by Abdul-Sattar Al-Duri dated 7`h January 1993. 
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upon all "brothers and friends, Arabs, Kurds, Islamists, nationalists, democrats, 
socialists, Communists and independent patriots" fell on deaf ears and his initiative 
was doomed to failure before it got off the ground. 
Executive Council Secretary General Abdul Hussein Shaban 
Seven months later, the INC was dealt another severe psychological blow when, on 
16th July 1993, Abdul-Hussein Shaban, an ex-Communist-turned-liberal democrat, 
who had been picked to be INC's Executive Council Secretary General, tendered his 
resignation. This was in protest, among other things, against the way in which 
Chalabi was steering the INC. In his memorandum, Shaban strongly attacked INC's 
emphasis on public relations exercises and its total reliance on the international factor 
to supplant the regime of Saddam Hussein. He further noted that he could no longer 
"accept the temperamental and autocratic methods of Ahmad Chalabi". He also 
accused INC of ignoring the aspirations of the Iraqi people and of adopting a political 
discourse that is out of touch with the Iraqi man in the street: 
Our prevalent discourse has so totally ignored the 
temperament of the man in the street that there exists at the 
moment a wide gulf, which separates our movement from 
the citizenry. Our lines of contact with the ordinary Iraqis 
have grown weaker and weaker, while a thick impenetrable 
wall arose between our compatriots and us. Unless we 
rectify the situation there is very little hope that we will 
ever succeed in our mission. 601 
Shaban also stressed that through its support of the UN-imposed sanctions, the INC 
had played into the hands of Saddam Hussein, who was quick to exploit this stance 
6°1 "Memo by Abdul-Hussein Shaban to INC Presidential and Executive Councils", Al MallafAl-Iraq! 
(Iraqi File), vol. XI (1993), pp. 24-5. 
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and portray INC as puppets and instruments in the hands of foreign powers. 602 
Shaban further objected to what he saw "as undue compulsion for the INC to 
recognize Kuwait's new border with Iraq". 603 
Da'wah Party 
Other condemnatiöns of the INC soon followed. On 28th August 1993, the Da'wah 
Party issued a statement in which it too severed relations with the INC. It is to be 
remembered that the Da'wah Party had joined the INC in order to achieve a number 
of objectives. Chief among these was the desire to: 
increase the proportion of the Islamists within the INC and to 
expose the INC's sources of INC funding and the extent of 
foreign involvement in this national project. We further wanted 
to abort all attempts at accusing us of working against what 
most observers at first considered a worthy and noble struggle 
against dictatorship in Iraq. 604 
In its justification of the decision to withdraw, the Da'wah Party cited a number of 
differences with the INC, which it accused of being under the influence of foreign 
powers seeking to undermine the independence of the Iraqi political will. The Party's 
communique also referred to the numerous attempts made by the Da'wah party to 
"correct the course of those influential elements within the INC". In announcing its 
withdrawal from INC, the Da'wah Party communique cited what has become a 
6021bid., p. 24. 
°Michael Gunter, The Kurdish Predicament in Iraq: a Political Analysis (New York: St Martin's 
Press, 1999), p. 39. 
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familiar refrain: its firm belief in "the necessity to unite opposition work in order to 
remove the regime of Saddam Hussein" and that despite this deep-rooted belief, it 
could no longer cooperate with the INC in the establishment of which it had played 
an important role: 6os 
The Da'wah Party which had registered reservations as to the way 
in which the INC was run reiterates its stand that the Iraqi 
opposition movement is need of a new strategy which is capable 
of mobilizing all Iraqi resources inside and outside of Iraq, 
harmonizing the political discourse and ensuring independence of 
our political struggle. During the ten months which elapsed since 
the Salah Al-Din Conference, we made every effort to alert the 
INC leadership of the necessity to correct the mistakes made and 
indicated our willingness to cooperate with the influential parties 
within the INC to rescue it from the negative milieu surrounding 
it. Despite our sincere and serious efforts failed to detect any sign 
of reform or movement in the right direction. 606 
The Communist Party 
Another blow to the INC came in January 1994, when the Communist Party 
threatened to suspend cooperation with INC. The Communists had attended the 
Salah- Al-Din Conference and joined the other INC founding members, despite their 
suspicion of the connection between the CIA and the INC. 
607 Despite this legitimate 
suspicion, they did so in order that they may not be left out in the cold, now that the 
604lnterview with Ibrahim A1-Jaafari, Da'wah Party Representative in London on 1" March 2000. It 
might be added that the Da'wah Party joined INC in order that 
it may appear as a party that renounces 
violence and upholds dialogue, especially as the Party leadership 
is convinced that the U. S. considers 
it "a terrorist organisation". Al-Da'wah Party was vigorously opposed to international involvement in 
Iraq, it nevertheless did not object to "regional involvement in this question. See "Speech by Da'wah 
Politbureau member Ibrahim Al-Jaffari on the Anniversary of Muhammad Sadiq Al-Sadr's 
Myrtardom", SoutAl Iraq, 3`d March 2000, p. 5. 
605"Couniqud by Hizb Al-Da'wah Al-Islamiya dated 9`h Rabi Al-Awwal 1414 A. H. (28th August 
1993)", AI-Mallaf Al-Iraqi, vol. 21 (1993), p. 24.. 
6%lbid., p. 24. 
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new world order threatened to greatly reduce their political impact in Iraqi opposition. 
In joining the INC, they were also hoping to establish some sort of dialogue, albeit 
indirect, with the United States. They were furthermore apprehensive of being 
submerged by the tide of the Islamic movement in Iraq which, they feared, might 
eradicate the Communist party altogether. 608 
Announcing their threat to withdraw, the Central Committee of the Communist Party 
issued a lengthy memorandum in which it strongly criticized the INC leadership, 
accusing its Presidential and Executive councils of being inactive and ineffectual. The 
Communists also picked serious holes in the INC's political discourse, which "did not 
touch the sentiments of the masses". They further voiced strong objections to the 
INC's position on: the UN sanctions, embargo on the people of Iraq, especially in 
Kurdistan, the demarcation of borders with Kuwait and the air raids against the Iraqi 
capital. The INC was, according to the Communists, no more than a media front with 
no real mechanism for political or operational activities. 
609 Among other charges 
directed against the INC, the Communist Party cited Chalabi's unswerving belief in 
the United States as the future saviour of Iraq: 
The most noticeable and persistent shortcoming of the INC is 
its total reliance on the international factor, specifically the 
United States, which is seen as the only power capable of 
assessing the situation in Iraq and of drawing its future. This 
naturally led to the total disregard of the domestic factor, 
Interview with ex- INC Liaison Officer, Muhammad Ihsanin London on 15`h January 2000; 
Cockburn, Resurrection, pp. 165-6. 
Interview with ex-Communist Party Central Committee member, Majid Al-Yasiri in London on 14 
Sevtember 1999. 
609Ncoý st party Memorandum to INC's Executive Council dated 15`h January 1994w, AI Mallaf 
A1 Iraqi, vol. 12, p. 22. 
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which should be considered decisive in resolving the struggle 
for political change in our country. 610 
The Communists threatened to sever links with the INC unless the latter "mended its 
ways" by taking an independent course and refraining from the practice of raising the 
hopes of the Iraqis, through propagation of the false notion that deliverance would 
come from certain states. The financial policies of the INC also came under fire. The 
Communists sought transparency and accountability and insisted on rejecting all 
foreign aid, from whichever quarter it came, if any strings were attached. They also 
insisted on being informed of all details of INC accounts through the creation of a 
supervisory financial Committee, which should be entrusted with the task of 
controlling INC coffers. Reactivating the different Committees and other INC organs 
was another demand the Communists insisted upon. They questioned the validity of 
"the sectarian and ethnic basis on which the INC was founded" and sought to effect a 
genuine reform of its organizational structure through the adoption of "political 
criteria" when assessing the strength and popularity of each political grouping. 611 
Fearing that the Communists would abandon the INC, Ahmad Chalabi hastened to 
contain the crisis by dispatching a high powered delegation, which included' two 
eminent members of the INC Executive Council: Hani Al-Fikaiki and Latif Rashid. 
The negotiations, which lasted two days, reflect the anxiety of the INC not to lose any 
more allies. The INC press release, which followed the lengthy sessions, clearly 
shows the reconciliatory tone of Chalabi's envoys, who vowed to do all they could to 
uphold the principles of fairness and democracy 
in their dealings with their 
61 olbid , p. 
22. 
631lbid, p. 23. 
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colleagues. They further asserted their intention to broaden INC's relations with the 
outside world and to forge new alliances with regional and international powers 
through developing the INC's relations with the parliaments and political parties of 
these states. 612 
Union of Iraqi Democrats 
In May 1994, another Iraqi dissident group severed relations with INC. The Union of 
Iraqi Democrats, which includes a number of Iraqi intellectuals, some of whom had at 
one point or other been associated with Marxist ideology, also decided to boycott the 
INC. Their reasons for abandoning the INC were included in a press release 
distributed on 29th May 1994: 
Many and great developments took place with regard to the Iraqi 
opposition, especially within the leadership of the INC. These 
were embodied in the collapse of the principle of collective 
leadership and the personal hegemony of the president of the INC. 
The INC newsletter, broadcasting and television stations are 
operating under direct command of the INC president. The 
Executive Council which is supposedly in charge of directing 
these establishments has been deprived of its supervisory role. The 
Broadcasting Corporation, which is a private company, owned by 
the INC president takes no directives except from INC president. 
INC finances are still a mystery, which the Executive Council 
president keeps to himself. ... [Against this 
background] the 
presence of our representative in the INC has become meaningless. 
Let it be known however that while we have no wish to be dragged 
into personal squabbles, which might hurt the Iraqi national 
movement, we will, on the other hand, not refrain from exposing 
those who, seek to push the Iraqi opposition to engage in issues 
detrimental 'to its cause and to the future of Iraq. 613 
612"INC's Executive Council Memorandum Responding to the Communist Party Memorandum", Al. 
AfallafAl Iraqi, 12, p. 24. 
613Fina1 statement of the 4 Annual Congress of the Union of Iraqi Democrats", Al Afa1lafAl Iraqi, 
vol. 30,1994, p. 31. 
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INCF. xecutive Council Member Talib Shabib 
On 18th June 1994, INC Executive Council member, Talib Shabib, who had served 
as Foreign Minister in the first Ba'thist government in 1963 and worked as Arab 
League ambassador to the Court of St James during the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War, 
tendered his resignation from the Council. 614 In it, he included a vehement attack on 
Chalabi, whom he described as a "company director who is a political novice": 
The least that can be said of the Executive Council is that many 
of its members are not known, either by name or by their history 
or struggle. If you ask any Iraqi inside the country to recognise 
half the members, they will find it an impossible task. Even I, a 
member of the Council itself, cannot do this. 
As for the way in which the Executive Council operates, let it be 
known that its president runs it as company director and not the 
head of a big political alliance. The secretive manner in which 
the finances of the INC are handled has made it possible for the 
president of the INC to impose his will, pay some or deprive 
others. This state of affairs has rendered INC offices devoid of 
any meaning, influence or power. Even Presidential Council 
members and those on the INC pay roll never fail to express 
their complaints and disgust. 615 
Escalating his tactics, Chalabi responded, a week later, by publishing a 
lengthy rebuttal in which he accused those who criticize him of being 
"politically bankrupt and envious of the successes" scored by the INC on 
many fronts: 
It is indeed puzzling that that the ideas contained in. .. [Shabib's statement] come from a member of INC's Executive 
Council, who has every right to contribute to the drawing up of 
INC's strategic policies and decision-making process. He 
furthermore has all the freedom to express his views within the 
614Interview with Al-Duri on St' February 2000. 
61S'Talib Shabib, "Al-Azma Al-Iraqiya Wa Al-Hal An Al-Hal Al-Mughayir" (The Iraqi Crisis and the 
Search for an Alternative), AI MallafAl Iraqi, vol. 31,1994, p 14. 
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organizational structure of the INC and through its conferences, 
meetings and through all its channels. 
What is even more puzzling is that the ideas presented [by 
Shabib] were never voiced until tangible successes of INC's 
struggle against the dictatorship were seen on the ground and 
deep inside our fettered country. ... The writer's 
belated 
criticism of the structure of the Executive Council is 
undoubtedly motivated by a desire other than that which is 
professed by the writer. Its members were chosen by the INC's 
General Assembly and have been carrying out their duties for a 
long time. All that is clearly intended is to belittle the 
honourable members and make light their contributions. 616 
INC Deputy President Hani AI-Fikaiki 
On 10th December 1994, Hani Al-Fikaiki informed INC's president that he no longer 
wished to serve as his deputy, indicating at the same time, his wish to withdraw 
from the Executive Council. 617 But he was apparently persuaded to continue his 
cooperation with the INC. He remained on the Executive Council until 4th January 
1996 when he again tendered. his resignation. Al-Fikaiki snubbed INC president 
Chalabi when he addressed his letter of resignation not to him directly, but to the 
president of INC General Assembly, the veteran Kurdish dissident Ibrahim Ahmad. 
In his resignation, which was accepted this time, Al-Fikaiki raised many issues, 
albeit indirectly, against INC president Chalabi: 
It is indeed regrettable and extremely sad that certain elements at 
the highest level of INC leadership should use the INC in such a 
way as to impose tactics and strategies which are at variance 
with the lofty ideals the INC had pledged to pursue in its 
original charter. It is unfortunate that these elements have all 
along been seeking to exploit the INC for their own personal 
and partisan gains. What augments the suffering and misery of 
Iraq's citizenry is that they have been plagued by this type of 
political opposition. ... This state of 
degenerate affairs has 
616Ahmad Chalabi, "Ta'qiban Ala Talb Shadib: Ta'abir Al-Azma Al-Iraqiya Wa Al-Ibhar Fi Al- 
Sarb" (Responding to Talib Shabib: Surmounting the Iraqi Crisis and Sailing Through A sea of 
frage", Al Ma11afA11ragi, vol. 31,1994, p. 16. 
6i7A1 Ma11afA1 Irag1, vol. 42,1995, p. 27. 
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meted out a terrible blow to ambitions, not only of the political 
powers of the nation but also to all Iraqis. 618 
General Assembly Member Muhammad Hamawand 
Voicing bitter resentment of INC's "dubious contacts" with foreign governments, Dr 
Muhammad Hamawand, a highly respected independent Kurd submitted on 15' 
April 1995 his resignation from the General Assembly, stating that INC's General 
Assembly was "a dead body" and that he found it difficult to be associated "with an 
opposition that is on the pay roll of a foreign power". 619 Dr Hamawand was very 
critical of Chalabi's hegemony over the INC, which he considered a great hindrance 
to INC performance. He also viewed Chalabi not only as a "political opportunist", 
but also a "profiteer who trades in political opposition". 62° 
Presidential Council Member Muhammad Bahr Al-Uloum 
Bahr Al-Uloum views Chalabi as a conspirator who never tires of weaving intrigues 
in order to further his own agenda. He was especially angered when he was left in 
the dark while important decisions were taken in the name of the INC Presidential 
Council. Chalabi, feeling that the INC had become almost totally inactive, if not 
paralyzed, especially as the situation in Kurdistan was deteriorating due to the armed 
rivalry between the KDP and PUK, hastened to form a new alliance which included 
these two parties as well as SCIRI and General Hasan Al-Naqib. The aim of this 
alliance, concluded on 17th November 1994, was to pave the way for armed 
operations and also to divert the attention of the Kurdish parties from internal 
61$Kthni Al-Fikaili's Letter of Resignation from INC", Al-Mallaf Al-Iraqi, vol. 50,1996, p. 53. 
619"M d Hamawand Withdrwas from the INC", Al MallafAI-Iraqi, vol. 42,1995, p. 27. 
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conflicts to fighting against their common enemy, the regime of Saddam Hussein. 
The alliance also aimed at bringing in the armed `Badr battalion" of the SCIRI in 
order to strengthen the military wing of the INC. Muhammad Bahr Al-Uloum, who 
had not been consulted, found himself outside the new alliance which, among other 
things, aimed at enhancing the confrontation with the Baghdad regime. One of the 
clauses of the new alliance stipulated that SCIRI was the sole representatives of all 
Islamists in Iraq. 621 This in effect sealed Al-Uloum's fate and rendered him a total 
political outcast. 
Bahr Al-Uloum considered this move quite unconstitutional "since neither the 
Executive nor Presidential Councils had been advised of it". 622 He further pointed 
out that: 
The ill-advised move threatens not only the future of the INC but 
also the future of Iraq as a whole. I have publicly stated that and, in 
a cable addressed to my two fellow Presidential Council 
members[Hassan Mustafa Al-Naqib and Masoud Barzani], 
condemned the infamous agreement which contradicts all the 
ideals of democracy to which some INC Council members paid 
only lip service. I have also written to Dr Chalabi and asked him to 
circulate the cable among all Executive Council members, asking 
at the same time, an urgent meeting be held to condemn those who 
had signed the Agreement. 623 
In another letter addressed to the Presidential Council, Bahr Al-Uloum attacked the 
political strategy adopted by the INC. He singled out for criticism reliance on the 
international factor, stressing it was "a big mistake, as foreign powers put their 
62°Interview with Muhammad Hamawand in London on 26th March 2000. 
621Text of the unpublished agreement dated 17th November 1994. 
622"INC presidential Council Member Muhammad Bahr Al-Uloum Announces Withdrawal From INC 
And Calls For An Islamic Front", AI MallafAl-Iraqi, vol. 42,1995, p. 28. 
Bahr Al-Uloum s letter addressed INC Presidential and Executive Councils members dated on 17th 
December 1994. 
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interests ahead of those of our country and nation". 624 He also attacked Chalabi for 
keeping everybody in the INC, including the Presidential Council, the highest body 
within the INC, in the dark, with regard to the sources of INC funding: 
Chalabi must hasten to clarify this highly sensitive issue 
and at least inform the Presidential Council of the sources 
of INC funding. His claim that a few well-to-do Iraqis had 
contributed generously to the INC and that he was 
compelled to place a total black-out on their identity to 
protect their relatives and friends in Iraq from certain 
savage reprisals cannot convince anyone. In point of fact, 
all INC members, without exception, suspect that there is 
something fishy about this question. 625 
National Reform Movement Leader Sami Azara Al-Majoun 
Sami Azara Al-Majoun, leader of the National Reform Movement in Iraq also 
expressed anger over the secrecy in which the question of INC funding was kept. 
One of the seven points he raised against the INC focused on the rumours, which 
surfaced even in the press626 about the INC's funds. He was further frustrated when 
his attempts to clarify this point had consistently been ignored. 627 
In his 22°d June 1995 statement, Al-Majoun explained why he suspended his party's 
membership of the INC. His objections were summarized in six points: 
1. Dictatorship of the INC leadership 
624"Muhammad Bahr Al-Uloum's Memorandum Concerning Suspension of his INC Membcrship ; 
Al MallafA1 Iraqi, vol. 43, p. 29. 
6251bid., p. 29 
626See for example the letter sent by Prof. Kemal Majid to the editor of Al-Mallaf Al-Iraqi in which he 
discusses the fate of $40m. allegedly "squandered" by the Iraqi Opposition. in Al-Mallaf A1-Iragl, 
vol43,1995, p. 30. 
617Sami Azara Al-Majoun's statement on the suspension of his INC Membership", Al MallafA1-Iraqi, 
vol. 43,1995, p. 32. 
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2. Absence of any political vision or strategies. This serious flaw was made even 
more serious by "Chalabi's total hegemony over all aspects of INC activities" 
3. Rumours in the press are rife about the sources of INC's funds. All attempts at 
seeking clArefications about this point have been ignored 
4. INC's failure to establish balanced relations with Iraq's neighbouring countries, 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and especially Syria `which is capable of providing 
immense help in the struggle to topple the regime of Saddam Hussein". 
5. INC's failure to provide any tangible help to the suffering masses of Iraq, This 
negligence led to the INC's "loss of their support and negatively influenced Iraqi 
opposition". 
6. The proportion of tribal opposition groupings to Saddam Hussein is much 
smaller than their actual political influence, size and impact on the struggle of 
the Iraqis. 
7. The Kurdish-Kurdish conflict shook the confidence of all Iraqis in the 
profitability of adopting the Kurdish region as the INC field of action. 
628 
Islamic Movement in Kurdistan 
More poignant is the letter sent by the Islamic Movement in Kurdistan in which it 
suspended its membership in the INC. In an interview with the London-based Al- 
Hayat daily, the Movement's spokesman, Ihsan Abdul-Aziz criticized the INC's lack 
of democracy and singled out INC's secret funding. Abul-Aziz who attacked "the 
extravagant life style of the INC leaders" points out that: 
We have no idea as to how the INC manages to cover its 
expenditures. Chalabi, contrary to all principles of 
democracy, refuses to provide any explanation. The 
Americans, on the other hand, confirmed that they have been 
62sSarrii pzaza Al-Majoun's statement on the suspension of his INC Membership", Al MallafAI-Iraq!, 
vol. 43,1995, p. 32. 
316 
giving financial aid to the INC, despite Chalabi's denials and 
claims that a number of benevolent states are providing help. 
On our part, we have taken care to fund our own 
participation in the INC whether inside the country or outside 
it. Even our transportation was paid from our funds. 629 
National Democratic Turkoman Movement 
Aziz Al-Qadiri, Secretary General of the National Democratic Turkoman Movement 
issued on 13th June 1995 a statement in which he declared suspension of its 
membership in the INC because of the 
many mistakes, which have become characteristic of the way 
the INC operates, absence of democracy, the total disregard of 
its constitution and rules of procedure as well as the dictatorial 
manner in which the affairs of the INC are handled. 630 
Iraqi National Accord Movement 
Even INC's closest ally, the Iraqi National Accord Movement began boycotting INC 
functions, keeping only their membership in the National Assembly. They did 
however reserve the right to withdraw from the Assembly at a later date, if the INC 
failed to take practical measures to amend its constitution, review its organizational 
structure and formulate a well-thought out and practical plan of action aimed at 
toppling the regime of Saddam Hussein. No objection or criticism was, however, 
raised against the question of INC funding. 
631 Like other Iraqi opposition groups, the 
National Accord Movement strongly objected to Chalabi's reluctance to hold General 
629`The Islamic Movement in Kurdistan Suspends its INC Membership", A1-Hayat, 13`h June 1995, p. 
3. 
63066The National Democratic Turkoman Movement Suspends its INC Membe rship", A1lltallajAl- 
Iraqi, vol. 43,1995,30. 
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Assembly meetings for fear that he might lose his position as INC leader. The Accord 
Movement also resented Chalabi's grip on INC's affairs. "Whenever we ask him 
about why no action was taken on any particular point that had been agreed upon, he 
claimed that he was acting on directives from the Americans". 632 The National 
Accord Movement also felt that Chalabi had overstepped his political and media role 
and engaged in military activities, trespassing onto their own domain. 
633 
Iraqi Democratic Party 
On 25t' May 1996 the Iraqi Democratic Party's turn came. In announcing that it 
would boycott all INC functions, the Democratic Party pointedly attacked INC 
president Chalabi as being behind most of the ills afflicting the INC. The question of 
INC funding was once again high on the list of points raised by the party. However, 
no political grouping operating under the INC banner was spared the bitter criticism 
voiced in the memorandum, signed by Secretary General Aziz Alayan: 
Responsibility [for INC's failures] cannot be confined to the 
INC presidency. Other political powers, which have never 
taken their duties seriously, must also share the blame. For 
they have failed in pushing this extensive alliance to achieve 
its aims and have also failed to cooperate amongst themselves 
despite their assurances that they value coordination and joint 
action. They have been blinded by their own narrow interests 
which have led them to renounce teamwork.... Their attitudes 
and practices have prolonged the suffering of the Iraqis, 
631" Interview with Salah Al-Shaikhli in London on 5`h October 1999. See also The Iraqi National 
Accord Movement Withdraws from the INC", Al MallafAl-lragi, vol. 43,1995, p. 31. 
632Interview with National Accord member of the Central Committee and official spokesman, Salah 
pl_Shaikhli in London on 5`h October 1999. 
6331bid. The National Accord Movement which includes a number of defected Iraqi officers and ex- 
Ba, thists, considers military operations to be their own domain and that the INC was a political 
umbrella incapable of executing military operations. 
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weakened their faith in the opposition not only in the southern 
and central regions but also in liberated Kurdistan. 634 
The Impact of the Kurdish-Kurdish Conflict on the INC 
The Arab opposition groups entered into an alliance with the Kurdish opposition 
during the Vienna Conference of June 1992 in the hope that they might be able to 
achieve their common objective: the toppling of President Saddam Hussein's regime. 
The hard reality however was that there was no "common objective". For the Kurdish 
movement had its own specific agenda and demands. Besides, in the nature of the 
historical struggle against successive Baghdad regimes, which revolved around the 
one demand cherished by the Kurdish movement, namely independence or at least 
full autonomy, there were also differences related to vision and strategy: 
First, the intra-Kurdish confict between the KDP and the PUK is a long protracted 
one, which has its roots in history. It started when in 1964 when PUK's leader Jalal 
Talbani rebelled against Mulla Mustafa Barzani, Masoud Barzani's father. This 
rebellion created a deep rift in the Kurdish movement which resulted in the 
emergence of two schools of leadership fighting over the souls of the Kurdish 
population in Iraq. This 36-year old conflict was one of the most devastating ailments 
which plagued the Kurdish movement. The inconclusive 1992 elections, the results of 
which pleased neither side, did not resolve the question of leadership. In point of fact, 
in organizing the elections, both parties were hoping to gain a landslide victory in 
order to eject the other party from the political arena. But the results of the election 
were so close that authority had to be partitioned between the two leaders. 
634"Iragi Democratic Party Statement on Suspending its INC Membership", Al MallafA1-Iraqi, vol. 
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Second, The Kurdish movement had deserted the Iraqi opposition during the March 
1991 Intifada and, prompted by a desire to exploit what seemed at the time a golden 
opportunity, entered into a dialogue with the Baghdad regime. Then, in August 1996, 
a major force within the INC and indeed within the Kurdish movement, the KDP, 
mended fences with Saddam Hussein's regime and negotiated with Baghdad in order 
to wrest back the province of Arbil from Talbani's PUK. The Arab opposition groups, 
on the other hand, which never swerved in their struggle against the Baghdad regime 
saw in the KDP's contacts with Baghdad an unnecessary move to accord the regime 
an undeserved legitimacy. The contacts were further seen as recognition of the 
dictatorial regime. Thus, "the line on the sand" drawn by the Arab opposition groups 
was, more than once, crossed by the Kurdish movement, which did not appear to have 
committed itself fully to the cause of ousting the regime in Baghdad. 
Third, Following the imposition, in April 1991, of the `No-Fly Zone' over the Safe 
Haven, the three liberated Kurdish districts (Arbil, Sulaumaniya and Duhawak), the 
situation on the ground was such that Masoud Barzani's partisans were in full control 
of the strategic Duhawk region, through which the overland route 
linking Iraq and 
Turkey passes. This situation enabled the Barzanis to collect substantial revenues in 
customs and excise. On the other hand, Jalal Talibani's 
forces controlled a larger area, 
which includes the city of Suleimaniya and a number of 
border posts along the Iraq- 
Iran borderline. The regional capital of Kurdistan, Arbil, where the Kurdish 
parliament is based, was held 
by both parties jointly. 
56,1996, p. 29. 
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Fourth, it was against this complex background that the resort town, Salah Al-Din, 
which lies within the Arbil district, was chosen as a base for the INC, following the 
first conference there in February 1993. Salah Al-Din was in the area controlled by 
Barzani with whom INC Executive Council President, Ahmad Chalabi had excellent 
relations at that stage. In taking the decision to base the INC in Salah Al-Din, Barzani 
pledged to host and protect the INC. 635 
From his base in Salah Al-Din, Chalabi was able to convince the Kurdish parties that 
the only way to guarantee international economic aid and political support was 
cooperation with the INC. The INC-Kurdish relationship was therefore transformed 
into an agreement of mutual interest: Kurdish protection of Arab opposition groups, 
against Arab opposition acceptance of federalism, self-determination for the Kurds 
and international support. 
Fifth, Barzani exploited the presence of the INC in Salah Al-Din, which afforded his 
supporters a much needed income by way of renting properties and providing 
lucrative catering and other services to the growing numbers of INC personnel and 
officess. 636 Viewing the situation in Salah Al-Din with disgruntlement and unease, 
Talbani felt compelled to consolidate his power in as large an area of Kurdistan as 
possible. Gradually, the two parties found themselves locked in an undeclared 
political and arms race. But the rivalry soon surfaced. When, in late 1993, Talbani felt 
that the Kurdish Islamic movement in the Halabcha area, which was under his 
control, was gaining ground, he tried to contain it, as it was perceived to be tilting in 
its political loyalty towards Barzani. The situation soon deteriorated and fighting 
635Interview with Hoshiar Zibari in London on 15th January 2000. Hoshiar points out that Barani had 
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between Talbani's forces and those of the Kurdish Islamic movement erupted in 
November 1993.637 The INC stepped in to negotiate a peaceful settlement to this 
round of Kurdish-Kurdish armed conflict and succeeded in effecting a cease-fire. 
Soon afterwards, however, the dangerous situation deteriorated even further when 
Talbani raised a number of issues against Barzani whom he accused of supporting the 
Islamic movement. Among these was his insistence that the INC should adopt a 
neutral policy and stop supporting Barzani. Talbani who enjoyed military 
superiority638 and was in control of a larger area in Kurdistan also demanded a share 
of the customs revenues, which Barzani was monopolizing. 
Feeling that he had a rough deal, Talbani resorted to the use of force in order to take 
what he considered Barzani owed him. A number of skirmishes between troops of the 
rival leaders took place, before the PUK finally decided to launch an assault against 
the headquarters of Barzan in Salah Al-Din, where the INC was based. Fighting broke 
out in March 1993 but the situation was soon contained, following quick intervention 
by the INC, which by its mediation, ended the fighting. The agreement reached 
stipulated that: 
1. all check-points along the main overland routes in the Arbil area should be 
manned by INC troops 
made it a condition that INC's protection is his own domain which no other person should share. 
636Interview with Abdul Hussein Shaban in London on 5t' January 2000. 
637Interview with Ihsan Abdul Aziz, Islamic Movement's UK representative in London on 22"d 
February 2000. 
638lnterview with General Wafiq Al-Samaraee in London on 10`h February 2000 
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2. the INC, which was entrusted with the task of supervising execution of the 
agreement, would act as arbiter should any problems arise. 639 
Following these political successes in mediation, which enabled it to deploy its troops 
as a peace-keeping force, the INC aspired to emerge as a third power in the Kurdish 
equation. 640 
On account of the deep-rooted conflict and the intensity of mutual suspicion and 
rivalry, the situation never returned to normal. Talbani felt that the deterioration of 
the situation could not be policed effectively by the fledgling troops of the INC which 
depended on arms donations from both parties. He grew more convinced that he 
should end Barzani for good through military confrontation. The fighting broke out 
much sooner than Talbani had thought. His rival took the military initiative by 
attacking the city of Shaglawa which was under the control of Talbani's forces and 
occupied it, securing the communication lines stretching between Salah Al-Din and 
his military posts in the area under his control. 
Talbani responded by attacking the regional capital of Kurdistan, Arbil from which he 
expelled Barzani's forces. With the taking of Arbil, Talbani became the dominant 
force in Iraqi Kurdistan. Realising that the balance of power had tipped in favour of 
Talbani, the INC under the leadership of Chalabi soon shifted to a more pro-Talbani's 
attitude. The move angered Barzani who came to view the INC as a Talbani puppet. 
From the occupation of Arbil onwards, the INC became hostage to the vagaries of 
intra-Kurdish conflict. 
639Tcxt of the Agreement signed by representatives of the PUK and KDP and witnessed by General 
Hasan Al-Naqib and Ahmad Chalabi for the INC. 
64OInterview with Ahmad Chalabi in London on 11th September 1999. 
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Talbani then moved to convince his new allies, the INC, of the necessity to push 
forward with armed struggle against the regime of Saddam Hussein. His plan to 
launch an attack against Baghdad from the North hit a chord in Ahmad Chalabi who 
was eager to end the perception that the INC was no more than a media front and a 
political umbrella. 641 On this basis, Chalabi began to coordinate plans with the CIA 
representative, known to Iraqi opposition as Bob, to launch an attack which would 
soon be known as the March Operations. 
The March 1995 Operations 
Having been deserted by most of the non-Kurdish opposition parties, the INC was 
quite anxious to make its presence felt and assert itself as a military power. Chalabi 
who had worked hard to establish a military wing within the INC was also suspicious 
of the intentions of his ally Ayad Allawi, leader of the Wfaq (Accord) group who had 
kept Chalabi guessing as to the nature of his relations with the United States. Chalabi 
feared that Allawi was perhaps being groomed by the Americans for a future role in 
Iraq. 642 Jalal Talbani, on the other hand, was quite enthusiastic about launching a 
military attack against the central government in Baghdad. Such a course of action 
Talbani thought, would crown him as the uncontested leader of the Kurds. He also 
calculated that he would be able to bring the region of Kirkuk under his control and 
thus realize a long-cherished Kurdish dream. 643 
Another factor which played no small part in inducing both Talbani and Chalabi to 
consider military action against the regime of Saddam Hussein was the unexpected 
641 Interview with Hoshiar Zibari in London on 15th January 2000. 
6421nterview with General Samaraee in London on 10th February 2000. 
6431nterview with Hoshiar Zibari in London on 15's January 2000. 
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but quite timely defection of General Wafiq Al-Samaraee, Director of Saddam 
Hussein's military intelligence. Samaraee, who joined the opposition immediately 
after his flight from Iraq, raised the hopes of the opposition and made them feel a 
little optimistic about the possibility of effecting political change in Iraq by force. His 
defection furthermore made it relatively easy for Chalabi to convince the Americans 
that plans to unseat Saddam Hussein by the opposition were afoot. Chalabi also 
managed to elicit U. S. support for the intended military action, which would come by 
M way of providing aerial cover. S 
The INC's efforts also led to the conclusion of what came to be known as the 
Kwaisanjaq Accord, which was signed by Jalal Talbani, Masoud Barzani, Wafiq 
Samaraee and Chalabi himself. The signatories agreed, among other things, to launch 
concerted attacks against Iraqi forces stationed along the areas adjacent to the Kurdish 
autonomous region. These attacks were intended to: 
a) rebuild and enhance INC credibility 
b) encourage as many Iraqi military personnel to defect to the opposition 
c) attack chosen targets deep inside Iraqi territory 
Besides the aerial cover, the Americans, according to General Wafiq Samaraee, also 
promised to mobilize a few military units where they had "some influence in the the 
central region, specifically in the Fallouja-Rashidiya sector", which was a few 
kilometers away from Baghdad. This move was to be timed in such a way as to 
coincide with the bifurcated attack against the Mosul province by Masoud Barzani's 
6`i4Interview with Hoshiar Zibari in London on 15th January 2000. 
' Interview with General Samaraee in London on 10th February 2000. 
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forces and Jalal Talbani's advance towards the Kirkuk. 646Barzani however sensed 
danger. He opposed the idea of assigning the attack on Kirkuk to Talbani and insisted 
that PUK and KDP forces should launch it jointly. Upon Chalabi's assurances that 
post-Saddam Hussein Iraq would be under the command of a national leadership 
comprising the signatories of the Kwaisanjaq Accord, Talbani reluctantly went ahead 
with the plan. 
647 
Talbani's rising popularity and mounting successes unsettled Masoud Barzani who 
was never enthusiastic about the plan in the first place. But Barzani could not renege 
on the agreement unless he had a compelling reason to extricate himself from what 
he considered a political and military predicament. With this in mind, he instructed 
his representative in London, Hoshiar Zibari, to get in touch with the American 
administration directly, without notifying Chalabi. Zibari's mission was to ascertain 
the truth and level of any U. S participation. On 3`d March 1995, hardly twenty-four 
hours before the start of operations, Zibari learnt that the U. S had not committed 
itself to the INC's plan and that it had no prior knowledge of it. When U. S. officials 
were told about Bob's frequent assurances that Washington knew of and supported 
the military operation, Zibari was told that "the cowboy [Bob] may have been 
exceeding his authority". 
648 
Upon hearing this, Talbani immediately declared that he was no longer bound by the 
agreement, accusing Chalabi at the same time, of involving the Kurdish movement in 
a highly dangerous project. If it failed, said Talbani, only the Kurds would pay its 
heavy price. Barzani's move deepened even further the enmity with Talbani. Chalabi, 
Ibid. 
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General Samaraee and Talbani nevertheless ignored the U. S. attitude and went ahead 
with their plan. On 4th March 1995, an attack against infantry and motorized Iraqi 
divisions was launched. Iraqi recruits were called upon to defect to the opposition 
side. These calls appealed to their sense of loyalty to the homeland and their yearning 
to live in a free Iraq, away from Saddam Hussein's dictatorship. 
Saddam Hussein was apparently fully aware of the rift between the PUK and KDP, 
and the division within the Iraqi movement in general. He had "infiltrated the INC 
military wing to which his Intelligence service had sent large numbers". "9 Another 
factor which rendered the military project ineffective was the refusal of Ayyad 
Allawi's party Al-Wifaq Al-Watani, (National Accord), which included many ex- 
Ba'thist officers, to participate in the project. Furthermore, Allawi issued a statement 
in which he condemned the military move, considering it an ill-advised escapade 
aimed at realizing personal ambitions rather than national objectives and patriotic 
ideals. 650 
A week after the eruption of fighting, Barzani tried to make use of Talbani's 
preoccupation with the attacks on Saddam Hussein's forces and sought to retake Arbil 
from Talbani's forces, which immediately withdrew from the battlefront to repel 
Barzani's forces. They succeeded in their mission and on 27th March Barzani ordered 
his fighters to retreat. But this was achieved at the expense of the joint offensive 
which was underway against Saddam Hussein., which collapsed totally. 
6'"Ibid. 
''Interview with Hoshiar Zibari in London on 15th January 2000. 
6491bid 
65ojnterview with Salah A1-Shaikhli in London on 5`h October 1999. 
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During the months which followed the failed attack, INC's relations with Masoud 
Barzani deteriorated. Once again, the INC became the victim of the bloody rivalry 
between Barzani and Talbani. The project to unseat Saddam Hussein was therefore 
put on hold between May 1995 and August 1996, when Barzani colluded with his 
erstwhile enemy, Saddam Hussein and succeeded in evicting Talbani's fighters from 
Arbil. Justifying this rather desperate move, Barzani claimed that his action was 
necessary "to prevent Iraqi territorial integrity being threatened by Iran", which he 
had accused of supporting Talbani. 651 
With the storming of Arbil by Saddam Hussein `s forces, the INC lost its beach-head 
on Iraqi soil. Upon conquering the province, Saddam Hussein's troops immediately 
targeted the -INC headquarters in Salah Al-Din and other offices in Arbil. INC 
personnel, collaborators and even some sympathizers were summarily executed. 
Some were taken captive to Baghdad for interrogation. 652 The impact of the invasion 
was a devastating blow to the INC, militarily, politically and psychologically. Besides 
losing many men and equipment, it lost its credibility as a fighting force. Most 
importantly, the INC lost its greatest source of pride, the much flaunted home base, 
from which it had hoped to start the great march towards Baghdad. 
Non-INC opposition Groups 
The groups and parties which did not join the INC, which were based either in 
Damascus, Tehran or London, did not offer any specific political project to rival that 
of the INC. They did however issue a number of statements, every now and then, in 
631Gunterm Kurdish Predicament, pp. 85-86. 
652ß Shihab, "Qissat Hazimat Al-Ci Ay Ay Fi Al-Iraq". (The CIA Defeat in Iraq, AI-Wasat, vol 242, 
September 1996, pp. 10-15. 
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which they criticized INC tactics and orientations. They held firmly to their 
suspicions and criticism of the INC as embodying an American project. 
Amidst an atmosphere of accusations and counter accusations, a new movement was 
born: the Constitutional Monarchy Movement. This movement was founded in 
London on 20th June 1993 by Sharef Ali Bin AiHussein, cousin to the last monarch 
of Iraq, the late King of Iraq Faisal II. Sharef Ali, the only survivor of the Iraqi royal 
family was born in Baghdad in 1956 and had until the Salah Al-Din Conference, 
remained aloof from partisan Iraqi politics, never favouring one group or movement 
over any other. He had nevertheless kept an eye on events in Iraq while maintaining 
his unswerving, if somewhat muted opposition to all republican regimes in Baghdad. 
In launching his movement, Sharef All sought to respond to what he considered a 
political vacuum that could only be filled by his monarchist project. He embarked 
upon a policy, the main objective of which was to establish good relations with all 
colours of the political spectrum in the Iraqi opposition. In 1995, the Movement 
opened a chapter in the Kurdish town of Arbil, where it started a radio station to 
further its cause among the Iraqis who had lost touch with the monarchy since July 
1958. The station, like that of the INC, was razed to the ground by Saddam Hussein's 
653 troops when they took the city of Arbil in August 1996. 
Sharef Ali argued that a military coup or indeed any change of government might 
bring with it a new dictatorship. This might entail endless reprisals and account 
settlements, which might develop along the same lines as in Afghanistan, Lebanon 
and Yugoslavia, possibly leading to the involvement of regional and foreign powers. 
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The first manifesto published by the Movement dwelt on the history of republican 
Iraq which 
Proved that the pluralist democratic republican regime called for by 
some Iraqi political forces is unfortunately no more than a romantic 
slogan aimed at achieving temporary gains of no real substance. The 
majority of the republics in the Middle East have brought about 
successively greater states of chaos, and degenerated into individual or 
single-party dictatorships. They have also hindered the stability of their 
respective societies while partisan military and state security forces 
have worked to guarantee the re-election of their "nominated leader", 
thus ensuring that he remains in power for life. While it is true that 
ethical competition in the political arena is not only a necessity but one 
of the most important pillars of democracy, the reality of our society is 
that competition for the top position has reached a highly dangerous 
pitch, often subjecting our homeland to the most lethal perils and 
bloody conflicts. For this, all our people have had to pay the price.... 
[Our Movement] believes that free parliamentary elections should be 
conducted in an atmosphere of stability and continuity, and that the 
Head of State should remain above factional disputes and political 
maneuvering. As a guarantor of the constitution, he would be entrusted 
with implementing its precepts and defending the rights of all the 
people and their representatives in a democratically elected 
assembly. 654 
Iraqi Opposition and State Responses 
Throughout the period following the invasion of Kuwait, Baghdad viewed the anti- 
regime activities with a mixture of anxiety, contempt, derision and sometimes even 
disregarded them. On the one hand, the Baghdad government feared that the efforts 
exerted by the opposition might succeed, which would mean the end of the regime 
and perhaps even the disintegration of the state. On the other hand, it was relieved by 
the apparent ineffectiveness and lack of unity of its opposition adversaries. The 
regime, however, never abandoned its unrelenting multi-fronted assault against the 
653Shaan Al-Ajeeli, Al-Kharita AI-Siyasiya Lil-Mu'aradha AI-Iraqiya (Political Map of Iraqi 
opposition) (London: Dar AI-Hikma, 2000), p. 314 
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opposition, including occasional use of the "carrot and stick" policy in its dealings 
with the issue. 
On the security level, the regime was able to destroy and prevent the opposition from 
establishing any effective political, military or even terrorist bases inside the areas 
under the central government control. This was achieved through mobilisation of its 
formidable security forces to combat and curtail, with extreme brutality, the 
clandestine activities of different opposition groups. The regime thought nothing of 
despatching hit groups under diplomatic cover to eliminate any opposition element it 
deemed dangerous. The murder in Beirut of the dissident tribal leader, Sheikh Talib 
Al-Suhail is a case in point. He was gunned down at his home in Lebanon on 12`s 
April 1994 by the Iraqi "consul", and his assistant who were later arrested at Beirut 
Airport by the Lebanese security forces as they were boarding a departing Jordanian 
plane. 655 
On the propaganda level, the state owned and controlled media were fully utilized to 
portray the opposition movement as a tool in the hands of regional enemies and 
imperialist powers, bent on dissecting the country in order to control it and usurp its 
wealth. The Baghdad regime also aimed at tarnishing the image of the opposition 
leadership and driving a wedge between the various groups. One such technique 
involved threats and intimidation by declaring that opposition figures were legitimate 
targets for elimination. Another was ridiculing them as agents of Iraq's enemies and 
 656 as "rabble, dwarfs, traitors and strays . 
654Constftutional Monarchy Movement Manifesto dated 20th June 1993. 
655 Interview with Al-Suhail's daughter, Saffia Al-Suhail in London on 2"d September 2000. 
656 MECS 1992, p. 482. 
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Another technique employed by the regime was use of material and political rewards, 
"guarantees" of amnesty, immunity from prosection as well as legal protection. This 
technique, notoriously used to lure Saddam Hussein's two sons-in-law who had 
defected to Jordan, was often resorted to in the hope of tempting selected opposition 
leaders whose return to Saddam Hussein's fold might then be fully exploited. 
According to ex-Iraqi Military Intelligence General wafiq Al-Samarraee, this 
technique was master minded by Saddam Hussein's own half-brother Barzan Al- 
Tikriti who served as Iraq's ambassador to the UN Geneva Headquarters. "From 1993 
onwards, Barzani tried, with little success, to pursue a number of opposition activists 
in order to convince them to visit Baghdad and engage in a dialogue with the regime's 
leadership". 657 
The INC Assessed 
Despite the withdrawals, accusations and bitter attacks to which it was subjected, the 
INC managed to lead the opposition for a number of years, establishing new contacts 
with a number of political groupings and exploiting the division and rifts within 
others. Immediately after the Vienna Conference, the international political climate 
helped INC's Executive Council President Ahmad Chalabi to transform the cause of 
Iraqi opposition from an Arab or, at best, regional question into an international one. 
Prior to the establishment of the INC, Iraqi opposition groups did not have any allies 
beyond the Arab land or Middle East. True, hundreds, if not thousands of Iraqi 
dissidents had been forced to live in exile across Europe and the United States. These, 
however, did not speak with one voice against the regime of Saddam Hussein. Nor 
657 Interview with Wafiq A1-Samamaei in London on 5th April 1999. 
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did they have any political umbrella under which they could operate, elicit support 
from host countries or engage in any form of cooperation with governmental or non- 
governmental organizations of the international community. Chalabi's outward- 
looking orientation was soon to lead to the emergence of new currents and trends, 
which were hitherto unknown in Iraqi opposition work. 
It was however quite clear from the beginning that the international support obtained 
by Ahmad Chalabi came mainly from the United States. Washington's support of 
Ahmad Chalabi was, however, not entirely altruistic. In providing him with generous 
support, both on the financial, political and media levels, the United States was 
following its own agenda. Among other things, it sought to contain the opposition 
movement and plan its future course and use it as a tool to apply pressure on the 
regime in Baghdad. . 
The INC was, to a certain degree, successful in forging channels with the U. S. and 
Europe, and in establishing a network of influential contacts with policy makers and 
media centres in the West, particularly in the United States and Britain, as well as 
with some Arab countries. This ensured that INC's delegates were well received by 
high-ranking officials, especially in the countries which could have impact on the 
Iraqi question. An indication of the great importance, which the INC attached to the 
media, may be seen in the fact that the INC had a large press office in London 
operated by a number of foreign media experts and supervised by Ahmad Chalabi 
himself. 
Through its sympathizers inside Iraq, the INC built a web of contacts, which managcd 
to infiltrate a number of Iraqi establishments. From these contacts, valuable and 
sensitive information was gathered. Some of the information received was of 
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exceptional value as it diagnosed the weak points of the Baghdad regime. The INC 
also succeeded in collecting evidence against the practices of President Saddam 
Hussein and a number of his lieutenants. With the assistance of the INC, Indict658 has 
already compiled files on high-ranking officials. This is a first step to starting legal 
proceedings against those accused of committing war crimes and genocide. 
These achievements would not have been possible had the INC not received 
substantial political and financial support. What further augmented the INC's success 
was the dismal failure of rival opposition groups to initiate any project similar to that 
of the INC. Another factor which went to strengthen the position of the INC was the 
immense support it continued to receive from the Kurdish front. Far from being 
altruistic, this support however was self-serving and a way of repaying the INC for 
endorsing the federal solution, which the Kurds have been calling for as a way of 
settling their age-old grievances against successive Baghdad regimes. 
However, the INC had its own drawbacks and weaknesses, some of which were quite 
serious. The very fact that the INC was seen to be operating under American wings 
was quite detrimental in that it heightened its political isolation, nationally, regionally 
and, towards the late nineties, internationally. Initial exaggeration, by the U. S., of the 
INC's power and its overestimation of its capabilities had its negative impact on the 
INC, as well as on Washington itself. The United States was blamed not only for the 
shortcomings of the INC but also for the proverbial failure of the whole opposition 
movement to unite in the struggle to unseat the regime of Saddam Hussein. 
658 An international human rights organization which takes upon itself the task of chasing those 
suspected of committing crimes against humanity. 
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The INC leadership included many people who were either little known politically 
or who were out of touch with Iraq. Others were of Persian extraction. In a state 
which raised its children on staunch Arab nationalism, through schools, the media as 
well as all forms of visual and performing arts, politicians of non-Arab descent were 
bound to be perceived as suspect by wide segments of Iraqi society. This problem 
was further confounded by strong objections, reiterated even among Iraqi opposition 
itself, to some of INC's unpopular views and political orientation. The fact that the 
INC was associated with the U. S. A did not help INC's image or impact on the 
national scene. 
Republican Iraq has always been an open field for anti-American propaganda. It 
would probably take long years before the perception of the U. S. A. as an enemy to 
Arab and Iraqi interests could be eradicated from the national consciousness of the 
Iraqis. Quite damaging, too, was the perception, especially among the Sunni Arabs, 
that the INC was basically an alliance between the Kurds and Shi'as, directed mainly 
towards the Sunnis, whom the INC sought to remove from the power which they 
had traditionally held since the birth of the nation after World War I. 
What weakened the INC even further was its almost total dependence on U. S. 
support. Its disregard of the interests and concerns of regional powers and 
its direct 
association with the CIA made regional powers 
feel quite suspicious and uneasy. On 
the other hand, the U. S financial support divided, rather than united, the groups and 
personalities operating under INC's umbrella, especially after 
it was revealed that 
contrary to Chalabi's assertions, INC's funds came 
from American sources, not 
"purely Iraqi sources". 
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A more serious charge against the INC is the fact that it failed to honour its own 
political programme and action plan. Despite the fact that it kept talking about the 
integrity of Iraqi soil, its policies were increasingly perceived by Sunnis as sectarian, 
as it concentrated mainly on advancing the cause of the Kurds and the Shi'as, 
highlighting their suffering at the hands of the regime. Its enthusiasm for federalism 
was considered by many to be a first step towards the partitioning of the country. On 
top of this, its recognition of the post-Gulf War demarcation lines between Iraq and 
Kuwait led to the loss of many friends and supporters, augmenting, at the same time, 
its opponents and adversaries. 
Abandoning the spirit of teamwork, the INC was, as it were, entirely taken over by 
its Executive president, Chalabi, who transformed some of the opposition 
representatives into employees working for him in return for monthly pay. The 
secretive maneuvering of Chalabi, who "had little authority over Iraqis either inside 
or outside the country"659' his high-handedness and devious attempts at exploiting 
differences among rival as well as allied opposition groups and personalities, 
weakened the INC's standing in the eyes of most Iraqis to whom he failed tö project 
a role model. Chalabi's defiance and secrecy, furthermore, not only estranged a 
number of political groupings but also made personal enemies of a host of Iraqi 
opposition leaders. 
Eruption of the Kurdish-Kurdish conflict paralyzed not only the INC but also other 
Iraqi opposition groups which fell prey to fiustration and despair as the conflict, 
among other things, shifted the focus from toppling the regime of Saddam Hussein 
659 Charles Tripp, A History oflraq (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 275. 
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to finding ways to contain intra-Kurdish conflicts. INC's stance on this issue was 
especially harmful. Its tilt towards one of the warring parties had an immense 
negative impact on its credibility as an umbrella for all Iraqi patriots. It hardly needs 
to be pointed out it also undermined its own position in Kurdistan, its operational 
base. 
Another factor which contributed INC's failure to achieve its objectives was the 
speed with which the military wing was created. It is now known that a number of 
Saddam Hussein's agents had managed to infiltrate the INC's striking arm. INC's 
dilemma was thus compounded, as it had originally attracted a number of groups 
an d individuals who had either been indecisive about taking a firm stand against the 
regime of Saddam Hussein, or who were still in contact with Baghdad. 
The damaging impact of the INC's adoption of, and participation in, joint military 
operations with the CIA on Iraqi soil had an immense negative impact on the INC's 
reputation and role in the national struggle. Coupled with this reliance on the United 
States was the lack of enthusiasm and self-sacrifice on the part of those in charge of 
the INC. The half-hearted commitment to the cause of struggle against the Baghdad 
regime soon led to the disintegration of the INC and the multiplication of 
resignations and withdrawals from its various organs and committees. 
Chalabi's attempt to use the Shi'a card to further his own agenda failed and 
contributed to the gradual demise of the INC. His successive visits to Tehran, during 
the early months of the INC, deepened the perception that he was a sectarian Shia 
who was not in a position to lead the national opposition. In his advancement of 
Shi'a cleric Muhammad Bahr Al-Uloum to a leading position within the INC, 
Chalabi was hoping to consolidate his Shi'a power base. His manoeuvre however 
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backfired when the venerable cleric withdrew from the INC in protest, among other 
things, against Chalabi's strategies and method of administering the affairs of the 
Council. The negative position adopted by the Da'wah Party towards the INC 
further weakened Chalabi's organisation, as this party enjoyed some popularity 
among the Shi'as and is at the forefront of the Islamic parties which had executed 
several successful operations against the regime of Saddam Hussein. On the other 
hand, the Proportion war, which the Shia groupings waged against other political 
parties shook the INC and undermined its credibility. 
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Conclusion 
The Iraqi society, like those of many developing countries in the Middle East, Africa 
and Latin America, has had little or no practical acquaintance with democracy. 
Despite the fact that Iraq was one of the earliest Arab states to gain independence, no 
democratic tradition ever evolved to match the advances achieved in the economic, 
cultural and scientific fields. This situation was the outcome of a confluence of a 
number of international, regional and domestic factors, which shaped political life in 
Iraq. Chief among these was the special social and political circumstances, which 
had prevailed in the country since the creation of the modem state following the 
conference of San Remo in April 1920. This absence of democratic practices greatly 
affected the Iraqi opposition, which came to be viewed with suspicion and so was 
severely punished. 
During the monarchist period (1921-1958), the opposition parties fell mainly into 
two categories: the elite groupings which were mostly licensed institutions, operating 
openly and occasionally participating in government. These parties did not seek to 
topple the regime, but called for introducing economic, political or social reform. 
Lacking any real popular base, these parties normally revolved round the leader of 
the group or round a few well known political figures. The Istlglal (Independence) 
and Al-Watani Al-Dimocrati (the National Democratic) parties afford the best 
example of these institutions. 
The second category was made up of the ideological parties with large popular 
following. Their political work cut across all social strata and was spread over an 
intricate organisational structure throughout the country. These clandestine and 
339 
persecuted parties, which succeeded in penetrating the government machinery, 
including the armed forces, aimed at effecting political change through toppling the 
regime and seizing power. The Communist and Ba'th parties best illustrate this 
category. 
These two categories however did not play a direct role in the July 1958 Revolution 
which ended the monarchy in Iraq. The drastic political change was effected at the 
hands of certain elements in the armed forces under the leadership of the Free 
Officers Movement. Despite contacts made by this movement with other opposition 
parties in Iraq, no co-ordination or organisational ties can be said to have existed 
between the military and the elite or ideological parties. The Free Officers 
Movement, however, did include a number of sympathizers with the main objectives 
of the ideological parties. It also included others who held leaders of the elite parties 
in great esteem. 
Following establishment of the republic in July 1958, Iraqi opposition underwent a 
fundamental change. The elite parties soon lost their legitimacy and disappeared 
from the scene. On the other hand, the role played by the ideological parties, whether 
in opposition or as government allies, dramatically increased. Between 1958 and 
1961 the Communist Party was quite instrumental in supporting the regime of 
General Qassiirn while the Ba'th Party and Arab nationalists spearheaded the 
opposition which succeeded in ending the First Republic on 8th February 1963. 
As a reaction to the growth of secular and leftist parties, this period also witnessed 
the emergence of new Islamic groupings, both Sunni and Shi'a, dcdicatcd to 
counterbalancing the activities of the secularists, especially the Communists, who 
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allied themselves with General Qassim. This development can be seen in the 
emergence of the Islamic Tahrir (Liberation) and the Islamic Da'wah (Call) parties. 
February 1963 marks an important development in the history if Iraqi opposition. For 
the first time in modern Iraq, an opposition ideological party, the Arab Ba'th 
Socialist Party, succeeded in ousting the military government which had been in 
power for almost five years. The Ba'thists, who were evicted from power in 
November of the same year, following bitter rivalries and division within themselves 
on the one hand, and between them and other powers in Iraq, were to make another 
successful come back in July 1968. 
This Ba'thist experience is highly significant in that it sheds ample light on the 
political climate in Iraq. The Ba'th party lost control of the government when its 
military officers who had seized power in the name of the Ba'th deserted the party. 
Failure of the first Ba'thist regime proved that army officers or the military cadres 
inside the Ba'th Party or what is known as "Party Generals" were instrumental not 
only in the actual process of power seizure, but also in the more arduous task of 
maintaining power. Instead of adopting democratic means, mass demonstrations or 
popular uprisings, the Ba'thists resorted to their military wing and entrusted it with 
the task of wresting power from General Qassim in February 1963, and again from 
General Aref in July 1968. 
The Ba'thist success in hanging on to power since 1968 has mainly been due to its 
neutralisation and extermination of all parties opposed to their rule. All forms of 
political and physical liquidation inside and outside Iraq were used against their 
adversaries. The Ba'thist absolute monopoly of power illustrates the incapability of 
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the political regime to co-exist with the phenomenon of opposition however weak or 
ineffectual it may be. It further illustrates the fact that the strength and steadfastness 
of any regime in Iraq lies in its ability to neutralise and eradicate all opposition 
forces. 
During the sixties and seventies, the Communist Party, the only political organisation 
capable of rivalling the Ba'thists in the struggle for power, failed to effect any 
change of government, but not because they lacked popular support. In fact, they had 
attracted many supporters and sympathisers even from among the rank and file of the 
armed forces. Their main problem, however, was the fact that they lacked the support 
of high ranking officers and, unlike the Ba'thists and Arab nationalists, had no "Party 
generals" the one essential vehicle, which could have transported them to power. The 
Communist impact on the Iraqi political scene receded dramatically with the demise, 
during the 1990's, of their main supporter, the USSR. 
The invasion of Kuwait which coincided with the advent of what came to be known 
as the "new world order", had an immediate impact on international attitudes towards 
the Iraqi opposition. Before the Kuwait crisis, the Iraqi opposition had no overt links 
with the West which, for a number of reasons, was quite reluctant to lend real support 
to the political forces hostile to the regime of Saddam Hussein. The separatist 
aspirations of the Kurdish movement were and still are seen as a major threat to 
territorial integrity of a number of regional countries, particularly Turkey, long 
considered a U. S. ally. Furthermore, Kurdish tics with Syria and Iran antagonised the 
West. On the other hand, Shia fundamentalism was almost universally seen as an 
ideological enemy of the West, and the ultimate objective of establishing an Iranian 
style Islamic fundamentalist revolutionary regime in Iraq had no appeal to Western 
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political sensibilities. Iraqi leftists and Arab nationalists were not in a better position. 
There was deep and mutual mistrust between the West and these opposition groups, 
many of which were based, sponsored and backed by Damascus. The political 
ideologies and objectives adopted and preached by these groups, especially with 
regard to Israel, socialism and imperialism, run counter to the interests of the West. 
The invasion of Kuwait marked a dramatic shift in the attitude of the West towards 
Iraqi opposition in that it suddenly provided a common denominator opposing the 
policies of Saddam Hussein. The universal condemnation of the aggression provided 
the opposition forces with a golden opportunity to exploit Saddam Hussein's 
misadventure. The invasion also impacted on the intra-opposition relations. Serious 
attempts were, for the first time, made to patch up, at least temporarily, the 
differences between various groups seeking to topple the Ba'thist regime in Baghdad. 
Encouraged by what seemed at the time as the imminent fall of the Ba'thist regime, 
both Syria and Iran, pushed the opposition to hold a general conference with a view to 
forming a united front. But the deep ideological and strategic differences between the 
opposition groups made the task difficult to achieve. 
The first attempt at creating an umbrella organisation resulted in the birth of the Joint 
Action Committee, which proved too fragile to withstand the turbulence of Iraqi 
politics. The newly created Committee failed to present a united front because, among 
other things, of the arrogance of the Islamic bloc, which looked down with disdain 
upon the other political groupings and whose leadership insisted it was capable, on its 
own, of leading the Iraqi masses to victory over Saddam Hussein. The JAC was 
further weakened by regional involvement in the affairs of Iraqi opposition. The 
hegemony of Syria and Iran over many of the opposition groups based in their 
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territories practically paralysed the opposition and removed its independence of 
action. In accepting to operate under the wings of Damascus or Tehran, many 
opposition groups subjected their activities to political considerations directly related 
to the interests of the host countries, which did not allow any of its protege groupings 
to cross the limits set for them, effectively practicing active censorship and the right 
of veto on the activities of the protege groups. 
Despite the failure of the JAC's Beirut Conference to bridge the gaps between rival 
opposition groups, intensive attempts continued in this direction. The second part of 
1992 witnessed two important initiatives, which resulted in the holding of two 
important opposition gatherings: the first in Vienna; the second on Iraqi soil in Salah 
Al-Din. The outcome of these gatherings, which were attended by a wide section of 
the Iraqi opposition, was the creation of a new organisational structure, the Iraqi 
National Congress (INC). But this newly created umbrella organisation, unlike the 
Iranian experience during 1979, which had produced a unified opposition leadership 
embodied in Khomeini who had co-ordinated domestic and exile opposition, did not 
have a unified command or an individual leader with enough popularity, charisma or 
gravitas to guide the opposition. Ahmad Chalabi, the Western-educated Shia 
millionaire was practically not known in the political arena before the Vienna 
Conference, which catapulted him to notoriety. Thus, two whole years of 
consultations, deliberations and meetings failed to produce an individual with enough 
legitimacy and authority to fill the leadership vacuum. 
The Vienna and Salah Al-Din conferences, like the Beirut gathering, which was held 
in the aftermath of Saddam Hussein's defeat and ejection from Kuwait, sought to find 
a common ground on which a minimum agreement between the rival opposition 
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parties could be reached. However, the experience of the two years after the Kuwait 
crisis witnessed unprecedented intense, inner rebellions, hostilities, dissensions, 
frictions and plots, which showed that each group had placed its own agenda and 
sectarian, nationalist or regional interests above the higher Iraqi national interests. 
The Vienna and Salah Al-Din conferences also sought to gain international 
recognition for the opposition movement and to steer the movement away from the 
conflicting interests of regional powers, while at the same time seeking political and 
material support from regional countries such as Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia and 
Turkey. The desire to project an image of independence was reflected in the choice of 
Vienna and Salah Al-Din as venues for the two conferences. The organisers of the 
two gatherings had hoped that geographical neutrality of the conference venue would 
reflect the free will and national independence of the Iraqi opposition movement. 
Despite the rhetoric of the press releases and communiques, the Vienna and Salah A]. 
Din conferences were held against a background of widespread disappointment and 
despondence that no single political party, or even the whole opposition, which 
claimed to have a large following inside Iraq, can topple or even shake the regime of 
Saddam Hussein. Although the international coalition had meted out extremely 
painful blows to the regime, the opposition did practically nothing to indicate that it 
could threaten the central government authority or influence the man in the street who 
had grown sceptical about the effectiveness of the opposition. No exile political 
organisation succeeded in exploiting the weaknesses of the regime during the Gulf 
War and in the period immediately after. This failure deprived all opposition parties 
of the opportunity to prove their legitimacy and credibility within the framework of 
the opposition itself and before the Iraqi people. 
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With the possible exception of the Tehran-based Supreme Council of the Islamic 
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) which deployed its recruits to take part in the March 1991 
Intifada, all other opposition groups adopted a wait-and-see attitude towards the 
sudden popular surge against the Baghdad regime. Instead of devising ways to help 
those who were willing to pay with their lives for their salvation from the regime of 
Saddam Hussein, the opportunistic and sel-serving opposition parties were busy 
scheming how best to exploit the Intifada and direct its outcome to further their own 
partisan cause. It is ironic that the Uprising, which should have unified all forces 
endeavouring to unseat Saddam Hussein, should itself divide them and sow even 
more seeds of suspicion and recrimination among them. 
The total absence of any leadership or co-ordination among the rebelling provinces 
was perhaps the most damaging shortcoming. In a way, the Intifada embodied the 
same shortcomings and weaknesses, which 
have plagued the Iraqi opposition 
movement in general. Inexperienced young men who had no military training took 
charge of a great task which even professional soldiers would find difficult to 
achieve. 
The Intifada came as a response to the oppressive policies of the Ba'thist regime. 
There were many reasons behind the its failure to produce the desired outcome. 
Among other things, the Iran-based Islamist Shi'a opposition, which attempted to 
monopolise the glory and fruits of the uprising even before any result was achieved, 
imbued the popular uprising with an unmistakable sectarian colour. This immediately 
estranged many Sunnis who would otherwise have extended a much-needed helping 
hand. The wild expectation that foreign succour was forthcoming meted out a severe 
psychological blow to the Intifada whose activists were left on their own to right 
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against a formidable vengeful force. 
Prior to the establishment of the INC, Iraqi opposition groups, had very little, if any, 
relations beyond the region. Chalabi's outward-looking orientation, however, was 
soon to lead to the emergence of new currents and trends, which were hitherto 
unknown in Iraqi opposition work. From the beginning, it was clear that international 
support came mainly from the United States. Washington's support of Ahmad Chalabi 
was however quite opportunistic. In providing generous support, both on financial, 
political and media levels, the U. S. was following its own agenda. Among other 
things, it sought to contain the opposition movement, plan its future and use it as a 
tool to apply pressure on the regime of Saddam Hussein. 
The INC also had its own drawbacks and weaknesses, some of which were quite 
serious. The very fact that the INC was seen to be operating in close association with 
the United States was quite detrimental in that it heightened its isolation. The U. S. 's 
initial exaggeration of the INC's power and overestimation of its capabilities had its 
negative impact on the INC, as well as on Washington itself. Furthermore, the fact 
that the INC was associated with the U. S. A, especially its its collaboration with the 
CIA, undermined its standing on the national and regional Arab scene. 
The secretive manoeuvring of Chalabi, his negative image as a dishonest 
businessman, his high-handedness and devious attempts at exploiting dif ercnccs 
among rival as well as allied opposition groups and personalities, weakened the 
INC's standing in the eyes of most Iraqis to whom Chalabi failed to project a role 
model. Chalabi's manipulatve policies not only estranged a number of political 
groupings but also made personal enemies of a host of Iraqi opposition leaders. But 
the most serious flaw, however, in the INC was its lack of a clear vision of Iraq's 
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future on the one hand, and the deep differences in strategies adopted by rival 
groups to effect political change in the country. 
The Constitutional Monarchists who continually sing the praises of the royal regime 
are, in fact, out of tune with the times and are trying to re-impose a political system 
with which the present generation does not identify, as the royal regime was ended 
more than forty-two years ago. Sharef Ali Bin Hussein, who is seeking restoration of 
the throne does not possess the personal qualities necessary for attracting loyal 
followers in a country he has never set foot in, since he fled Baghdad, as an infant, 
in 1958, or among a people who had never heard of him before the launch of his 
movement in 1992. The image of Monarchist Iraq as a feudal, corrupt and 
uncritically pro-Western regime is too deeply etched in the national consciousness 
of the Iraqis to be eradicated by an untested, little known politician, whose claim to 
the throne rests solely on the fact that he is a maternal cousin of the last monarch. 
The Communists and leftists, on the other hand, who were dreaming of a flourishing 
socialist system are still reminiscing about a past, which is impossible to resuscitate. 
The collapse of the USSR meant the loss of the Iraqi Communists' lifeline. With the 
disintegration of their party organisation and the resultant recriminations, resentments 
and internal division, their impact on Iraqi opposition has dwindled dramatically. 
Before the conference of Salah Al-Din the Communists were one of the five 
constituents of the Joint Action Committee. and were treated as one of the major 
political currents. One result of the Communist decline can be seen in the fact that 
several of its leading members abandoned the socialist ideal and started advocating 
democracy and world peace. Many of the Union of Iraqi Democrats and the Iraqi 
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Human Rights Organisation are ex-Communists. The party now consists mainly of 
old die-hard cadres with an ever decreasing following. 
As for the Shi'a Islamists who continue to dream of a revolutionary republic in 
Mesopotamia, the experience of the post Gulf War era showed that they have not 
been able to present a united front. Nor did they have a co-ordinated strategy as to 
how to topple the regime of Saddam Hussein. The Da "wah Party, for example, has 
adopted a four-stage strategy to achieve its objective of seizing power. But 
Munadhama AI Amal Al-Islami (Islamic Action Organisation) seeks to achieve the 
same objective through armed struggle, which it believes should constitute the only 
stage of ridding Iraq of its present rulers. SCIRI, on the other hand, has based its 
strategy on the leader as symbol, guiding popular resistance to effect political change. 
It is quite noticeable that, of all opposition formations, Arab Sunni opposition groups 
are almost non-existent. Apart from the wall of distrust, which stands in the way of 
Sunni cooperation with the Shi'a opposition, there are numerically, considerably 
fewer Sunni Arab Iraqis living abroad. Whatever may be said of the regime's 
repression of the Shi'a in Iraq, Saddam Hussein feels that the Sunnis could constitute 
a decidedly more real threat to his rule, as they occupy the highest and most sensitive 
posts in the military establishment, security and intelligence apparatus as well as the 
government machinery. Any hesitation to show total allegiance to the regime is more 
severely punished in the case of Sunnis than otherwise. From the Sunni regime's point 
of view, this constitutes not just an ordinary crime, but high treason. Fear of brutal 
retaliation, even against sixth-degree relatives, has therefore constrained them to be 
fully engaged in opposition activities. 
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All opposition umbrella organisations looking to foreign powers for support in the 
effort to topple Saddam Hussein have failed to deliver. The Iran-based Shia Islamists, 
for example, who were operating under the SCIRI banner failed to unite or coordinate 
their activities. Wide differences over strategic narratives transformed SCIRI into just 
another group operating alongside a multitude of other opposition parties. The 
Damascus-based JAC also failed to provide a united front. Differences over 
proportions and sectarian representation meted out a deadly blow to what had earlier 
been hoped to be a canopy encompassing all opposition groupings. Nor has the INC, 
which has unashamedly been working closely with the U. S. succeeded in bringing the 
divided Iraqi opposition together back to the fold. On the other hand, the Kurdish 
movement did not fare any better. The Kurds had pinned high hopes on the Arbil- 
based parliament, elected in 1992. These hopes were soon dashed when hostilities 
broke out between Barzani and Talbani over leadership of the Iraqi Kurds. 
Like the very party which the opposition movement has been endeavouring to remove 
from government for so long, most opposition groupings are in efrect intolerant and 
exclusive, on the sectarian, religious and ethnic levels with widely different narratives 
and visions of the future. Just as the ruling Ba'th Party was not planned to include 
Kurds or Turcomans, the Kurdish bloc is exclusively closed to non-Kurds. Shia 
opposition parties, despite assurances to the contrary, are not designed to embrace 
Sunnis or non-Muslims. Unless a broad national programme, open to all Iraqis, 
regardless of their religion, race or ethnicity is established, the opposition movement 
will never be able to leave the quagmire of exclusion or make any progress towards 
democratic change in Iraq. 
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Finally, in response to the central question posed at the beginning of the investigation 
as to the reasons for the opposition's failure to topple the regime in Baghdad and 
install a new government capable of taking the country out of its crisis, we might 
point out that there were three major reasons for the lacklustre. The first lies in the 
opposition's own weakness, fragmentation, inner conflicts and its inability to present 
a credible political programme. For the development of opposition movement in the 
post-Gulf era shows that the political groupings were in fact waging two wars on two 
different fronts: one against the regime of Saddam Hussein, the second against each 
other. Squabbles over the proportion of representation and insistence to obtain 
maximum influence was particularly harmful. Most of the political groupings, citing 
their past struggles and sacrifices, wanted to acquire a high proportion of 
representation even before they agreed to attend any conference. 
The complexity of the Kurdish question in Iraq was another reason which further 
complicated the task of forging a united opposition front. While non-Kurdish parties 
struggled to topple the regime of Saddam Hussein and install a more humanitarian 
and democratic regime in Baghdad, the Kurds continue to see the struggle through 
narrow nationalistic eyes. Their aim is not to liberate Iraq from the dictatorship of 
Saddam Hussein, but to achieve some sort of autonomy in the predominantly Kurdish 
areas of Iraq. In furthering their nationalistic cause, the Kurdish movement thinks 
nothing of negotiating with Saddam Hussein or concluding agreements with his 
regime, as it repeatedly did from April 1991 until 1996, when Barzani asked the 
Baghdad regime to back him up against his rival Talbani. Since JAC had no public 
relations philosophy and did not speak with one voice, it failed miserably in 
mobilising the Iraqis, both among ex-patriots and inside Iraq, to rally behind its 
banner and rise against the regime in Baghdad 
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The third reason for the opposition's failure was the success of Saddam Hussein's 
regime in re-grouping its striking forces and restoring sufficient power to prop up the 
Baghdad central government. The regime's characteristic ruthlessness manifested 
itself in the brutal crushing of the March 1991 Intifada and in the mobilization of its 
formidable Security and Mukhabarat (Intelligence) forces to punish, with extreme 
brutality, any clandestine opposition activities, however insignificant or ineffectual 
they might be. What further inspired terror in the hearts of the Iraqis was the 
infiltration by Saddam Hussein's agents of most of the opposition groups. 
The high hopes placed by Arabs as well as other nations on the Iraqi opposition's 
ability to oust the Baghdad regime was quite a miscalculation, based on 
overestimation of the potentials and resources of the Iraqi opposition. Another 
miscalculation was that which underestimated the power and resilience of the regime 
of Saddam Hussein which was capable of surviving against great odds, amidst a sea 
of regional and international hostility. 
The Iraqi opposition movement is both a victim and a culprit. As we have seen 
throughout the previous pages, the movement's evident failure and paralysis can be 
attributed to a variety of factors, some which lay far beyond the movement's contro, 
while others are simply of the movements' own making. However, as pointed out in 
the introduction, there are basically three identifiable factors that played a major role 
which led to state of ineffectiveness that has plagued the Iraqi opposition movement 
from the early days of the Gulf crisis and throughout the post-Gulf War era. 
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The actual dilemma of the opposition movement may be likened to a triangle, with 
three clear dimensions. The first dimension symbolizes the nature of the Iraqi society; 
the second, the nature of the Iraqi state, while the third represent the nature of the 
opposition movement itself. The interplay between these three dimensions or factors 
constitutes the major reason behind the state of powerlessness in the opposition 
movement. 
On the one hand, the nature of the Iraqi society had an unmistakable impact on the 
overall performance of the opposition movement, which failed escape from or rise 
above the inherit problems and division of the society. Indeed, the fragmentation 
crystallized within the opposition groups operating in exile. The ethnic and sectarian 
conflicts appeared just as deep and serious as actual rivalries and conflicts within the 
larger Iraqi society at home. Thus, the Iraqi opposition movement became a mirror's 
image of a disunited society. 
The nature of the Iraqi state in general and the characteristucs of Saddam Hussein's 
regime, in particular, constitute another major factor which had a great negative impact 
on the movement's achievement and political weight. The rigidly centralized structure 
of the state and the highly personalized power within the regime had effectively 
neutralized the ability of the movement to establish itself on Iraqi soil. The Baghdad 
regime proved quite able to deter the opposition from conducting major activities 
inside the country and prevent the people from cooperating with the opposition 
movement in exile. The regime, by effective employment of its formidable repressive 
power, was able to divorce the Iraqi opposition movement in exile from its natural 
constituency inside the country. 
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Finally, the third major factor which contributed. to the evident failure of the 
movement was the permanent state of infighting, disunity, and conflict within the 
movement's different factions. This state of affairs was aggravated by the absense of a 
generally accepted agenda. On the other hand, the regional and international 
opportunistic intervention in the affairs of the opposition had a very negative impact 
on the movement as a whole. Instead of enhancing the mutually suspicious and 
enfeebled oppostion movement, the conflicting interests and objectives of these 
external powers deepened its fragmentation and ineffectiveness. 
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(Washington D. C.: Library of Congress, 1990) modified. 
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Source: Area Handbook Series, Federal Research Division 
(Washington D. C.: Library of Congress, 1990) modified. 






Oil PUK IRAQI BUFFER ZONE 
. KDP '"ý KURDISH CLAIMS 
IMK 
Source: Area Handbook Series, Federal Research Division 
(Washington D. C.: Library of Congress, 1990) modified. 
Appendix II: Modern Iraq: Chronology 
1914 British occupation of Basra 
1917 Baghdad falls 
1920 Iraqis rebel against British rule 
1920 Sharef Faisal Bin Hussein crowned King of Iraq 
1932 Iraq ends British Mandate and joins League of Nations as an independent state 
1933 September: King Faisal dies; King Ghazi succeeds 
1936 First military coup in the middle East backed by General Bakr Sidqi 
1937 August: Bakr Sidqi assassinated; Hikmat Suleiman's goernment overthrown by 
army 
1939 April: King Ghazi killed in car accident; suceeded by infant son, Faisal II, 
under regency of Prince 'Abd Al-Ilah' 
1941 April: military coup d'etat: 'Governemnt of National Defence' formed by 
Rashid'Ali Al-Kailani 
1948 January: new Anglo-Iraqi Treaty signed at Portsmouth; mass protests in 
Baghdad - known as Al-Wathba (the leap); Treaty abandoned 
1953 King Faisal II enthroned King of Iraq 
1956 October: Suez Crisis; riots in major Iraqi towns 
1958 Formation of United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria); Jordan and Iraq form 
Arab Union 
1958 July: military coup d'etat in Baghdad; monarchy ends with declaration of 
Republic 
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1963 February First Ba'thist coup d'etat; Qassim and colleagues killed 
1963 November President 'Abd Al-Salam 'Aref and non-Ba'thist Arab' nationalist 
officers eject Ba'thists from power 
1967 June: war with Israel 
1968 July: Second Ba'thist military military coup. Abd Al-Rahman 'Aref toppled; 
Ahmad Hasan Al-Bakr becomes president 
1975 March: Algiers Agreement between Saddam Hussain and Shah of Iran 
partitions Shat Al-arab waterway andends Iranian assistance to KDP; Kurdish 
revolt collapses 
1978 Saddam deports Khomaini from Iraq 
1979 Saddam Husain sworn in as president; bloody purge of military and Ba'th 
leadership 
1980 Iraq-Iran War breaks out ostensibly over border disputes 
1988 February: Saddam attacks Kurds with chemical weapons in Halabcha 
1988 'August: Iraq-Iran war ends 
1990 August: Iraq invades and annexes Kuwait; UN imposes total trade embargo on 
Iraq 
1991 January: Desert Storm' begins: 
1991 February Iraqi forces ejected from Kuwait 
1991 March armed rebels start the Intifada 14 of the 18 Iraqi provinces fall briefly 
into rebel hands 
1991 End of March, Joint Action Committee (JAC) holds Beirut Conference 




1992 June Iraqi opposition Vienna Conference 
1992 October, Opposition hold national conference on Iraqi soil, Salah Al-Din 
1994 Head of Iraqi Military Intelligence (General Wafiq Al-Samaraee) defects to the 
West 
1995 February: Iraq accepts UN Security Council Resolution 986 (Oil for Food) 
1996 August: Iraqi government forces enter Arbil and help KDP retake the regional 
capital from PUK forces 
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